
美国总统唐纳德·特朗普已发出信号,表明华盛顿不急于结束其与伊朗的战争。
United States President Donald Trump has signalled that Washington is in no hurry to end its war with Iran.
“我们不需要与伊朗达成协议,”特朗普上周末在其“真相社交”平台上写道。“那些日子早已一去不复返。我们掌握了他们的钱,数千亿美元,我们还掌握了他们的海峡!”,指的是连接波斯湾与公海的霍尔木兹海峡。
“We don’t need a deal with Iran,” Trump wrote on his Truth Social platform late last week. “Those days have long since passed. We’ve got their money, Hundreds of Billions of Dollars, and we’ve got their Strait!”, referring to the Strait of Hormuz, which joins the Gulf to the open ocean.
在同一帖文中,特朗普要求副总统JD·万斯对特朗普所谓的民主党执政城市中的“腐败和犯罪”给予“完全和彻底的关注”。万斯曾主导与伊朗的谈判,促成了6月短暂的停火。但特朗普近日发出了矛盾信号。
In the same post, Trump told Vice President JD Vance to give his“complete and total attention” to what Trump described as “corruption and crime” in Democratic-run cities. Vance led the talks with Iran, which produced a short-lived truce in June. But Trump has given mixed signals in recent days.
上周早些时候,他说这场战争“在军事上……实际上已经结束”,但他补充说,如果外交失败,他“不会犹豫”恢复打击。
Earlier last week, he said the war was “militarily … effectively over”, though he added that he “would not hesitate” to resume strikes if diplomacy failed.
特朗普的矛盾表态出现在其共和党在11月3日中期选举中遭受惨重失利之际,万斯将此归咎于极不得人心的美以对伊战争及其经济后果,特别是燃油价格飙升。
Trump’s mixed messaging came as his Republican Party suffered heavy losses in the November 3 midterm elections, which Vance blamed on the deeply unpopular US-Israel war on Iran and its economic fallout, in particular soaring fuel prices.
以下是我们目前了解的这场战争可能走向,以及历史告诉我们的冻结战争结局。双方现在想要什么?
Here’s what we know about where this war may be heading now and what history tells us about where frozen wars end. What do both sides want now?
观察人士表示,特朗普的矛盾信息——以及万斯批评战争的言论——表明党内存在分歧,至少部分政府成员更倾向于让冲突保持未解决状态。
Observers say Trump’s mixed messages – and Vance’s comments criticising the war – indicate a disagreement within the party, with at least some members of the administration more comfortable with leaving the conflict unresolved.
这可能意味着维持美国对伊朗港口的海上封锁和对伊制裁——这两条都是伊朗的红线,伊朗一贯表示,在封锁和制裁解除等要求得到满足前,不会重新开放霍尔木兹海峡或恢复和谈。
That could mean leaving the US naval blockade of Iranian ports in place and sanctions against Iran ongoing – both red lines for Iran, which has consistently stated that it will not reopen the Strait of Hormuz or resume peace talks until these are lifted, among other demands.
11月9日,总统马苏德·佩泽希齐扬表示,最高领袖穆杰塔巴·哈梅内伊已下令官员结束“非战非和”状态。
On November 9, President Masoud Pezeshkian said Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei had ordered officials to end the state of “neither war nor peace”.
佩泽希齐扬补充说,伊朗已准备好谈判,但不会向胁迫屈服。伊朗议长、首席谈判代表穆罕默德·巴盖尔·卡利巴夫对半岛电视台表示,“球现在在美国场上” —— 接受其谈判条件,还是继续战争。什么是冻结冲突?
Pezeshkian added that Iran was ready to negotiate but would not yield to coercion. Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Iran’s chief negotiator, told Al Jazeera that “the ball is now in the American court” – to accept its terms for talks or continue the war. What is a frozen conflict?
该术语没有严格的法律定义。它通常指大规模战斗已经停止或大幅减少,但尚未达成和平协议或政治解决方案的冲突。引发战争的问题依然悬而未决。
The term has no strict legal definition. It generally describes a conflict in which large-scale fighting has stopped or sharply declined, but no peace agreement or political settlement has been reached. The issues which caused the war remain unresolved.
前线或控制力量对比随之固化为既成事实 —— 在本案中,表现为美国封锁伊朗港口,而伊朗瞄准其称未获授权通过的霍尔木兹海峡船只,或向邻国的美军资产发射导弹。
The front lines or the balance of control then harden into a de facto reality – in this case, with the US blockading Iranian ports and Iran targeting ships in the Strait of Hormuz that it says have not been authorised to pass, or firing missiles at US assets in neighbouring countries.
双方都保持兵力部署,常由停火线或缓冲区分隔。它们可能达成停战协定或一系列停火安排,却不正式结束敌对状态,例如6月在巴基斯坦伊斯兰堡签署的谅解备忘录,几周内便告破裂。
Both sides keep their forces in place, often separated by a ceasefire line or a buffer zone. They may agree to an armistice or a series of truces without formally ending hostilities, such as the memorandum of understanding signed in Islamabad, Pakistan, in June, which fell apart within weeks.
“冻结战争”一词在1990年代和2000年代变得常见,用来描述前苏联地区的冲突。这些冲突包括摩尔多瓦的德涅斯特河左岸、格鲁吉亚的阿布哈兹和南奥塞梯,以及纳戈尔诺-卡拉巴赫。冻结冲突不一定是和平的。小规模冲突、封锁、经济战和周期性升级很常见。其决定性特征是:双方都无法强加决定性结局,也都不愿作出持久和平所要求的让步。美以对伊战争会成为“冻结战争”吗?
The phrase “frozen war” became common in the 1990s and 2000s as a way to describe conflicts in the former Soviet Union. These included conflicts in Transnistria in Moldova Abkhazia South Ossetia in Georgia, and Nagorno-Karabakh A frozen conflict is not necessarily a peaceful one. Skirmishes, blockades, economic warfare and periodic flare-ups are common. The defining feature is that neither side can impose a decisive outcome, and neither is willing to make the concessions a lasting peace would require. Could the US-Israel war on Iran become a ‘frozen war’?
战争始于2月,当时美国和以色列对伊朗发动了空袭。4月在巴基斯坦举行的会谈于6月产生了一份谅解备忘录,暂停了战斗,并短暂解除了美国的封锁。停火不久后破裂——主要是因对霍尔木兹海峡控制权的分歧——美国于7月14日重新实施了海上封锁。
The war began in February, when the US and Israel launched strikes on Iran. Talks in Pakistan in April produced a memorandum of understanding in June which paused the fighting and briefly lifted the US blockade. The truce collapsed soon after – primarily over disagreements about control of the Strait of Hormuz – and Washington reimposed its naval blockade on July 14.
“在外交层面,我们已经到达那一步,且自7月以来一直如此,当时6月的谅解备忘录破裂了,”多哈研究生院关键安全研究助理教授穆哈纳德·塞卢姆表示。不过,他补充说,“冻结”一词“过誉”了这场冲突——冲突伴随着美国的封锁、霍尔木兹海峡周边每天发生一起以上的袭船事件,以及双向空袭。
“Diplomatically, we are already there and have been since July, when the June memorandum fell apart,” said Muhanad Seloom, an assistant professor in critical security studies at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies. However, he added that the word “frozen” “flatters” a conflict with a US blockade, attacks on shipping around Hormuz running at more than one a day and strikes in both directions.
美国实施了有限空袭,包括打击伊朗凯什姆岛的防空系统。伊朗使用其所谓的“未经授权航线”在霍尔木兹海峡袭击油轮。据贸易情报公司Kpler统计,11月7日仅有五艘大宗商品船只通过海峡,次日则无一艘通过,尽管美国声称正在护航船只通行。
The US has carried out limited strikes, including on Iranian air defence systems on Qeshm Island Iran has attacked tankers using what it calls unauthorised routes in the Strait of Hormuz. According to trade intelligence firm Kpler, only five commodity vessels crossed the strait on November 7, and none crossed the following day, despite US claims to be escorting ships through.
“型战争形式已变,从空中战役变成了一场围困,”塞卢姆对半岛电视台表示,“围困的结局是被围困的一方要么崩溃,要么突围。”华盛顿有哪些选项?对特朗普而言,严重升级眼下承担着沉重的政治风险。
“The war has changed form, from an air campaign to a siege,” Seloom told Al Jazeera, “and sieges end when the besieged side either breaks or breaks out”. What are Washington’s options? For Trump, a serious escalation carries heavy political risk right now.
10月,芝加哥全球事务委员会的一项民调显示,近70%的美国人认为这场战争不值得打。民调也一贯显示,美国民众深度反对向伊朗派兵。
In October, a Chicago Council on Global Affairs survey found that nearly 70 percent of Americans believed the war was not worth fighting. Polls have also consistently suggested deep opposition to sending troops to Iran.
在中期选举惨败、导致共和党失去对美国国会的控制权、由民主党掌控后,万斯在X上写道,任何认为这场战争值得“为此失去参议院未来6年的控制权”的人,都应该公开提出论证。
Following the crushing defeat in the midterms, which resulted in the Republicans losing control of the US Congress to the Democratic Party, Vance wrote on X that anyone who believed the war was worth “losing the Senate for the next 6 years” should argue so openly.
“战争支持率仅为31%,且国会刚刚失利,地面行动几乎无法推销,”塞卢姆说。但按目前条件结束战争对美国来说同样没有吸引力。
“With support for the war at 31 percent and Congress just lost, a ground operation is close to unsellable,” Seloom said. Yet ending the war on current terms is also unattractive for the US.
解除对伊朗港口的海上封锁——这一举措旨在阻止石油出口,进一步重创伊朗经济——并让霍尔木兹海峡继续处于伊朗有争议的控制之下,将使特朗普在经历八个月战争后一无所获。有人认为这甚至是更糟糕的局面,因为在战争爆发前,该海峡对所有航运都是自由开放的。
Lifting the naval blockade on Iranian ports – a move designed to stop oil exports, further crippling Iran’s economy – and leaving the Strait of Hormuz under contested Iranian control would leave Trump with nothing to show for eight months of war. It would arguably be a worse position given that the strait was freely open to all shipping up until the war began.
据美联社报道,特朗普已承认,在伊朗现政府留任的情况下撤军将等同于“失败”。
According to reporting by The Associated Press news agency, Trump has conceded that walking away with Iran’s current government in place would amount to a “defeat”.
“具有讽刺意味的是,不涉及地面部署的军事解决方案根本不存在,”埃克塞特大学战略与安全研究所研究员塔利哈·阿卜杜勒拉扎克说。特朗普不愿投入地面部队,而公众“警惕再陷入另一场伊拉克或阿富汗式战争”。因此,阿卜杜勒拉扎克说,“这场冲突将拖延下去,因为双方都不愿在谈判立场上退让”。
“Ironically, there is no military solution that does not involve a ground component,” said Tallha Abdulrazaq, a researcher at the University of Exeter’s Strategy and Security Institute. Trump is reluctant to commit ground forces, and the public is “wary of another Iraq or Afghanistan”. As a result, Abdulrazaq said, “this conflict will drag on as neither side is willing to back down on their negotiating positions”.
阿卜杜勒拉扎克说,特朗普想要达成的协议远超2015年奥巴马总统任内与伊朗谈判达成的《全面协议》(JCPOA)。根据该协议,伊朗承诺限制铀浓缩活动并接受定期核查。
Abdulrazaq said Trump wants a deal that goes far beyond the 2015 nuclear agreement with Iran negotiated under President Barack Obama, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Under that, Iran committed to restrictions on uranium enrichment and submitted to regular inspections.
但特朗普在其首个任期内让美国退出了《全面协议》。“他根本没有政治回旋余地接受类似协议,而伊朗人甚至没有心情给他那些条件,”阿卜杜勒拉扎克说。
But Trump withdrew the US from the JCPOA during his first term. “He simply has no political wiggle room to accept a deal similar to it, and the Iranians are in no mood to even give him those terms,” Abdulrazaq said.
这使特朗普“进退维谷”,他说。美国总统要么试图决定性地赢得战争,要么接受较低条件。否则,冲突将“保持僵局,双方偶尔进行零星的针锋相对报复”。
That leaves Trump “stuck between a rock and a hard place”, he said. The US president must either try to win the war decisively or accept lesser terms. Otherwise, the conflict will “stay frozen with the odd bit of tit-for-tat retaliation from either side”.
阿卜杜勒拉扎克补充说,美国发起的任何严重战争升级最有可能发生在未来两个月内——即在美国国会正式处于民主党控制之下之前。
Abdulrazaq added that any serious US-initiated escalation of the war would most likely come within the next two months – before the US Congress formally comes under Democratic control.
直到1月,共和党在即将卸任的国会中仍占据微弱多数。阿卜杜勒拉扎克表示,这给了特朗普“一个狭窄的机会窗口”,特别是考虑到三个美国航母打击群很可能将在12月前继续留在该地区。
Until January, Republicans hold slim majorities in the outgoing Congress. That gives Trump “a narrow window of opportunity”, Abdulrazaq said, particularly with three US carrier strike groups likely to remain in the region through December.
阿卜杜勒拉扎克说,在这个窗口期之外,白宫倾向于“不战不和”。在他看来,华盛顿“正确地”认为,美国承受经济痛苦的能力强于伊朗。
Outside that window, Abdulrazaq said, the White House would prefer “no war, no peace”. In his view, Washington believes “correctly” that the US can absorb more economic pain than Iran.
但多哈研究所的塞卢姆警告称,霍尔木兹海峡内外的封锁只能维持在成本不过高的情况下。“美国人员伤亡、霍尔木兹海峡冲击导致燃油价格再次飙升,或情报显示德黑兰正在转移其440公斤高浓缩铀,每一种情况都会终结这一局面,”他说。德黑兰现在的算盘是什么?
But the Doha Institute’s Seloom warned that the siege in and around the Strait of Hormuz will hold only while it remains without too much cost. “American deaths, a Hormuz shock that lifts fuel prices again, or intelligence that Tehran is moving its 440kg of highly enriched uranium would each end it,” he said. What are Tehran’s calculations now?
伊朗自身也陷入困境。它为正式停火、重新开放海峡和恢复和谈设定了七项条件。这些条件包括解除美国海上封锁、制裁减免、释放冻结资金,以及在所有战线上停止敌对行动,包括以色列在黎巴嫩的敌对行动和针对伊朗在也门和伊拉克盟友的敌对行动。卡利巴夫表示,霍尔木兹海峡届时也可重新开放,但将“永不恢复”到战前免收通行费的状态。
Iran is in its own bind. It has set seven conditions for a formal ceasefire, the reopening of the strait and a resumption of peace talks. These include lifting the US naval blockade, sanctions relief, the release of frozen funds and an end to hostilities on all fronts, including by Israel in Lebanon and hostilities against Iran’s allies in Yemen and Iraq. Ghalibaf has said while the Strait of Hormuz could also then be reopened, it will “never return” to its pre-war, toll-free status.
但由于海上封锁、数十年的制裁,以及战争爆发以来美国重新对与伊朗有贸易往来的国家和实体施加经济压力,伊朗经济正承受严重压力。
But the Iranian economy is under severe strain as a result of the naval blockade, decades of sanctions and a renewed economic push by the US against countries and entities trading with it since the war began.
伊朗官方统计机构报告称,今年3月至6月,经济同比收缩了10.1%。中央银行称,9月年通胀率为83.8%,里亚尔汇率屡创历史新低。
Iran’s official statistics agency has reported that the economy shrank by 10.1 percent year-on-year between March and June. The central bank put annual inflation at 83.8 percent in September, and the rial has repeatedly hit record lows.
阿卜杜勒拉扎克表示:“德黑兰的主要非动能选项是通过卡塔尔等地区调解人进行外交接触。但伊朗不愿按美国的条件达成协议,因此经济压力将给政权带来日益绝望的处境。”他补充说,伊朗“试图通过加深对中国石油采购的依赖来度过美国制裁的难关,但这受到海上封锁的阻碍”。
“Tehran’s primary non-kinetic option is engaging in diplomacy through regional mediators like Qatar,” Abdulrazaq said. “But Iran isn’t willing to cut a deal on the US’s terms, so the economic pressure will create ever-increasing desperate circumstances for the regime to contend with.”Iran is “attempting to weather the storm of US sanctions by deepening its reliance on Chinese oil purchases but this is being hindered by the naval blockade”, he added.
塞卢姆表示:“德黑兰唯一的好棋是一个可否认的举动,通过安全渠道运作。卡塔尔方案将在封锁解除的同时让核查员重返被轰炸的地点。”他说:“另一种选择是‘萨达特选项’,即通过有限战争迫使谈判,这正是埃及在1973年打破自身‘不战不和’僵局的方式。卡利巴夫谈论‘可持续威慑’,表明德黑兰内部有人受到诱惑。”
“Tehran’s only good move is a deniable one, worked through security channels,” Seloom said. “The Qatari formula would put inspectors back into the bombed sites as the blockade comes off.”“The alternative is the ‘Sadat option’, a limited war to force negotiations, which is how Egypt broke its own ‘no war, no peace’ stalemate in 1973,” he said. “Ghalibaf’s talk of ‘sustainable deterrence’ suggests some in Tehran are tempted.”
阿卜杜勒拉扎克说:“敌人永远有发言权……伊朗可能决定单方面升级,通过攻击该地区的海湾阿拉伯能源生产国制造全球经济痛苦,以打破美国的海上封锁和制裁,从而给特朗普政府施加国际和国内的政治双重压力,迫其退让并达成有利于伊朗的协议。”历史对冻结战争有何启示?以往的冻结冲突表明,这种僵局可能持续数十年。一个例子是朝鲜半岛。
Abdulrazaq said, “The enemy always gets a vote … Iran may decide to unilaterally escalate to break the US naval blockade and sanctions by causing global economic pain by attacking the Gulf Arab energy producers of the region”, adding, “piling international and domestic political pressure on the Trump administration to back off and cut a deal favourable to Iran”. What does history tell us about frozen wars? Previous frozen conflicts suggest that such stalemates can last for decades. One example is the Korean Peninsula.
朝鲜战争于1953年7月以停战协定结束,但未签署和平条约。70多年后,朝韩双方技术上仍处于战争状态,由一条重兵把守的非军事区分隔。乌克兰东部是一个更近期、也更不稳定的例子。
The Korean War ended with an armistice in July 1953, but no peace treaty followed. More than 70 years later, the two Koreas remain technically at war, divided by a heavily fortified Demilitarized Zone. Eastern Ukraine is a more recent and less stable example.
2014年俄罗斯吞并克里米亚后,乌克兰东部顿巴斯地区爆发了乌克兰军队与俄罗斯支持的分离主义者之间的战斗。明斯克协议带来了停火,但未能达成和解。近八年来,前线几乎没有变动,尽管炮击仍在继续。这种僵局于2022年2月结束,当时俄罗斯对乌克兰发动了全面入侵。
After Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, fighting broke out in Ukraine’s eastern Donbas region between Ukrainian forces and Russian-backed separatists. The Minsk agreements brought ceasefires but no settlement. For nearly eight years, the front line barely moved, though shelling continued. That freeze ended in February 2022, when Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
纳戈尔诺-卡拉巴赫表明,当力量对比发生变化时,冻结的冲突如何重新升温。亚美尼亚与阿塞拜疆之间1994年的停火协议维持了四分之一世纪。随后,实力更强的阿塞拜疆于2020年重新点燃战争,并在2023年完全收复了该有争议的领土。
Nagorno-Karabakh shows how a frozen conflict can thaw when the balance of power shifts. A 1994 ceasefire between Armenia and Azerbaijan held for a quarter of a century. Then a stronger Azerbaijan reignited the war in 2020, and in 2023 it retook the disputed territory entirely.
然而,分析人士认为,朝鲜半岛和俄乌冲突等领土僵局,与美国和以色列针对伊朗的战争不太相符。
Analysts, however, argue that territorial stalemates such as the Koreas and Russia-Ukraine are a poor fit for the US-Israel war on Iran.
塞卢姆表示,更相似的参照是1991年至2003年的伊拉克——“一个经历战争、随后经历12年禁运和定期打击的政权,其中四次打击没有监察员参与”。
Seloom said the closer parallel would be Iraq between 1991 and 2003 – “a regime that survived a war and then 12 years of embargo and periodic strikes, four of them without inspectors”.
阿卜杜勒拉扎克则指向伊朗的历史:1980年代的两伊战争,当时双方都试图瘫痪对方的石油出口。由此引发的“油轮战争”以对船舶的袭击和对能源设施的导弹打击为特征,是一场经济消耗战。一场针对伊朗的冻结战争会有何不同?
Abdulrazaq points instead to Iran’s history: the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s, when each side tried to cripple the other’s oil exports. The resulting “Tanker War” was defined by attacks on shipping and missile strikes on energy facilities, a campaign of economic attrition. How would a frozen war on Iran be different?
大多数冻结的冲突都围绕有争议的领土和固定的接触线展开。美国与伊朗的对抗则贯穿国际航运航道、制裁制度和能源市场。
Most frozen conflicts revolve around disputed territory and a fixed line of contact. The US-Iran confrontation runs through international shipping lanes, sanctions regimes and energy markets.
塞卢姆表示,伊拉克的比较在霍尔木兹海峡不再成立。“萨达姆的遏制建立在伊拉克领土上,而这次遏制建立在一条水道上,战争前该水道承载了大约五分之一的世界石油和天然气,”他指前伊拉克领导人萨达姆·侯赛因说道。
Seloom said the Iraq comparison breaks down at Hormuz. “Saddam’s containment sat on Iraqi territory, while this one sits on a waterway that carried about a fifth of the world’s oil and gas before the war,” he said, referring to former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein.
这使得稳定的冻结更难维持。每一次油轮袭击都可能导致更广泛的升级。这里的冻结战争可能看起来不像朝鲜半岛安静的非军事区,而更像2022年之前的乌克兰顿巴斯。
That makes a stable freeze harder to sustain. Every tanker attack risks a wider escalation. A frozen war here could look less like the Koreas’ quiet Demilitarized Zone and more like Ukraine’s Donbas before 2022.
阿卜杜勒拉扎克表示,全球经济无法无限期地承受如此关键咽喉要道上的冻结冲突,而多元化贸易路线需要时间和金钱。他说,双方在经济上都“时间紧迫”,这种情况是韩国与朝鲜、以及乌克兰与俄罗斯从未经历过的。
Abdulrazaq said the global economy cannot indefinitely absorb a frozen conflict over such a vital chokepoint, and diversifying trade routes takes time and money. Both sides, he said, are “on the clock” economically, in a way that South Korea and North Korea, as well as Ukraine and Russia, have never been.
海湾国家、航运商和能源进口国都面临风险,这使得卡塔尔和巴基斯坦等调解方有强烈利益去打破僵局。目前,华盛顿和德黑兰都坚持认为时间站在自己这边。但历史表明,冻结冲突往往比允许其冻结的领导人更长久。
Gulf states, shippers and energy importers are all exposed, which gives mediators such as Qatar and Pakistan a strong interest in breaking the deadlock. For now, both Washington and Tehran insist time is on their side. But history suggests that frozen conflicts often outlast the leaders who allowed them to freeze.