
是南加州大学政治学与国际关系教授。他曾任兰德公司高级国防分析师,以及美国国防部亚太安全事务助理部长的每日情报简报员。
is a professor of political science and international relations at the University of Southern California. He formerly served as a senior defense analyst at RAND and as the daily intelligence briefer to the assistant secretary of defense for Asian and Pacific security affairs at the U.S. Department of Defense.
缅甸残酷的内战爆发已逾五年,战火依然燃烧不息——然而,美国和东盟却日益倾向于与军政府接触,而非对抗。从军政府领导人转任总统的敏昂莱,几乎未面临任何压力,被迫做出实质性让步以换取国际社会的重新接纳。
More than five years since it started, Myanmar's brutal civil war rages on -- and yet, both the U.S. and ASEAN are increasingly willing to engage the regime rather than confront it. Min Aung Hlaing, the Burmese junta leader turned president, has faced little pressure to make substantial concessions in exchange for renewed international acceptance.
9月15日,特朗普政府官员秘密访问内比都,与敏昂莱及其他高层领导人会晤。当务之急是争取释放被拘留的美国人亚当·卡斯蒂略,他是一名前美国海军陆战队员,曾任缅甸美国商会主席。代表团达成了这一目标,并与官员讨论了打击网络诈骗行动,以及可能获取缅甸庞大稀土矿藏的准入权。
On Sept. 15, Trump administration officials secretly visited Naypyidaw to meet with Min Aung Hlaing and other top leaders. The immediate goal was to secure the release of detained American Adam Castillo, a former U.S. marine and former chairman of the American Chamber of Commerce in Myanmar. The delegation achieved its goal and discussed with officials combating online scam operations, and potentially gaining access to Myanmar's vast rare-earth deposits.
美国的一项新战略旨在达成至少三项商业或投资协议,每项价值超过500万美元;与此同时,缅甸军方支持的政府正鼓励更多美国投资。然而,许多最重要的矿藏位于克钦族领地,该地区由一个与军政府作战的民族武装组织控制。
A new U.S. strategy seeks at least three commercial or investment agreements worth more than $5 million each, while Myanmar's military-backed government is encouraging greater U.S. investment. Yet many of the most important deposits lie in Kachin territory, which is controlled by an ethnic armed group fighting the junta.
与此同时,马来西亚上个月决定接待敏昂莱,可能已为东盟“五点共识”敲响了丧钟。该共识于2021年由东盟通过,呼吁立即停止暴力、各方展开建设性对话、委任东盟特使斡旋谈判、提供人道主义援助,以及特使探访冲突各方当事人。
Meanwhile, Malaysia's decision to host Min Aung Hlaing last month may have sounded the death knell for ASEAN's " Five-Point Consensus " Adopted by the regional bloc in 2021, the agreement called for an immediate cessation of violence, constructive dialogue among all parties, the appointment of an ASEAN special envoy to facilitate negotiations, the provision of humanitarian assistance and a visit by the envoy to meet with all parties involved in the conflict.
作为一个民主国家、军政府的直言不讳的批评者,以及共识早期最坚定的支持者之一,马来西亚仍决定举行会晤,这进一步削弱了东盟的集体立场,而东盟峰会将于下周在马尼拉举行。文莱和印度尼西亚已在寻求与敏昂莱举行峰会,使得这一地区集团长期以来对接触缅甸军方领导人的限制显得越来越难以维持。目前,东盟十个成员国中已有五个与缅甸方面会晤过。
The fact that Malaysia, a democratic nation, outspoken junta critic, and one of the strongest early proponents of the consensus, proceeded with the meeting has further weakened ASEAN's collective position ahead of the ASEAN summit hosted by Manila next week. Brunei and Indonesia are already pursuing summits with Min Aung Hlaing, making the regional bloc's longstanding restrictions on engaging Myanmar's military leadership appear increasingly difficult to sustain. At present, five of ten ASEAN members have already met with Myanmar.
泰国也欢迎华盛顿重启接触。东盟尚未就恢复缅甸的全面政治代表权达成一致,这使得即将在马尼拉举行的讨论成为检验双边接触是否会转化为集体政策转变的重要试金石。
Thailand has also welcomed Washington's renewed outreach. ASEAN has yet to agree on restoring Myanmar's full political representation, making its forthcoming Manila discussions an important test of whether bilateral contacts will translate into a collective policy shift.
特朗普政府与马来西亚接触军政府的一个共同点是,双方都未获得任何实质性的政策回报。当然,卡斯蒂略的获释值得庆贺,但与此同时,华盛顿并未从政权那里获得任何开始缓和战争的更广泛承诺。事实上,特朗普政府是否曾提出这一问题都值得怀疑。
One commonality between the Trump administration and Malaysia's engagement with the junta is that neither received anything of policy substance in return. Of course, Castillo's release should be celebrated, but at the same time, Washington did not obtain any broader commitments from the regime to begin winding down the war. Indeed, it is questionable whether the Trump administration ever raised it at all.
缅甸驻菲律宾国防武官吞吞桑准将(中,身着军装)于周三(10月28日)在菲律宾中部宿务举行的东盟国防部长会议开幕式上。
Brig. Gen. Tun Tun San, Myanmar’s defense attache to the Philippines, center in uniform, at the opening ceremony of the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting, on Wednesday, Oct. 28, in Cebu, central Philippines.
众议院外交委员会民主党首席议员格雷戈里·米克斯谴责特朗普政府的接触“既违背我们的价值观,也违背我们的利益”,指责国务卿马可·鲁比奥使缅甸军方支持的政府获得合法性,却未能执行制裁和支持亲民主倡议。公平地说,特朗普代表团也会见了与政权作战的民主反对派团体和民族武装,但重心无疑在于接触军政府。
Ranking Democrat on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Gregory Meeks, condemned the Trump administration's outreach as "contrary to both our values and our interests," accusing Secretary of State Marco Rubio of legitimizing Myanmar's military-backed government while failing to enforce sanctions and support pro-democracy initiatives. To be fair, the Trump delegation did meet with democratic opposition groups and ethnic armies fighting the regime as well, but the focus was certainly on engaging the junta.
华盛顿也开始重新考虑其部分制裁工具,尽管敏昂莱本人仍处于制裁之下。在缺乏相应和平进展的情况下放松压力,有在军政府改变行为前奖励其行为的风险。
Washington has also begun reconsidering some of its sanctions tools, even as Min Aung Hlaing remains under sanction himself. Any easing of pressure without corresponding progress toward peace risks rewarding the regime before it changes its behavior.
马来西亚的接触同样很少强调内比都遵守“五点共识”。相反,总理安瓦尔·易卜拉欣明显且赤裸裸地专注于推动缅甸国民持续遣返,以减轻吉隆坡接收他们的财政和政治负担。安瓦尔获得了缅甸方面的承诺,同意接收另外3000至4000名被关押在马来西亚移民拘留中心的本国国民,同时承诺扩大双边合作并支持缅甸最终重返东盟。
Malaysia's outreach similarly placed little emphasis on Naypyidaw's adherence to the Five-Point Consensus. Instead, Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim was clearly and nakedly focused on facilitating the continued repatriation of Myanmar nationals, easing the financial and political burdens on Kuala Lumpur of hosting them. Anwar secured a commitment from Myanmar to accept an additional 3,000-4,000 nationals held in Malaysian immigration detention, while pledging to expand bilateral cooperation and support Myanmar's eventual reintegration into ASEAN.
关于后一点,安瓦尔宣称:“我们将尽一切可能确保加强这种合作,并最终在没有偏见的情况下,特别是在东盟背景下,将缅甸作为我们国家大家庭的一部分。”安瓦尔的言辞强调东盟团结,但他的行动却有破坏旨在维护这种团结的共识的风险。
On the latter point, Anwar declared: "We'll do whatever is possible to make sure that we enhance this collaboration and ultimately take Myanmar as part of our community of nations without prejudice and particularly in the context of ASEAN." Anwar's rhetoric emphasizes ASEAN unity, but his actions risk undermining the very consensus meant to preserve it.
仅10月一个月,军政府空袭就造成至少100名平民丧生,而军方声称在11月进一步夺取了抵抗力量的阵地。几乎没有迹象表明重启外交接触让冲突更接近结束。
At least 100 civilians were killed in junta airstrikes in October alone, while the military has claimed further gains against resistance positions in November. There is little indication that renewed diplomatic engagement has brought the conflict closer to an end.
无论是美国还是东盟,最近以马来西亚的形式,他们对缅甸的零成本“复交”有使其军队胆子变大、加强对平民和民族反对武装的攻击、延长冲突的风险,而外交本应寻求通过胡萝卜加大棒的组合来结束冲突。
Whether by the U.S. or ASEAN, most recently in the form of Malaysia, their no-cost rehabilitation of Myanmar risks emboldening its military forces to intensify their attacks against civilian populations and ethnic opposition groups, prolonging a conflict that diplomacy should be seeking to end through a combination of not only carrots but sticks as well.
例如,据报道,该政权轰炸了若开邦皎道一个拥挤的市场,造成至少50名平民死亡,其中包括妇女和儿童。此次袭击发生在特朗普政府高级官员会见敏昂莱不到两周之后,凸显出尽管该政权获得了新的外交接纳,针对平民的暴力仍在持续。
The regime, for example, reportedly bombed a crowded marketplace in Kyauktaw, Rakhine State, killing at least 50 civilians, including women and children. The attack came less than two weeks after senior Trump administration officials met with Min Aung Hlaing, underscoring the continued violence against civilians even as the regime gains renewed diplomatic acceptance.
今后,与缅甸接触的国家必须向该政权施压,迫使其为政治解决做出有意义的让步,并最终结束战争。印度和中国在敏昂莱近期与东盟领导人会晤之前都曾与其接触,同样未能争取到有意义的让步,这进一步使该政权获得合法性,却无助于推进和平前景。几个东盟成员国以及现在的美国似乎也在采取类似做法。
Going forward, countries engaging with Myanmar must press the regime to make meaningful concessions toward a political settlement and ultimately end the war. India and China, which both engaged Min Aung Hlaing before his recent meetings with ASEAN leaders, similarly failed to secure meaningful concessions, further legitimizing the regime without advancing prospects for peace. Several ASEAN members and now the U.S. appear to be following a similar approach.
按逻辑推演,东盟的“五点共识”有可能变得毫无意义——如果它尚未如此的话——而特朗普政府对关键矿产和其他战略利益的追求,可能日益盖过结束战争的努力,进一步侵蚀华盛顿长期以来对民主、法治和人权的承诺。
Taken to its logical conclusion, ASEAN's Five-Point Consensus risks becoming meaningless, if this isn't already the case, while the Trump administration's pursuit of critical minerals and other strategic interests could increasingly overshadow efforts to end the war, further eroding Washington's longstanding commitment to democracy, the rule of law, and human rights.
美国对稀土的兴趣使这一两难更加尖锐。这些矿产为摆脱中国主导的供应链提供了潜在的 strategic 替代选择,但出产这些矿产的地区未必处于军政府控制之下。因此,华盛顿可能发现自己正在向军事领导人授予外交利益。
The U.S. interest in rare earths makes this dilemma even sharper. The minerals offer a potential strategic alternative to China-dominated supply chains, but the areas that produce them are not necessarily under junta control. Washington could therefore find itself conferring diplomatic benefits on military leaders.
如果没有有意义的让步,缅甸的第二次机会可能只是给其军事领导层又一次延长战争的机会。
Without meaningful concessions, Myanmar's second shot may simply give its military leadership another opportunity to prolong the war.