请想象一下,如果民调是正确的,那将意味着什么。民主党有可能不仅在北卡罗来纳州和佐治亚州赢得参议院选举,还可能在爱荷华州、俄亥俄州、德克萨斯州、堪萨斯州和阿拉斯加州获胜。如果民调对民主党略有偏差,那么在南卡罗来纳州可能会出现民主党赢得席位的情况,在内布拉斯加州可能会出现对自由派友好的独立人士获胜,甚至南达科他州也可能出现势均力敌的竞争。
Consider, for a minute, what it would mean for the polls to be right. Democrats could plausibly win Senate races not just in North Carolina and Georgia but also in Iowa, Ohio, Texas, Kansas and Alaska. If surveys were slightly biased against Democrats, there could be a blue pickup in South Carolina, an independent friendly to liberals in Nebraska and perhaps a close race in South Dakota, too.
到了一月,民主党有可能同时掌控国会两院,并在共和党腐败和赤裸裸的自利行为达到历史高点之后,获得传唤和调查权。他们还可能掌控全国50个州长职位中的28个,不仅包括爱荷华州和阿拉斯加州,还可能包括德克萨斯州和堪萨斯州。在摇摆州宾夕法尼亚州,乔什·夏皮罗可能以25个百分点的优势赢得连任。蓝色选区可能掌控全国国内生产总值的70%,甚至可能更多。而且,全国三个最大的城市将不仅由民主党执政,还将由左翼市长领导。
Come January, Democrats could control both houses of Congress and command subpoena and investigative power in the wake of a historic run of Republican corruption and naked self-enrichment. They could control 28 of the country’s 50 governorships, including not just Iowa and Alaska but also potentially Texas and Kansas. In the swing state of Pennsylvania, Josh Shapiro might win re-election by 25 points. Blue districts could command 70 percent of the country’s gross domestic product, perhaps even more. And the country’s three biggest cities would be run not just by Democrats but also by left-wing mayors.
过去十年里,我们一直处于一种明显的特朗普时代,即便是进步派的策略和民主党的政策也受到总统及其MAGA运动对美国未来主张的不可抗拒的影响。更不用说唐纳德·特朗普对美国注意力的独特掌控:在三次竞选中,他获得的选票比他的民主党对手少了近八百万,但当他在2015年乘坐那部金色扶梯下降时,他夺得了国家政治想象的中心舞台,并且自此未曾离开。
We’ve spent the past decade in what feels unmistakably like the Trump era, with even progressive strategy and Democratic policy shaped by the inescapable gravity of the president and MAGA’s claim on the American future. Not to mention Donald Trump’s singular command of American attention: Across three campaigns, he won almost eight million fewer votes than his Democratic opponents, but when he descended that gold escalator in 2015, he claimed center stage in the country’s political imagination and hasn’t left it since.
乔·拜登上任时曾梦想着像富兰克林·D.罗斯福那样的总统任期,但他的政府在国家记忆中更像是一个注释,指出特朗普实际上并未连续执政12年。
Joe Biden began his term dreaming of an F.D.R. presidency, but his administration lingers in national memory more like an asterisk noting that Trump was not actually in power for 12 consecutive years.
如果我们能够告别那个整个时代,那会是什么样子?而它之后又会是什么?
What would it be like to leave that whole era behind? And what might follow it?
也许这些问题听起来像是不祥之兆。民主党赢得参议院的道路仍然看起来像是走钢丝,取决于在红州实现一些结构上不可能的胜利。人们有理由担心民意调查过于乐观,拒绝接受民调机构电话的农村选民仍可能前来投票,以及共和党的巨额支出可能很快袭来——其中仅埃隆·马斯克一人就可能投入数亿美元。也许油价还会继续下跌。即便出现蓝色浪潮,也只会让我们在华盛顿面临数年的争议性跛脚鸭冲突。特朗普时代已经制造了如新山脉般的国家创伤,而清理工作很可能成为一项跨代项目。
Perhaps those questions sound like a jinx. The path to a Democratic Senate still looks like a tightrope walk, dependent on some structurally unlikely victories in red states. There are reasons to worry that polls have been too optimistic, that rural voters who have refused calls from pollsters may still turn up to vote, and that a tsunami of Republican spending could hit soon — including hundreds of millions of dollars from Elon Musk alone. Perhaps the price of gas could continue to fall. And even if there is a blue wave, it would still leave us with several years of contentious lame-duck conflict in Washington. The Trump era has already produced national wreckage like a new mountain range, and the cleanup may well be a generational project.
尽管考虑到所有这些保留条件,时代仍可能比你想象的更快结束。早在2003年春天,乔治·W·布什总统的批准率仍在70%左右徘徊,直至他第二任期深入,美国文化似乎仍深受他那种牛仔式福音主义的影响,至少与MAGA渗透美国血液之深相当。
Consider all those caveats granted. Eras can still come to a close more quickly than you might expect. As late as the spring of 2003, President George W. Bush’s approval rating was still hovering around 70 percent, and well into his second term the country’s culture seemed suffused with his particular brand of cowboy evangelicalism at least as much as MAGA has ever infiltrated the American bloodstream.
我们仍在承受反恐战争及其名义下建立的监控国家的后果,更不用说医保D部分和布什减税带来的巨额财政账单。选举有后果。但这并不意味着每一次投票都会在国家性格上留下长久的印记。在布什时代,一位高级顾问曾臭名昭著地形容政府成员是“历史的参与者”,他们将在未来多年塑造新的政治现实。但如今,乔治·W·布什在共和党政治中几乎已成被遗忘的人,他每天花时间创作令人毛骨悚然却又动人的画作,描绘他曾是世界历史人物和文化符号的那段奇特时光。
We are still living with the fallout from the war on terror and the surveillance state built in its name, not to mention Medicare Part D and the giant fiscal bill due from the Bush tax cuts. Elections have consequences. But that doesn’t mean that every vote marks a long-lasting shift in the character of the country. During the Bush era, one senior adviser notoriously described members of the administration as “history’s actors” who would be creating new political realities for years to come. But these days George W. Bush is almost a forgotten man in Republican politics, who spends his days composing eerily moving paintings about the strange time in history when he was a world-historical figure and a cultural meme.
布什主义之后是奥巴马主义,但接下来会是谁和什么跟随特朗普?我们只能拭目以待。中期选举的胜利以及随后的跛脚鸭时期将为民主党提供一个机会,来梳理它实际上可能代表什么。该党现在就该开始为后特朗普时代奠定基础,而不是等到2028年。我说的不是政治信息层面的问题,在那个层面上,广泛的一致性很容易想象。
What followed Bushism was Obamaism, but who and what will follow Trump? We’ll have to wait and see. Victory in the midterms and the lame-duck period that follows would present the Democratic Party with an opportunity to hash out what it might actually stand for. The time for the party to start laying the groundwork for the post-Trump era is now, not in 2028. I don’t mean this as a matter of political messaging, where broad alignment is easy enough to imagine.
我所说的是政策:除了谴责特朗普之外,该党想要做什么?在2027年的民主党控制的国会中,《H.R. 1》法案会包含什么内容?2029年就职日后的前100天里,一位民主党总统会试图做什么?
I am talking about policy: What does the party want to do beyond rebuking Trump? What would go into an H.R. 1 bill in a Democratic Congress in 2027? What would a Democratic president try to do in the 100 days after Inauguration Day in 2029?
目前,这些问题仍然悬而未决。过去几年里,民主党或多或少地遵循了詹姆斯·卡维尔在2025年《纽约时报》客座文章中的建议:党员保持低调,等待特朗普和MAGA自行崩溃。总体而言,民主党已经淡化了一些他们曾认为在拜登年间疏远了选民的言论——特别是在气候和性别议题上——并转而强调腐败和寡头政治的信息,而特朗普政府恰好把这些议题端到了他们面前。
These questions remain remarkably unanswered at the moment. For the past few years, Democrats have more or less followed James Carville’s advice from a 2025 Times guest essay that party members keep their heads down and wait for Trump and MAGA to implode. Overall, Democrats have softened some of the rhetoric that they decided alienated voters in the Biden years — on climate and gender issues in particular — and leaned into messaging about corruption and plutocracy that the Trump administration has served them on a platter.
最近,他们又加入了对人工智能的怀疑,这标志着与奥巴马时代科技政治的某种决裂——或者至少证实了科技领袖们在2024年选举周期中与民主党的分手。
More recently, they’ve added skepticism about artificial intelligence, marking a kind of break with Obama-era tech politics — or at least confirming the breakup that tech leaders made with Democrats in the 2024 election cycle.
但这只是失权政党的简单定位。几乎没有迹象表明他们在赢得选举后所需的那种长期政策规划和优先级安排。总体来看,政策图景似乎比2008年大选前要模糊得多,当时民主党似乎明确指向从伊拉克撤军、医疗改革以及某种形式的气候行动。进入2020年大选时,民主党提出了绿色新政和更广泛的关怀经济议程,后来被称为“重建更美好”。
But this is all the easy positioning of an out-of-power party. There are few signs of long-term policy planning and prioritization of the kind you need after you’ve won. In general, the policy picture seems considerably cloudier than it did leading up to the 2008 election, when the Democratic Party seemed pointed toward withdrawal from Iraq, health care reform and climate action of some kind or another. Leading into 2020, Democrats had the vision of a Green New Deal and the broader care economy agenda, which became known as Build Back Better.
但展望2028年?人们可以想象,一场反腐败运动可能会演变为更广泛的良好治理、反DOGE议程:针对选区划分的行动,显著扩大国税局的调查权力,以便实际执行对富人的税率,以及对特朗普削减的所有科学和研发资金作出恢复-plus的回应。也许这种良好治理议程甚至会延伸到最高法院改革以及华盛顿特区和波多黎各的州地位——尽管更可能的是,他们会被认为不值得为此斗争。
But heading into 2028? One could imagine an immediate anti-corruption crusade giving way to a broader good governance, anti-DOGE agenda: action on gerrymandering, significant expansion of I.R.S. investigative powers so that tax rates on the rich can actually be enforced, a restoration-plus response to all the science and R. & D. funding cut by Trump. Perhaps that good governance agenda would even extend to Supreme Court reforms and statehood for Washington, D.C., and Puerto Rico — though it’s more likely that they would be judged as not worth the struggle.
在许可改革方面,有自然的前进道路,重点放在清洁能源上,而非目前国会正在辩论的版本;还有国家数据中心政策,旨在让开发商为电网的重大升级买单并降低当地电价;以及一种受“丰盛”理念影响的可负担性方法,特别是针对全国性住房短缺问题。
There are natural paths forward for permitting reform focused more on clean energy than the version currently being debated in Congress, for national data center policies designed to make developers pay for major upgrades to the grid and drive local electricity prices down, and for an “Abundance”-inflected approach to affordability, especially to the national housing shortage.
有意成为众议院议长的哈基姆·杰弗里斯承诺将迅速行动,恢复奥巴马医改补贴,撤销医疗补助削减,并终结特朗普的关税战争。进步派可能会推动撤销移民与海关执法局的资金,甚至禁止对非重罪犯进行国内移民执法,而且不难想象一项新的国防预算,通过取消镀金武器系统来削减开支,转而投资于下一代低成本替代方案。
The would-be House speaker Hakeem Jeffries has promised fast action on restoring Obamacare subsidies, reversing Medicaid cuts and undoing Trump’s tariff war. Progressives might push for a rollback on Immigration and Customs Enforcement funding or even a ban on internal immigration enforcement against non-felons, and it’s not hard to picture a new defense budget that would cut spending by axing gold-plated weapons systems and investing instead in next-generation, low-cost alternatives.
民主党尚未公开讨论特朗普政府对私营企业持股的方式如何能够为进步派在特定行业的干预创造机会,或他宣称能源紧急状态如何为进步派的工业产能创造机遇 — — 尽管如果他们愿意,罗斯福研究所最近的《2029计划》汇编了进步派可能的政策和治理创新,或许是一个很好的起点。还有那些搁置已久的旧想法,有些比其他更受欢迎 — — 全民医保、新的全国最低工资、免费大学教育 — — 但所有这些在高利贷时代看来实施的可能性都似乎变小了。
Democrats haven’t begun to talk publicly about how the way that Trump’s government has taken stakes in private companies might enable progressive-minded interventions on particular sectors, or the way that his invocation of an energy emergency creates opportunity for progressive industrial capacity — though if they wanted to, the Roosevelt Institute’s recent Project 2029 compendium of possible policy and governing innovations for progressives might be a good place to start reading. And then there are those old ideas sitting on the shelf, some more popular than others — Medicare for all, a new national minimum wage, free college — but all looking a bit less likely to be implemented in an era of high interest rates.
如果这听起来像是一份杂乱无章的清单,那是因为它确实如此。也许这在本次选举中,甚至在下一次选举中都不会产生政治影响。特朗普主义的腐败可能已经足够,尤其是因为总统的第二任期让共和党看起来显然是一个自私交易且腐败的精英群体,以至于民主党不再看起来像是金钱的政党。我们已经可以看到有志于参选总统的人抓住这一机遇,在意识形态光谱的任何位置上,都在倡导常识性的反 plutocracy(即反对富豪统治)立场。
If this sounds like a grab-bag list, that’s because it is. Maybe it won’t matter politically for this election, or even the next one. The rot of Trumpism may be enough, particularly because the president’s second term has made Republicans look so obviously like a self-dealing and corrupt elite that Democrats no longer look remotely like the party of money. We can already see would-be presidential candidates seizing that opportunity and leaning into common-sense anti-plutocratic positioning, wherever they are on the ideological spectrum.
但人们希望这种定位能够转化为具体政策,而不仅仅是被反复重复为一套永恒的模糊口号。可以肯定的是,特朗普第二任期的一个教训是过度扩张的代价。但当一个政治时代在波澜壮阔的选举中结束时,也存在不足作为的风险。
But one hopes the positioning will translate into policy rather than just get repeated as an eternal set of vague talking points. To be sure, one lesson of Trump’s second term is the price of overreach. But when one political era comes to an end with a wave election, there is a risk of underreach, too.