
在总统唐纳德·特朗普的领导下,帝国的野心总在不断变化。格陵兰岛、委内瑞拉、伊朗和古巴,往往被当作一连串已经取得的彻底胜利以及即将取得的彻底胜利来谈论。随着中期选举的迅速临近,以及显然蓄势待发的重返伊朗战争的日期紧随其后,关于轻松推翻政权的言论卷土重来——如果这些言论从未真正消失的话。
Imperial ambitions are ever-shifting under President Donald Trump. Greenland, Venezuela, Iran, and Cuba are oftentimes spoken about as one continuous train of complete victories and soon-to-be-complete-victories. With the midterms fast approaching, and the date for an apparent telegraphed return to the Iran war on its heels, talk of easily overthrowing regimes has returned, if it ever truly left.
上周五在佛罗里达州的一次集会上,特朗普阐述了他的宏伟愿景。他承诺,一旦伊朗伊斯兰共和国作为对世界的威胁被消除,这一愿景就会实现:“我们将从伊朗凯旋。那些美丽的船只将驶过古巴。我们将让其中一艘停在离海岸约50码的地方。他们会举起双手,然后我们将派马可·鲁比奥去完成这笔交易。”
At a rally in Florida last Friday, Trump laid out his grand vision, which he promised would come to pass once the Islamic Republic is neutralized as a threat to the world: “We’re going to come back from Iran. Those beautiful ships will pass Cuba. We’ll have one of them stop about 50 yards off the coast. They’ll raise up their hands, and then we’re going to send Marco Rubio in to finish up the deal.”
国务卿马可·鲁比奥是富尔亨西奥·巴蒂斯塔总统统治时期离开古巴的古巴移民后裔(尽管鲁比奥后来曾试图声称他的父母逃离了三年后才掌权的卡斯特罗),长期以来一直将推翻哈瓦那的共产主义政府作为其议程的首要任务,并希望复制一月份绑架委内瑞拉总统尼古拉斯·马杜罗时的相对轻而易举。鲁比奥上周五在X平台上公开贴文称,那些寻求“在古巴创造积极变革”的人可以“抓住机遇,通过与中情局建立暗中(原文如此)伙伴关系来创造你想要的变革”,此举令人侧目。
Secretary of State Marco Rubio, the descendant of Cuban immigrants who left under President Fulgencio Batista (though Rubio later tried to claim his parents fled Castro, who came to power three years later), has long put overthrowing the Communist government in Havana at the top of his agenda, with the hope of replicating the relative ease of kidnapping Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro in January. Rubio turned some heads last Friday when he publicly posted on X that those seeking “to create positive change in Cuba” could “seize this opportunity to create the change you desire through a discrete [sic] partnership with the CIA.”

这篇贴文普遍招致了困惑(彭博社的白宫记者写道:“反复核实了约四次,确信这是真的”),但美国官员和国会议员也转发了这篇贴文,提升了对公开合作的呼吁。对于习惯了想象中央情报局通过秘密渠道或隐藏网站来招募秘密特工和线人的公众来说,公开招募可能会显得奇怪且不符合其一贯作风,就像该局当年在布什和奥巴马执政期间试图在伊朗境内招募特工时所做的那样。
The post was widely met with bewilderment (Bloomberg’s White House correspondent wrote: “Checked like four times that this was real”), but U.S. officials and members of Congress also shared the post, elevating the public call for collaboration. Recruiting in public might come across as strange and out of character to a public that imagines the CIA recruiting secret agents and informants through clandestine channels or hidden websites, as the agency had done to try and recruit agents inside Iran under Bush and Obama.
但这种公开呼吁并非完全是新鲜事。在拜登政府领导下,美国中央情报局曾通过一个公开的Telegram频道在俄罗斯境内招募合作者,并在社交媒体上发布视频,希望招募中国、伊朗和朝鲜的情报资产。
But public appeals of this kind are not wholly new. Under the Biden administration, the CIA recruited collaborators inside Russia via a public Telegram channel, as well as publishing videos on social media hoping to recruit Chinese, Iranian, and North Korean assets.
这种公开招募源于西方情报机构在面对建立了自身复杂监控网络的对手时所面临的困难。一名美国中央情报局官员于2025年5月对美国广播公司新闻网表示:“在当今(普遍技术监控)的世界里,我们无法再像20年前那样招募线人,可能也无法像10年前那样招募了。”这不仅影响了针对北京的情报行动,也影响了针对德黑兰和哈瓦那的行动;在那两地,美国和以色列由于缺乏地面联系和有限的官方存在,导致美国中央情报局和摩萨德试图在网上招募愿意合作的线人。
This kind of overt recruitment stems from the difficulties Western intelligence agencies face against adversaries who have built sophisticated surveillance networks of their own. A CIA official told ABC News in May 2025, “in today’s world of [universal technical surveillance], we can’t recruit sources the same way that we did 20 years ago, probably the same way you did 10 years ago.”This has not only affected intelligence operations targeting Beijing, but also Tehran and Havana, where both the U.S. and Israel’s lack of on-the-ground connections and limited official presence has led the CIA and the Mossad to try to recruit willing informants online.
虽然这些局限性可能会决定这项策略的具体细节,但各自国家当权者可能并不认为这是受制于约束的证据,反而认为这是其新策略威力的证明:炫耀其国家实力,而不是将其关在据称无用的密室里。毕竟,如果没人知道威慑是你干的,那威慑又有什么用呢?
While these limitations may govern the particulars of this strategy, those in power in their respective countries may not see it as evidence of constraints, but instead as evidence of the power of their new strategy: boasting about their national power, rather than keeping it behind closed doors where it supposedly remains useless. After all, what is the use of a deterrent if nobody knows it was you?
这些公开宣传的规模虽在拜登任内就已开始,但在特朗普第二任期呈爆炸式增长。不过,可以说,本雅明·内塔尼亚胡将摩萨德行动更多引入公共领域的努力,是这些举动的先声。以色列总理吹嘘在2010年代末针对伊朗核计划进行了多次网络攻击,这开始引发公众对摩萨德工作的讨论转变,包括时任司法部长阿耶莱特·沙凯德在内的许多内塔尼亚胡盟友称赞说,伊朗现在可以“知道自己已暴露,而且以色列可以在伊斯兰共和国境内任何地方打击。”
The scale of these public appeals, despite having started under Biden, has exploded under the second Trump term, but these moves were arguably preceded by Benjamin Netanyahu’s efforts to bring the Mossad’s operations much more into the public sphere. The Israeli prime minister’s bragging about numerous cyberattacks targeting Iran’s nuclear program in the late 2010s began to precipitate a shift in public discussion of the Mossad’s work, with many Netanyahu allies, like then-Justice Minister Ayelet Shaked, praising the fact that Iran could now “know it is exposed and that Israel can reach anywhere in the Islamic Republic.”
摩萨德前副局长在伊朗遭窃的核档案曝光后表示,内塔尼亚胡的举动“违背我们的本性”,并称“总理坚持要公开此事。”
A former deputy director of the Mossad said after the unveiling of Iran’s stolen nuclear archive that Netanyahu’s move “goes against our nature,” and that “the prime minister insisted on publicizing this.”
内塔尼亚胡2021年任命的摩萨德局长戴维·巴尼亚被认为将这一转变制度化,使这个神秘情报机构的行动转向吸引更广泛的公众。据报道,此举令摩萨德老将们感到担忧,他们对公开伊朗境内特工的做法感到震惊。在内塔尼亚胡领导下,将以色列描绘成一个能随时随地施展实力的超级大国,已成为一种流行的说法。在接受《60分钟》采访时,一名摩萨德官员谈到2024年在黎巴嫩发生的传呼机袭击事件(造成逾2000人受伤)时说,“它们是我们遍布中东的优越性的活生生证明。”另一名官员则表示,这次行动的复杂性和成功表明“世界就是我们的舞台。”美国。
Netanyahu’s pick in 2021 for the director of the Mossad, David Barnea, has been credited with institutionalizing that change, shifting the secretive intelligence agency’s operations toward appealing to larger masses, and reportedly concerning Mossad veterans who were shocked by the publicizing of agents inside Iran. Casting Israel as a superpower capable of exerting its power anywhere has become a popular refrain under Netanyahu. In an interview with “60 Minutes,” one Mossad officer said of the 2024 pager attacks in Lebanon, which injured more than 2,000 people, that “they are walking proof of our superiority all around the Middle East,” with another officer saying the operation’s complexity and success demonstrated “the world is our stage.”

在特朗普治下,该国也养成了秀出超级大国地位的习惯,宣布了征服格陵兰岛和加拿大等地的意图,要掠夺委内瑞拉和伊朗的自然资源来填满美国的金库,并公开且毫不掩饰地将西半球置于一个被称为“唐罗主义”的华盛顿保护国之下。鲁比奥10月早些时候在希腊发表讲话时,在雅典卫城的背景下以文明之战的措辞宣称,“我们选择毫不掩饰地追求国家权力”。
The U.S. has also gotten in the habit of flexing its superpower status under Trump, declaring the nation’s intent to conquer places like Greenland and Canada, to steal the natural resources of Venezuela and Iran to fill American coffers, and to openly and unabashedly place the Western Hemisphere under a Washingtonian protectorate known as the “Donroe Doctrine.”Rubio declared in Greece in early October, speaking in terms of civilizational battle against the backdrop of the Acropolis, that “we choose the unapologetic pursuit of national power.”
公开指使中央情报局对付外国对手、指使移民和海关执法局对付国内对手,一直是其在国内外拥抱帝国狂热的战略的一部分。黑水公司创始人、在特朗普的世界里依然具有影响力的私人安保承包商埃里克·普林斯表示,他对外地寻呼机袭击事件感到“嫉妒”,并公开敦促中央情报局向摩萨德取经,称“我们也应该取得那种成果”。
Openly siccing the CIA on foreign adversaries and ICE on domestic ones has been part of that strategy of embracing imperial fervor at home and abroad. Erik Prince, the founder of Blackwater and a private security contractor who remains influential in Trump world, said he was “jealous” of the pager attacks and publicly urged the CIA to take a lesson from the Mossad, saying “we should be getting those kinds of results.”
尽管两国都曾公开寻求对敌对国家进行深度情报渗透,但无论是超级大国还是效仿者,秘密行动和公开行动的力量都是有限的。尽管中央情报局今年5月通过公开安排其局长在哈瓦那会见古巴官员并要求进行“根本性变革”以换取解除经济窒息来宣示其权力,但该机构试图推翻古巴共产主义政府的历史既充满传奇色彩,又屡遭失败。
While both countries have openly sought deep intelligence penetration in adversarial nations, there are limitations to the power of clandestine and overt operations, even by superpowers and wannabes. While the CIA asserted its power in May by openly having its director meet with Cuban officials in Havana to demand “fundamental changes” in return for relief from economic strangulation, the agency’s history of attempts to overthrow the Communist Cuban government are as storied as they are unsuccessful.
此前希望伊朗问题能像控制委内瑞拉政府那样迅速而干净利落地解决,但在冲突初期就已破灭,这场原本只需几周的战争现在几乎可以确定将持续到中期选举之后,迎来又一轮毁灭性的较量。
Earlier hopes for Iran to be as quick and as clean as taking control of Venezuela’s government were dashed early on in the conflict, with the war that was supposed to only take a few weeks now all but certain to extend past the midterm elections for another devastating round.
即便与伊朗的战争结束得如此轻松,以至于美国军舰在回程途中可以顺道通过古巴并随时准备投入下一场战斗,无论是外部分析人士还是美国国内的情报评估,都不认为推翻这个共产主义国家会有这么容易。《纽约时报》8月报道称,美国情报来源显示,这可能更类似于伊朗的情况——即便劳尔·卡斯特罗(他自2021年以来未在国中担任任何官方职务)被捕,“几乎没有什么务实的官员”可能会取而代之掌权。
Even if the war with Iran ends so easily that American ships are able to go through Cuba on the way back ready for more, both outside analysts and even internal U.S. intelligence assessments do not see as easy a way to overthrow the Communist state. The New York Times reported in August that American intelligence sources indicate it could be a situation closer to Iran, where even if Raúl Castro (who has held no official position in the country since 2021) were captured, “few pragmatic officials” are likely to take power in his stead.
虽然古巴军队缺乏伊朗那种先进装备,且战备展示(如针对委内瑞拉的展示)并不代表一个国家进行长期战役的实际意愿,但古巴的军事结构与伊朗相似,都是建立在权力分散和领导层冗余的基础之上的。此外,古巴的政治权力结构也与伊朗相似,尽管普遍有相反的说法,但它实际上并不是围绕某一个个人建立的。
While Cuba’s military lacks the kind of advanced equipment Iran has, and shows of readiness (like with Venezuela) are no indication of a country’s actual willingness to fight a protracted campaign, Cuba’s military structure is similar to Iran’s in that it is based on decentralization and redundancies in leadership. In addition, Cuba has a political power structure that, also similar to Iran, is not actually based around a single individual, despite popular claims to the contrary.

尽管特朗普不断大吹大放,宣称能够零美军伤亡除掉马杜罗是个奇迹,但该行动的鲁莽,以及与伊朗谈判中表现出的明目张胆的虚伪,似乎给古巴领导层上了一课。总统米格尔·迪亚斯-卡内尔6月表示:“所有这些因素在古巴人民开展任何类型的谈判时,都产生了极大的不信任。我们继续表达对话的意愿,但那必须是平等之间的对话、没有施压且尊重我们主权的对话。”
Despite Trump’s constant bluster about the miracle of being able to take out Maduro without a single American death, the brazenness of that operation, and the openness with which the negotiations with Iran have been deceptive, appear to have had lessons for the Cuban leadership. President Miguel Díaz-Canel said in June: “All these elements create a lot of distrust in the Cuban people when it comes to conducting any type of negotiation. We continue to express our willingness for dialogue, but it has to be a dialogue between equals, without pressure and with respect for our sovereignty.”
美国官员尚未将这种情绪内化。特朗普3月在谈到古巴时愉快地沉思道:“无论是解放它还是占领它,我想,我对它做什么都行。”当时,他也在发表关于伊朗的类似言论。
American officials have yet to internalize that sentiment. Discussing Cuba in March, Trump joyfully mused: “Whether I free it, take it, I think, I could do anything I want with it.”At the time, he was saying similar things about Iran.