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普京的战略正在奏效Putin’s Strategy Is Working

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乌克兰哈尔科夫,一座购物中心在俄罗斯导弹袭击中受损,2026年10月 索菲娅·加蒂洛娃 / 路透社A shopping mall damaged by Russian missile strikes, Kharkiv, Ukraine, October 2026 Sofiia Gatilova / Reuters

弗拉基米尔·普京在玩长线游戏。几十年来,这位俄罗斯领导人一直致力于使乌克兰屈服。几十年来,他也一直在培养与唐纳德·特朗普的关系。如今,后一项努力的成功,正让普京从前一项努力的失败中恢复过来:在对乌克兰战争中俄罗斯目标受挫近五年后,美国总统正帮助他取胜。通过放宽对俄罗斯的制裁、削减对乌克兰的军事和经济援助、破坏情报合作,并施压乌克兰总统弗拉基米尔·泽连斯基接受普京的战争目标,特朗普使得俄罗斯成功吞并大量乌克兰领土、并实际上控制基辅未来决策的可能性,比2022年2月以来几乎任何时候都要大。

Vladimir Putin plays the long game. For decades, the Russian leader has worked to subjugate Ukraine. For decades, he has also cultivated ties with Donald Trump. Now, success at the latter endeavor is allowing Putin to recover from failures at the former: after nearly five years of thwarted Russian objectives in the war on Ukraine, the U.S. president is helping him win. By easing sanctions on Russia, cutting military and economic assistance to Ukraine, disrupting intelligence cooperation, and pressuring Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to accept Putin’s war aims, Trump is making Russia’s successful annexation of substantial Ukrainian territory and de facto control over Kyiv’s future decisions more likely than at almost any point since February 2022.

自普京发动全面入侵乌克兰以来,战场态势在双方之间反复摇摆。俄军起初占据优势。但到2022年秋天,乌克兰已夺回攻势,收复了俄军曾占据的大量领土,以至于华盛顿担心普京可能会使用核武器来阻止乌克兰的推进。此后战争陷入前线的悲惨消耗战——直到去年春天。基辅部署了可打击俄罗斯纵深目标的新型远程导弹、能袭击乌克兰东部被占区俄军补给线的新型中程无人机,以及能更好防御俄军袭击乌克兰城市的改进型拦截无人机,战场态势重新向乌克兰倾斜。普京的大军证明无法在前线推进;乌军甚至在收复领土上取得了渐进式进展。

Since Putin launched his full-scale invasion of Ukraine, battlefield momentum has swung back and forth between the two sides. Russian forces had the advantage at the start. But by the fall of 2022, Ukraine had seized the offensive, liberating so much territory once held by Russian troops that Washington worried Putin might use a nuclear weapon to stop Ukrainian advances. The war then settled into a tragic grind on the frontline—until last spring. Momentum returned to Ukraine after Kyiv deployed new long-range missiles capable of striking targets deep inside Russia, new midrange drones able to attack Russian supply routes in the occupied parts of eastern Ukraine, and improved interceptor drones that could better defend against Russian attacks on Ukrainian cities. Putin’s army proved unable to advance on the frontline; Ukrainian troops even made incremental progress in liberating territory.

但特朗普帮助俄罗斯重新夺回了势头。普京在前线受阻后,将重心转向通过火箭弹和无人机袭击平民及其生计所依赖的基础设施——尤其是能源和水源——来恐吓乌克兰社会,他希望受苦的民众会向泽连斯基施压,迫使其投降。新式武器使这场恐怖行动尤为残酷,特别是弹道导弹的大规模生产,以及一种新型无人机“天竺葵-5”,该无人机配备了乌克兰防空系统无法拦截的强力中国产火箭发动机。

But Trump has helped return the momentum to Russia. Stymied at the frontline, Putin has shifted his focus to terrorizing Ukrainian society through rocket and drone strikes on both civilians and the infrastructure their livelihood depends on—energy and water in particular—driven by the hope that a suffering population would pressure Zelensky to capitulate. New weaponry has made this terrorist campaign especially brutal, in particular the mass production of ballistic missiles and a new drone, the Geran 5, equipped with a powerful Chinese rocket engine that Ukrainian air defenses cannot intercept.

由于俄罗斯拥有更多兵力、更强的军事生产能力以及一些新的更先进武器,普京相信,尽管看似陷入僵局,他仍有能力坚持下去。

Because Russia has more troops, greater military production capacity, and some new and better weapons, Putin believes that he can afford to persist despite the seeming stalemate.

特朗普的支持强化了普京的信念,即时间站在他这一边。就在过去几周里,特朗普及其盟友扩大了对莫斯科的帮助:暂停制裁、购买俄罗斯柴油、扰乱乌克兰获取星链和星盾通信系统的渠道,甚至坚持要求泽连斯基必须下台。泽连斯基指出:“同样清楚的是,当一些伙伴放松对俄罗斯的压力时,这只会强化普京的信念,即他的目标触手可及。”美国支持的减少——尤其是在防空方面——加上俄罗斯无人机速度更快、导弹更多,将使即将到来的冬天成为乌克兰人迄今为止最残酷的冬天。

Trump’s support has bolstered Putin’s belief that time is on his side. In just the last few weeks, Trump and his allies have expanded his help to Moscow: suspending sanctions, buying Russian diesel, disrupting Ukraine’s access to Starlink and Starshield communications systems, and even insisting that Zelensky must go. “It is equally clear that when some partners ease the pressure on Russia,” Zelensky has noted, “it only reinforces Putin’s belief that his goals are within reach.”The combination of less support from the United States, especially when it comes to air defenses, and faster Russian drones and more missiles will make the coming winter the most brutal yet for Ukrainians.

我们在华盛顿的人脉 普京与特朗普的长期博弈始于多年前,与其说是由某个具体目标驱动,不如说是希望克里姆林宫对他的影响力有朝一日能派上用场——这是克格勃的惯用伎俩。如今,这一天已经到来。

OUR MAN IN WASHINGTON Putin’s long game with Trump began years ago, driven not so much by some specific objective, but by the hope that Kremlin influence on him might someday prove useful—a common KGB tactic. Now that day has come.

在特朗普首次竞选总统前多年,与普京关系密切的俄罗斯人士便开始与这位当时的房地产大亨寻求商业联系,其中最著名的是特朗普于2013年与埃明·阿加拉罗夫和阿拉斯·阿加拉罗夫合作,在莫斯科举办环球小姐选美大赛。随后,普京策划了前所未有的外国干预行动,介入2016年美国总统大选,旨在助特朗普一臂之力、打击其对手希拉里·克林顿。

Years before Trump first ran for president, Russian actors close to Putin pursued business ties with the then real estate mogul, including most famously when Trump collaborated with Emin and Aras Agalarov to host the Miss Universe pageant in Moscow in 2013. Putin then orchestrated unprecedented foreign interference in the 2016 presidential election to help Trump and hurt his opponent Hillary Clinton.

俄罗斯窃取并公布克林顿竞选团队邮件,加上全方位的社交媒体造势助推特朗普,这一组合拳是否改变了2016年大选结果,无法证实。但普京试图影响选举结果,则毫无疑问。

Whether the Russian theft and publication of Clinton campaign emails, combined with a comprehensive social media effort to bolster Trump, affected the 2016 election outcome is impossible to prove. That Putin was trying to influence the result is without question.

2017年,普京对特朗普的经营开始带来一些氛围层面的红利。特朗普明确表达了对这位俄罗斯独裁者的钦佩。更令人震惊的是,2018年在赫尔辛基与普京举行峰会时,特朗普对本国情报界关于俄罗斯干预2016年大选的调查结论表示怀疑,反而背书普京的否认。然而,在其第一任期内,特朗普在言辞上对普京的溢美,仅在边缘程度上改变了美国对俄实际政策,部分原因是特朗普国家安全团队中的几位高级官员——国家安全顾问H·R·麦克马斯特、国防部长詹姆斯·马蒂斯、国务卿迈克·蓬佩奥——制约了特朗普,使其无法彻底转向亲俄立场。

In 2017, Putin’s cultivation of Trump started to deliver some atmospheric benefits. Trump made clear his admiration for the Russian dictator. More shockingly, during his summit with Putin in Helsinki in 2018, Trump expressed doubt about the findings of his intelligence community regarding Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election and instead endorsed Putin’s denial. Yet in his first term, Trump’s rhetorical adulation of Putin only marginally changed actual U.S. policy toward Russia, in part because several senior officials on Trump’s national security team—National Security Adviser H. R. McMaster, Secretary of Defense James Mattis, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo—constrained Trump from making a full pro-Russia pivot.

特朗普2024年再次当选后,克里姆林宫长期以来的拉拢开始产生更切实的成果。最具影响的后果是,特朗普终止了美国对乌克兰的直接军事和经济援助。在此之前,美国一直是乌克兰最大的支持者。特朗普仍允许美国公司向欧洲各国政府出售部分武器,再由这些政府转交给乌克兰。但即便是这条渠道也时常受到干扰,而且与美国此前提供的援助相比,只能算涓涓细流般的武器和弹药。

After Trump’s reelection, in 2024, the Kremlin’s long courtship started to produce more tangible results. Most consequentially, Trump ended direct U.S. military and economic assistance to Ukraine. Before then, the United States was Ukraine’s biggest backer. Trump has still allowed American companies to sell some arms to European governments, who then transfer them to Ukraine. But even that channel has been disrupted periodically and only amounts to a trickle of weapons and ammunition compared with what the United States previously provided.

而乌克兰最需要的东西——其“爱国者”导弹防御系统的拦截弹——供应极为短缺,部分原因是美国在特朗普对伊朗的战争期间发射了太多拦截弹。未来任何一位总统都不太可能延续特朗普的俄罗斯政策。

And what Ukraine needs most—interceptors for its Patriot missile defense systems—are in very short supply, in part because the United States has launched so many of them during Trump’s war with Iran. No future president is likely to continue Trump’s Russia policy.

美国采取的其他措施进一步削弱了乌克兰,并帮助了俄罗斯。特朗普坚持认为乌克兰永远不会加入北约。去年,他在阿拉斯加峰会上给予普京红毯待遇,两位总统在会上谈论了向乌克兰施压,要求其放弃顿巴斯地区剩余的东部领土,普京自2014年以来一直试图征服该地区。特朗普曾多次严厉斥责泽连斯基,其中最具戏剧性的一幕发生在2025年2月的椭圆形办公室会议上,当时他打断泽连斯基并大喊:“你已经说得够多了。你赢不了这场战争……你手里没有牌。”

Other U.S. steps have further undermined Ukraine and aided Russia. Trump has insisted that Ukraine would never join NATO. He gave Putin red-carpet treatment at an Alaska summit last year, at which the two presidents talked about pressuring Ukraine to give up the rest of the eastern region of the Donbas, which Putin has been trying to conquer since 2014. Trump has periodically berated Zelensky, including most dramatically at a February 2025 Oval Office meeting, when he cut off Zelensky and yelled, “You’ve done enough talking. You’re not winning this . . . You don’t have the cards.”

此后,特朗普偶尔会回到与乌克兰总统较为友好的关系上来。但特朗普又回到了公开表达敌意的状态,呼应普京宣称“该是乌克兰换个总统的时候了”。在过去两周里,特朗普增加了对普京战争的支持。他解除了制裁,允许俄罗斯柴油出口销售,这将为莫斯科提供数十亿美元资金,帮助其为军事行动融资。他签署了一项行政命令,暂停《2026年林赛·O·格雷厄姆制裁俄罗斯和伊朗法案》中概述的新制裁,而他几周前才刚刚签署了该法案。

Since then, Trump has occasionally zagged back to more cordial relations with the Ukrainian president. But Trump has returned to expressing open hostility, echoing Putin by proclaiming that it’s “time for Ukraine to get a new president.”In the last two weeks, Trump has increased support for Putin’s war. He lifted sanctions to allow the sale of Russian diesel exports, which will provide Moscow with billions of dollars to help finance military operations. He issued an executive order suspending new sanctions outlined in the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026, which he had signed just weeks earlier.

在共享某些只有美国能提供的情报方面出现了新的疏漏。最关键的是,乌克兰在使用SpaceX公司(由埃隆·马斯克拥有,他是特朗普的主要支持者和盟友,也是其政府前官员)提供的“星链”和“星盾”通信系统时遭遇了中断。基辅需要这两项服务来引导自己的无人机,并追踪和防御俄罗斯的无人机和火箭弹。是美国政府还是马斯克独立下令造成这些中断,目前尚不清楚。

There have been new lapses in sharing certain kinds of intelligence that only the United States can provide. Most consequentially, Ukraine has experienced disruptions in its access to Starlink and Starshield communications systems provided by SpaceX (a company owned by Elon Musk, a major backer and ally of Trump and a former official in his administration). Kyiv needs both services to guide its own drones and to track and defend against Russian drones and rockets. Whether the U.S. government or Musk independently ordered the disruptions is still not clear.

但干扰的后果显而易见:更多俄罗斯无人机和火箭弹击中了更多乌克兰目标,包括无辜平民;更多俄罗斯武器装备向前线推进;更多乌克兰无人机从空中坠落。

But the results of the disruptions were clear: more Russian drones and rockets hit more Ukrainian targets, including innocent civilians; more Russian weaponry moved closer to the frontline; and more Ukrainian drones fell out of the air.

通过各自的团队,普京和特朗普也在谈判新的商业交易,包括美国投资者收购俄罗斯主要石油公司卢克石油(Lukoil)的资产;出售连接德国和俄罗斯的、目前处于闲置状态的“北溪-2”天然气管道;甚至包括俄罗斯秘密投资阿拉斯加的一个液化天然气项目。如果这些项目推进,都将为普京提供新的收入,以资助他在乌克兰的战争。钟摆能否摆回?

Through their teams, Putin and Trump have also been negotiating new business deals, including the purchase of assets owned by a major Russian oil company, Lukoil, by American investors; the sale of a currently dormant gas pipeline, Nord Stream 2, connecting Germany and Russia; and even secret Russian investments in a liquefied natural gas project in Alaska. If they move forward, all these projects will provide Putin with new revenues to underwrite his war in Ukraine. CAN THE PENDULUM SWING BACK?

乌克兰人并未放弃;根据民调,稳固的多数仍认为本国应继续战斗。欧洲人也没有放弃乌克兰。虽然普京希望特朗普第二任期伊始撤回美国的军事和经济援助会导致乌克兰迅速崩溃或投降,但他未曾预料到欧洲国家填补美国留下的空白会如此愿意且有能力。此外,乌克兰国防科技公司正疯狂研发新武器,以拦截数量快速上升的俄罗斯弹道导弹和速度极快的“格拉尼-5”无人机。目前,钟摆已向俄罗斯一方摆动,但乌克兰人过去多次打破预期、重夺主动权;他们能再次做到。

Ukrainians are not giving up; according to polls, a solid majority still think that their country should keep fighting. Nor are Europeans quitting on Ukraine. Although Putin hoped that the withdrawal of American military and economic aid early in Trump’s second term would lead to a quick Ukrainian collapse or capitulation, he did not anticipate how willing and capable European countries would be in filling the American void. What’s more, Ukrainian defense tech companies are working frantically to develop new weapons to intercept the rapidly rising number of Russian ballistic missiles and speedy Geran 5 drones. Right now, the pendulum has swung in Russia’s direction, but the Ukrainians have defied expectations and regained momentum many times in the past; they can do it again.

美国政策也可能发生变化,尤其是在中期选举之后。美国社会不支持特朗普拥抱普京并抛弃乌克兰,这使得政府在政治上难以维持这一政策转向。如果民主党在下周的中期选举中赢得参众两院中一院或两院的控制权,他们很可能会利用新的选举授权,调查美俄商业交易;提出新立法以重启美国对乌克兰的军事和经济援助,并禁止“星链”和“星盾”服务中断;或采取立法行动强制执行现有的制裁法律。特朗普本人以前也曾对普京退让——他曾公开质疑普京是否在“拖着我走”。他可能会再次这样做。

U.S. policy could also change, especially after the midterm elections. American society does not support Trump’s embrace of Putin and abandonment of Ukraine, making it politically hard for the administration to maintain this policy pivot. If Democrats win control of one or both houses of Congress in midterm elections next week, they could very well use their new electoral mandate to investigate American-Russian business deals; introduce new legislation to restart American military and economic assistance to Ukraine and outlaw Starlink and Starshield disruptions; or deploy legislative action to enforce existing sanctions laws. Even Trump himself has stepped back from Putin before—he once wondered out loud whether Putin was “tapping me along.”He could do so again.

普京也应意识到,他对特朗普的笼络是一种贬值资产。无论下一任总统是民主党人还是共和党人,都不大可能延续特朗普的对俄政策。而下周,特朗普将成为跛脚鸭总统,他在未来两年塑造美国对俄政策的能力将逐渐下降。因此,普京明智的做法是,现在认真着手谈判停火。他获得有利协议的几率从现在起只会降低。

Putin should also realize that his cultivation of Trump is a wasting asset. No future president—Democrat or Republican—is likely to continue Trump’s Russia policy. And next week, Trump will become a lame duck, whose power to shape U.S. policy toward Russia will decline over the next two years. Putin would be wise, accordingly, to get serious about negotiating a cease-fire now. His odds of getting a favorable deal will only diminish from here.

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