
据报道,刚果民主共和国(DRC)与卢旺达的又一轮会谈预计将于11月19日在日内瓦举行,双方在落实《华盛顿和平与繁荣协议》方面的分歧依然存在。《非洲情报》报道称双方预计将会晤,但半岛电视台无法独立证实该聚会。
Another round of talks between the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Rwanda is reportedly expected to take place in Geneva on November 19 , as disagreements persist over implementing the Washington Accords for Peace and Prosperity. Africa Intelligence reported that the two sides were expected to meet, although Al Jazeera has been unable to independently confirm the gathering.
僵局的核心在于两项承诺:中和卢旺达解放民主力量(FDLR)以及卢旺达解除防御措施。双方不仅在这些义务的履行进度上存在分歧,而且对何种情况构成合规也有不同看法。谈判将涉及哪些内容?
At the heart of the impasse are two commitments: neutralising the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and Rwanda lifting its defensive measures. The governments disagree not only over progress on these obligations but also on what would constitute compliance. What will the talks deal with?
《华盛顿协议》于2025年12月4日签署,建立在双方政府于2025年6月27日签署的和平协议以及2025年4月25日的《原则宣言》基础之上。
The Washington Accords, signed on December 4, 2025, build on the peace agreement signed by the two governments on June 27, 2025, and the Declaration of Principles of April 25, 2025.
承诺内容包括中和FDLR、卢旺达撤离部队并解除防御措施、尊重领土完整,以及停止支持武装团体。
The commitments include neutralising the FDLR, Rwanda’s disengagement of forces and the lifting of defensive measures, respect for territorial integrity, and an end to support for armed groups.
执行情况由联合安全协调机制(JSCM)监督,该机制包括刚果(金)、卢旺达、美国、卡塔尔、以非盟调解人身份参与的多哥,以及非盟委员会的代表。该机制协调安全措施,包括定位FDLR的行动。早期会谈发生了什么?
Implementation is overseen by the Joint Security Coordination Mechanism (JSCM), which includes representatives of the DRC, Rwanda, the United States, Qatar, Togo in its role as African Union mediator, and the AU Commission. The mechanism coordinates security measures, including efforts to locate the FDLR. What has happened in earlier talks?
联合安全协调机制已举行多轮会议,但进展主要集中在程序、监测和核查方面,而非解决核心分歧。
The JSCM has held several rounds of meetings, but progress has largely focused on procedures, monitoring and verification rather than resolving the central disagreement.
在2026年7月、8月和9月的会议上,双方讨论了刚果(金)东部的安全局势、情报共享、监测安排以及FDLR成员的解除武装和复员问题。他们还探讨了加强核查的途径。然而,双方迄今未能就何种情况构成各自安全义务的履行达成一致。僵局在哪里?
At meetings in July, August and September 2026, the parties discussed the security situation in eastern DRC, information-sharing, monitoring arrangements and the disarmament and demobilisation of FDLR members. They also considered ways to strengthen verification. However, they have yet to agree on what would constitute fulfilment of their respective security obligations. Where is the impasse?
卢旺达表示已开始履行其承诺。9月29日,卢旺达常驻联合国代表马丁·恩戈加在联合国安理会发言时称,基加利已开始解除其防御措施。
Rwanda says it has begun implementing its commitments. Addressing the United Nations Security Council on September 29 , Rwanda’s Permanent Representative, Martin Ngoga, said Kigali had started lifting its defensive measures.
然而,他坚称,民主解放卢旺达力量(FDLR)仍在刚果(金)东部活动,并继续与刚果政府军及其他武装团体合作。卢旺达认为,结束这种所谓的合作对于落实协议至关重要。
He maintained, however, that the FDLR remained active in eastern DRC and continued to cooperate with Congolese forces and other armed groups. Rwanda considers ending this alleged cooperation essential to implementing the agreement.
与此同时,金沙萨指出其已努力解除武装并遣散FDLR战斗人员。7月28日,刚果(金)政府宣布与FDLR武装派别的一个派系达成议定书,规定了解除武装和遣散的安排。
Kinshasa, meanwhile, points to its efforts to disarm and demobilise FDLR fighters. On July 28 , the Congolese government announced a protocol with a faction of the armed wing of the FDLR, setting out arrangements for disarmament and demobilisation.
政府发言人帕特里克·穆亚亚对半岛电视台表示,该进程构成了华盛顿协议项下承诺的一部分。
Government spokesman Patrick Muyaya told Al Jazeera that the process formed part of the commitments under the Washington agreements.
卢旺达拒绝接受该安排。外交部长奥利维耶·恩杜洪吉雷赫称其为“粗暴的操纵”,而恩戈加则辩称,与一个派系达成协议无法满足中和该武装团体的更广泛承诺。
Rwanda rejected the arrangement. Foreign Minister Olivier Nduhungirehe called it a “crude manipulation”, while Ngoga argued that an agreement with one faction could not satisfy the broader commitment to neutralise the group.
这一分歧暴露了核心问题:金沙萨将该议定书呈现为实现中和目标的进展,而基加利则认为,解除一个派系的武装并不能证明FDLR的整体作战能力已被瓦解。双方尚未建立衡量进展的共同标准。美国为何制裁卢旺达国防部?
The disagreement exposes the central problem: Kinshasa presents the protocol as progress towards neutralisation, while Kigali argues that disarming one faction does not demonstrate that the FDLR’s wider operational capacity has been dismantled. The parties have yet to establish a shared standard for measuring progress. Why did the US sanction Rwanda’s Ministry of Defence?
10月28日,美国以涉嫌支持刚果(金)东部“3·23运动”(M23)武装团体为由,制裁卢旺达国防部及卢旺达金融机构济加马储蓄信贷合作社。
On October 28 , the US sanctioned Rwanda’s Ministry of Defence and Zigama Credit and Savings Society, a Rwandan financial institution, over alleged support for the M23 armed group in eastern DRC.
华盛顿指控国防部指挥与M23并肩作战的卢旺达部队,并向该武装提供军事装备及其他援助。美国还指控济加马为卢旺达的军事活动提供了财政和后勤支持。
Washington accused the ministry of directing Rwandan forces operating alongside M23 and providing the group with military equipment and other assistance. It also alleged that Zigama facilitated financial and logistical support for Rwanda’s military activities.
美国财政部表示,制裁旨在让卢旺达对其在《华盛顿协议》下的承诺负责。
The US Treasury said the sanctions were intended to hold Rwanda accountable for its commitments under the Washington Accords.
基加利拒绝了这些指控。政府发言人约兰德·马科洛表示,关于“民主解放卢旺达力量”(FDLR)的承诺仍未兑现,并呼吁让所有各方承担责任。
Kigali rejected the allegations. Government spokesperson Yolande Makolo said the commitments concerning the FDLR remained unfulfilled and called for all parties to be held accountable.
制裁增加了对卢旺达的压力,并凸显了华盛顿推动落实其协助斡旋达成的协议的决心。与M23的谈判如何融入这一进程?
The sanctions increased pressure on Rwanda and underscored Washington’s determination to push for implementation of the agreement it helped broker. How do the talks with M23 fit into the process?
《华盛顿协议》涉及卢旺达与刚果(金)之间的安全承诺。然而,金沙萨与M23及其盟友“刚果河联盟”(AFC)之间的谈判遵循一条由卡塔尔在多哈进程下斡旋的独立轨道。
The Washington Accords address security commitments between Rwanda and the DRC. However, negotiations between Kinshasa, M23 and its ally, the Congo River Alliance (AFC), follow a separate track facilitated by Qatar under the Doha process.
这两条轨道截然不同但相互关联。2025年6月的和平协议承认,解决刚果(金)东部冲突也需要解决非国家武装团体问题。
The two tracks are distinct but connected. The June 2025 peace agreement recognises that resolving the conflict in eastern DRC also requires addressing non-state armed groups.
多哈进程于2025年7月产生了一份《原则宣言》和一份全面和平协议框架,涵盖停火监测、人道主义准入、安全安排、裁军以及恢复国家权威。
The Doha process produced a Declaration of Principles in July 2025 and a framework for a comprehensive peace agreement covering ceasefire monitoring, humanitarian access, security arrangements, disarmament and the restoration of state authority.
政治格局于2026年10月12日发生变化,当时“国家重建阵线”(FRN)成立。这一新运动被呈现为取代AFC/M23的政治军事结构,并将其政治和军事组成部分结合在一起。在其成立宣言中,FRN宣布解散AFC,并表示将承担该联盟的权利和义务,包括多哈进程下的承诺。
The political landscape shifted on October 12, 2026, when the Front for the Refoundation of the Nation (FRN) was established. The new movement was presented as replacing the AFC/M23 political-military structure and bringing together its political and military components. In its founding declaration, the FRN announced the dissolution of the AFC and said it would assume the coalition’s rights and obligations, including commitments under the Doha process.
尽管M23的政治和军事领导层已被纳入新结构,但创始宣言并未明确说明该武装运动的独立组织地位。M23作为武装运动与更广泛的政治军事联盟之间的区别仍然重要,尤其是在确定谁代表非政府一方参加多哈谈判,以及谁负责执行该进程下作出的承诺方面。华盛顿与金沙萨之间的矿产伙伴关系是什么?
Although M23’s political and military leadership has been incorporated into the new structure, the founding declaration does not explicitly spell out the separate organisational status of the armed movement. The distinction between M23 as an armed movement and the broader political-military coalition remains important, particularly in determining who represents the nongovernmental side in the Doha negotiations and who is responsible for implementing commitments made under that process. What is the minerals partnership between Washington and Kinshasa?
在和平协议之外,美国和刚果民主共和国于2025年12月4日签署了一项战略伙伴关系,以扩大经济合作,包括对采矿、关键矿产和基础设施的投资。
Alongside the peace agreement, the US and the DRC signed a strategic partnership on December 4, 2025, to expand economic cooperation, including investment in mining, critical minerals and infrastructure.
该伙伴关系反映了华盛顿对刚果民主共和国铜和钴储量的兴趣,以及多元化矿产供应链的努力。在11月6日于巴黎举行的指导委员会会议后,两国政府报告称,美国公司的兴趣日益增长。金沙萨强调,该伙伴关系应根据实际投资而非宣布来评判。此前发生了什么?
The partnership reflects Washington’s interest in the DRC’s copper and cobalt reserves and efforts to diversify mineral supply chains. Following a steering committee meeting in Paris on November 6 , the two governments reported growing interest from US companies. Kinshasa has stressed that the partnership should be judged by tangible investments rather than announcements. What came before?
华盛顿进程是在数十年来解决刚果民主共和国东部冲突及两个邻国之间紧张关系的努力之后开展的。
The Washington process follows decades of efforts to address conflict in eastern DRC and tensions between the two neighbours.
1999年卢萨卡停火协议旨在结束第二次刚果战争,并规定外国部队撤出和武装团体解除武装。这些团体中包括前卢旺达武装部队的残余部队,以及在1994年卢旺达针对图西族的种族灭绝后逃往刚果民主共和国的因特拉汉韦民兵成员。这些部队的部分成员后来成立了FDLR,该组织成立于2000年。
The 1999 Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement sought to end the Second Congo War and provide for the withdrawal of foreign forces and disarmament of armed groups. Among those groups were remnants of the former Rwandan armed forces and members of the Interahamwe militia who fled to the DRC after the 1994 genocide against Tutsi in Rwanda. Elements of these forces later formed the FDLR, established in 2000.
2002年比勒陀利亚协议承诺卢旺达撤出其在刚果民主共和国的部队,而金沙萨则承诺解决前卢旺达武装部队和“因特拉汉韦”分子的存在。2007年内罗毕公报和2013年《和平、安全与合作框架》重申了解除武装团体、尊重领土完整和加强区域合作的承诺。
The 2002 Pretoria Agreement committed Rwanda to withdrawing its troops from the DRC, while Kinshasa undertook to address the presence of former Rwandan armed forces and Interahamwe elements. The 2007 Nairobi Communique and the 2013 Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework renewed commitments to disarm armed groups, respect territorial integrity and strengthen regional cooperation.
这些举措难以克服相互的安全担忧以及武装团体的持续存在。FDLR在其起源于东部刚果民主共和国近三十年后,仍然是争议的核心点。
Those initiatives struggled to overcome mutual security concerns and the continued presence of armed groups. The FDLR remains a central point of contention nearly three decades after its origins in eastern DRC.
下一轮谈判将检验基加利和金沙萨能否超越对各自义务的相互竞争性解释,并就落实华盛顿协议的可信、可核查的进程达成一致。如果不就合规性如何衡量达成一致,地面上的进展可能远远落后于外交框架。
The next round of talks will test whether Kigali and Kinshasa can move beyond competing interpretations of their obligations and agree on a credible, verifiable process for implementing the Washington Accords. Without agreement on how compliance is measured, progress on the ground risks lagging far behind the diplomatic framework.