伦敦：传统观点认为，在特朗普总统本周遭到美国选民严厉斥责、失去国会两院控制权后，他更有可能通过外交政策发泄不满——这是他权力依然未被稀释的唯一领域。
LONDON: Conventional wisdom has it that after President Donald Trump suffered a stinging rebuke from American voters this week losing both houses of Congress, he’s now all the more likely to lash out via foreign policy - the one area where his power remains undiluted.
这让乌克兰人感到忧心忡忡（俄罗斯官方媒体也在猜测），担心特朗普可能会将败选归咎于他们，认定自己的政治遗产取决于迫使乌克兰向莫斯科投降，或者两者兼而有之。伊朗人担心他可能试图“彻底解决”伊朗问题。以色列人担忧他可能会顺应针对他们的舆论风向转变。古巴领导人如果还没把自己列入他的“菜单”，现在也该有所准备了。
That has Ukrainians fretting (and Russia’s state-controlled media speculating) that Trump could blame them for his defeat, decide that his legacy depends on forcing their capitulation to Moscow or both. Iranians worry he could try to “finish” them. Israelis are concerned he may follow the shifting tide of opinion against them. And if Cuba’s leaders didn’t already assume they’re on his menu, they now should.
其中一些担忧很可能成真，但这位有记忆以来最不可预测的美国总统将如何反应，远未明朗。唯一的稳妥押注——正如我的彭博观点同事、特朗普传记作者蒂莫西·奥布莱恩周四（11月5日）所言——就是预期会出现剧烈波动。他写道，特朗普一向倾向于“在失败时加倍押注，很少顾及后果”。
Some of those fears may well materialise, but it’s far from clear how the least predictable US president in memory will react. The one sure bet - as my Bloomberg Opinion colleague and Trump biographer Timothy O’Brien put it on Thursday (Nov 5) - is to expect volatility. Trump, he writes, has always tended “to double down when he fails, with little regard for consequences”.
关于伊朗 然而，美国的外交伙伴至少可以用正确的框架来探讨后续走向，这不仅关乎他将保留或失去哪些权力。一个更可靠的预测指标是：特朗普——两年来一直将政府运作用于取悦、歌颂和富养自己及其亲信——将做他认为最有利于自己的事。
ON IRAN And yet, America’s foreign partners can at least pose the question of what comes next using the correct framework, and that's not just about which powers he will keep or lose. A more reliable predictor is that Trump - who for two years has run his administration to please, glorify and enrich himself and those close to him - will do what he believes best serves him.
例如，很难看出与伊朗重燃高强度战争如何符合这一算计。虽然特朗普不是会承认错误的人，但他似乎已接受副总统万斯的观点，即战争及其经济后果是共和党惨败的关键。如果美国民众对伊朗冲突如此反感，要选择重返战场，需要他更在乎政策议题而非个人利益。
It’s hard, for example, to see how a renewed high-intensity war with Iran would fit that bill. While Trump isn’t the type to admit mistakes, he does appear to have accepted Vice President JD Vance’s view that the war and its economic consequences were key to the Republican defeat And if Americans resent the Iran conflict that much, it would take caring more about the policy issue than about himself to choose to go back to war.
在接受《金融时报》采访时，特朗普表示，目前的局势对他来说已经足够好——流出的海湾国家石油多于伊朗石油，因此在这一关键指标上，“我们似乎得到了想要的一切”。此外，全面战争的回归将给中东领导人带来灾难，而总统及其家族一直在与这些领导人达成交易，他们再次施压特朗普保持克制。
In an interview with the Financial Times, Trump indicated that the current situation is good enough for him - more Gulf state oil is getting out than Iranian oil, so on that important score, “We seem to be getting everything we want.”Plus, a return to full-scale war would be disastrous for the Middle East leaders with whom the president and his family have been making deals, and they are again pressing him to hold back.
的确，第一次他没有听从他们的建议，认为伊斯兰共和国将在几天内崩溃，最终他们会感谢他。但他今天不可能还抱有同样的幻想。
True, he didn’t listen to them the first time, thinking the Islamic Republic would collapse in days and that they would ultimately thank him. But he cannot be under the same illusion today.
这并不意味着战争不会升级，因为伊朗领导人也有发言权。风险在于，他们可能认为目前这种“无战事的战争”现状不符合其利益。如果是这样，他们很可能会升级事态，迫使特朗普在更多动荡和为达成协议不得不吞下的让步之间做出选择。
That doesn’t mean the war can’t escalate, because Iran’s leaders also get a vote. The risk is that they decide the current war-without-war status quo doesn’t serve their interests. And if that’s the case, they could well up the ante to make Trump choose between more disruption and the concessions he’d have to swallow to cut a deal.
论乌克兰与欧洲 乌克兰和欧洲面临的计算更为艰难。它们仍易受特朗普随意撤回美国关键安全保护伞的影响。除欧洲本土的极右翼民粹主义者外，它们也将对他在民主与西方角色问题上的观点持敌对态度。从这个意义上说，它们比普京更像是特朗普的敌人，这种状况不太可能改变。
ON UKRAINE AND EUROPE Ukraine and Europe have even harder calculations ahead. They remain vulnerable to Trump’s ability to nonchalantly withdraw America’s critical security umbrella. They will also be (with exceptions for Europe’s own far-right populists) hostile to his views on the role of democracy and the West. In this sense, they are more Trump’s enemies than Putin, and that is unlikely to shift.
然而，迄今阻碍他达成乌俄协议、并以此获得他渴望作为政治遗产的“和平缔造者”形象的障碍，依然没有任何改变。
Yet there’s also no change to the obstacles that have so far prevented him from securing the Ukraine-Russia deal and, with it, the peacemaker’s image that he clearly wants to be his legacy.
从逻辑上讲，特朗普的算计本应是：既然在他控制国会时，以有利于美国的商业交易为交换，给予普京想要的乌克兰领土和欧洲安全让步都失败了，那么现在或许是尝试另一种做法的时候了。这意味着要利用即将上任的美国议员们的挺乌情绪，通过明确表示普京永远无法实现乌克兰的屈服或北约的解体，来迫使普京妥协。
Logically, Trump’s calculation should be that if giving Putin the Ukrainian territory and European security concessions he wants in exchange for commercial deals beneficial to the US failed even when he controlled Congress, then perhaps now is the time to try the other approach. That would mean harnessing the pro-Ukraine sentiment of the incoming US lawmakers and pressuring Putin to compromise by making it clear that he will never achieve either Ukraine’s subjugation or the dismantling of NATO.
克里姆林宫押注这不会发生。普京的发言人德米特里·佩斯科夫对特朗普的失败表示：“我们真诚地指望他继续他的和平努力”，言下之意是：试图强迫乌克兰和欧洲向普京的要求投降。或者正如国家控制的“俄罗斯1号”电视频道所言，莫斯科的希望是：“世界看到的可能不是一只跛脚鸭，而是另一种鸟，更像是一只暴怒的鹰”。
The Kremlin is betting that won’t happen. Putin’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov greeted Trump’s defeat by saying, “We sincerely count on him continuing his peace-making efforts,” for which read: attempting to force Ukraine and Europe to capitulate to Putin’s demands. Or as the state-controlled Rossiya 1 TV channel put it, the hope in Moscow is that: “Instead of a lame duck, the world might see a different bird, one more akin to an enraged eagle”.
以色列方面 在以色列，中期选举结果可能对该国在10月27日举行的无果选举后组建政府的努力产生戏剧性影响。
ON ISRAEL In Israel, the midterm result may have a dramatic effect on efforts to form a government after the country’s own inconclusive election on Oct 27.
特朗普曾背书总理本雅明·内塔尼亚胡，并在该国依然拥有高人气。但这种赞赏伴随着担忧，即当特朗普离开白宫时，以色列可能会失去其最重要的盟友美国。这是美国选民对以色列的敌意首次成为影响选举结果的因素。
Trump had endorsed Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and remains popular in the country. But that appreciation coincides with concern that Israel could lose the US, its most important ally, when he leaves the White House. This was the first American election in which voter hostility toward Israel has factored into the outcome.
反对派领袖加迪·艾森科特周三承诺将恢复失去的两党美国支持。他称这股民主党浪潮进一步证明，内塔尼亚胡继续执政将给以色列带来的危险——这是一个自利的说法，但却是事实。美国的支持正在以谁也无法预料的速度瓦解——包括特朗普本人，他在选举日表示，将在年底前停止每年近40亿美元的美国对以军事援助。
Opposition leader Gadi Eisenkot pledged on Wednesday to renew the lost bipartisan US backing. He called the Democratic wave further evidence of the danger Netanyahu’s continued rule would pose to Israel - a self-serving claim that is nonetheless true. US support is unravelling faster than anyone could have predicted - including from Trump, who on election day said he would halt the almost US$4 billion of annual American military aid to Israel by the end of the year.
不仅是以色列现在必须从根本上重新调整其外交政策。每一位国家领导人都应为特朗普执政的最后几年做好防范准备，并为其后将出现的美国版本做好准备。
It isn’t just Israel that must now fundamentally recalibrate its foreign policy. Every national leader should armour themselves against Trump’s last years in office and prepare for the version of the US that will follow.
无论好坏，无论由共和党还是民主党领导，它都将与特朗普的美国有显著不同。
For better or worse, Republican or Democrat led, it will be significantly different than Trump’s America.