伦敦——正当美国总统唐纳德·特朗普权衡对伊朗战争的下一步举措之际，海湾地区能源生产商已经适应了“不战不和”的现实，而这正使其运营成本变得更高、风险更大。即便没有重新爆发全面冲突，这些额外成本也可能为全球油价托底。问题在于这种脆弱的平衡能持续多久。
LONDON, - As US President Donald Trump weighs his next steps in the Iran war, Gulf energy producers have adapted to a no-war, no-peace reality that is making their operations more expensive and risky. Even without renewed full-scale fighting, those additional costs could help put a floor under global oil prices. The question is how long this uneasy equilibrium can last.
基准布伦特原油周二跌破每桶90美元，为8月下旬以来首次，延续了自10月30日近期高点118美元逾20%的跌幅，因为在共和党在美国中期选举中惨败之后，投资者越来越不相信美伊冲突会再次大幅升级。
Benchmark Brent crude fell below $90 a barrel on Tuesday for the first time since late August, extending a decline of more than 20% from its recent high of $118 on October 30, as investors increasingly discount another major escalation in the US-Iran conflict following the Republican Party's rout in the US midterm elections.
特朗普周一强化了这一看法，称在听取了海湾盟友的呼吁后，他将暂缓对伊朗采取新的军事行动。
Trump on Monday reinforced that view, saying he would hold off on new military action against Iran following appeals from Gulf allies.
但美军仍在继续向中东增兵。由卡塔尔和巴基斯坦主导的斡旋努力也在继续，尽管华盛顿和德黑兰在一些最棘手的问题上，特别是伊朗核计划，似乎分歧依然巨大。
But the US military continues to build up forces in the Middle East. Mediation efforts led by Qatar and Pakistan also continue, though Washington and Tehran appear far apart on some of the thorniest issues, particularly Iran's nuclear programme.
这表明特朗普目前对大规模打击的暂停，可能并不意味着冲突即将结束。这可能只是一次战术上的暂停，因为特朗普正在权衡另一轮空袭能否增加华盛顿在寻求达成有利协议以结束这场已进入第九个月的战争时的筹码。
This suggests Trump's current moratorium on major strikes may not signal an imminent end to the conflict. It may instead be a tactical pause as Trump considers whether another round of airstrikes can improve Washington's hand in seeking a favourable deal to end a war now in its ninth month.
尽管中东的原油出口正在复苏，但低强度冲突正在成为该地区的新常态。昂贵的变通方案最近几个月，海湾地区的石油外运量出现了显著反弹。
Low-intensity conflict is becoming the Middle East's new normal even as the region's crude exports recover.EXPENSIVE WORKAROUNDSCrude flows out of the Gulf have staged a striking rebound in recent months.
根据克普勒公司（Kpler）的数据，自10月初以来，通过霍尔木兹海峡的交通量平均每天达到1050万桶。虽然这仍低于战前平均每天1350万桶的水平，但已较中断时期的谷底大幅回升。
Traffic through the Strait of Hormuz has averaged 10.5 million barrels per day (bpd) since the start of October, according to Kpler. While that is still below the pre-war average of 13.5 million bpd, it is up substantially from the depths of the disruption.
此外，克普勒公司的数据显示，一旦算上绕过霍尔木兹海峡的替代路线，自10月初以来，海湾地区原油出口总量平均已增至每天1670万桶，仅略低于战前每天1700万桶的水平。
Moreover, once alternative routes bypassing Hormuz are included, total average Gulf crude exports have risen to 16.7 million bpd since the start of October, just shy of the pre-war level of 17 million bpd, according to Kpler.
这种复苏，加上特朗普态度中鸽派色彩的减弱，有助于解释为什么原油价格在过去一周会跌得如此之快。但这掩盖了一个重要的区别：再次爆发全面战争的风险已经下降，但忍受现有冲突的代价并没有下降。
That recovery, coupled with Trump's less hawkish tone, helps explain why crude oil prices have fallen so sharply in the past week. But this obscures an important distinction: the risk of another full-scale war has declined, but the cost of living with the existing conflict has not.
伊朗对过往霍尔木兹海峡船只的袭击已近乎成为家常便饭。国际海事组织追踪到，自2月28日战争爆发至11月9日，狭窄水道附近共发生了131起确诊事件。
Iranian attacks on vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz have become an almost daily occurrence. The International Maritime Organization tracked 131 confirmed incidents near the narrow waterway from the start of the war on February 28 through November 9.
这一数字在10月份急剧上升至35起，为冲突期间的最高月度总数。真实数字可能更高，因为船东通常选择不报告造成很少或没有损害的事件。
The number rose sharply to 35 in October, the highest monthly total during the conflict. The real figure is likely higher because shipowners often choose not to report incidents that cause little or no damage.
海湾地区的石油和液化天然气（LNG）出口商对此做出的反应是，在美军保护下，让油轮组成船队通过霍尔木兹海峡，走靠近阿曼海岸的狭窄航线，并进行船对船转运，以限制任何单艘船只的暴露风险。
Gulf oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) exporters have responded by sending tankers through Hormuz in convoys, using narrow routes close to Oman's coast under US Navy protection and conducting ship-to-ship transfers to limit the exposure of any one ship.
虽然这一复杂的过程正在发挥作用，但代价高昂。运费和保险费用仍约为战前水平的10倍。
While this complex process is working, it comes at a high price. Freight and insurance costs remain about 10 times pre-war levels.
除非华盛顿和德黑兰达成持久协议，否则几乎没有理由指望这些成本会消失。将非正常状态常态化海湾生产者正在将非正常状态常态化。虽然这种新常态凸显了海湾石油工业非凡的韧性，但也强调了当今平衡的脆弱性。
Unless Washington and Tehran reach a durable agreement, there is little reason to expect those costs to disappear.NORMALIZING THE EXCEPTIONALGulf producers are normalizing the exceptional. While the new normal highlights the extraordinary resilience of the Gulf oil industry, it also emphasizes the weakness of today's equilibrium.
几十年里，霍尔木兹海峡航运持续中断一直被视为一种遥远但可能具有灾难性的事件。然而，生产者已经证明，他们可以通过创造性的变通方案来适应。但适应危机并不等于解决危机。
For decades, a sustained disruption to shipping through Hormuz was treated as a remote but potentially catastrophic event. Yet producers have shown that they can adapt with creative workarounds. But adapting to a crisis is not the same as resolving it.
伊朗目前有充分的动机继续袭击穿过霍尔木兹海峡的船只。虽然美国对伊朗石油出口的封锁正在扼杀其经济，但该国政府没有表现出任何愿意在其红线上妥协的迹象。德黑兰可能认为自己能够熬过华盛顿，特别是经历了上周共和党的大败之后。华盛顿准备承担保护霍尔木兹海峡交通的财务和军事负担多久？
Iran currently has every incentive to continue attacking vessels crossing Hormuz. While the US blockade on Iran's oil exports is choking its economy, the government shows no sign that it is willing to compromise on its red lines. Tehran likely believes it can outlast Washington, particularly after the Republican Party's drubbing last week. How long is Washington prepared to shoulder the financial and military burden of protecting traffic through Hormuz?
不战不和的环境也可能阻碍冲突期间受损的海湾能源基础设施的重建，特别是在沙特阿拉伯，该国继续遭到也门与伊朗结盟的胡塞武装的袭击。运营商几乎没有动力去寻求昂贵的永久性修复，因为那可能只会制造新的目标。因此，短期权宜之计更有可能占上风。尴尬的选择这给特朗普留下了一个尴尬的选择。
The no-war, no-peace environment is also likely to impede the reconstruction of Gulf energy infrastructure damaged during the conflict, particularly in Saudi Arabia, which continues to be attacked by Yemen's Iran-aligned Houthis. Operators will have little incentive to pursue expensive permanent repairs that could simply create new targets. Short-term fixes are therefore more likely to prevail.AN AWKWARD CHOICEThat leaves Trump with an awkward choice.
中期选举向人们发出了关于一场不受欢迎的战争政治代价的明确信号。但华盛顿是否愿意接受一份几乎无法遏制伊朗核计划的协议，从而强化美国输掉这场战争的观点？
The midterm elections sent a clear signal about the political cost of an unpopular war. But is Washington willing to accept a deal that does little to curb Tehran's nuclear programme, reinforcing the idea that the US lost the war?
如果在未来几周内没有取得切实的外交进展，特朗普仍有可能得出结论，认为重新发动打击是增强华盛顿在谈判中筹码的最佳机会。
If no tangible diplomatic progress is made in the coming weeks, Trump could still conclude that renewed strikes offer the best chance of strengthening the US hand in negotiations.
然而，除非军事行动给予重大打击并显著削弱伊朗政府，否则另一轮战斗实际上可能会巩固德黑兰的立场，并使达成协议变得更加困难。
However, unless military action delivers a decisive blow that significantly weakens the Iranian government, another round of fighting could actually harden Tehran's position and make a settlement more difficult.
因此，危险不仅仅是由战争重燃引起的油价戏剧性飙升。危险在于中东将陷入一种更持久、更阴险的局面：这种冲突的强度足以使航运变得危险、保险费变得昂贵、能源基础设施变得脆弱，但其克制程度又足以让全世界学会与之共存。
The danger, therefore, is not simply another dramatic surge in oil prices caused by renewed war. It is that the Middle East settles into something more durable and more insidious: a conflict intense enough to keep shipping dangerous, insurance expensive and energy infrastructure vulnerable, but contained enough for the world to learn to live with it.