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美国为何压不住中国Why America can’t keep China down

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“对我来说,黄之锋事件掩盖了一个更令人不安的故事。”(弗农·袁/盖蒂图片社)“For me, l'affaire Huang obscures a far more troubling story.” (Vernon Yuen/Getty)

两件事日益明朗。第一,黄仁勋并非因婚外情被迫辞去英伟达首席执行官一职。第二,“美人计”说法是个转移视线的手段。真正的问题现在是:转移的是什么视线?在我看来,黄仁勋事件掩盖了一个规模大得多、更令人担忧的故事,关乎美国全球战略一个核心组成部分的失败。

Two things are increasingly clear. First, Jensen Huang was not forced to quit as chief executive of Nvidia because of an affair. Second, the honeytrap story is a diversion. The real question now is: a diversion from what? For me, l’affaire Huang obscures a far bigger, more troubling story, one encompassing the failure of a central component of US global strategy.

多年来,华盛顿依赖经济施压——从美元制裁到关税——以遏制其地缘政治对手。芯片禁令也是如此:美国长期试图通过限制AI芯片的销售和使用,让中国停留在技术黑暗时代。这项战略不仅已宣告失败,还产生了讽刺性后果,倒逼北京发展自主替代方案。

For years, Washington has relied on economic pressure — from dollar sanctions to tariffs — to keep its geopolitical rivals in line. Semiconductor bans too: the US long sought to keep China in the technological dark ages by restricting the sale and use of AI chips. Not only has this strategy now failed, it’s had the ironic consequence of pushing Beijing to develop its own home-grown alternatives.

黄仁勋事件的关键角色是Megaspeed(新加坡公司),Alice Huang(无亲属关系)曾任该公司高级总监。Megaspeed是一家云计算公司,采购英伟达先进计算设备,再将算力租赁给运行AI系统的客户。换言之,这就是经典的云业务模式。

The key player in the Huang saga is Megaspeed, the Singaporean firm for which Alice Huang (no relation) worked as a senior director. Megaspeed is a cloud-computing company that purchases advanced Nvidia computing equipment, before renting out capacity to clients that operate their AI systems. In other words: the classic cloud-business model.

理论上,美国法律限制中国在新加坡等第三国获取AI基础设施。但认为能同时管控硬件流向和虚拟算力使用的想法简直天真,因为在互联网上隐藏身份易如反掌。毕竟,现代算力大多存在于我们形象称之为的“云端”。我不想过度延伸这个隐喻,但认为任何单一国家能控制这样一个虚拟世界的想法荒谬至极。而且正如彭博社所指出的,英伟达甚至不知道其物理芯片在任何特定时刻身在何处。

In theory, US law restricted Chinese access to AI-infrastructure in third countries such as Singapore. But it’s downright naive to think that you can control both the dispersion of hardware, and the use of virtual capacities, when it’s so easy to hide your identity on the internet. After all, most modern computing power resides in what we figuratively call the cloud. I don’t want to push the metaphor too far, but the idea that any one country could control such a virtual world is absurd. And, as Bloomberg has noted, Nvidia didn’t even know where their physical chips were at any one time.

那么,Megaspeed 是否在芯片走私中发挥了关键作用,或者至少帮助中国公司获取了美国法律本应阻止它们获取的云服务?很可能——但情况比这严重得多。泄露生产该产品的知识,更不用说其更先进的后继产品,远比单纯出售高科技产品更为重要。

So, was Megaspeed instrumental in the smuggling of chips, or anyway helping Chinese companies gain access to cloud services US law should have prevented them from accessing? Probably — but it’s much worse even than that. Far more significant than the mere sale of a high-tech product is leaking the knowledge to produce it, let alone its more-advanced successor.

我们知道,Alice Huang(黄爱丽丝)是一名企业“解决问题的人”。但知识跨国传播并非真正通过她这类人实现。比黄本人更为重要的是,那一代在中国攻读西方理工科博士学位的中国学生。在数学领域,我记得曾有一个整个年级的研究生全部从中国招募而来。考虑到英国大学严重依赖中国学生维持财政平衡,这并不令人惊讶。

We know that Alice Huang was a corporate fixer. But the diffusion of knowledge across borders doesn’t really happen though people like her. Far more significant than Huang herself was the generation of Chinese students laboring away on PhDs in Western science and engineering departments. In mathematics, I recall an instance when an entire year group of graduate students was recruited from China. That’s unsurprising when British universities are critically reliant on Chinese students to remain solvent.

既然我们自己培养了一整代中国科学家和工程师,为什么我们会惊讶于无法压制他们,尤其是当中国本身现在拥有世界上一些顶尖大学时?归根结底,你无法对知识实施出口禁令。看看原子弹吧,这是另一项在美国发明的技术,但很快就被苏联和红色中国掌握了。

Since we ourselves educated an entire generation of Chinese scientists and engineers, why are we surprised that we fail to keep them down, especially when China itself now boasts some of the top universities on Earth? In the end, you can’t place an export ban on knowledge. Just look at the atom bomb, another technology invented in the US, but which was quickly acquired by both the Soviet Union and Red China.

了解我们为何在英伟达问题上走到这一步是值得的。在布什总统任内,美国外交政策由新保守主义者主导。经济大棒虽在,但扮演的是从属角色。然而在贝拉克·奥巴马执政下,美国变得更加依赖其金融武器库。从某种意义上说,这并不令人惊讶。美元是世界主导货币,意味着美国控制着任何美元交易,即使是在国外进行的交易。这使得华盛顿能够实施次级制裁——迫使外国银行遵守美国政策,否则面临被切断美元结算系统的风险,这对大多数银行来说原本是不可想象的。

It’s worth understanding how we got to this point with Nvidia. During the Bush presidency, US foreign policy was run by neoconservatives. Economic cudgels were there, but they played a subordinate role. Under Barack Obama, however, America became much more reliant on its financial arsenal. In a sense, this isn’t surprising. The dollar is the world’s dominant currency, meaning the US has control over any dollar transaction, even those conducted abroad. This made it possible for Washington to place secondary sanctions on countries — forcing foreign banks to comply with US policy or risk being cut off from the dollar, which for most would have been inconceivable.

这里也存在技术层面的论据。直到2022年,仍可读到中国无法生产出与台湾或荷兰同等水平芯片的说法,而这两个都是美国的盟友。这最终导致美国人认为,仅靠法律战就能遏制中国的技术领先地位。2018年,国会通过了《出口管制改革法案》,以强化高科技产品周围的法律框架。一年后,商务部将中国巨头华为列入实体清单,使其在华盛顿的出口管制制度下需要特别许可证。2020年,在特朗普政府时期,美国限制华为获取利用美国技术在海外制造的芯片。

There were technological arguments here too. As late as 2022, one could read that China was failing to produce chips as good as those in Taiwan or the Netherlands, both US allies. That ultimately led the Americans to think they could stifle Chinese technological leadership through lawfare alone. In 2018, Congress duly passed the Export Control Reform Act to strengthen the legal framework around high-tech products. A year later, the Department of Commerce placed Chinese giant Huawei on the list of companies that need a special license under Washington’s export-control regime. In 2020, again under the Trump administration, the US restricted Huawei’s access to chips manufactured abroad using US technology.

但最大的单一举措出现在2022年10月,这次是在拜登政府时期,美国禁止向中国出售高性能半导体。这具体包括先进AI芯片:包括英伟达生产的芯片,禁令还扩大到制造这些芯片的机器。

But the single biggest measure came in October 2022, this time under the Biden administration, which imposed a ban on the sale of high-performance semiconductors to China. That specifically included advanced AI chips: including those produced by Nvidia, with the ban widened to include the machines that build them.

这就是美国法律如何变得具有域外效力——最重要的掌握制造这些机器技术的公司是ASML,总部位于埃因霍温附近。ASML是当今世界最伟大的科技公司之一,它与其欧洲供应链——由高精度光学和机械工程专家组成——共同开辟了一个利润丰厚的利基市场。但由于通过北约依赖美国提供自身安全,荷兰政府选择屈从于美国压力,迫使ASML遵循华盛顿的限制。很快,拜登政府进一步升级,限制美国公民为任何可能生产高科技机器的公司工作,甚至协助受制裁商品流向中国。

That’s how US law became extraterritorial — the most important company that knows how to make these machines is ASML, based near Eindhoven. ASML is one of the greatest tech companies in the world right now, and which, together with its European supply chain of high-precision optical and mechanical engineering specialists, has carved out a profitable niche market. But dependent on the US for its own security through Nato, the Dutch government chose to yield to US pressure to make ASML follow Washington’s restrictions. Soon enough, the Biden administration went even further, restricting US citizens from working for any firm that could produce high-tech machines or even help with the distribution of sanctioned goods to China.

这一政策在特朗普第二任期内得以延续。去年4月,在总统宣布“解放日”关税后不久,其政府实施了新的许可要求,限制英伟达较旧一代芯片H20的销售。这是一款专为中国市场设计的降级处理器,此前并未受限制约束。中国以关税反制及出口管制作为回应后,特朗普撤销了H20禁令,并达成安排:美国将从任何销售中抽取15%的分成。2026年初,特朗普进一步授权对更强大的英伟达H200芯片实行逐案许可,但附带特定限制。

It’s a policy that continued with the second Trump administration. In April last year, shortly after the President announced his “Liberation Day” tariffs, his government imposed new licensing requirements to restrict the sale of an older generation of Nvidia chips, the H20. This was a dumbed-down processor designed specifically for the Chinese market, and which had previously not fallen under the restrictions. After China retaliated to US tariffs with tariffs of its own, as well as export controls, Trump undid the H20 ban, with an arrangement that the US would receive a 15% cut of any sale. At the start of 2026, Trump’s went further, authorizing a case-by-case licensing for the more powerful Nvidia H200 chip, albeit subject to certain restrictions.

简而言之,在特朗普二期执政下,政策方向发生了逆转。但现在清楚的是,美国扼制中国的战略已告失败。撇开英伟达不谈,习近平主席已要求中国企业采购华为芯片,而非英伟达或其美国竞争对手AMD的产品。为何不呢?毕竟,华为在追赶美国对手方面已取得长足进步。虽尚未完全赶上,但正如AI本身一样,差距现已缩小至仅几个月。鉴于英伟达目前发生的一切,加上可能很快冲击AI行业的其他潜在干扰,若中国在2030年前实现技术对等,我不会感到惊讶。

In short, under Trump II, the direction of policy reversed. Yet it’s now clear that the US strategy of strangling China has failed. Quite aside from Nvidia, President Xi has asked Chinese firms to buy Huawei chips over those made by Nvidia or AMD, its US competitor. And why not? After all, Huawei has come a long way to catching up with its American rivals. They aren’t quite there yet, but, as with AI itself, the lag is now only a few months. With everything happening at Nvidia now, combined with other potential disturbances that could soon hit the AI industry, I wouldn’t be surprised to see China reach technological parity by 2030.

这是美国各种博弈的悖论效应——中华人民共和国如今已蓄势待发,将在美国擅长的游戏中击败美国。若这还不算傲慢,鉴于其他行业的教训,美国更无借口。以汽车业为例,该行业曾由德国主导,近来却为中国所征服。梅赛德斯-奔驰董事长康林松近日对公司在中国销量下滑表示困惑。但为何?事实是,凭借更优的技术实力,中国人正在购买国产汽车,正如他们正在制造国产半导体一样。

That’s the perverse effect of America’s various gambits — with the People’s Republic now poised to beat the US as its own game. And if that’s hubristic enough, the Americans have even less excuse given the lessons of other industries. Take cars, a sector German once dominated but which China has lately conquered. Ola Källenius, the chairman of Mercedes, lately expressed bewilderment about his company’s declining sales in China. But why? The fact is that, with better technological knowhow, the Chinese are buying their own cars, just as they’re making their own semiconductors.

这对欧洲人也有更广泛的启示。我们对俄罗斯的经济制裁之所以失败,原因与美国的芯片政策遭遇挫折如出一辙。海洋辽阔,国境多孔,国际商业世界有如此多的后门渠道,只有傻瓜才会以为能堵住每一个漏洞。这在俄罗斯身上表现得尤为明显:俄罗斯与14个国家接壤,拥有超过2万公里的陆地边境,仅靠制裁扼杀普京政权从来就不可能奏效。

There are broader lessons for the Europeans here too. Our economic sanctions against Russia are failing for the same reason that America’s chip policy foundered. Oceans are vast, borders porous, and the world of international commerce has so many backchannels that only a fool would think they could close every loophole. That’s especially true in Russia’s case: bordering 14 countries, and with over 20,000 kilometers of external land borders, strangling Putin’s regime by sanctions alone was never going to work.

至于美国人,如果他们设想不周的制裁倒逼中国磨砺自身芯片产业,金融领域正在发生类似的事情。中国和俄罗斯都建立了基于加密货币背后相同区块链技术的支付体系。虽然还处于早期阶段,但摆脱美元的大趋势已经开始。这远比黄仁勋究竟与谁有染要重要得多。

As for the Americans, if their ill-conceived sanctions pushed China to sharpen its own chip sector, something similar is happening in finance. Both China and Russia have built payment systems based on the same blockchain technology behind cryptocurrencies. It’s early days, then, but the great decoupling from the dollar has begun. That matters far more than who, exactly, Jensen Huang had affairs with.

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