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半岛电视台

不恢复也门国家,红海就无法实现安全The Red Sea cannot be secured without restoring the Yemeni state

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在这张取自2026年10月5日发布的一段视频的静止画面中,一名也门政府军战士在也门杜巴卜附近发射一具车载武器。政府军称,当时他们正在向伊朗支持的胡塞武装推进。[南方巨人旅/路透社供图]A Yemeni government fighter fires a vehicle-mounted weapon during what government forces say was an advance against the Iran-backed Houthis, near Dhubab, Yemen, in this still image taken from a video released October 5, 2026 [Southern Giants Brigades/Handout via Reuters]

十年来,也门内战被视为地区性问题,局限于阿拉伯半岛南部。但正如2024-2025年的升级以及今年的事态所清楚表明的那样,这场冲突如今已直接影响全世界,扰乱全球贸易和航运,并冲击每一个大国的战略利益。

For a decade, the Yemen civil war was treated as a regional issue, confined to the southern part of the Arabian Peninsula. But as escalations in 2024-2025 and this year have made clear, the conflict now directly affects the whole world, disrupting global trade and navigation and impacting the strategic interests of every major power.

在伊朗支持下,胡塞武装有能力威胁曼德海峡的海上通行——这是世界上最关键的海上走廊之一——这并非孤立的军事事态。

The Houthis’ ability, with Iranian backing, to endanger maritime transit through the Bab al-Mandeb strait, one of the world’s most critical maritime corridors, is not an isolated military development.

这直接源于也门国家机构的崩溃、国际社会对合法政府支持的减少、武装派别的扩散以及相互冲突的地区议程。

It resulted directly from the collapse of Yemeni state institutions, the dwindling international support for the legitimate government, the proliferation of armed factions and the conflicting regional agendas.

正如过去几个月所表明的,仅靠航母和海军特遣舰队无法恢复航行安全。长期解决方案要求首先认识到,然后解决也门危机的根本原因。

As the past few months have demonstrated, the security of navigation cannot be restored with aircraft carriers and naval task forces alone. A long-term solution necessitates first recognising and then addressing the root causes of the Yemen crisis.

面对胡塞武装袭击商船的后果,国际社会几乎未采取任何行动防止也门的瓦解。其某些行动甚至助长了胡塞武装于2014年9月夺取萨那。

The international community, now facing the consequences of Houthi attacks on commercial vessels, did almost nothing to prevent Yemen’s disintegration. Some of its actions even contributed to the Houthis’ seizure of Sanaa in September 2014.

胡塞武装的政变标志着一个决定性的转折点,终结了2011年后的过渡进程,为一个拥有自身政治项目、控制战略领土(包括曼德海峡入口和俯瞰红海的高地)的平行武装权力铺平了道路。

The Houthi coup marked a decisive turning point, ending the post-2011 transition and opening the way for a parallel armed authority with its own political project that controls strategic territory, including the approaches to Bab al-Mandeb and the highlands overlooking the Red Sea.

最危险的是,胡塞武装继承了一个国家的残余能力,该国军队曾被评为阿拉伯世界第五大武装力量。

Most dangerously, the Houthis inherited the residual capabilities of a state whose military was once ranked the fifth most heavily armed in the Arab world.

领土控制、继承的国家与军事能力以及外部支持的这种结合,使胡塞武装的威胁比“伊斯兰国”(ISIS)或基地组织曾构成的威胁更为严重、更为持久。

This combination of territorial control, inherited state and military capacity, and external sponsorship has made the Houthi threat more serious and more durable than that ever posed by ISIS or al-Qaeda.

然而,国际社会并未像对待“伊斯兰国”(ISIS)和“基地”组织那样严肃对待胡塞武装,也未将恢复也门国家机构置于首要位置。国际社会将胡塞武装视为一种可以遏制、谈判或加以利用的力量。

And yet, the international community has not treated the Houthis as seriously as it did ISIS and al-Qaeda, nor has it placed the restoration of Yemeni national institutions as top priority. It has approached the Houthis as a force that could be contained, negotiated with, or instrumentalised.

国际社会没有捍卫也门国家,而是满足于达成临时谅解和施加政治压力。一个例子是2018年关于战略港口城市荷台达的《斯德哥尔摩协议》,该协议确保了停火、双方重新部署,以及联合国监督下的安全和财政安排,将港口收入导向中央银行而非胡塞武装。然而,该协议使胡塞武装成为港口乃至整个城市的实际控制者,导致力量对比向其倾斜;该协议在反胡塞武装力量中极不受欢迎。

Instead of defending the Yemeni state, the international community settled for temporary understandings and political pressure. One example is the 2018 Stockholm Agreement on the strategic port city of Hodeidah, which secured a ceasefire, mutual redeployment, and UN-supervised security and financial arrangements directing port revenues to the Central Bank rather than to the Houthis. Yet, the deal entrenched the Houthis as the de facto authority over the port and the city as a whole, leaving the power imbalance tilted in their favour; it is highly unpopular among anti-Houthi forces.

2021年,在西海岸联合部队——一支为国际公认的也门政府作战的部队联盟——莫名其妙撤军后,胡塞武装设法巩固了对荷台达省的控制。

In 2021, the Houthis managed to solidify their grip on Hodeidah governorate after the inexplicable withdrawal of the Joint Forces on the Western Coast, a coalition of forces fighting on the side of the internationally recognised Yemeni government.

联合部队及其背后的地区联盟均未将行动告知也门政府或联合国;这些地区的平民仅在24小时前获知,没有足够时间撤离。

Neither the Joint Forces nor the regional coalition supporting them had notified the Yemeni government or the UN of their movements; civilians in these areas were told 24 hours prior, which did not give them enough time to evacuate.

这一事件不仅暴露了《斯德哥尔摩协议》的失败——联合国也门问题专家小组已予以确认——也暴露了反胡塞武装阵线的失败,该阵线面临多个军事决策中心、与政府协调不力以及地区联盟内部矛盾日益加深的问题。

The episode exposed not just the failure of the Stockholm Agreement – something acknowledged by the UN Panel of Experts on Yemen– but also the failure of the anti-Houthi front, which faced multiple military decision-making centres, inadequate coordination with the government and growing contradictions within the regional coalition.

联军没有通过国防部在合法政府领导下建设一支国家军队,而是允许许多地方武装在国家指挥链之外形成。这体现在阿联酋支持分裂主义的南方过渡委员会,以及沙特阿拉伯的不同优先事项上。

Rather than building a national army under the legitimate government through the defence ministry, the coalition allowed numerous local formations to emerge outside the state’s chain of command. This was reflected in the Emirati backing for the separatist Southern Transitional Council and Saudi Arabia’s divergent priorities.

通过扶持那些声称要恢复国家却拒绝服从国家的武装力量,也门的支持者们让反胡塞武装阵营分裂,使胡塞武装得以巩固战果,避免了与一支统一的也门军队进行决定性对抗。

By empowering armed formations that refuse to submit to the very state they claim to restore, Yemen’s backers left the anti-Houthi camp divided, allowing the Houthis to consolidate their gains and avoid a decisive confrontation with a united Yemeni army.

结果,如今该地区和世界面对的是一个夺取了国家政权、装备有无人机、弹道导弹和潜在高超音速导弹的民兵组织。它控制着一条主要水道旁的海岸线,并将地理位置作为施压和勒索的工具。

As a result, today, the region and the world face a militia that has captured a state and is armed with drones, ballistic and potentially hypersonic missiles It is controlling coastline beside a major waterway and is using geography as an instrument of pressure and blackmail.

国际社会的回应是海上军事部署。无论多么先进,海军部署和海上行动或许能拦截导弹,却无法提供持久解决方案,因为它们没有触动允许武装团体从也门领土发动袭击的条件。

The international response has been a military deployment at sea. However sophisticated, naval deployments and maritime operations may intercept missiles but cannot deliver a lasting solution, since they leave untouched the conditions that allow an armed group to launch attacks from Yemeni territory.

将胡塞威胁视为一个孤立的海上问题,只能治标,而根源依然存在。红海安全不能与沿岸国家的安全割裂开来。

Treating the Houthi threat as a discrete maritime problem addresses only its symptoms while leaving its causes in place. Red Sea security cannot be separated from the security of the states that border it.

也门拥有近2500公里海岸线,濒临阿拉伯海、红海和亚丁湾,扼守曼德海峡。任何严肃的战略都必须将也门危机视为关乎国家、主权和体制的问题,而非竞争对手之间的较量。

Yemen has nearly 2,500km of coastline along the Arabian Sea, the Red Sea, and the Gulf of Aden, and overlooks Bab al-Mandeb. Any serious strategy must treat Yemen’s crisis as one of state, sovereignty and institutions rather than a contest between rival parties.

这要求恢复国家建设项目的首要地位,支持合法机构,将军队和安全部队统一置于单一国家指挥之下,终结多重权力中心,仅在武装团体——即胡塞武装——被击溃并战败后才达成政治解决,从而使稳定的国家成为可能。

That requires restoring the primacy of the national-state project, supporting legitimate institutions, unifying military and security forces under a single national command, ending the multiplicity of power centres, and reaching a political settlement only after armed groups, represented by the Houthis, have been broken and defeated, so that a stable state becomes possible.

所有海湾国家,包括阿联酋,都必须认识到,它们自身的安全与稳定取决于恢复也门国家并支持其军事和安全机构。迁就或赋权武装团体,如胡塞武装和南方过渡委员会,只会助长动荡。

All Gulf states, including the UAE, must recognise that their own security and stability depend on restoring the Yemeni state and supporting its military and security institutions. Accommodating or empowering armed groups, such as the Houthis and the Southern Transitional Council, can only fuel instability.

国际社会也必须认识到,恢复也门国家并非纯粹的也门内部事务。这符合全世界的战略利益。

The international community too must recognise that restoring the Yemeni state is not a purely Yemeni concern. It is in the strategic interest of the whole world.

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