At the moment, Saudi Arabia – as it has for quite a few years now – has a problem with mobile Houthi missile launchers, which mount strikes against Saudi targets, or against shipping in the southern Red Sea, and then move off before they can be counter-struck. One would always want to shoot the archer rather than the arrow, but this is not an easy thing to achieve. This is not just a problem for the Saudis.

One reason there has not been a full-blown global economic crisis is that oil can move out of the Gulf without going through the Strait of Hormuz, via the Saudis’ east-west pipeline to Yanbu in the northern Red Sea – provided the pipeline has not been struck. From Yanbu the oil can move by tanker out into the global market. But if the tanker is to head north for the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean, it must be a “Suezmax” vessel, one able to fit through the canal.

Suezmax tankers can carry, say, a million barrels of oil. Full-size Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs, the industry term for supertankers) can carry more than twice as much. Suezmax tankers are not as efficient as VLCCs.

But if you want to take a VLCC-load of oil from the Yanbu pipeline, that ship has to run the gauntlet past the Houthis at the southern end of the Red Sea.

In sum, Houthi control of the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, the “Gate of Tears”, the southern exit from the Red Sea, is pushing up oil prices and causing inflation and related economic woes all over the world. But how do you solve a problem like the Houthis?

Houthi missile and drone teams are not conventional targets sitting conveniently in barracks or lined up on an airfield. They are mobile, dispersed and capable of disappearing into difficult terrain – often urban terrain packed with civilians – almost as soon as they have fired.

Trying to destroy them exclusively with air strikes and expensive precision missiles can become an exercise in punching smoke. Long-range precision missiles like the US Tomahawk and JASSM take a long time to fly in to their targets. They can be replaced only slowly and at great cost.

Cheaper weapons must mostly be released from aircraft above the target, exposing airmen to the risk of being shot down and captured: something any Western leader would wish to avoid, especially Donald Trump as he heads into the midterm elections at home. There is another option: putting boots on the ground to find and destroy the missile units. It is a far more dangerous proposition, politically as well as militarily. But if we are serious about ending the threat rather than merely managing it, Western governments may have to consider the uncomfortable reality that some targets cannot be neutralised from the air.

I would argue that this should not be a matter of occupying ground with regular troops: what is wanted is special operations forces able to operate covertly in hostile territory. Britain has plenty to offer here. The SAS and SBS have a proud history of operating behind enemy lines, locating elusive targets and striking where conventional forces struggle.

From the Aden campaign to the First Gulf War, British special forces have demonstrated precisely the kind of skills that could prove relevant today. During the 1991 Gulf War, SAS patrols hunted Iraqi Scud missile launchers across the desert, seeking to prevent Saddam Hussein from firing them at Israel and coalition forces, including yours truly. British tank crews of the 1st Armoured Division were deployed as part of the coalition, including B Squadron, 14th/20th Hussars – the unit with which I had the honour to serve in that war.

The threat of chemical warheads made the mission particularly urgent.

The technology has changed, but the essential challenge remains the same: finding mobile launchers and taking them out.

But one can imagine the response at Credenhill, the SAS’s Herefordshire home, if soldiers were asked to risk their lives at least in part to rescue an American administration seemingly oblivious to the consequences of its own strategic choices. There is a deeper question for the British Government.

How can ministers expect our most elite soldiers to undertake dangerous operations for an ally while allowing those who fought terrorism in Iraq, Afghanistan and Northern Ireland to be dragged repeatedly through the courts? Years of legal and political battles have left veterans wondering whether the country they served will stand behind them when it matters. I am not arguing that special forces should be above the law.

They should not. I do argue that only the proper laws of war should apply to soldiers – the Geneva Conventions, not the various overweening forms of human-rights law – and that those making life-and-death decisions must be judged fairly, on the evidence and in context.

In particular it is time to end the lawfare being waged against the veterans of Northern Ireland, which is particularly egregious given the fact that many known IRA terrorists have received “letters of comfort” conferring immunity on them. Coming back to the problem of today, British special forces have operated against Iranian-backed threats in Iraq.

Their experience could prove invaluable against the networks sustaining the Houthis.

However, I would rather continue paying through the nose for my petrol and diesel than watch another generation of British troops risk everything abroad, only to face years of legal persecution at home. President Donald Trump may yet discover that his most effective weapons are not multi-million-dollar missiles, but the experience of an ally whose soldiers know how to hunt an elusive enemy. The question is whether he understands the price of asking for their help and whether Britain has the courage to stand behind its soldiers afterwards.