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一个更土耳其化的中东?A More Turkish Middle East?

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土耳其总统雷杰普·塔伊普·埃尔多安在土耳其安卡拉举行的北约峰会上,2026年7月。乌米特·贝克塔什 / 路透社Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan at a NATO summit in Ankara, Turkey, July 2026 Umit Bektas / Reuters

自哈马斯于2023年10月7日对以色列发动袭击以来,中东的未来一直面临激烈的争夺。此前以海湾为中心的秩序中,沙特阿拉伯和阿拉伯联合酋长国(阿联酋)试图利用经济治国方略以及同伊朗、以色列、土耳其和叙利亚等昔日宿敌关系正常化来稳定并塑造该地区。加沙三年的战争,以及近期在伊朗和海湾地区的冲突,严重打乱了这一秩序构建项目,并对未来走向产生了深深的不确定感。

Since Hamas’s October 7, 2023, attack on Israel, the future of the Middle East has been fiercely contested. The previous Gulf-centered order had Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) trying to stabilize and shape the region using economic statecraft and the normalization of relations with former foes in Iran, Israel, Turkey, and Syria. Three years of war in Gaza, and more recently in Iran and the Gulf, have severely disrupted that order-building project and generated a deep sense of uncertainty about what comes next.

同中东的每一个大国一样,土耳其也一直试图填补权力真空。2023年之前,安卡拉的影响力一直在下降;在经历阿拉伯之春后多年的外交孤立之后,它才刚刚开始修复与地区主要大国的关系。但在过去几年里,土耳其的叙利亚政策及其地区外交赢得了美国的支持,并通过对库尔德工人党(PKK)寻求和平进程来努力巩固国内后方。

Turkey, like every major power in the Middle East, has tried to fill the vacuum. Before 2023, Ankara’s influence had been in decline; after years of diplomatic isolation following the Arab uprisings, it had just begun repairing its ties with major regional actors. But in the past few years, Turkey has earned American backing for its policies in Syria and its regional diplomacy, and it has made an effort to secure the home front by pursuing a peace process with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a militant group that has fought a decades-long insurgency against the Turkish state.

库尔德工人党是一个长期针对土耳其国家进行武装叛乱的武装组织。最近在8月,巴基斯坦、沙特阿拉伯和土耳其签署了《麦加防务联盟》集体安全协议,这一协议将土耳其的地区定位制度化,并直接将该国拉入了沙特与胡塞武装的战争之中。

Most recently, in August, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey signed the Mecca Defense Alliance, a collective security agreement that institutionalizes Turkey’s regional positioning and pulls the country directly into Saudi Arabia’s war with the Houthis.

土耳其在10月7日之后的战略恢复了该国作为地区大国的地位。但它没有能力实现其更大的目标:按自己的条件建立秩序。土耳其和该地区的其他抱负远大的领导者一样,缺乏独自强加新安全框架的力量。它为建立此类框架而进行的初步努力——例如新的麦加条约——只会让该集团之外的国家感到不安全,从而助长动荡。因此,土耳其争夺地区领导地位的最雄心勃勃的举措可能会被证明是无效的,甚至是适得其反的。

Turkey’s post–October 7 strategy has restored the country’s position as a regional heavyweight. But it is not capable of meeting its larger objective: establishing order on its own terms. Turkey, like the region’s other aspiring leaders, lacks the power to impose a new security framework on its own. Its nascent efforts to build one, such as the new Mecca pact, merely make countries outside the bloc feel unsafe, feeding instability. Turkey’s most ambitious plays for regional leadership are therefore likely to prove ineffective or even counterproductive.

只要中东高度军事化、此消彼长的安全动态依然存在,安卡拉最好还是专注于它有能力保护的本土更近的利益。

As long as the Middle East’s highly militarized, zero-sum security dynamics remain, Ankara would be better off concentrating on interests closer to home that it has the power to protect.

风险与回报 这并不是土耳其第一次试图塑造更广泛的中东秩序。安卡拉将2010年代初的阿拉伯起义视为历史性的机遇窗口。执政的正义与发展党将席卷该地区的政治转型描述为“人民掌权”,土耳其政府曾预计,受抗议冲击的阿拉伯国家最终举行的选举将使与穆斯林兄弟会结盟的政党上台。穆斯林兄弟会在意识形态上与正发党同情,并与之有着实际联系。当时的观点认为,友好政府的出现将增加土耳其在该地区的影响力。

RISK AND REWARD This is not the first time that Turkey has tried to shape the broader Middle Eastern order. Ankara saw the Arab uprisings in the early 2010s as a historic window of opportunity. The ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) described the political transformation sweeping the region as “the people’s coming to power,” and the Turkish government expected that eventual elections in the Arab countries rocked by protest would bring into office parties aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood, which was ideologically sympathetic and had practical links to the AKP. The emergence of friendly governments, the thinking went, would increase Turkey’s influence in the region.

然而,这些希望很快就破灭了。埃及与穆斯林兄弟会有渊源的总统穆罕默德·穆尔西于2013年被推翻,随着巴沙尔·阿萨德坚守权力,土耳其对叙利亚反对派运动的押注也宣告失败。土耳其陷入孤立。由埃及、沙特阿拉伯和阿联酋组成的对立轴心反对土耳其与穆斯林兄弟会的联系,并试图限制安卡拉的影响力。这个集团在中东、北非、东地中海和非洲之角对抗土耳其的立场,实际上在利比亚、索马里和叙利亚的冲突中与土耳其展开了代理人战争。

Yet these hopes soon receded. Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood–affiliated president, Mohamed Morsi, was overthrown in 2013, and Turkey’s bet on the opposition movement in Syria failed as Bashar al-Assad clung to power. Turkey was left isolated. A rival axis composed of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE objected to Turkey’s Muslim Brotherhood ties and sought to limit Ankara’s influence. This group contested Turkey’s positions across the Middle East, North Africa, the eastern Mediterranean, and the Horn of Africa, effectively fighting proxy battles with Turkey in conflicts in Libya, Somalia, and Syria.

随后,2023年10月7日的袭击开启了又一个动荡时期。此后的某些变化对土耳其有利。其中最主要的是,2024年12月,以沙姆解放组织为首的反对派武装推翻了叙利亚阿萨德政权。为了追求推翻大马士革政权,土耳其投入的精力可以说超过了其他任何国家;多年来,它一直在援助反对派武装。然而随着岁月流逝,这一目标似乎越来越遥不可及。

Then, the attacks on October 7, 2023, ushered in another period of upheaval. Some changes since have played in Turkey’s favor. Chief among them is the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria in December 2024 at the hands of opposition groups led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. Turkey had arguably invested more than any other country in pursuit of regime change in Damascus; it assisted opposition groups for years. Yet as the years went by, that objective seemed increasingly out of reach.

该地区的其他大国已经接受了该政权得以存续的现实,甚至连安卡拉也开始考虑与阿萨德实现关系正常化,以免被冷落在一旁。阿萨德的倒台一夜之间改变了土耳其的命运,使其在叙利亚获得了十多年来从未有过的影响力。土耳其的地区关系正常化努力取得了参差不齐的结果。

The region’s other major powers made their peace with the regime’s survival, and even Ankara began considering rapprochement with Assad to avoid being left out in the cold. Assad’s fall changed Turkey’s fortunes overnight, handing it a level of influence in Syria it had not held in more than a decade. Turkey’s regional normalization efforts have yielded mixed results.

其他事态发展对安卡拉而言被证明更加危险。自10月7日以来,以色列的外交政策变得更加强硬和具修正主义倾向,其扩张性的安全目标开始与土耳其的安全目标发生冲突。土耳其总统雷杰普·塔伊普·埃尔多安对以色列加沙政策的尖锐批评使两国关系紧绷,而当土耳其扩大其在阿萨德政权倒台后的叙利亚的立足点、且以色列开始将安卡拉在那里的军事存在视为直接威胁时,两国关系进一步恶化。

Other developments proved more dangerous for Ankara. Israel’s foreign policy became more assertive and revisionist after October 7, and its expansive security objectives began to clash with Turkey’s own. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s sharp criticism of Israeli policies in Gaza strained the relationship, and it deteriorated further when Turkey expanded its foothold in post-Assad Syria and Israel came to view Ankara’s military presence there as a direct threat.

随着以色列继续空袭叙利亚境内的地点——安卡拉谴责了这些袭击——局势升级的风险正在不断增加。任何一方的误判都可能导致以色列军队与土耳其军队发生直接冲突。

As Israel continues to strike sites in Syria—attacks Ankara has condemned—the risk of escalation is only growing. A miscalculation on either side could lead to a direct clash between Israeli and Turkish forces.

与此同时,美以与伊朗的战争对土耳其而言有利有弊。尽管德黑兰的注意力一直集中在别处,但安卡拉对伊朗从叙利亚撤出以及借此机会回击伊朗在伊拉克残存影响力的机会表示欢迎。土耳其同样不希望看到一个拥有核武器的伊朗颠覆地区权力平衡。然而,如果伊朗政权倒台,土耳其东部边境出现混乱的前景已在安卡拉引发了真正的焦虑,如果该政权在战争中完好无损地挺过来而可能变得更有底气,同样也引发了这种焦虑。

The U.S.-Israeli war with Iran, meanwhile, has cut both ways for Turkey. While Tehran’s attention has been focused elsewhere, Ankara has welcomed Iran’s retreat from Syria and the chance to push back against its remaining influence in Iraq. Turkey also has no interest in seeing a nuclear-armed Iran upend the regional balance of power. Yet the prospect of chaos across Turkey’s eastern border, should the Iranian regime fall, has bred real anxiety in Ankara, as has the possibility that Iran could become emboldened if the regime emerges from the war intact.

在这个复杂的环境中,安卡拉奉行了一项三管齐下的战略,以保护其安全利益,并希望借此利用动荡所带来的机遇。自美国总统唐纳德·特朗普重掌权力以来,埃尔多安拉近了土耳其与美国的关系,并试图利用他与华盛顿的关系来推进安卡拉的地区政策。土耳其还一直在推进地区关系正常化,在20世纪20年代初(注:此处原文如此,应为2020年代初)修复与沙特阿拉伯、埃及和其他主要阿拉伯国家关系的基础上再接再厉,旨在建立一个更广泛的地区集团。

In this complex environment, Ankara has pursued a three-pronged strategy to protect its security interests and, it hopes, capitalize on opportunities the upheaval has created. Since U.S. President Donald Trump’s return to power, Erdogan has drawn Turkey closer to the United States and tried to use his relationship with Washington to advance Ankara’s regional policies. Turkey has also pressed ahead with regional normalization, building on efforts to repair ties with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and other key Arab countries in the early 2020s, with the aim to forge a broader regional bloc.

此外,安卡拉在国内启动了“无恐怖土耳其”进程,试图解决土耳其境内外与库尔德工人党的冲突,长期以来,土耳其的对手一直通过武装库尔德组织或在政治上支持它们来利用这一冲突。

And, domestically, Ankara launched the “Turkey Without Terror” process, an attempt to resolve the conflict with the PKK inside and outside Turkey, which Turkey’s adversaries have long exploited by arming Kurdish groups or backing them politically.

收效甚微 安卡拉的一些政策已经取得了成果。例如,对华盛顿的外交接触。埃尔多安与特朗普的紧密关系帮助美国接受了土耳其在叙利亚不断扩大的角色。土耳其是华盛顿引入参与谈判的四个国家之一,该谈判促成了美国提议的2025年10月以色列与哈马斯之间的停火协议;因此,特朗普向埃尔多安提供了一个美国总统所谓的加沙重建和平委员会的席位,埃尔多安接受了这一席位。

FALLING SHORT Some of Ankara’s policies have borne fruit. Consider, for instance, the outreach to Washington. Erdogan’s close relations with Trump helped bring the United States on board with Turkey’s expanded role in Syria. Turkey was one of the four countries Washington brought in to help negotiate the U.S.-proposed October 2025 cease-fire agreement between Israel and Hamas, and as a result, Trump offered and Erdogan accepted a seat on the U.S. president’s so-called Board of Peace for Gaza’s reconstruction.

在最近的这场战争期间,土耳其积极参与了美国和伊朗之间的斡旋。此外,特朗普公开支持麦加防务联盟,称其“宏大、大胆且重要”。所有这一切都表明,华盛顿认识到了土耳其的地区重要性,美国政府愿意支持安卡拉的一些优先事项,土耳其也决心提升自身的地位。

Turkey has played an active part mediating between the United States and Iran during the latest war. And Trump publicly endorsed the Mecca Defense Alliance, calling it “big, bold, and important.”All of this points to a recognition in Washington of Turkey’s regional importance, the U.S. administration’s willingness to support some of Ankara’s priorities, and Turkey’s determination to elevate its own position.

然而,土耳其对影响力的追求有着不可否认的局限性。例如,在2026年2月的一次和平委员会峰会上,土耳其被排除在加沙一项计划中的国际维和部队部署和警察培训之外——这表明,与华盛顿变暖的关系并不足以凌驾于以色列对巴勒斯坦领土上存在土耳其军事印记的反对之上。同样,在叙利亚,土耳其从特朗普政府那里获得的支援,并没有阻止以色列对土耳其阵地附近的叙利亚目标发动军事打击。

Yet there are undeniable limits to Turkey’s quest for influence. At a February 2026 Board of Peace summit, for instance, Turkey was excluded from participating in a planned international troop deployment and police training in Gaza—a sign that warming relations with Washington were not enough to override Israeli objections to having a Turkish military footprint in the Palestinian territory. In Syria, similarly, the support Turkey has secured from the Trump administration has not stopped Israel from launching military strikes at Syrian targets near Turkish positions.

简而言之,土耳其一直未能利用其与特朗普政府的关系来克服以色列的反对对其地区角色范围所构成的限制。当安卡拉置身于中东冲突之外时,它拥有最大的影响力。

Simply put, Turkey has not been able to use its relationship with the Trump administration to overcome the limit Israeli opposition places on the scope of Turkey’s regional role. Ankara has the most clout when it stays out of the Middle East’s conflicts.

土耳其的地区关系正常化努力也产生了参差不齐的结果。可以肯定的是,恢复与沙特阿拉伯等重要大国的全面外交关系符合土耳其的利益。但是,安卡拉正在与这些国家结成的同盟,存在使土耳其和该地区变得更不安全而非更安全的风险。与巴基斯坦和沙特阿拉伯达成的《麦加条约》最终可能会使敌对集团固化,并加剧地区紧张局势。

Turkey’s regional normalization efforts have yielded mixed results, too. Restoring diplomatic ties with significant players such as Saudi Arabia is in Turkey’s interest, to be sure. But the alliances Ankara is entering with these countries risk making Turkey and the region less secure, not more. The Mecca pact with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia could end up hardening rival blocs and elevating regional tensions.

土耳其坚称该同盟不针对任何特定国家,并暗示埃及、叙利亚甚至伊朗最终都可能加入。但与此同时,伊朗、以色列和胡塞武装可能会将其视为一种威胁,并试图考验或削弱其成员国的承诺。

Turkey insists that the alliance is directed against no country in particular and has suggested that Egypt, Syria, or even Iran could eventually join. But in the meantime, Iran, Israel, and the Houthis could see it as a threat and try to test or weaken its members’ commitment.

此外,该条约可能会把土耳其拉入其他国家的战争。随着土耳其议会已批准该协议,且胡塞武装正在加剧对沙特阿拉伯的袭击,这种可能性目前已经摆在桌面上。土耳其政府坚称,其提供的任何军事支持都将仅限于威慑、情报共享和国防工业合作。然而,沙特阿拉伯目前正寻求巴基斯坦和土耳其在防空和领土保护方面的帮助,并且这三个国家已同意为快速部署筹备兵力。

Furthermore, the pact could pull Turkey into other countries’ wars. That possibility is already on the table now that the Turkish parliament has ratified the agreement and the Houthis are escalating their attacks on Saudi Arabia. The Turkish government has insisted that any military support it provided would be confined to deterrence, intelligence sharing, and defense-industrial cooperation. Yet Saudi Arabia is now seeking Pakistan’s and Turkey’s help with air defense and territorial protection, and the three states have agreed to prepare forces for rapid deployment.

向沙特阿拉伯派遣土耳其军队仍需获得议会的单独批准。如果议会予以批准,哪怕是有限的部署,也将使土耳其面临被卷入更广泛地区冲突的风险。

Sending Turkish troops to Saudi Arabia would still require separate parliamentary approval. If parliament allowed it, even a limited deployment would risk drawing Turkey into a wider regional conflict.

某种形式的地区安全框架是必要的。问题在于,包括土耳其在内的地区内没有任何一个国家有能力将安全秩序强加给其他国家,因此每当有人尝试时,其他国家就会感到受到威胁。一个对地区内所有国家开放、并要求成员承诺互不侵犯而非做出共同防御承诺的非正式合作框架,可能会发挥更好的作用。但这样一个联盟的组建和运转,需要地区各国政府所不具备的信任。

Some kind of regional security framework is necessary. The problem is that no country in the region, including Turkey, has the power to impose a security order on the rest, so whenever someone tries, other countries feel threatened. An informal cooperation framework that is open to all countries in the region—and that asks its members to commit to nonaggression instead of making mutual-defense pledges—might work better. But the assembly and functioning of such a coalition require trust that governments in the region do not have.

打破僵局可能需要美国发挥比近年来更具建设性的作用——而不是像特朗普对麦加条约那样,仅仅背书任何出现的地区安排,也不是像特朗普也做过的那样,在不期望以色列改变其政策的情况下向各国施压,迫使其同以色列关系正常化。相反,华盛顿或许需要在北京的帮助下,迫使伊朗和沙特阿拉伯等地区对手采取建立信任的措施,从而使一个具有包容性的安全框架在长期内切实可行。如果没有这种外部推动,地区内出现的较小安全集团只会导致进一步的不稳定。

Breaking the impasse would likely require the United States to play a more constructive role than it has in recent years—not simply endorsing whatever regional arrangement emerges, as Trump did with the Mecca pact, or pressuring countries to normalize relations with Israel without expecting Israel to change its policies in return, as Trump has also done. Instead, Washington, perhaps with the help of Beijing, would need to compel regional rivals such as Iran and Saudi Arabia to take confidence-building measures that would make an inclusive security framework viable in the long run. Without this external push, the narrower security blocs that emerge in the region will only lead to further instability.

发挥自身优势 安卡拉手里最强的牌离家更近。库尔德和平进程自2025年2月以来进展缓慢,当时被关押的库尔德工人党领导人阿卜杜拉·奥贾兰呼吁该武装组织解除武装。但它已经取得了切实进展。2025年5月,库尔德工人党宣布解散。在叙利亚,库尔德武装力量正被并入叙利亚军队,隶属于库尔德工人党的库尔德武装组织“人民保护部队”司令马兹卢姆·阿布迪于8月被任命为总统顾问。

PLAY TO YOUR STRENGTHS Ankara’s strongest cards lie closer to home. The Kurdish peace process has moved slowly since February 2025, when Abdullah Ocalan, the imprisoned leader of the PKK, called on the militant group to disarm. But it has yielded tangible progress. In May 2025, the PKK announced that it would dissolve. In Syria, Kurdish forces are being integrated into the Syrian army, and Mazloum Abdi, the commander of the People’s Defense Units, a Kurdish armed group affiliated with the PKK, was appointed as a presidential adviser in August.

叙利亚的冲突后转型依然脆弱,大马士革与东北部库尔德武装之间的和解,可能既归功于美国的压力,也归功于土耳其为实现与库尔德工人党和平相处而做出的国内努力。但对土耳其而言,叙利亚库尔德武装力量最终并入叙利亚国家,消除了安卡拉在其南部边境看到一个拥有自治权的武装库尔德实体所带来的风险。而且,鉴于安卡拉与大马士革建立的紧密安全与经济联系,以及土耳其政府在国内可以采取的旨在彻底解散库尔德工人党和深化民主改革的政治与法律举措,土耳其有能力让这些令人鼓舞的事态发展保持在正轨上。

Syria’s postconflict transition remains fragile, and the reconciliation between Damascus and Kurdish militants in the northeast may owe as much to American pressure as it does to Turkey’s domestic efforts to make peace with the PKK. But for Turkey, the eventual integration of Syrian Kurdish forces into the Syrian state removes the risk Ankara saw in having an autonomous, armed Kurdish entity on its southern border. And, given the close security and economic ties Ankara has developed with Damascus, as well as the political and legal steps the government can take at home to complete the disbanding of the PKK and to deepen democratic reforms, Turkey has the ability to keep these encouraging developments on track.

当土耳其发挥自身长处而非试图在地区内耀武扬威时,其地区政策最为成功。在二十一世纪的前十年里,安卡拉通过在叙利亚与以色列之间以及巴勒斯坦各派别之间进行调解、扩大其在黎凡特的经济参与、并提出连接该地区能源和交通基础设施的项目,建立了真正的影响力。与此同时事实证明,当军事力量被用于特定目的时最为有效,例如确保与叙利亚的边境安全。

Turkey’s regional policies are most successful when the country plays to its strengths—not when it is trying to throw its weight around the region. In the first decade of the twenty-first century, Ankara built real influence by mediating between Syria and Israel and between Palestinian factions, expanding its economic engagement in the Levant, and proposing projects to connect the region’s energy and transportation infrastructure. Military power, meanwhile, has proved most effective when applied for specific purposes, such as to secure the border with Syria.

这种组合是土耳其的制胜秘诀:通过外交和经济拓展来扩大影响力,并用有限的武力来保护核心利益。相比之下,广泛、无期限的承诺则有可能将土耳其拖入地区冲突,而又无法使其更安全。

This combination is Turkey’s winning formula: diplomacy and economic outreach to extend its influence, and limited force to protect its core interests. Broad, open-ended commitments, by contrast, risk drawing Turkey into regional conflicts without making it safer.

如今,坚持更有效的秘诀并不意味着从地区政治中退缩。这意味着设定优先事项并进行长期规划。巩固库尔德和平进程、保持华盛顿对叙利亚稳定的投入、管控在叙利亚与以色列发生对抗的风险、以及与伊拉克北部的库尔德地区政府和巴格达的伊拉克政府保持建设性关系,是确保土耳其边境安全的关键,并且在土耳其能力范围之内。

Today, sticking to a more effective formula does not mean retreating from regional politics. It means setting priorities and planning long-term. Consolidating the Kurdish peace process, keeping Washington invested in Syria’s stabilization, managing the risk of confrontation with Israel in Syria, and maintaining constructive relations with the Kurdistan Regional Government in northern Iraq and the Iraqi government in Baghdad are key to keeping Turkey’s borders secure and are within Turkey’s ability to achieve.

当推进和平进程的机会出现时,安卡拉可以继续利用其调解经验。它还可以通过扩大贸易联系以及支持地区基础设施项目(例如伊拉克-欧洲发展之路以及连接海湾与约旦、叙利亚和土耳其的拟建管道网络)来促进经济连通性。如果能够在不作出正式承诺的情况下参与,它也不必回避与海湾国家的安全合作。然而在所有这些努力中,安卡拉应该记住,当它远离地区冲突时,它拥有最大的影响力。

Ankara can continue to use its experience in mediation when opportunities to advance peace processes present themselves. It can also promote economic connectivity, both by expanding trade ties and by supporting regional infrastructure projects such as the Iraq-Europe Development Road and a proposed pipeline network connecting the Gulf to Jordan, Syria, and Turkey. It need not shy away from security cooperation with the Gulf, either, if it can engage without making formal commitments. Yet in all these endeavors, Ankara should remember that it has the most clout when it stays out of the region’s conflicts.

中东不断升级的战争和敌对集团,可能会使土耳其过去那种较为狭隘的安全政策在今天更难以维持。捍卫安卡拉的利益并在动荡的周边环境中发挥建设性作用,将需要谨慎的平衡。土耳其为地区稳定做出贡献的最佳方式,或许是避免试图做过多事情。

The Middle East’s escalating wars and rival blocs could make a narrower Turkish security policy more difficult to sustain today than it was in the past. Defending Ankara’s interests and playing a constructive role in a volatile neighborhood will require a careful balance. The best way Turkey can contribute to regional stability may be to avoid trying to do too much.

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