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关键矿产投资缺口The Missing Critical Minerals Investment

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2024年5月,爱达荷州萨蒙市以西的一处钴矿开采场。卡洛斯·巴里亚 / 路透社A cobalt mining site west of Salmon, Idaho, May 2024 Carlos Barria / Reuters

美国及其盟友终于开始认真对待关键矿产供应链问题。中国在过去三十年里建立起在全球矿产产量中的主导份额,北京自2023年以来定期实施的出口管制,已经让人清楚地看到,其他国家在获取半导体、国防技术和汽车核心组件所需的材料时依赖中国是多么危险。

The United States and its allies are finally taking supply chains for critical minerals seriously. China has spent the last three decades building a dominant share of global mineral production, and the export controls Beijing has introduced periodically since 2023 have made clear just how dangerous it is for other countries to rely on China for access to materials that are essential components of semiconductors, defense technologies, and automobiles.

华盛顿和欧洲各国首都现在正试图将其风险暴露降至最低。这些政府与私营企业一起,已经开始投资上游产业(包括矿山、精炼厂和回收基础设施)以及下游产业(如磁铁和电池)。他们迄今为止的大部分努力都集中在已经投产或接近投产的矿山以及精炼领域。诚然,美国和欧洲没有足够的设施将原矿加工成专用化学品或精炼材料,建设更多的精炼设施将有助于减少对中国的依赖并缓解紧迫的供应链担忧。

Washington and European capitals are now trying to minimize their exposure. Alongside private firms, these governments have begun investing in both upstream industries including mines, refineries, and recycling infrastructure and downstream industries such as magnets and batteries. The bulk of their efforts so far have focused on mines already in operation or close to it and on refining. It is true that the United States and Europe do not have sufficient facilities to process raw ore into specialized chemicals or refined materials and that building more refining facilities will help reduce their reliance on China and alleviate immediate supply chain concerns.

但这只是权宜之计。只有拥有稳定、长期的原材料供应,精炼设施才具有价值。而这反过来又需要新矿山,尤其是随着先进产业对矿产的需求日益增长。由于建设一座矿山大约需要20年,确保矿产长期供应就要求现在投资新矿山。致力于维持供应链主导地位的中国,一直愿意为此类项目投入巨额资金。日本也是如此,自2010年中国因钓鱼岛争端(中国称钓鱼岛,日本称尖阁诸岛)禁止向日本出口关键矿产以来,东京便开始了漫长的供应链“去风险”进程。

But this is a temporary fix. Refining facilities are valuable only if they have a steady, long-term supply of raw materials. That, in turn, requires new mines, especially as advanced industries demand ever more minerals. Because building a mine takes roughly 20 years, ensuring a long-term supply of minerals requires investing in new mines now. China, which is committed to maintaining its supply chain dominance, has been willing to allocate substantial capital to such ventures. Japan has, too, ever since China blocked exports of critical minerals to the country amid a dispute over the Senkaku Islands (known in China as the Diaoyu Islands) in 2010, which pushed Tokyo to start the long process of disentangling its own supply chains.

但日本仍任重道远;投资15年后,该国对中国稀土的依赖度仅从约90%降至65%至70%之间——远不足以满足自身需求,更遑论盟友的需求。

But Japan still has a long way to go; after 15 years of investing, the country has reduced its dependence on China for rare earths from about 90 percent to between 65 and 70 percent—not nearly enough to supply its own needs, much less those of its allies.

简而言之,投资精炼虽属必要却不充分。为避免未来供应链脆弱性,美国及其盟友,尤其是七国集团(G-7)成员,还必须着手建设新矿山管道。这些投资是长线押注,且风险高企。但一旦成功,回报丰厚。

In short, investing in refining is necessary but insufficient. To avoid future supply chain vulnerabilities, the United States and its allies, especially those in the G-7, must also start building a pipeline of new mines. These investments are long bets, and they are risky. But when successful, they reap high rewards.

“死亡谷” 美国及其盟友在矿产勘探方面显著优于中国。仅澳大利亚和加拿大企业就占全球勘探支出的约三分之一。但绝大多数地质前景从未转化为运营中的矿山。这并非因勘探融资不足,而是因为一旦采矿项目推进,就会出现诸多财务抑制因素和风险。

THE VALLEY OF DEATH The United States and its allies significantly outperform China in mineral exploration. Australian and Canadian firms alone account for roughly one-third of global exploration spending. But the vast majority of geological prospects never become operating mines. This is not for lack of financing in prospecting but because of the many financial disincentives and risks that appear once a mining project moves forward.

矿业开发的初始阶段主要依赖一类被称为“初级公司”的独特矿业公司生态系统,之所以这样称呼,是因为它们市值较小、专注于一项或少数几个项目,且规模远未达到在主要证券交易所上市的程度。它们大多在澳大利亚或加拿大上市,并集中于初始的高风险勘探阶段。地质不确定性使得押注初级公司项目风险极高,但如果矿床被证实拥有大量储量,初级公司可以出售项目或引入新合作伙伴,从而获得丰厚回报。

The initial stages of mining development rely chiefly on a unique ecosystem of mining companies called “juniors,” so called because they have a small market cap, focus exclusively on one or a few projects, and are nowhere large enough to list on major stock exchanges. Most of them list in Australia or Canada and concentrate on the initial high-risk exploration stages. Geological uncertainty makes betting on junior ventures extraordinarily risky, but if a mineral deposit proves to have significant reserves, the junior can sell the project or bring in a new partner, and that payout is large.

然而在后续阶段,投资者往往会失去耐心或资金耗尽。虽然初步勘探成本相对较低,但随后评估矿床规模、工程需求、成本和预期回报的可行性研究轻易就要花费数千万美元,此外还有钻探、工程、许可和开发规划的成本。商业贷款机构对此类项目避而远之,因为这些项目没有即时收入、没有可作抵押的资产,也不保证最终具有可行性。

Yet in the next stages, investors tend to lose patience or run out of capital. Although initial prospecting is relatively cheap, subsequent feasibility studies that estimate a deposit’s size, engineering needs, costs, and expected returns can easily run into the tens of millions of dollars, in addition to the costs of drilling, engineering, permitting, and development planning. Commercial lenders stay away because these projects have no immediate revenue, no assets to offer as collateral, and no guarantees they will even be viable.

简而言之,风险太高,不值得为不确定的回报承担。大型矿业公司也回避这些项目,因为它们面临股东要求提供最大回报的压力。即使矿产需求上升,大型矿业公司将收入再投资于新开发的比例仍保持平稳。

The risk, in short, is too high to take for uncertain returns. Large mining companies also avoid these projects because they face pressure from shareholders to provide maximum returns. Even as demand for minerals has risen, the share of revenue that major mining companies have reinvested in new development has stayed flat.

在没有外部融资的情况下,初级矿企无法完成吸引建设资金所需的研究工作,即使它们已经发现了有前景的矿床。作为单一资产公司,它们没有其他现金流或资产可作为额外贷款的抵押品。这一时刻常被称为“死亡谷”。许多寻求摆脱这一困境的公司转向了一个可靠的投资来源:中国。中国企业更愿意承担此类风险,并提供必要的资本推进采矿项目,往往是初级矿企唯一可行的选择。

Without outside financing, juniors cannot complete the studies needed to attract additional financing for construction, even if they have found a promising deposit. As single-asset companies, they have no other cash flow or assets to offer as collateral for additional loans. This moment is often referred to as the “valley of death.”Many companies looking for a way out of this predicament have turned to one reliable source of investment: China. Chinese companies are much more willing to take on this type of risk and provide the necessary capital to advance mining projects, and they are often the only viable option for juniors.

因此,中国在全球供应链中的主导地位依赖于西方公司的勘探工作。这种局面之所以持续,并非因为中国提供了更具竞争力的条款,而是因为在一个关键的融资阶段,它是市场上唯一的选择。

Thus, China’s dominance in global supply chains relies on Western companies’ exploration. It endures not because China offers more competitive terms but because at a key financing stage, it is the only game in town.

下游效应 几十年来,中国一直在扩大其关键矿产供应管道。2025年,中国通过“一带一路”倡议在金属和采矿项目上花费了创纪录的320亿美元,打破了上一年210亿美元的纪录。中国企业也愿意进行股权投资,购买公司所有权股份,且不附带保证回报。额外支出采取资源换基础设施交易的形式,即中国为矿产资源丰富的国家提供港口、能源设施和铁路等基础设施资金,以换取采矿项目利润分成——这些采矿项目也可能由中国公司和国家银行协助融资。

DOWNSTREAM EFFECTS China has been expanding its supply pipeline for critical minerals for decades. In 2025, it spent a record $32 billion on metals and mining projects through its Belt and Road Initiative, breaking the previous year’s record of $21 billion. Chinese firms are also willing to invest in equity, buying ownership stakes in companies that come with no guaranteed returns. Additional spending takes the form of resources-for-infrastructure deals, by which China funds infrastructure such as ports, energy facilities, and railways in mineral-rich countries in exchange for a share in the profits of mining projects—which Chinese companies and state banks may also help finance.

通过在多个国家投资广泛的矿产项目组合,中国企业可以让成功项目的利润弥补失败项目的损失。

By investing in a broad portfolio of mineral projects across several countries, Chinese firms can let the profits of those that succeed cover the losses of those that fail.

除了资本,中国采矿战略中最重要的部分是技术诀窍。由于失败十分常见,识别最具开发潜力矿藏的能力至关重要。北京依靠专业国有企业、地质公司、私营企业和政府官员来审查项目,并与东道国政府合作,确保获得许可、基础设施和矿产交付。七国集团中唯一在采矿项目上保持类似实地存在的国家是日本,其项目分布在澳大利亚、加拿大、秘鲁和乌兹别克斯坦等国。这些项目旨在获取能够支持日本产业的关键矿产,但目前不足以满足日本全部生产需求,更不用说更广泛的盟友需求。

Apart from capital, the most important part of China’s mining strategy is know-how. Because failure is so common, the ability to identify deposits with the highest potential to deliver is crucial. Beijing relies on specialized state-owned enterprises, geological firms, private companies, and government officials to vet projects and work with host governments to secure permits, infrastructure, and delivery. The only G-7 country that maintains a comparable on-the-ground presence for mining projects is Japan, in countries such as Australia, Canada, Peru, and Uzbekistan. These projects are intended to secure critical minerals that can support Japan’s industries, but they are currently insufficient to meet all of Japan’s production needs, let alone broader allied needs.

中国与美国及其盟友在采矿投资上的差距在非洲最为明显,非洲拥有一些最大的未开发矿产资源。2023年,美国在该大陆的关键矿产项目上投资约3亿美元,而中国的投资约为80亿至100亿美元。华盛顿已经认识到缩小这一差距的必要性,但仍任重道远。

The disparity between China’s mining investments and those of the United States and its allies is most evident in Africa, home to some of the largest untapped mineral resources. Whereas the United States invested about $300 million in critical mineral projects on the continent in 2023, China invested about $8 billion to $10 billion. Washington has recognized the need to close this gap, but it still has a long way to go.

在特朗普政府特别关注的刚果民主共和国,中国企业控制了大约百分之七十的钴矿和铜矿。在2008年至2020年期间,中国银行和企业为刚果的矿山开发和运营提供了超过90亿美元的信贷,此外还有中国进出口银行提供的30亿美元基础设施贷款。美国和其他七国集团国家曾有机会参与这些投资,但认为这些项目风险过高。

In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, a particular focus of the Trump administration, Chinese companies control about 70 percent of cobalt and copper mines. Between 2008 and 2020, Chinese banks and companies extended over $9 billion in credit for mine development and operations in Congo, in addition to $3 billion in infrastructure loans from the Export-Import Bank of China. The United States and other G-7 countries had the opportunity to take part in these investments but judged the projects to be too risky.

例如在2015年,在加拿大上市的矿业公司艾芬豪矿业为其在刚果的卡莫阿-卡库拉铜矿项目寻求资金。由于没有西方投资者愿意承担风险,中国企业紫金矿业收购了该项目的股权。如今,卡莫阿-卡库拉铜矿有望成为全球最大的铜矿之一。与此同时,在2016年和2020年,唯一在刚果活跃的美国大型矿业公司将其在两个大型铜钴矿床中的股权(其在该国仅存的股权)出售给了一家中国矿业公司。

In 2015, for example, the Canadian-listed mining company Ivanhoe Mines sought funding for its Kamoa-Kakula copper project in Congo. With no Western investors willing to take on the risk, the Chinese firm Zijin Mining acquired an ownership stake. Today, Kamoa-Kakula is on track to become one of the largest copper mines in the world. Meanwhile, in 2016 and 2020, the only major American mining company active in Congo sold its stakes in two substantial copper-cobalt deposits, its only remaining stakes in the country, to a Chinese mining company.

矿山的所有者决定了其矿产的最终去向。当中资企业拥有所谓的矿山时,其产量会流向中国的炼厂或下游制造商。例如,中国电池巨头宁德时代持有刚果基桑富矿山的股权,从而为其电池确保了稳定供应的铜和钴。美国汽车制造商和盟友的电池生产商也投资了一些项目,但没有一个达到相同的程度——即便如此,其中大部分原料仍经由中国流转。

The owners of a mine control where its minerals eventually go. When Chinese firms own a mine, the output flows either to their refineries or downstream manufacturers in China. The Chinese battery giant CATL, for example, has an ownership stake in the Kisanfu mine in Congo, where it secures a steady supply of copper and cobalt for its batteries. U.S. automakers and allied battery producers have also invested in some projects, but none to the same degree—even still, much of that material flows through China.

这种精炼原料在中国的高度集中,赋予了北京越来越大的市场支配地位以及将其武器化的能力。采矿的出路理论上,美国及其盟友拥有为未来采矿项目融资的手段。2024 年,两个总部位于多伦多的证券交易所共托管了近 1,100 家上市矿业公司,占全球总数的 40%。这些公司约占过去五年全球矿业股权融资总额的三分之一。

The concentration of this refined material in China gives Beijing ever-greater market power and the ability to weaponize it. MINING THE SOLUTION In theory, the United States and its allies have the means of financing their own pipeline of future mining projects. In 2024, two Toronto-based stock exchanges hosted nearly 1,100 publicly listed mining companies, 40 percent of the global total. These companies account for roughly one-third of the world’s total mining equity capital raised over the last five years.

约有一半的上市公司项目位于加拿大。澳大利亚证券交易所也是重要的交易所,2024 年约有 850 家公司在其上市从事矿业开发。

About half of the listed companies’ projects were based in Canada. The Australian Stock Exchange is another key exchange, with about 850 companies listed in 2024 for mining development.

但这些公司正面临抑制对有前景项目投资的压力。世界上最易获取的矿床已经被开采,潜在的新矿床往往位于更为复杂的地质环境中,使得勘探早期阶段更为困难且成本更高。随着社会和环境要求的提升,许可程序被拉长,勘探向生产的转化也需要更长时间。这一时间延长降低了私人投资者的风险偏好,因为他们必须更久才能看到投资产生回报。

But these companies are facing pressures that discourage investment in promising projects. The world’s most accessible mineral deposits have already been tapped, so potential new deposits are often located in more complicated geological environments, making the early stages of exploration more difficult and costly. Moving from exploration to production is also taking more time, as increased social and environmental requirements draw out permitting processes. This lengthening timeline lowers private investors’ appetite for risk because they have to wait longer for their investments to start generating returns.

与此同时,中国对关键矿产的过度生产压低了关键商品的价格。尽管有强烈信号表明矿产需求将继续增长,但低价抑制了新进入者的加入,并削弱了投资者帮助已有企业的动机。

At the same time, Chinese overproduction of critical minerals has depressed prices for key commodities. Despite strong signals that demand for the minerals will continue to increase, these low prices discourage new players from entering the game and weaken investors’ incentives to help those already in it.

因此,美国及其盟国政府需要吸引大量新投资。美国已经迈出第一步,通过入股国内外的矿业公司并扩大对它们的贷款。官方公告声称这些投资总额约为500亿美元,但已签署协议的价值更接近90亿美元,而实际投入的资金总计约40亿美元。这些资金大多没有流向那些深陷“死亡谷”的项目。相反,获得资金的是那些更接近投产的项目,因为它们有助于应对眼前的供应风险。中国在全球供应链中的主导地位依赖于西方企业的勘探。

U.S. and allied governments therefore need to draw in substantial new investment. The United States has made a start by taking equity stakes in domestic and international mining companies and expanding loans to them. Official announcements claim that these investments total around $50 billion, although the value of the deals that have been signed falls closer to $9 billion, and the money actually moving adds up to around $4 billion. Most of this money does not go to the projects languishing in the valley of death. Instead, the projects getting funded are those that are closer to production, because they can help tackle immediate supply risks. China’s dominance in global supply chains relies on Western companies’ exploration.

这是一个良好的开端,但仍处于早期阶段的企业依然需要资金,而私人投资者仍对矿业项目持谨慎态度。自2025年以来,少数参与的机构投资者往往是在美国政府宣布入股或贷款支持某个项目之后才采取行动。尽管这种谨慎并非新鲜事,但依赖政府信号和公共投资会形成一种反向激励,使私营企业在没有公共支持的情况下不愿投资,而这正是各国政府希望避免的。

This is a good start, but ventures that remain at early stages still need funding, and private investors are still wary of mining projects. Since 2025, the few institutional investors that have gotten involved tended to do so after the U.S. government announced an equity stake or loan to back a project. Although such caution is not new, relying on government signals and public investment sets up a perverse incentive for private companies not to invest in the absence of public support, which is exactly what governments want to avoid.

要真正吸引私人资本用于勘探和矿山开发,美国和欧盟应借鉴加拿大的做法。加拿大政府向从事矿产勘探的公司提供税收抵免,其“流通股份”制度通过向投资者提供税收激励,帮助矿业公司为勘探和开发融资。如果其他七国集团成员能够建立这种金融架构,更多的勘探资本将流向关键矿产项目。并且,如果成员国通过让投资者在七国集团任何地区的勘探活动中都能享受税收优惠,将其制度相互衔接,就能构建支持项目从勘探到建设所需的大规模共享的勘探与开发资本池。

To really pull in private capital for exploration and mine development, the United States and the European Union should take a page from Canada’s book. The Canadian government offers tax credits to companies engaged in mineral exploration, and its “flow-through shares” system helps mining companies finance exploration and development by offering tax incentives to investors. If the rest of the G-7 can establish this kind of financial architecture, far more exploration capital would flow to critical mineral projects. And if member countries link their systems by letting investors claim tax benefits for exploration anywhere in the G-7, they could build the large, shared pool of exploration and development capital needed to support projects through to construction.

此外,七国集团国家必须消除大型机构投资者进入矿业部门的障碍——主要是通过改革税法。目前的税法使得免税投资者,如养老基金、捐赠基金和基金会,在投资矿业项目时的回报可能被视为收入而被征税,从而抑制了其投资意愿。

In addition, G-7 countries must remove barriers for large institutional investors to enter the mining sector—primarily by reforming their tax codes, which currently disincentivize tax-exempt investors, such as pension funds, endowments, and foundations, from investing in mining projects because returns on such investments can be taxed as income.

最后,当某些项目的私人投资激励仍然不匹配时,七国集团国家应动用公共资本,直接帮助矿业公司走出“死亡谷”。为此,美国、日本和欧洲国家应设立一个联合机构,汇集资金用于可行性研究——这类研究尤其难以获得私人融资——并建立一个广泛的项目组合,使任何失败项目的损失由成功项目来弥补。该 pooled 基金将向有前景的项目分配赠款,以换取项目股权或矿山投产后的权益金。

Finally, when the incentives for private investment still do not line up for certain projects, G-7 countries should use public capital to directly help mining companies escape the valley of death. To do this, the United States, Japan, and European countries should set up a joint facility to pool financing for feasibility studies, which are particularly difficult to raise private funding for, establishing a broad portfolio so that the losses from any failures are covered by the winners. This pooled fund would allocate grants to promising projects in exchange for equity in the project or a royalty once the mine goes into production.

许多项目仍会失败,但有了一个专门且人员配备充足的机构,投资质量很可能会提高——正如中国的情况一样,中国对早期采矿采取了类似的项目组合方式。而对投资者和国家利益而言,其收益将远远超过损失的资本。

Many projects would still fail, but with a dedicated, well-staffed facility, the quality of investments would likely improve—as they have for China, which takes a similar portfolio approach to early-stage mining. And the benefits to both investors and national interests would far outweigh the lost capital.

如今关键矿产的瓶颈主要位于加工或精炼阶段,但未来对制造业、能源、人工智能和国防技术所需矿产的威胁将出现在矿山环节。七国集团国家拥有市场和政策工具,可以建立一条安全的采矿项目管道,防止下一次经济紧急情况的发生。如果美国及其盟友十年后没有矿产来供应精炼设施,那么对精炼设施的投资就意义不大。因此,唯一的选择就是现在就承诺为新的采矿项目提供融资。

Today’s chokepoints for critical minerals sit mostly at the processing or refining stage, but future threats to the minerals needed for manufacturing, energy, artificial intelligence, and defense technology will be at the mines. G-7 countries have the markets and the policy tools to build a pipeline of secure mining projects and prevent the next economic emergency. Investment in refining facilities means little if the United States and its allies have no minerals to feed them a decade from now. The only choice, then, is to commit to financing new mining projects now.

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