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印度斯坦时报

四国领导人将在马尼拉会晤,一些疑虑仍挥之不去Quad leaders set to meet in Manila, some lingering doubts persist

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时隔两年,印度、美国、澳大利亚和日本的领导人将在菲律宾举行四方安全对话领导人峰会。尽管2017年这一四国集团重启时备受怀疑,但四方安全对话,即四方机制,已在印太地区确立了持久存在的地位。四国设立的海事域名意识倡议已启动,此外还有新的海岸警卫队演习、在巴布亚新几内亚和缅甸开展的人道主义救援行动,以及在斐济建设港口的计划。去年9月,四国海岸警卫队在印度一艘船上从印度钦奈一起航行至澳大利亚珀斯,这是扩大安全任务的一部分。

After a two-year gap, the leaders of India, America, Australia and Japan will meet in the Philippines for the Quad Leaders Summit. Despite the scepticism that greeted the revival of the four-nation grouping in 2017, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or Quad, has established itself as a lasting presence in the Indo-Pacific. A maritime domain awareness initiative established by the four nations has taken off, alongside new coast guard exercises, humanitarian relief efforts in Papua New Guinea and Myanmar and plans to build a port in Fiji. In September, the coast guards of all four countries sailed together on an Indian vessel from Chennai to Perth, Australia, as part of an expanded set of security missions.

然而,四国领导人准备在马尼拉会面之际,四方机制并非一切顺利。美国与其他四方国家的关系均出现紧张。围绕贸易、俄罗斯石油采购以及特朗普政府与巴基斯坦领导层关系密切等问题的紧张局势,给美印伙伴关系带来压力。华盛顿还推动日本和澳大利亚等盟友做出贸易让步并增加国防开支,造成相当大的摩擦。

Yet, all is not well with the Quad as the four leaders prepare to meet in Manila. America’s relations with each of the other Quad nations have been strained. Tensions over trade, Russian oil purchases and the Trump administration’s cosy relationship with Pakistan’s leadership have weighed on the US-India partnership. Washington has also pushed allies such as Japan and Australia to make trade concessions and increase defence spending, creating considerable friction.

特朗普因素与中国的阴影 还有另一个问题,即特朗普政府对华政策。北京的经济和军事崛起,使其成为亚洲最强大的国家,这一崛起推动了2017年四方机制的重启,以及其在2021年升格为领导人级别对话。在前总统乔·拜登执政期间,中国是定义美国印太战略的“节奏挑战”,华盛顿将四方机制作为平衡中国努力的核心。

The Trump factor and China’s shadow Then, there is the question of the Trump administration’s policy towards China. Beijing’s economic and military rise, which has made it Asia’s most powerful state, drove the revival of the Quad in 2017 and its later elevation to a leader-level dialogue in 2021. Under former president Joe Biden, China was the “pacing challenge” that defined American Indo-Pacific strategy, and Washington elevated the Quad as a centrepiece of its effort to balance China.

特朗普政府的政策更为复杂:既具有竞争性,又专注于与北京和解并避免重大冲突。美国2025年国家安全战略暗示了这一变化,即不再提及中国是战略竞争对手,这一描述此前的文件中经常使用。

The Trump administration’s policy has been more complex: competitive, yet focused on conciliating with Beijing and avoiding major conflict. America’s 2025 National Security Strategy hinted at this change by dropping references to China as a strategic competitor, a description used frequently in earlier documents.

有时,这种与中国保持稳定的愿望让美国盟友陷入困境。例如,日本在与中国就台湾未来问题发生升级的言语战时,对华盛顿的冷淡支持感到失望。观察人士认为,四方安全对话也是这一转变的受害者之一——随着特朗普总统寻求与中国妥协,并专注于乌克兰和伊朗的冲突,四方安全对话被搁置。值得注意的是,自2024年9月以来,四方安全对话领导人峰会尚未举行,批评者将此视为美国对该机制兴趣和雄心减弱的证据。

At times, this desire to maintain stability with China has left American allies in the lurch. Japan, for example, was disappointed by Washington’s lukewarm support during an escalating war of words with China over the future of Taiwan. Observers argue that the Quad has been another casualty of this shift — left to languish as President Trump pursues accommodation with China and is preoccupied with conflicts in Ukraine and Iran. Notably, no Quad leaders’ summit has taken place since September 2024, which critics cite as evidence of flagging US interest and ambition in the grouping.

上一次峰会于2024年9月21日举行,当时拜登在其家乡特拉华州威尔明顿主持了领导人峰会。“我个人认为,一旦一个机构是领导人主导的,就像拜登政府时期那样,那么没有这种直接领导,就很难保持势头。我认为其他领导人能够感觉到总统在这些聚会上缺乏雄心,甚至可能缺乏兴趣。值得注意的是,总统有时似乎对七国集团以及与欧盟或北约的会议等多边场合不太感兴趣,”库尔特·坎贝尔说,他曾在拜登政府担任副国务卿和印太政策事务协调员。

The last one was on September 21, 2024, when Biden hosted the leaders’ summit in his hometown, Wilmington, Delaware.“My own belief is that once an institution is leader-led, as it was in the Biden administration, then it’s very difficult to sustain momentum without that direct leadership. I think the other leaders can sense a lack of ambition and maybe even interest from the President in these gatherings. It is interesting to note that the president sometimes appears less interested in multilateral settings like the G7 and meetings with the EU or NATO,” said Kurt Campbell, who served as deputy secretary of state and Indo-Pacific policy czar under Biden.

迪伦·约翰逊,国务院全球公共事务助理国务卿,反驳了美国对四方安全对话兴趣正在下降的观点。“这是一个完全荒谬的看法。鲁比奥国务卿在过去两年中已正式与四方外长会面五次——过去六个月中有三次会面。国务卿上任后的第一个官方电话就是打给四方的。我们定期举行四方沙尔帕电话会议和会议。我们正在努力将下周东盟峰会上的四方领导人峰会正式化。假新闻!”

Dylan Johnson, assistant secretary of state for global public affairs, countered the view that the US’s interest in the Quad was declining. “This is an utterly ridiculous take. Secretary Rubio has formally met with the Quad foreign ministers five times in the past two years — with three meetings in the past six months. The Secretary’s first official call in office was to the Quad. We have regular monthly Quad sherpa calls and meetings. And we are working to formalise a Quad Leaders Summit at ASEAN next week. Fake News!” said Johnson, responding to a news story suggesting that interest in the Quad was declining.

约翰逊说,这是针对一则暗示四方安全对话兴趣正在下降的新闻报道作出的回应。一位印度官员表示同意。“人们过分强调领导人级别峰会已经两年没有举行的事实。

An Indian official agreed. “Too much is being made of the fact that the leaders-level summit hasn’t happened for two years. The Quad foreign ministers have met several times. A lot of the real work happens in those meetings as well as at the working level. Leaders essentially bless that progress during their meetings. There’s a lot going on,” said the official, speaking to HT on condition of anonymity.

Quad四国外长已举行多次会晤。大量实质性工作在这些会晤以及工作层面的会谈中完成。领导人在会晤中基本上是对这些进展予以认可。正在进行的事情很多,”该官员在接受《印度斯坦时报》采访时表示,条件是不具名。交付缺口与“小分队”挑战尽管如此,围绕Quad及其持续相关性的争论日益加剧,对该机制前景的怀疑归结为几个核心担忧。

Delivery gaps and the ‘Squad’ challengeStill, the debate around the Quad and its continued relevance has increased, with scepticism about the grouping’s future boiling down to a few key concerns. First, critics have long asked a fairly simple question: What has the Quad actually achieved?

首先,批评者长期以来一直提出一个相当简单的问题:Quad究竟取得了什么实际成果?直到几年前,其议程涵盖范围从保障海底电缆基础设施安全到赞助太阳能项目和癌症“登月计划”。批评者称,试图事事涉猎导致Quad力量分散,实际交付成果被视为参差不齐。以Quad在2021年新冠疫情高峰期供应疫苗的旗舰努力为例。该项目面临生产障碍和分发延误,最终未能达到Quad承诺到2022年交付12亿剂疫苗的雄心勃勃目标。

The agenda stretched from securing undersea cable infrastructure to sponsoring solar projects and a cancer moonshot initiative until just a few years ago. Critics said trying to do a little bit of everything had left the Quad stretched thin with actual delivery seen as uneven. Take the Quad’s flagship effort to supply vaccines at the height of the Covid-19 pandemic in 2021. The project faced production hurdles and distribution delays, ultimately falling short of the ambitious 1.2 billion doses that the grouping pledged to deliver by 2022.

这种批评有其道理。2025年7月,Quad四国外长确实承认该集团的议程变得庞杂难管,并将其精简至仅四大主要领域:经济安全、海上安全、人道主义援助和关键技术。

The criticism has merit. In July 2025, the Quad foreign ministers did recognise that the group’s agenda had become unwieldy and trimmed it down to just four main areas: economic security, maritime security, humanitarian assistance and critical technology.

然而,Quad的捍卫者认为该机制拥有实实在在的成就。Quad于2022年启动的“印太海洋态势感知倡议”收集并分发商业可用的海洋数据和情报给地区国家。今年5月宣布的一项新的海上监视倡议将增加并扩大这一努力。

However, the Quad’s defenders argue the grouping has real achievements. The Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain Awareness initiative - launched by the Quad in 2022 - collects and distributes commercially-available maritime data and intelligence to regional countries. A new maritime surveillance initiative announced in May this year will add and expand that effort.

“四方安全对话”还在帮助太平洋岛国帕劳升级电信基础设施,预计新的开放无线接入网系统将于明年初投入运营。

The Quad is also helping the Pacific island nation of Palau upgrade its telecom infrastructure with a new Open Radio Access Network system expected to be operational by early next year.A second criticism is that the Quad’s reluctance to take on an explicit defence and security focus had led to a decline in its importance.

第二个批评是,“四方安全对话”不愿承担明确的防务和安全职能,导致其重要性下降。近年来,中国通过现代化导弹和核武库,迅速扩充了军事能力。中国人民解放军海军现在拥有世界上规模最大的舰队。尽管“四方安全对话”是唯一能够应对中国的制衡联盟,但批评者认为,该机制刻意避免开展那种能够制衡中国、稳定印太局势的联合防务活动。

China has rapidly expanded its military capabilities in recent years by modernising its missile and nuclear arsenals. The PLA Navy now boasts the largest fleet in the world. Although the Quad is the only balancing coalition capable of handling China, critics argue that the grouping has studiously avoided the kind of joint defence activities that could balance China and stabilise the Indo-Pacific.

这种观点认为,“四方安全对话”有被“小分队”取而代之的风险,“小分队”由美国、日本、澳大利亚和菲律宾组成,后者是一个更敏锐、以防务为重点、旨在遏制中国的联盟。

The argument goes that the Quad risks being eclipsed by the Squad, which includes America, Japan, Australia and the Philippines, as the latter is a sharper, defence-focused coalition aimed at deterring China.

“四方安全对话”的支持者表示,这种批评预设成员国想要一个“亚洲版北约”,因而偏离了要点。

斯坦福大学弗里曼·斯波格利国际研究学院研究学者阿尔赞·塔拉波尔说:“‘四方安全对话’和‘小分队’的使命不同,优势也不同。‘小分队’的优势在于它们在军事上关系更紧密,能在一组特定的军事挑战上合作得更好。‘四方安全对话’的优势在于其地理分布覆盖整个印太地区,战略分量大得多。因此,它们的使命应该不同,甚至可以是互补的。”

Supporters of the Quad said this critique misses the point by assuming members want an “Asian Nato”.“The Quad and the Squad have different missions and different strengths. The Squad’s strength is that they are militarily much closer and can work much better together on a specific set of military challenges. The Quad’s strength is that its geographic spread across the entire Indo-Pacific and strategic weight is much greater. Therefore, their missions should be different and can even be complementary,” said Arzan Tarapore, a research scholar at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies.

塔拉波尔认为,这两个集团旨在以不同方式实现同一目标:向中国发出威慑信号,同时不引发冲突。从新德里视角看印度洋安全核算第三个批评,特别是从新德里的角度来看,是“四方安全对话”现有的军事活动给印度带来的利益寥寥,反而使其安全核算变得更加复杂。

Tarapore argued that both groupings aim to achieve the same goal in different ways: send a deterrent signal to China without sparking conflict. India’s security calculus in the Indian OceanA third criticism, especially from New Delhi’s perspective, is that the Quad’s existing military activities generate few benefits for India while complicating its security calculus.

在其他四方(Quad)国家仍将注意力集中在台湾和南海之际,印度的目光坚定地投向印度洋以及其边境上的巴基斯坦和中国。昆西研究所的萨朗·希多尔(Sarang Shidore)认为,印度参与四方的军事活动可能被中国误读,从而引发进一步冲突。新加坡国际战略研究所的达尔沙纳·巴鲁阿(Darshana Baruah)持相反观点。四方四国参加的年度马拉巴尔(Malabar)防务演习提升了印度在面对日益增长的中国海军在其后院活动时的海上备战能力。

巴鲁阿指出:“在2019年至2025这六年间,中国海军已经开始在印度洋地区进行演练,这在十年前是没有的。印度不需要去挑起冲突,但我认为它需要做好准备。我不确定防务生态系统是否已足够准备,因为新德里仍在质疑中国在印度洋的自给自足能力,而北京已经确立了自己作为印度洋参与者的地位。”

While the other Quad nations remain focused on Taiwan and the South China Sea, India’s sights are firmly set on the Indian Ocean and on Pakistan and China on its frontier. Sarang Shidore of the Quincy Institute argued that India’s participation in the Quad’s military activities risks being misread by China and provoking further conflict. Darshana Baruah at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in Singapore disagreed. The annual Malabar defence exercises, attended by the four Quad nations, have improved India’s maritime preparedness as it faces a growing Chinese naval presence in its backyard.“In just six years between 2019 and 2025, the Chinese navy has started exercising across the Indian Ocean region in a way they did not 10 years ago. India doesn’t need to go and pick a fight but I think it needs to be prepared. I am not sure the defence ecosystem is adequately prepared as Delhi continues to question China’s ability to sustain itself in the Indian Ocean, whereas Beijing has established itself as an Indian Ocean player,” Baruah argued.

塔拉波尔(Tarapore)补充说,印度参与四方是战略威慑的一部分。“在概念层面上最重要的是要记住,四方最大的战略价值在于它的存在本身。它甚至不需要做太多事情。但如果会议继续举行,议程不断推进,四方已被确立为一个可以在地区形势恶化时进一步构建并启动的框架,这一点在北京的心目中具有最大的战略影响。”

Tarapore added that India’s participation in the Quad serves as a strategic deterrent.“The most important thing to remember at a conceptual level is that the Quad’s greatest strategic utility is that it exists. It doesn’t even have to do a whole lot. But if meetings continue and if the agenda keeps inching forward, the fact that the Quad has been established as a framework that could be built upon and that could be activated as conditions worsen in the region has the greatest strategic effect in Beijing’s mind,” he said.

即便是对四方前景持乐观态度的人也承认,特朗普政府的举动已经引发了深刻的疑问,即华盛顿是否具备意愿、专注力和持久力在长期内继续投入四方。

Even optimists about the Quad’s prospects conceded that the Trump administration’s actions have led to deep questions about whether Washington has the will, focus and stamina to stay invested in the Quad over the long haul.

如果未来的美国政府效仿特朗普政府,将与中国的战略包容置于优先地位,该集团的其他成员可能会质疑其持续的相关性。四方机制的未来还将取决于华盛顿能否修复构成四方机制基础的紧张双边关系,尤其是美印关系。

“我确实认为四方机制重新聚在一起很重要,但我认为很难过分强调过去两年对印度造成了多大的创伤。因此,他们在四方机制内的做法会更加谨慎。两年前,当我们在特拉华州会面时,是印度在四方机制中主要起了带头作用。他们从某种程度上不情愿、偶尔谨慎,转变为幕后的推动力量。我认为在目前的情况下,他们不太可能想扮演那个角色,”坎贝尔指出。

Should future American administrations follow the Trump administration’s lead of prioritising strategic accommodation with China, the group’s other members may question its continued relevance. The Quad’s future will also depend on whether Washington can repair the strained bilateral ties that form the foundation for the Quad, especially the US-India relationship.“I do think that it is important that the Quad is coming back together again, but I think it would be difficult to overstate how much India has been scarred by the last two years. So they will be more wary of their approach inside the Quad. Two years ago, when we met in Delaware, it was India that largely led the way in the Quad. They had gone from being somewhat reluctant and occasionally careful to being the driving force behind the scenes. I think it is unlikely that they would want to play that role in the current circumstances,” observed Campbell.

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