
在乌克兰战争爆发将近五年之际,对于倡导对弗拉基米尔·普京的俄罗斯实施更严厉西方制裁的人士来说,这是一个令人感到卑微的时期。
These are humbling times for advocates of tougher Western sanctions on Vladimir Putin’s Russia, almost five years on from its invasion of Ukraine.
美国总统唐纳德·特朗普正驾驶着一艘“寡头级别”的超级游艇,通过一项向国际市场释放更多柴油的协议,冲破对莫斯科能源出口的限制。尽管欧盟仍在坚持不懈地推进针对俄罗斯个人和实体的第22轮惩罚性经济措施,但它也开始看到自身影响力的局限。受制裁者的漏洞随处可见,甚至连法国和卢森堡等欧盟成员国也试图通过解除对某些亿万富翁的限制来解决本土政治问题。
US President Donald Trump is driving an oligarch-sized superyacht through curbs on Moscow’s energy exports with a deal to release more diesel onto international markets. And while the European Union is pressing on gamely with a 22nd set of punitive economic measures against Russian individuals and entities, it’s starting to see the limits of its reach. Loopholes for the sanctioned are appearing everywhere, and even EU members such as France and Luxembourg are trying to fix local political problems by lifting restrictions on certain billionaires.
自2022年俄罗斯入侵乌克兰以来,对俄制裁一直走在一条令人沮丧的道路上,特朗普的白宫将其金融和外交武器指向了莫斯科以外的任何地方。对伊朗的战争和霍尔木兹海峡的关闭使问题更加严重,导致俄罗斯石油价格上涨,并最终导致特朗普在美国中期选举前迫切希望缓解柴油市场压力。其结果是:为普京的生日送上一份包装精美的礼物。
Since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Russia sanctions have been on a depressing pathway, with the Trump White House aiming its financial and diplomatic weaponry anywhere but Moscow. The war on Iran and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz compounded the problem, creating higher prices for Russian oil and ultimately Trump’s desperation for relief for the diesel market ahead of the US midterm elections. The result: a nicely wrapped gift for Putin’s birthday.
欧洲人可能会对这份田园诗般的柴油协议感到惊愕,但他们自己也谈不上光彩夺目。鉴于对乌克兰的空袭不断加剧以及俄罗斯对欧盟领土和领空日益猖獗的侵犯,他们显然更愿意对莫斯科施加惩罚。然而,据新书作者、历史学家尼古拉斯·穆尔德称,该集团缺乏美元体系的影响力,且建立共识需要更长的时间。
The Europeans may look aghast at a sweetheart diesel deal, but they’ve hardly covered themselves in glory. They are clearly more willing to inflict punishment on Moscow given the intensifying strikes on Ukraine and Russia’s increasingly blatant violations of EU territory and airspace. But the bloc lacks the clout of the US dollar system and it takes longer to build consensus, according to historian Nicholas Mulder, author of a new book, .
更不可原谅的是,它每月仍进口约10亿欧元(合11亿美元)至20亿欧元的俄罗斯化石燃料。尽管该国努力逐步淘汰液化天然气的采购,但这一局面看起来依然糟糕透顶。
Less forgivable, it still imports about €1 billion ($1.1 billion) to €2 billion a month of Russian fossil fuels. That’s a bad look, despite the efforts to phase out its purchases of liquefied natural gas from the country.
当然,俄罗斯及其精英阶层的经济状况也远非良好。它正在运行一种战争经济,这种经济正在耗尽全国各地的资源,从人力劳动到大公司的资源,再到这些公司巨头老板的财富。俄罗斯最富有的男子之一弗拉基米尔·波塔宁最近表示,尽管正在进行“庞大”的努力以平衡账目,但经济尚未触底。我们离莫斯科精英们曾在“伦敦格勒”受到欢迎、德国人批准俄罗斯北溪天然气管道的那些日子还很遥远。
Of course, Russia and its elite are hardly in fine economic fettle. It is running a war economy that is depleting resources from every part of the nation, from human labor to the resources of big companies and the fortunes of their tycoon bosses. Vladimir Potanin, one of Russia’s richest men, recently said the economy had yet to hit bottom amid a “titanic” effort to balance the books. We’re a long way from the heady days where Moscow’s finest were welcomed in “Londongrad” and the Germans gave their blessing to the Nordstream gas pipeline from Russia.
从蔚蓝海岸到金丝雀码头的游艇和房产被冻结,伦敦证券交易所上市的两 dozen 家俄罗斯公司已经消失,英国首相安迪·伯纳姆公开指责普京干预了2016年英国脱欧公投。即使制裁正在松动,也没有制裁也好。俄罗斯仍然无法访问托管在Euroclear的数十亿美元资金。诸如切尔西足球俱乐部这样的奖杯资产的火售所得仍然遥不可及。
Yachts and properties from the Cote d’Azur to Canary Wharf are frozen, two dozen Russian firms listed on the London Stock Exchange have disappeared and UK Prime Minister Andy Burnham openly accuses Putin of interfering in the 2016 Brexit vote. Even fraying sanctions are better than no sanctions at all. Russia still cannot access many billions of dollars in funds held by Euroclear. The proceeds from the fire-sales of trophy assets such as Chelsea Football Club remain out of reach.
但在这种围绕莫斯科建起的金融封锁之下,继续向其倾注更多资金几乎毫无意义。亲乌克兰阵线上的任何裂缝都将成为普京利用的裂痕。欧盟将阿利舍尔·乌斯曼诺夫和米哈伊尔·弗里德曼从制裁名单中删除——一个是为了囚犯交换,另一个是担心输掉官司——这可能会给普京提供想法,因为在法国和德国,更同情他极端民族主义事业的极右翼党派正在民意调查中崛起。
But having built this financial blockade around Moscow, it makes little sense to keep throwing money over the top of it. Any cracks in the pro-Ukraine front will become fractures exploited by Putin. The EU’s removal from the sanctions list of Alisher Usmanov and Mikhail Fridman — one to do with a prisoner exchange, the other because of fears of losing a court case — could give Putin ideas as far-right parties more sympathetic to his ultranationalist cause rise in the polls in France and Germany.
曾担任欧盟前最高外交官何塞普·博雷利顾问的巴黎政治学院的扎基·莱迪认为,特朗普与他的俄罗斯密友达成的柴油协议,不仅仅是对中期选举前美国选民的抚慰。他表示:“这是一个政治信号,将在军事上为普京壮胆,对乌克兰形成制约,并将更多支持基辅的负担转嫁给欧洲人。这并非西方制裁机器的崩溃,而是一个缺口。”
And Trump’s diesel deal with his Russian buddy is more than just a sop to American voters ahead of midterm elections, according to Sciences Po’s Zaki Laidi, who previously advised the EU’s former top diplomat Josep Borrell. “This is a political signal that will embolden Putin militarily, constrain Ukraine and shift more of the burden of supporting Kyiv onto the Europeans,” he says. “It is not a collapse of the West’s sanctions machine but it is a breach.”
事情是在哪里出了差错,它们还能被纠正吗?在布鲁塞尔和其他西方首都,人们对制裁能做什么、不能做什么正在形成一种更现实的算计。俄罗斯经济学家、伦敦商学院院长谢尔盖·古里耶夫表示,惩罚个别寡头对战争产生的“影响有限”,因为大亨们为了自我保护(或财富保护)大都选择保持沉默。不过他表示,对俄罗斯国家及其机器的更广泛经济因此产生了真正的冲击。
Where did things go wrong and can they be put right? In Brussels and other Western capitals, a more realistic calculus is emerging of what sanctions can and cannot do. Sergei Guriev, a Russian economist and dean of London Business School, says punishing individual oligarchs had a “limited impact” on the war as tycoons have largely chosen to stay quiet out of self-preservation (or wealth preservation). Broader economic sanctions on the Russian state and its machinery have, however, had a real impact, he says.
因此,欧盟最好还是简单地执行现有的制裁,例如打击离岸司法管辖区内复杂的金融空壳公司游戏。在未来一年法国和其他地方的选举结果尚无定论之际,欧盟应该加倍努力。与其等待亲俄民粹主义者可能上台,不如现在就采取行动。
So the EU would be better off by simply enforcing existing sanctions, such as cracking down on elaborate financial shell-company games in offshore jurisdictions. And it should double down on this effort with the outcome of elections in France and elsewhere up in the air over the next year. Better to act now than wait for Russia-friendly populists to possibly take power.
甚至可能是时候考虑一下那些不可想象的事情了,即如果寡头们有足够的勇气与普京分道扬镳并公开反对这场战争,或许可以接受与他们进行某种讨价还价。虽然这样的人寥寥无几,但已经有几个人这样做了,并被从制裁名单中除名,从Yandex的阿尔卡季·沃洛日到消费品行业大亨奥列格·蒂恩科夫。
It might even be time to think the unthinkable and accept that maybe some bargaining with oligarchs is possible if they are brave enough to part ways with Putin and publicly oppose the war. Several individuals have already done this and been removed from sanctions lists, from Yandex’s Arkady Volozh to consumer-industry tycoon Oleg Tinkov, though they are rare.
这或许是分裂俄罗斯精英的一种方式,而不是迫使他们围聚在普京周围。当然,这不会赢得战争。但欧盟至少必须对普京在其领土上的挑衅和侵略作出更具活力和信心的回应。同时,还需减少类似特朗普那样的人物乘坐游艇穿越制裁体系所可能造成的损害。
This might be one way to divide the Russian elite rather than forcing them to huddle around Putin. None of this will win wars, of course. But the EU must at the very least present a more dynamic and confident response to Putin’s provocations and aggressions on its soil. And lessen the potential damage of a Trump-type figure sailing their yacht through the sanctions edifice.