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大西洋月刊

与激进民兵作战不在计划之内Fighting a Radical Militia Was Not Part of the Plan

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拼贴插图展示了沙特官员和象征符号,以及胡塞武装人员的照片。A collage illustration shows Saudi officials and symbols as well as photos of Houthi fighters.

然而,目前沙特阿拉伯正独自应对他们。作者:罗伯特·F·沃思 发布时间:2026-11-21T12:00:00Z 10月下旬,我在利雅得一家高档商场遇见了一名也门军官。他身穿迪沙达长袍,神态粗犷疲惫,像个老练的职业军人。他的部队一直在也门南部与胡塞武装作战,距离我们点咖啡的地方——沙特首都中心那座地面铺着大理石、环境一尘不染的避风港——有800多英里之遥。

Yet for now, Saudi Arabia is combatting them alone. By Robert F. Worth Published: 2026-11-21T12:00:00Z In late October, I met a Yemeni military officer at a high-end mall in Riyadh. He wore a dishdasha and had the gruff, weary manner of an aging career soldier. His unit had been fighting the Houthi militia in southern Yemen, more than 800 miles from the immaculate, marble-floored refuge at the center of the Saudi capital where we ordered coffee.

他用手在桌面上推演战场态势,描述最近一轮战斗的经过,突然周围所有人的手机同时响起警报:来袭导弹预警。片刻后,巨大的爆炸声在商场内回荡,邻桌传来清晰的惊呼声,一个孩子吓得哭了出来。购物者定在原地,有人焦急地望向头顶的玻璃穹顶。

He was mapping the battlefield on the table with his hands, describing how the latest round of fighting had played out, when cellphones began beeping simultaneously all around us: an incoming-missile warning. Moments later, loud booms echoed through the mall, followed by audible gasps from nearby tables and a child’s cry of fear. Shoppers froze in their tracks, some glancing anxiously toward the glass dome above us.

那名也门军官看着我,一言不发。嘴角浮现一丝阴郁的微笑,仿佛在说:他们现在都在了解胡塞武装了。

The Yemeni officer looked at me without speaking. A grim smile played on his lips, as if to say: They are all learning about the Houthis now.

导弹被拦截了,但那一刻久久萦绕心头。一种新现实正在闯入这个民众的生活,多年来他们被关于“无摩擦的后石油时代”的愿景所宠溺,仿佛新技术能让所有人快乐、娱乐以度余生。

The missiles were intercepted, but the moment stayed with me. A new reality was intruding on a population coddled for years by visions of a frictionless post-oil future, when new technologies would keep everyone happy and entertained.

沙特阿拉伯正处于战争状态。胡塞武装通过反复的导弹齐射,证明了他们能随意瘫痪该国大半经济命脉。10月中旬,针对利雅得主机场的一次致命袭击造成至少14人死亡、数百人受伤。一个多月过去了,航班仍大多未恢复。

Saudi Arabia is at war. The Houthis have demonstrated, by means of recurring missile barrages, that they can shut down much of the country’s economy at will. A deadly strike on the main airport in Riyadh killed at least 14 people in mid-October and injured hundreds. More than a month later, few flights have resumed.

“王国今天面临历史上最危险的危机,”沙特记者阿卜杜勒拉赫曼·拉希德上个月对一位沙特播客主持人说。

“The kingdom today faces the most dangerous crisis in its history, the Saudi journalist Abdulrahman al-Rashed told a Saudi podcaster last month.

这种坦率在沙特阿拉伯极难得见。我10月在利雅得会见的沙特和也门官员,无人愿公开记名发言。他们告诉我,君主制现在对胡塞武装的威胁比过去重视得多。利雅得已达成协议,从巴基斯坦和叙利亚引入数千名士兵,协助防守与也门接壤的边境。但这些努力可能还不够。在伊朗、中国、朝鲜和俄罗斯的帮助下,胡塞武装也在扩充兵力。

That kind of candor is extremely hard to come by in Saudi Arabia. None of the Saudi or Yemeni officials I met in Riyadh in October would speak with me on the record. They told me that the monarchy is now taking the Houthi threat far more seriously than in the past. Riyadh has struck deals to bring thousands of soldiers from Pakistan and Syria to help defend the country’s border with Yemen. But these efforts may not be enough. The Houthis are building up their forces too, with help from Iran, China, North Korea, and Russia.

胡塞武装不再是十年前那些叛军新贵。他们正大步迈向成为阿拉伯世界的“朝鲜”:一个封闭、武装精良、狂热的小国,对整个地区构成威胁。他们拥有人工智能辅助的军工产业,研究过俄乌战争;其信息战行动远超沙特和也门对手。胡塞武装很快可能比其长期赞助人伊朗更具威胁性。

The Houthis are no longer the rebel upstarts of a decade ago. They are well on their way to becoming the North Korea of the Arab world: an insular, well-armed, and fanatical statelet that poses a threat to the entire region. They have an AI-assisted weapons industry and have studied the Ukraine war; their information operations are way ahead of their Saudi and Yemeni rivals’. The Houthis could soon become more dangerous than Iran, their long-standing patron.

沙特军队并非为这种战争而建。该国统治者长期以来不愿建立一支日后可能威胁君主制的军队。即便现在,除已部署在也门的精锐特种部队外,他们也拒绝派遣本国部队去打击胡塞武装。但他们可能很快会发现,当国家面临真实的入侵威胁时,无法指望外国人来保家卫国。

The Saudi military was not designed for this kind of war. The country’s rulers have long been reluctant to build an army that could one day pose a threat to the monarchy. Even now they have dismissed the notion of sending their own troops, apart from elite special forces already deployed in Yemen, to fight the Houthis. But they may soon find that you cannot rely on foreigners when your country is facing a very real threat of invasion.

目前的胡塞武装军事攻势始于9月,当时该组织占领了红海上的曼德海峡。沙特阿拉伯领导人认为,这一计划主要由伊朗策划。10月,我会见了一位沙特高级官员,他描述了德黑兰及其“抵抗轴心”盟友在过去几个月协调的一项战略。这位官员说,最新一章始于春季,当时特朗普总统下令封锁霍尔木兹海峡。这使德黑兰的报复选择有限,因此伊朗官员与其胡塞盟友会面,说服他们对曼德海峡发动攻势。

The current Houthi military offensive began in September, when the group captured the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, on the Red Sea. Saudi Arabia’s leaders believe that this plan was largely devised by Iran. In October, I met with a senior Saudi official who described a strategy coordinated by Tehran and its allies in the “Axis of Resistance” over the past several months. The latest chapter, the official said, began in the spring, when President Trump ordered the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. That left Tehran with limited options to retaliate, so Iranian officials met with their Houthi allies and persuaded them to launch an offensive on the Bab el-Mandeb.

这位官员说,伊朗人同意协助实施。他告诉我,7月,一个胡塞代表团参加了在德黑兰举行的阿亚图拉·阿里·哈梅内伊葬礼,返程时,载运该代表团的马汉航空航班还搭载了一整支“抵抗轴心”军事技术人员和指挥官团队,其中包括两名朝鲜人、一名曾属阿萨德政权的叙利亚人,以及伊朗伊斯兰革命卫队成员和黎巴嫩真主党(什叶派民兵)成员。

The Iranians, the official said, agreed to help make it happen. A Houthi delegation attended the funeral of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in Tehran in July, he told me, and when it returned, the Mahan Air flight that carried it also conveyed a whole team of Axis military technicians and commanders, including two North Koreans, a Syrian who had been part of the Assad regime, and members of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and of Lebanese Hezbollah, the Shiite militia.

这位沙特官员告诉我,飞机上装载了现金和武器,包括无人机零件和导弹制导系统。(关于马汉航空航班的一些细节此前已有报道,包括机上搭载的武器和伊朗军官。)沙特方面获悉飞机货物情况后,轰炸了也门首都机场跑道以阻止其降落。但该航班改飞荷台达——这座红海沿岸城市同样处于胡塞武装控制之下——并在那里降落。这位沙特官员还告诉我,俄罗斯单独运送了一大批武器和技术,藏在数万吨小麦之下。

The plane was loaded with cash and weapons, including drone parts and missile-guidance systems, the Saudi official told me. (Some details of the Mahan Air flight have been reported previously, including the weapons and Iranian officers on board.) The Saudis had gotten word of the plane’s cargo and bombed the runway of the airport in the Yemeni capital to prevent it from landing. But the flight was diverted to Hodeida, a city on the Red Sea coast that is also under Houthi control, and landed there. Separately, the Saudi official told me, Russia delivered a large shipment of weapons and technology, concealed under thousands of tons of wheat. If the Saudi official’s account is accurate, it would suggest that the Houthis are receiving more international support than ever.

如果这位沙特官员的说法属实,将表明胡塞武装获得的国际支持比以往任何时候都多。即使该报告是为了讨好一位美国记者而有所夸大——沙特官员急于从美国获得更多军事援助——它依然指向一个关于胡塞武装已成何种力量的更大真相。

Even if the report was exaggerated for the benefit of an American journalist—Saudi officials are desperate to get more military assistance from the United States—it still points to a larger truth about what the Houthis have become. The Houthis are the world’s problem.

胡塞武装是世界的问题。他们已证明能够封锁一条承载全球约 15% 贸易量的水道。他们目前控制也门约三分之一的领土和大部分人口,并意图征服全部领土。他们使用童兵的情况已有据可查长达十年,频繁使用酷刑、任意拘留和强迫失踪的情况也是如此。他们的统治植根于一种不止步于也门国界、并以持续战争为生的革命意识形态。他们曾挑战沙特对麦加和麦地那——伊斯兰教最神圣的两座城市——的控制权,并经常夸口要解放耶路撒冷。

They have proved that they can block a waterway that carries about 15 percent of the world’s trade. They now control about a third of Yemen’s territory and most of its population, and aim to conquer it all. Their use of child soldiers has been well documented for a decade, as has their frequent use of torture, arbitrary detentions, and disappearances. Their rule is rooted in a revolutionary ideology that does not stop at Yemen’s borders and that thrives on constant war. They have challenged Saudi control of Mecca and Medina, Islam’s holiest cities, and they often boast that they will liberate Jerusalem. These are not empty ambitions.

这些并非空谈。胡塞武装正不断扩大导弹和无人机产能,使用中国供应的光纤等材料。近期有证据表明,他们曾利用 AI 工具 Claude 改进制导导弹技术。尽管存在教派差异(胡塞武装信奉什叶派的一个分支;基地组织和青年党属于逊尼派),他们仍与基地组织和恐怖组织青年党建立了务实关系。在展现政治灵活性和意识形态狂热的举动中,他们一直在非洲之角的索马里、吉布提、厄立特里亚、埃塞俄比亚、肯尼亚和苏丹等国招募并培训族群和部落亚群。

The Houthis are constantly expanding their missile and drone production, using fiber optics and other materials supplied by China. Evidence recently came to light that they have used the AI tool Claude to improve their guided-missile technology. They have developed pragmatic relationships with al-Qaeda and the al-Shabaab terrorist group, despite sectarian differences (the Houthis adhere to an offshoot of Shiite Islam; the other two groups are Sunni). And, in a show of political dexterity and ideological fervor, they have been recruiting and providing training to ethnic and tribal subgroups throughout the Horn of Africa, in Somalia, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Sudan. These outreaches appear to be modeled on Iran’s efforts to build up regional allies, and could add more tinder to an already volatile region of Africa.

这些拓展行动似乎仿照伊朗建立地区盟友的做法,可能为本已动荡的非洲地区增添更多火种。

For now, Saudi Arabia lies on the front line of any effort to contain the Houthis’ power.

目前,沙特阿拉伯处于遏制胡塞武装力量的任何努力的最前线。美国因深陷与伊朗的冲突,无力提供除最低限度援助以外的任何帮助;欧洲则专注于乌克兰局势。其他海湾国家虽有充分理由对抗胡塞武装,但因各种原因,它们不会这样做。

The United States is too deep in its war with Iran to provide anything more than minimal help, and the Europeans are focused on Ukraine. The other Gulf countries have good reasons to fight the Houthis, but for various reasons, they will not. The Omanis have been hedging their bets for years—allowing the Houthis to smuggle arms across their border with Yemen and providing some intelligence—in case the Houthis end up as the winners.

阿曼多年来一直在两边下注——允许胡塞武装经其与也门的边境走私武器,并提供一些情报——以防胡塞武装最终获胜。阿拉伯联合酋长国曾与沙特并肩在也门境内与胡塞武装作战多年,但去年底,两国长期积累的紧张关系达到临界点,沙特下令阿联酋撤军。阿联酋的缺席损害了更广泛的战争努力。

The United Arab Emirates fought the Houthis inside Yemen for years alongside the Saudis, but late last year, long-running tensions between the two countries reached a breaking point, and the Saudis ordered the Emiratis to withdraw. The Emiratis’ absence has damaged the broader war effort. The Saudis, who have long backed the internationally recognized Yemeni government in Aden, organized a counteroffensive after the Houthis captured the Bab el-Mandeb.

长期支持亚丁国际公认也门政府的沙特,在胡塞武装攻占曼德海峡后组织了一次反攻。他们将沙特特种部队嵌入全国各地的也门政府军中。10月19日,一名沙特官员在利雅得告诉我,近期目标是收复9月失去的所有领土,随后争取某种形式的停火。沙特支持的也门部队尚未实现这一目标,也不清楚他们能否做到。“除非美国同意提供直接空中支援,否则我看不出有出路,”中东研究所副研究员纳德瓦·达乌萨里告诉我。

They embedded Saudi commandos with Yemeni government forces across the country. Some were killed in a devastating Houthi strike on October 19. The Saudi official I met in Riyadh told me that the near-term goal is to recapture all of the territory that was lost in September, and then secure some kind of truce. The Saudi-backed Yemeni forces have not yet achieved that, and it is not clear that they will. “I don’t see a way out unless the U.S. agrees to provide direct air support,” Nadwa al-Dawsari, an associate fellow at the Middle East Institute, told me.

即使沙特人能够实现战事喘息,胡塞武装仍将掌握冲突的主动权,因为他们依然能够打击沙特王国的机场和石油设施。他们肯定会利用任何停火协议继续扩充军力,就像过去所做的那样。这位沙特官员告诉我,王国的长远计划是建立一支规模更大、更团结的也门军队,能够将胡塞武装击退并“消除其军事能力”。

Even if the Saudis are able to achieve a respite from the fighting, the Houthis will retain the whip hand in the conflict, because they will still be able to strike the kingdom’s airports and oil facilities. And they will surely use any truce to continue expanding their military, as they have in the past. The Saudi official told me that the kingdom’s long-term plan is to build a larger and more unified Yemeni military that is capable of pushing the Houthis back and “eliminating their military capabilities.”

这是一项艰巨的任务。我上个月在利雅得会见的一位也门军官描述了一支因相互冲突的政治和地区效忠而受阻的战斗力量。“有部队效忠伊斯兰党”——也门的伊斯兰主义政党——“他们恨我们,”他说,指的是他自己所属的更世俗的派别。(他不必补充说,这种感觉是相互的。)在南方,许多士兵更有兴趣建立一个独立的国家,而不是与胡塞武装作战。

That is a tall order. The Yemeni military officer I met in Riyadh last month described a fighting force that is hamstrung by clashing political and regional loyalties. “There are forces loyal to Islah”—the Yemeni Islamist party—“and they hate us,” he said, referring to his own more secular faction. (He did not need to add that the feeling is mutual.) In the south, many of the soldiers are more interested in creating a separate state than in fighting the Houthis. “The Houthis know all about the divisions on our side,” the officer said, “and they take advantage of it.”

“胡塞武装非常了解我们这边的分裂,”这位军官说,“并加以利用。”沙特人给冲突带来了他们自己的问题。其中之一是王国的特权文化和腐败,这已渗透到其在也门的行为中。几十年来,沙特人通过向部落酋长和军事人物发放津贴的庇护体系维持其在也门的影响力,并以一种准帝国主义的眼光视也门人为原始的下属。

The Saudis bring problems of their own to the conflict. One is the kingdom’s culture of entitlement and corruption, which has bled into its behavior in Yemen. For decades, the Saudis maintained their influence in Yemen through a patronage system of stipends paid to tribal sheikhs and military figures, and they took a quasi-imperial view of Yemenis as primitive underlings. They had a reputation for paying their proxy soldiers so poorly or so late that some had to sell their weapons in order to feed their children.

他们因给代理人士兵的薪酬极低或拖欠太久而臭名昭著,以至于一些士兵不得不出售武器来养活孩子。

This pattern of behavior generated deep resentment, partly because the Yemenis got a glimpse of a different approach.

这种行为模式引发了深深的怨恨,部分原因是也门人看到了另一种截然不同的做法。阿联酋人在本国花费数十年培养了一种纪律和问责的文化,在也门,他们以训练盟友、支付更高薪水并要求回报成果而著称。阿联酋人——他们自己拥有一支规模虽小但极其高效的军队——因此在也门新兵身上取得了大得多的成功。沙特人说他们正在改革体制,但这需要时间。

The Emiratis spent decades fostering a culture of discipline and accountability in their own country, and in Yemen, they had a reputation for training their allies, paying them higher salaries, and demanding results in return. The Emiratis—who run a small but highly effective military of their own—therefore had far more success with their Yemeni recruits. The Saudis say they are reforming their system, but that will take time. The Saudis and their allies are now struggling to relieve the month-long Houthi siege of Taiz, one of Yemen’s largest cities.

沙特人及其盟友目前正艰难地试图解除胡塞武装对泰兹长达一个月的围困,泰兹是也门最大的城市之一。如果胡塞武装攻下该城,他们与亚丁之间将只隔着畅通无阻的道路,亚丁是也门国际公认政府及其军事总部所在地。“目前没有任何行动在保卫亚丁,”曾与联合国合作的也门问题专家亨利·汤普森告诉我。(就在过去几天里,对亚丁的威胁已加剧,那里已出现一些防御准备的迹象。)

If the Houthis capture it, nothing but open roads will separate them from Aden, the base of Yemen’s internationally recognized government and its military headquarters. “There is nothing going on to defend Aden,” Henry Thompson, a Yemen expert who has worked with the United Nations, told me. (Just in the past few days, the threat to Aden has grown, and some signs of defensive preparations have become evident there.) The Houthis, meanwhile, have taken measures in the territories they control that could pull Yemeni troops into protracted conflict even if they succeed in retaking ground. Some recent seizures of cargo destined for Houthi ports have intercepted equipment for digging tunnels, including excavation tools and ventilation systems.

与此同时,胡塞武装在其控制的领土上采取了一些措施,即使政府军成功夺回领土,这些措施也可能将也门军队拖入长期冲突。最近几起查获的运往胡塞武装控制港口的货物中,截获了挖掘隧道的设备,包括挖掘工具和通风系统。近年来,胡塞武装似乎已成功大量进口此类装备。

The Houthis appear to have successfully imported large quantities of this kind of gear in recent years. “In Hodeida, the Houthis have built a city underneath the city,” Mohammed al-Basha, a Yemen analyst and the founder of the Basha Report, a geopolitical-risk advisory firm, told me. “For anyone trying to capture that place, it would be like going into Gaza.”

“在荷台达,胡塞武装在城市之下建起了一座城市,”也门问题分析师、地缘政治风险咨询公司“巴沙报告”创始人穆罕默德·巴沙告诉我。“对于任何试图夺取该地的人来说,那就像进入加沙地带一样。”目前战争进展不利。在10月取得一些进展后,沙特支持的部队于11月15日宣布,他们被迫从曼德海峡周边地区撤军。我在利雅得会见了也门国际公认政府的几名成员——那是他们的后方基地——他们试图表现得坚强,成效不一。

For the moment, the war is not going well. After making some gains in October, the Saudi-backed forces announced on November 15 that they had been forced to withdraw from the area around the Bab el-Mandeb. I met several members of Yemen’s internationally recognized government in Riyadh—their rear base—and they tried to put on a brave face, with varying degrees of success. Some seem resigned to deeper losses.

一些人似乎已对更大的损失感到无奈。“胡塞武装将占领亚丁,并将继续推进,”其中一人告诉我。

“The Houthis will take Aden, and they will keep going,” one told me. The current battlefield is in southern Yemen, but everyone I spoke with agreed that the Houthis will eventually open a new front in the north and attempt to invade Saudi Arabia.

目前的战场在也门南部,但我交谈的所有人都一致认为,胡塞武装最终将在北方开辟新战线,并试图入侵沙特阿拉伯。那将使沙特无法否认自己处于战争状态。直到现在,他们坚持声称这是也门内部冲突,沙特阿拉伯只是第三方。但胡塞武装多年来已明确表示,他们认为自己正与利雅得交战,并经常嘲笑也门国际公认政府是沙特的遮羞布。

That would make it impossible for the Saudis to deny that they are at war. Until now, they have held firmly to the claim that this is an intra-Yemeni conflict, and that Saudi Arabia is a third party. But the Houthis have made clear for years that they consider themselves to be at war with Riyadh, and they frequently mock Yemen’s internationally recognized government as a Saudi fig leaf. Almost no one in Saudi Arabia wants to acknowledge the possibility that they could soon be forced to defend their country.

在沙特阿拉伯,几乎没有人愿意承认这样一种可能性:他们可能很快被迫保卫自己的国家。“为什么要派我们的年轻人去保卫曼德海峡?”一位官员在利雅得问我。“冲突是在也门境内。”他接着把胡塞武装描述为无非是一种“烦扰”。我在利雅得交谈的普通沙特人,无论是老朋友还是我在咖啡馆遇到的人,似乎都不愿谈论这场战争。

“Why should we send our young men to defend the Bab el-Mandeb?” one official asked me in Riyadh. “The conflict is inside Yemen.”He went on to describe the Houthis as nothing more than an “annoyance.”None of the ordinary Saudis I spoke with in Riyadh, whether old friends or people I approached in cafés, seemed comfortable talking about the war. Saudi Arabia is an autocratic society where dissent can land a person in jail—but the reticence may also reflect the dissonance people feel between the war and everything their ruler has been telling them for the past decade.

沙特阿拉伯是一个专制社会,异见可能让人入狱——但这种沉默也可能反映出人们感到的不协调:这场战争与他们的统治者在过去十年里一直告诉他们的一切格格不入。沙特阿拉伯的问题本应通过技术和创新来解决。被卷入一场与激进民兵的血腥战争,不在计划之中。

Saudi Arabia’s problems are supposed to be solved through technology and innovation. Being dragged into a bloody war with a radical militia is not part of that plan. It is not part of America’s plans, either—especially not since the Trump administration waged an expensive and largely futile air war against the Houthis lasting seven weeks in early 2025.

这也不在美国的计划之中——尤其是自从特朗普政府在2025年初发动了一场为期七周、代价高昂且基本徒劳的对胡塞武装空战以来。但这种情况可能会改变。胡塞武装和他们的伊朗盟友一样,认为自己正在对美国进行一场形而上学的战斗,并决心推翻该地区美国影响力的每一个前哨。

But that could change. The Houthis, like their Iranian allies, believe that they are waging a metaphysical battle against America, and they are determined to topple every outpost of American influence in the region. *Illustration sources: Kay Nietfeld / Picture Alliance / Getty; Arne Hodalic / Getty; Encyclopaedia Britannica / Universal Images Group / Getty; Wolfgang Kaehler / LightRocket / Getty; Mohammed Huwais / AFP / Getty; Mohammad Daher / NurPhoto / Getty

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