
每到十月,我私下和公务场合的大多数谈话都会变成某种版本的:“你觉得民调准吗?”我的回答是:这取决于你所说的“准”是什么意思。我曾为从市议员到总统的各级竞选活动运营民调业务。在2020年和2024年,我分别负责拜登和哈里斯总统竞选团队的民调与分析项目。在每场竞选中,我利用民调的目的不那么多是为了预测谁会赢,而是为了弄清候选人如何能赢。民调在识别选民想要什么方面通常是准确的,但在势均力敌的选举中,它们并不总能预判正确的结果。
Every October, most conversations in my personal and professional life turn to some version of: “Do you think the polls are right?”My answer is: It depends on what you mean by “right.”I’ve run polling operations for campaigns from city council to president. In 2020 and 2024, I ran the polling and analytics programs on the Biden and Harris presidential campaigns. In each race, I used polls not so much to predict who would win, but rather to tell me how the candidate can win. Polls are often accurate in identifying what voters want, but they’re not always right about the outcome of a close election.
总统所属政党在中期选举中几乎总会失去席位。今年,这一趋势被放大了。
The president’s party almost always loses ground in a midterm. This year, that trend is amplified.
我们先从最狭义的问题入手:民调是否准确捕捉了某位候选人在特定选举中的支持率?我听到的最常见论点是:“上次民调错了,所以这次也会错。”的确,过去三届总统大选中,大多数公开民调都高估了民主党的支持率——尽管2024年的偏差比2016年和2020年小得多。
Let’s start with the narrowest version of the question: Are polls accurately capturing support for a candidate in a specific election? The most common argument I hear is that “the polls were wrong last time, so they’ll be wrong again this time.”It’s true that most public polling overestimated Democratic support in the past three presidential elections — though the misses were much smaller in 2024 than in 2016 and 2020.
然而,在过去两次中期选举中,民调相当准确,并没有系统性地高估某一方。而在2023年和2025年等最近的非大选年选举中,民调实际上低估了民主党。今年会不会出现系统性偏差,高估民主党支持率?完全有可能。但近期的历史并没有给我们任何理由预设这种情况会发生。
In the past two midterms however, polling was quite accurate and did not overestimate one party or the other. And in recent off-year elections like 2023 and 2025, polls actually underestimated Democrats. Could a systematic polling miss overstate Democratic support this year? Absolutely. But recent history doesn’t give us any reason to assume that will be the case.

乔谈中期选举乐观:“民主党大获全胜非常可行” 2026年10月26日 我之所以信任当前民调的大致走向,是因为它与更广泛的信号相吻合。总统所属政党在中期选举中几乎总会失去席位。今年,这一趋势被放大了。美国选民既……国外民众对现任者的不满情绪日益加剧。特朗普的支持率正跌至历史最低点。美国人的经济情绪悲观,汽油价格超过每加仑4美元。而近期的选民登记初选投票率趋势则指向民主党的热情高涨。
Joe on midterms optimism: ‘very doable’ for Dems to do well October 26, 2026 One reason I trust the general direction of current polling is because it aligns with broader signals. The president’s party almost always loses ground in a midterm. This year, that trend is amplified. Voters both in the U.S. abroad are increasingly fed up with incumbents. Trump’s approval ratings are hitting all-time lows. Economic sentiment among Americans is grim, with gas more than $4 a gallon. And recent voter registration primary turnout trends point to Democratic enthusiasm.
民调可能出错,而且经常出错。但眼下,民调与我们所知的其他一切情况相吻合。
Polls can be wrong, and often they are. But right now, they square up with everything else we know.
对民调有信心的另一个原因是,该行业持续在创新。例如,在本选举周期,许多民调机构采用改进后的方法来纳入投票回忆,这有助于样本更好地反映实际选民群体。这些进步并非万灵药,但它们体现了民调行业如何从失误中学习。
Another reason for confidence in the polls is that the industry continues to innovate. This cycle, for example, many pollsters are using improved methods to incorporate vote recall, which helps samples better reflect the actual electorate. These advancements aren’t a silver bullet but they reflect how the polling industry learns from its misses.
由于让选民通过电话完成民调的难度日益加大,该行业大部分已转向更便宜、更快捷的自选式在线样本库。然而,这些样本库很难做到准确。
Because of the growing difficulty to get voters to complete polls via phone, much of the industry has migrated to cheaper, faster, opt-in online panels. However, these panels can be hard to get right.
与此同时,民调仍存在一些非常严重的问题。其中大部分源于愿意接受民调的人很少这一事实。参与民调的人往往与不参与的人在诸多方面存在很大差异,而这些差异难以衡量和校正。这造成了一个民调机构称之为无应答偏差的障碍。
At the same time, there remain some very serious problems with polling. Most of them stem from the fact that few people are willing to take polls. Those who do participate tend to be quite different from those who do not, in ways that are hard to measure and correct for. This creates a hurdle pollsters call nonresponse bias.
由于让选民通过电话完成民调的难度日益加大,该行业大部分已转向更便宜、更快捷的自选式在线样本库。然而,这些样本库很难做到准确。每一项民调都依赖于关于谁将出来投票的假设,而说服真正具有代表性的选民群体加入在线样本库本身就有其挑战。
Because of the growing difficulty to get voters to complete polls via phone, much of the industry has migrated to cheaper, faster, opt-in online panels. However, these panels can be hard to get right. Every poll relies on assumptions about who will turn out to vote, and convincing a truly representative slice of the electorate to opt into an online panel presents its own challenges.
这种高频、低成本的在线民调环境也为不法分子打开了大门。在本轮选举周期中,我们已经看到了人工智能生成的受访者、故意扭曲的结果以及捏造的民调数据。由于该行业缺乏监管,这些糟糕的民调可以在社交媒体上迅速传播,并常常进入官方新闻报道和预测之中。与此同时,预测市场为发布虚假数据增添了经济激励,目的是操纵这些市场。所有这些都使得信任任何单一民调变得比以往任何时候都更加困难。
This high-frequency, low-cost online polling environment has also opened the door to bad actors. Already this cycle, we’ve seen artificial intelligence-generated respondents, intentionally skewed results and fabricated polling data. Because the industry is unregulated, these bad polls can spread rapidly on social media and often make their way into official news reports and forecasts. Meanwhile, prediction markets have added financial incentives to publish false data, in hopes of moving those markets. All of this has made it harder than ever to trust any single poll.

民主党似乎在参议院占据微弱优势:萨巴托的水晶球 每两年一次关于我们能否“信任”民调的争论令人沮丧,因为它掩盖了民调数据的真正价值。在整个政治生态系统中,我们利用民调来了解选民的动机、他们对未来的期望以及他们的观点正在如何变化。我们利用民调来分配资源并锁定可说服的选民。民调在这方面非常擅长。它仍然是我们检验假设、倾听那些真正决定选举的人的意见的最佳工具之一。
Democrats appear to hold narrow edge on the Senate: Sabato’s Crystal Ball The biennial debate over whether we can “trust” the polls is frustrating because it obscures the real value of polling data. Across the political ecosystem, we are using polls to understand what motivates voters, what they want for the future and how their views are changing. We are using polls to allocate resources and target persuadable voters. Polling is great at this. It remains one of our very best tools for testing assumptions and listening to the people who will actually decide an election.
民调不太擅长的是告诉我们某位候选人将以49.8%还是49.6%的得票率获胜。民调捕捉的是某一时刻的情况;它们并不预测未来。所有民调都存在统计不确定性,这种不确定性往往大于势均力敌的竞选中的差距。
What polling is not so good at is telling us whether a candidate will win 49.8% or 49.6% of the vote. Polls capture a moment in time; they don’t predict the future. All polls have statistical uncertainty that is often larger than the margin of a close race.
从现在到11月,我将这样解读民调:我会关注民调平均值和趋势线,而不是紧盯某一份民调。我会对来自新机构的民调以及那些不公开其方法的民调保持怀疑。当民调呈现相互矛盾的信息时,我会查看其人口统计和方法论假设,以判断哪些是合理的,并理解投票率假设的影响。而且,相比头条结果,我会更关注是什么在驱动选民——是特朗普、数据中心、食品杂货价格还是其他因素。
Here’s how I’ll be reading the polls between now and November: I’ll look at polling averages and trend lines, instead of zeroing in on any single poll. I’ll remain skeptical of polls from new outfits and those that don’t share their methodology. When polls present contradictory information, I’ll look at their demographic and methodological assumptions to see which are plausible and to understand the impact of turnout assumptions. And I’ll be much more interested in what’s motivating voters — whether that’s Trump, data centers, the cost of groceries or something else — than the headline results.
如果我们已经知道结局,选举之夜就不会令人兴奋了。今年,我鼓励你们按民调本来的面目来看待它们:一个战略指南针、一条趋势线、一扇了解选民感受和动机的窗口——而不是对结果的预测。
Election night wouldn’t be exciting if we already knew the ending. This year, I encourage you to take polls for what they are: a strategic compass, a trendline, a window into voters’ feelings and motivations — not a prediction of the outcome.
我曾负责为拜登和哈里斯监督民调。以下是我如何解读中期选举民调。
The post I oversaw polling for Biden and Harris. Here’s how I’m reading the midterm polls.