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四国新防务枢纽能否在南海制衡中国?Can a new 4-country defence hub counter China in the South China Sea?

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分析人士表示,随着美国、日本、澳大利亚和菲律宾加快建立联合作战架构并强化集体应对的步伐,中国在南海争议水域的活动可能面临更大挑战。

China’s activities in the South China Sea’s disputed waters could face greater challenges as the US, Japan, Australia and the Philippines accelerate efforts to build a joint operational structure and strengthen their collective response, analysts said.

根据10月28日达成并于11月10日公布的一项协议,这四国计划在菲律宾设立一个防务协调中心,此举有望改善情报共享、联合监视,以及跟踪和应对中国海上活动的能力。

Under an agreement reached on October 28 and made public on November 10, the four countries plan to establish a defence coordination centre in the Philippines, a move that could improve intelligence sharing, joint surveillance and their ability to track and address Chinese maritime activities.

该拟建中心正式名称为“联合协调中心”,是一份联合声明中列出的多项举措之一。

Officially named the Combined Coordination Centre, the planned hub was among several initiatives outlined in a joint statement.

声明中,该小组的防务部长还承诺扩大联合演习和合作活动的范围、复杂程度和频率,同时协调投资,旨在增强马尼拉“保卫其群岛”的能力。

In it, the group’s defence ministers also pledged to expand the scope, complexity and frequency of combined exercises and cooperative activities, while aligning investments aimed at strengthening Manila’s ability to “defend its archipelago”.

这些进展标志着这个非正式安全组织——也被称为“小分队”——在运作层面建立更紧密联系的又一步骤,正值北京与马尼拉因南海领土主张竞争而陷入紧张之际。

The developments mark another step towards closer operational ties within the informal security grouping, also known as “the Squad”, amid tensions between Beijing and Manila over competing territorial claims in the South China Sea.

澳大利亚战略政策研究所高级驻所研究员大卫·达顿在本月发布的一份报告中指出,“小分队”正在发展成为一个“应对中国海上施压的联合作战架构”。

In a report published this month, David Dutton, a senior resident fellow at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, argued that the Squad was developing into a “joint operational structure that counters Chinese maritime pressure”.

拟建中心可能为这一努力提供更持久的制度基础。SeaLight基金会创始人兼执行主任雷蒙德·鲍威尔将这一转变描述为迈向“持久的协调习惯”。更紧密的协调也可能影响北京对海上对抗风险的计算。

The proposed centre could give that effort a more permanent institutional footing. Raymond Powell, founder and executive director of the SeaLight Foundation, described the shift as a move towards “durable habits of coordination”. Closer alignment could also affect Beijing’s calculations about the risks of maritime confrontations.

“对于[中国人民解放军]而言,这四国之间的合作使国防规划变得更加复杂,因为解放军在东海或南海的任何挑衅行动都可能涉及多达四个国家,”中国与安全研究公司Perceptum的总监蒂莫西·希思表示。该拟建中心建立在四国此前作出的承诺基础之上。

“For the [People’s Liberation Army], the cooperation between the four countries complicates defence planning, since aggressive PLA actions in either the East China or South China seas could involve up to four countries,” said Timothy Heath, director of China and security research firm Perceptum. The planned centre builds on earlier four-country commitments.

去年5月,合作伙伴同意共同投资菲律宾国防网络安全和韧性建设,加强情报共享,并探讨规划联合情报、监视和侦察活动。

In May last year, the partners agreed to jointly invest in Philippine defence cybersecurity and resilience, strengthen information sharing, and explore planning joint intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance activities.

今年5月29日,四国军方首长就一个更广泛的合作框架达成一致,涵盖情报共享、海上活动、作战规划和后勤保障。新中心还可以利用现有的美菲合作。

On May 29 this year, their military chiefs agreed on a broader cooperation framework covering information sharing, maritime activities, operational planning and logistics. The new hub could also draw on existing US-Philippine cooperation.

2024年11月,华盛顿和马尼拉在阿吉纳尔多营动工兴建双边“联合协调中心”,并在今年的“肩并肩”军演中投入使用——“肩并肩”军演是菲美两国举行的最大规模年度双边军事演习。

Washington and Manila broke ground on a bilateral Combined Coordination Centre at Camp Aguinaldo in November 2024, and it was in use by this year’s Balikatan exercises – the largest annual bilateral military drills conducted between the Philippines and the US.

四国中心将建立在该安排基础上还是单独运作仍不清楚,其组织架构和作战能力也同样不明。

Whether the four-country centre will build on that arrangement or operate separately remains unclear, as do its organisational structure and operational capabilities.

原则上,通过此类枢纽汇集监视数据,有助于改善对中国海军、海警和海上民兵舰艇的跟踪监控。

In principle, pooling surveillance data through such a hub could improve the tracking of Chinese naval, coastguard and maritime militia vessels.

但要将这些信息转化为有效的联合行动,将需要兼容的系统、既定的程序以及对抗期间的政治共识。

But turning that information into effective joint action will require compatible systems, established procedures and political agreement during a confrontation.

除了实时行动外,更紧密的协调还可以帮助马尼拉及其伙伴更好地集体利用通过单独双边项目提供的能力和训练,范围涵盖监视飞机、无人机和雷达系统,到军舰、军事基础设施和弹药设施。

Beyond real-time operations, closer coordination could help Manila and its partners make better collective use of capabilities and training being provided through separate bilateral programmes, ranging from surveillance aircraft, drones and radar systems to warships, military infrastructure and ammunition facilities.

例如,华盛顿资助了菲律宾军事基地的改善,包括后勤和弹药储存设施,同时提供海军和空中无人机,并安排向菲律宾海岸警卫队移交三架“空中国王”350型监视飞机。

Washington, for example, has funded improvements to Philippine military bases, including logistics and ammunition storage, while providing naval and aerial drones and arranging the transfer of three King Air 350 surveillance aircraft to the Philippine Coast Guard.

与此同时,日本提供了海岸警卫队舰艇和监视设备。就在上周11月9日,东京签署了一项进一步的43亿日元(约合2690万美元)政府安全援助协议,向菲律宾海军提供沿海雷达系统,向菲律宾空军提供监视无人机。

Japan, meanwhile, has supplied coastguard vessels and surveillance equipment. And just last week, on November 9, Tokyo signed a further 4.3 billion yen (US$26.9 million) Official Security Assistance agreement to provide a coastal radar system to the Philippine Navy and surveillance drones to its air force.

双方还同意推进即将退役的“阿武隈”级护卫驱逐舰的移交,首艘舰将在退役后移交,并致力于在日本2027财年结束前再移交一架TC-90巡逻机。

The two sides have also agreed to pursue the transfer of soon-to-be-retired Abukuma-class destroyer escorts, with the first to follow its decommissioning, and are working towards transferring an additional TC-90 patrol aircraft by the end of Japan’s 2027 financial year.

澳大利亚方面,据达顿称,正在吕宋岛五个地点实施八个国防基础设施项目,并于7月宣布拨款1000万澳元(约合680万美元),用于菲律宾海岸警卫队无人机及操作员培训。

For its part, Australia is undertaking eight defence infrastructure projects at five locations on Luzon, according to Dutton, and announced A$10 million (US$6.8 million) in funding for Philippine Coast Guard drones and operator training in July.

两国还致力于深化更广泛的国防合作。11月15日,堪培拉和马尼拉签署了一项更新后的国防合作安排,旨在加强海上活动、情报共享、作战规划、训练和互操作性。

The two countries have also moved to deepen their broader defence cooperation. On November 15, Canberra and Manila signed an updated defence cooperation arrangement aimed at strengthening maritime activities, information sharing, operational planning, training and interoperability.

通过拟议中心将这些分散的合作串联起来,有助于马尼拉填补监视空白,并更有效地与伙伴国持续开展海上行动。

Bringing those separate strands together through the proposed centre could help Manila plug surveillance gaps and sustain maritime operations more effectively alongside its partners.

希思表示,在作战层面,仅靠装备是不够的,并补充说,菲律宾需要来自美国和其他伙伴国家军队的“训练和建议”,以提高其监测和应对中国军事及准军事活动的能力。

At the operational level, equipment alone would not be enough, Heath said, adding that the Philippines needed “training and advice” from the US and other partner militaries to improve its ability to monitor and respond to Chinese military and paramilitary activities.

据日本安全政策专家塞巴斯蒂安·马斯洛(Sebastian Maslow)表示,日本向马尼拉提供军事援助的更广泛意义,不在于装备本身,而在于展示对菲律宾安全的“长期承诺”所具有的威慑价值。

More broadly, the significance of Japan’s military help to Manila lay less in the equipment itself than in the deterrent value of showing “long-term commitments” to Philippine security, according to Sebastian Maslow, a specialist in Japanese security policy.

然而,在鲍威尔(Powell)的评估中,该计划中心作为威慑手段的有效性,将取决于四国是否能持续使用它,并在面对中国压力时保持统一战线。

In Powell’s assessment, however, the planned centre’s effectiveness as a deterrent would depend on whether the four countries used it consistently and maintained a united front in the face of Chinese pressure.

加强的军事关系招致了中国官媒《环球时报》的批评。该报11月12日的一篇评论警告称,新中心可能使菲律宾成为外部大国寻求遏制北京的枢纽。它还提醒,马尼拉可能不得不承受对抗的后果。

The bolstered military ties have drawn criticism from China’s state-owned Global Times, which warned in a November 12 commentary that the new centre could turn the Philippines into a hub for outside powers seeking to contain Beijing. It also cautioned that Manila could be left exposed to the consequences of a confrontation.

除了此类警告,分析人士表示,北京可能会通过灰色地带活动来考验四国的凝聚力,这些活动旨在保持在武装对抗的阈值以下。

Beyond such warnings, analysts said Beijing could seek to test the four countries’ cohesion through grey-zone activities designed to stay below the threshold of armed confrontation.

希思(Heath)预计,中国将试图利用四个合作伙伴之间的政治分歧,并加强对“小队”活动的监视。他还指出,北京可能会继续依赖海警、准军事和海上民兵力量来维护其主张,而不引发直接的军事回应。

Heath expected China to try to exploit political divisions among the four partners and increase surveillance of Squad activities. He further suggested that Beijing might continue relying on coastguard, paramilitary and maritime militia forces to press its claims without triggering a direct military response.

“通过灰色地带行动,中国可能能够在有利于自己的方向逐步改变现状,同时展示美国主导的多边军事合作在这些地区的有限效力,”希思说。

“With grey-zone ops, China might be able to continue incrementally changing the status quo in its favour while showing the limited effectiveness of the US-led multilateral military cooperation in those areas,” Heath said.

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