字号·· | 护眼
海峡时报

美国国会易主,特朗普在伊朗战争问题上面临艰难抉择With US Congress flipped, Trump faces hard choices on the Iran war

点「原文对照」整页切到原文,或双击某段只看那段的原文。

伦敦——美国总统唐纳德·特朗普现在比以往任何时候都更自由地向伊朗发动轰炸。

LONDON – US President Donald Trump has never been freer to bomb Iran than he is at the moment.

诚然,他遭到了美国选民的沉重打击。同样无疑的是,这次全面败选的主要原因之一,正是特朗普对伊朗发动的这场不得人心的战争。

True, he suffered a severe drubbing from the US electorate. It’s also undoubtedly true that one of the chief reasons for this wholesale electoral defeat was the unpopular war which Trump launched against Iran.

由民主党掌控的新一届美国国会要到1月才召开会议。特朗普已经相当明确地表示,11月3日中期选举一结束,海湾地区的战事就可能重新开始。

The new Democrat-controlled US Congress does not convene until January. Trump has been fairly explicit that, the moment the Nov 3 midterm elections are over, shooting time in the Gulf may re-start.

未来几天在这一方面将十分关键。特朗普现在做出的任何决定都充满严重风险。

The next few days will be critical in this respect. Any decision Trump now takes is fraught with serious dangers.

虽败选但未受限制。从法律上讲,特朗普仍拥有他于2026年2月28日下令发起对伊朗的最新战争——“史诗愤怒行动”——时所行使的全部总司令权力。他保留这些权力,直至2029年1月20日其总统任期届满。

Defeated but unrestricted Legally, Trump retains every US commander-in-chief authority he exercised when he ordered the start of Operation Epic Fury – as the latest war against Iran is called - on Feb 28, 2026. He keeps such powers until Jan 20, 2029, when his presidential term expires.

如果特朗普想对伊朗发动一场据称具有决定性的打击,从现在到2027年1月3日新一届国会开始履职之间是最佳时机。与此同时,西奥多·罗斯福号航母打击群正在南海,全速驶向波斯湾。

If Trump wants one more supposedly decisive strike against Iran, the period between now and Jan 3, 2027 - when the new Congress starts work - is optimal. Meanwhile, the Theodore Roosevelt aircraft carrier group is in the South China Sea, sailing speedily towards the Gulf.

资金也不是恢复敌对行动的直接障碍。美国国会从未为这场战争通过专项拨款。白宫6月份提出了876亿美元(1118亿新元)的追加拨款请求,但从未经过辩论。

Money is also not an immediate obstacle to a resumption of hostilities. The US Congress has never passed a dedicated appropriation for this war. The White House sent a US$87.6 billion (S$111.8 billion) supplemental financial request in June, but this was never debated.

因此,这场战争一直依靠现有的军事拨款、2025年拨款中的未动用余额以及五角大楼自行支配的资金来支付——这就是为什么特朗普至少在未来两个月内可以继续开展这场战争。

The war has therefore been paid for out of existing military appropriations, unspent balances from the 2025 allocations of funds, and the Pentagon’s own discretion - which is why Trump can continue to pursue this campaign for at least the next two months.

财政和政治障碍:美国政府的麻烦在于,至关重要的拦截弹、防区外武器以及更换这场战争所需全部弹药的工业基础,在现行财政授权(12月11日到期)之后将无法获得资金支持。

Financial and political obstacles The snag for the US administration is that the essential interceptors, standoff weapons and the industrial base required to replace all the munitions needed for this war cannot be funded beyond the current financial authority, which expires on Dec 11.

目前由共和党控制的国会仍可在圣诞节前批准新的资金,但这并非易事,因为共和党人如今对这场战争是否明智存在严重分歧。

The current Republican-controlled Congress can still authorise new funds before Christmas, but that won’t be easy, because the Republicans are now deeply split about the wisdom of this war.

副总统J.D.万斯公开承认,共和党人因伊朗战争而输掉了中期选举,这加剧了这些分歧。没有哪位梦想在不久的将来重返活跃政坛的共和党议员愿意与这场战争扯上关系。因此,尽管美国国会无法命令美国海军撤回国内,但它可以拒绝购买所需的炸弹。

Vice-President J.D. Vance’s open admission that the Republicans lost the midterm ballots because of the Iran war has exacerbated these divisions. No Republican lawmaker who dreams of returning to active politics in the near future would wish to be associated with the war. So, although the US Congress cannot order the US Navy home, it can decline to buy the bombs required.

对特朗普更深层的制约是政治上的。万斯在八个月里一直是政府内部对这场他私下抵制的战争最不热心的支持者,而他现在已把这一立场转为公开立场,显然着眼于2028年的下一届美国总统选举。这是一场已无多少可失的总统与仍有一切可赢的副总统之间的争论,并将在未来两年于行政分支内部持续进行。

The deeper constraint on Trump is political. Vance has spent eight months as the administration’s least enthusiastic supporter of a war he privately resisted, and he has now converted that position into a public one, with an evident eye to the next US presidential elections in 2028. This is an argument between a president with nothing left to lose and a vice-president with everything still to win, and it will run inside the executive branch for the next two years.

民主党议员将就这场战争以及国防部长皮特·赫格塞思对这场军事行动的处理举行听证会。甚至有人谈到要在新当选的国会召开之前就对赫格塞思进行弹劾表决。共和党众议员托马斯·马西已于9月15日提交针对赫格塞思的弹劾条款,指控他在未经国会批准的情况下执行对伊朗的敌对行动命令,滥用职权。

Democratic lawmakers will hold hearings on the war and Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth’s conduct of the campaign. There is talk of a Hegseth impeachment vote even before the newly-elected Congress convenes. Republican Representative Thomas Massie had filed articles of impeachment against Hegseth on Sept 15, accusing him of abusing his office by executing an order for hostilities against Iran without approval by Congress.

这一切都不会结束这场冲突,但会使特朗普进行战争变得困难得多,因为如今每一位美国官员都急于与这场军事冒险撇清关系。

None of this will end the conflict but makes the conduct of the war much more difficult for Trump, since every US official is now keen to distance himself or herself from this military adventure.

美国与以色列的军事同盟如今已成为一个负担。在中期选举前夕,特朗普宣布美国将在今年年底前终止对以色列每年约40亿美元的军事援助,明确原因是共和党人因此受到损害。

The US military alliance with Israel is now a liability. On the eve of midterm elections, Trump announced that the US would end roughly US$4 billion in annual military aid to Israel by the conclusion of this year, explicitly because Republicans are damaged by it.

军事选项 海湾地区的军事局势不会变得更容易。伊朗内部的决策者似乎已经得出结论,认为白宫目前因中期选举结果而受到掣肘,因此正在强化自身立场。

Military options The military situation in the Gulf will not get any easier. Decision makers inside Iran appear to have drawn the conclusion that the White House is now hobbled by the outcome of its midterm elections, and are therefore hardening their stance.

伊朗现在要求立即解除美国的海上封锁、豁免制裁、释放大部分被冻结的伊朗资金,并实现延伸至真主党的停火——真主党是伊朗在黎巴嫩的代理人——以此作为同意开放霍尔木兹海峡的交换条件。

Iran is now demanding an immediate lifting of the US naval blockade, a waiving of sanctions, release of most Iranian frozen funds, and a ceasefire that extends to Hezbollah - the Iranian proxy in Lebanon, in return for agreeing to open the Strait of Hormuz.

特朗普极不可能接受这些条件,部分原因是这些条件将意味着美国公开遭受失败,同时也是因为它们既不能解决来自伊朗的军事挑战,也不能解决高油价问题。事实上,伊朗的政治胜利将使石油出口风险更高、成本更大,只会加速地区紧张局势。

Trump is highly unlikely to accept such conditions, partly because they will signify a very public defeat for the US, and also because they won’t solve either the military challenge from Iran, or the problem of high oil prices. Indeed, an Iranian political victory would make oil exports riskier and more expensive, and only accelerate regional tensions.

德黑兰还恢复了利用地下设施中储存的零部件制造弹道导弹,并加大了针对中东地区美国人员的力度。

Tehran has also resumed making ballistic missiles using stockpiled components in underground facilities and ramped up efforts to target US personnel in the Middle East.

还有相当多的证据表明,伊朗恢复军事能力的速度超过了美国所有情报时间表的预测。美国和以色列的情报评估认为,伊朗重启的导弹产量大约为每月50至200多枚。同样重要的是,伊朗正忙于加固其核设施。

There is also considerable evidence that Iran has regenerated military capacity faster than every US intelligence timeline predicted. US and Israeli intelligence assessments put Iran’s restarted missile production at somewhere between 50 and 200-plus missiles a month. Just as significantly, Iran is busy fortifying its nuclear installations.

美军已经在对伊朗进行低调的军事打击。11月3日,在霍尔木兹上空有防空阵地向美国飞机开火后,美国飞机打击了伊朗的导弹阵地。

The US military is already conducting low-key military strikes on Iran. On Nov 3, US aircraft struck Iranian missile sites after batteries fired at American aircraft over Hormuz.

传感器、软件集成和防空系统是目前美国的关键打击目标,部分原因是伊朗最难替换这类军事资产,同时也是因为摧毁伊朗的防空系统是未来行动的必要前奏。

Sensors, software integration and air defence systems are the key US targets at the moment, partly because Iran finds it hardest to replace such military assets, but also because the destruction of Iran’s air defences is a necessary prelude for future action.

特朗普曾多次威胁要向“镐山”倾泻炸弹,该重兵把守的地点位于伊朗首都以南,靠近该国主要的纳坦兹核浓缩设施。但一贯采取“或许我会,或许我不会”战术的总统,也曾定期否定这一想法。

Trump has repeatedly threatened to rain bombs down on Pickaxe Mountain, a heavily fortified site south of the Iranian capital, close to the country’s major Natanz nuclear enrichment facility. But in his usual “maybe I will, but maybe I won’t” tactic, the President has also periodically dismissed the idea.

然而,依然清晰的是,使未来八周成为美军实施军事打击的最佳窗口期的逻辑,正是使谈判解决更加困难的逻辑:伊朗和美国现在都有理由去试探对方是否已被削弱。

What remains clear, however, is that the logic that makes the next eight weeks the optimal window for a US military strike is the same logic that makes a negotiated settlement harder: both Iran and the US now have reasons to test whether the other has been weakened.

阅读媒体原文 ↗