
作者:南希·A·尤瑟夫,乔纳森·勒米尔特朗普总统目前似乎满意于让伊朗战争处于一种无限期的僵持状态。通过既避免军事打击,又避免和平谈判,他希望为霍尔木兹海峡的海上封锁和广泛的美国制裁争取时间,以此迫使伊朗政权屈服。特朗普认为他可以负担得起等待,因为华盛顿掌握着所有的筹码。“我们不需要与伊朗达成协议。那些日子早已一去不复返了,”特朗普最近在社交媒体上写道。“我们掌握着他们的钱,数千亿美元,我们还掌握着他们的海峡!”
By Nancy A. Youssef, Jonathan Lemire President Trump appears content, for now, to leave the Iran war in an indefinite holding pattern. By avoiding both military strikes and peace talks, he hopes to allow time for the naval blockade in the Strait of Hormuz and extensive U.S. sanctions to squeeze the regime into submission. Trump believes he can afford to wait because Washington holds all the leverage. “We don’t need a deal with Iran. Those days have long since passed,” Trump recently wrote on social media. “We’ve got their money, Hundreds of Billions of Dollars, and we’ve got their Strait!”
德黑兰持有一种镜像般的观点。该政权认为筹码掌握在自己手中,尤其是在对战争的不满和高得离谱的油价导致共和党在中期选举中惨败之后。伊朗和特朗普政府一样,都认为自己的立场会随着时间的推移而变得更强。其领导人准备维持现状,通过发动定期的无人机袭击和网络攻击,推高美国及其盟友的战争成本。上周,最高国家安全委员会秘书长表示,伊朗不会允许移走“哪怕一颗浓缩核材料微粒”,这一立场几乎无法诱使特朗普政府坐上谈判桌。
Tehran has a mirror-image view. The regime believes that it holds the leverage, especially after dissatisfaction with the war and sky-high gas prices led to a rout of Republicans in the midterm elections. Iran, like the Trump administration, believes that its position will grow stronger over time. Its leaders are prepared to maintain the status quo, driving up the costs of the war for the United States and its allies by launching periodic drone attacks and cyberattacks. Last week, the head of the Supreme National Security Council said Iran would not allow the removal of “even a single particle of enriched nuclear material,” a position hardly designed to coax the Trump administration into negotiations. (One of the few things the president has been consistent about in the war is his determination to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon.)
(总统在战争中为数不多的坚持之一,就是他决心阻止伊朗研发核武器。)双方都玩等待游戏的结果是,冲突似乎已趋于稳定。但这具有误导性。目前最大的危险是,由于误判、意外,或任何一方为利用其自认为拥有的优势而鲁莽行事,导致局势剧烈升级。在表面平静之下,对峙依然极其不稳定。特朗普的伊朗战争计划处于悬而未决的状态,因为这种状态总比其他选项要好。但这种悬而未决的状态不可能永远持续下去。
The upshot of both parties playing the waiting game is that the conflict appears to have stabilized. But that’s misleading. The greatest danger now is a dramatic escalation through a miscalculation, an accident, or a rash attempt by either side to capitalize on what it considers its advantage. Beneath the apparent calm, the standoff remains deeply unstable. Trump’s Iran-war plans are in limbo because limbo is better than the other options. But that limbo can’t last forever. In the weeks before the midterms, Trump privately told people that he favored another round of military strikes so severe that Iran would have no choice but to reopen negotiations.
在中期选举前几周,特朗普私下告诉身边人,他倾向于再发动一轮军事打击,力度要大到迫使伊朗别无选择,只能重返谈判桌。但这一次,谈判将按华盛顿的条件进行,最终让特朗普获得他长期声称早已赢得的胜利。特朗普近几天似乎对这个主意冷却了下来。“现在根本没有多少好选项,”一位外部顾问告诉我们。中期选举“让情况变得更糟”。
But this time, they would be on Washington’s terms, finally granting Trump the victory he has long claimed to have already won. Trump appears to have cooled on the idea in recent days. “There just aren’t many good options right now,” one outside adviser told us. And the midterms “made it worse.”There is also a resigned sense in the West Wing that Trump’s leverage over Iran has diminished, however much he tries to pretend otherwise.
西翼办公室也弥漫着一种无奈感,觉得特朗普对伊朗的筹码已经减弱,无论他如何试图装作不是这样。德黑兰也能看新闻。民主党大胜是对总统的严厉斥责。白宫一些人担心,伊朗强硬派会像美国许多评论员那样解读选举结果:视其为美国民众缺乏进行长期冲突意愿的证据,并认为特朗普最终将被迫止损收场。
Tehran can follow the news. The Democrats’ sweep was a sharp rebuke to the president. Some in the White House fear that hard-liners in Iran will interpret the result just as many pundits in the U.S. did: as evidence that the American public has little appetite for a prolonged conflict and that Trump will eventually be forced to cut his losses. The Republican Thomas Massie’s unsuccessful bid to impeach Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, which was driven in part by Hegseth’s handling of the Iran war, reinforced the political risks that Trump could face were he to resume a full-scale conflict.
共和党众议员托马斯·马西(Thomas Massie)试图弹劾国防部长皮特·赫格塞思(Pete Hegseth)未果,此举部分源于对赫格塞思处理伊朗战争方式的不满,这凸显了特朗普若恢复全面冲突将面临的政治风险。因此,重点转向在经济上施压德黑兰,将其视为最不令人反感的选择。“最终你得吃饭,”国务卿马可·鲁比奥(Marco Rubio)上周对记者说,“最终经济现实会渗透进即使是最激进疯子的脑袋里。”但政府还能等多久?
Hence the focus on squeezing Tehran economically as the least unpalatable option. “Eventually you have to eat,” Secretary of State Marco Rubio told reporters last week. “Eventually the economic realities penetrate the skull of even the most radical lunatic.”
大规模军事部署成本高昂,消耗人员和装备,并占用了本可部署他处的资产。约17艘美国海军军舰部署在中东,包括三个航母打击群,第三个近期刚从亚洲抵达。(不清楚“西奥多·罗斯福”号(USS Theodore Roosevelt)是来替换另外两个航母打击群之一,还是来补充兵力。)海上封锁自4月起间歇性运行。但霍尔木兹海峡的航运流量仍远低于正常水平。
But how much longer can the administration afford to wait? The massive military deployment is costly, strains personnel and equipment, and ties up assets that could be deployed elsewhere. About 17 U.S. Navy warships are in the Middle East, including three aircraft-carrier groups, the third having recently arrived from Asia. (Whether the USS Theodore Roosevelt arrived to relieve one of the other two or to complement them is unclear.) The naval blockade has operated, off and on, since April. But shipping traffic through the Strait of Hormuz remains far below normal levels.
美国最近启动了代号为“铁门特遣队”(Task Force Iron Gate)的单独行动,旨在切断武器、两用技术及其他受制裁物资通过陆路的贸易。但拦截极其困难。
The U.S. recently launched a separate operation, dubbed Task Force Iron Gate, to disrupt the trading of weapons, dual-use technologies, and other sanctioned materials through overland routes. But interdiction is extremely difficult.
特朗普还面临这样一种风险:在其党内外许多人的眼中,这种僵局可能演变成他曾承诺绝不发动的那种“永久战争”。他指出,目前的伊朗战争远不如伊拉克、阿富汗和越南的冲突持续时间长。但他早先预测冲突将持续几周,随着战争进入第十个月,这一预测已显得天真。尽管经济施压在许多方面奏效,但伊朗政权对民众福祉漠不关心,并表现出令人惊讶的承受美国压力的能力。
Trump also runs the risk of the limbo becoming, in the eyes of many inside and outside his own party, the sort of “forever war” that he promised never to start. He has noted that the Iran war is currently nowhere near as long as the conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Vietnam were. But his early predictions of a conflict lasting a few weeks already look naive as the war approaches its tenth month. Although the economic campaign is working in many ways, Iran’s regime has shown little regard for the well-being of its people and a surprising ability to absorb U.S. pressure.
事实上,德黑兰可能将持续冲突视为一种有用工具,以使民众注意力集中在外部威胁上,而非政权自身的经济和政治弱点。
Indeed, Tehran could view ongoing conflict as a helpful tool to keep its citizens’ attention focused on outside threats, rather than the regime’s own economic and political weaknesses.
与此同时,伊朗的邻国一直在劝阻华盛顿恢复攻击,因为它们担心成为伊朗报复的目标。特朗普目前似乎听取了这一信息,但未向德黑兰发出退缩信号。“就目前而言,采取军事行动似乎不是一件非常必要的事——但我们已蓄势待发,随时准备因任何理由采取行动,”特朗普上周在白宫简报会上对记者说。
Iran’s neighbors, meanwhile, have been discouraging Washington from resuming attacks because they fear becoming targets of Iranian retaliation. Trump, for now, seems to be heeding the message without signaling to Tehran that he is backing down. “At this point, taking military action doesn’t seem to be a very necessary thing—but we’re locked and loaded, ready to go for any reason,” Trump told reporters during a White House briefing last week.
即使特朗普改变主意——他已多次如此——并恢复全面冲突,重燃战火也不一定能取得决定性打击。特朗普在7月记者会上提出的选项之一——打击水处理厂,作为针对伊朗基础设施的全面打击的一部分——根据国际法可能构成战争罪行。民主党在国会山两院均拥有新的、巨大多数席位,明年1月可能将打击水处理厂列入他们想就伊朗战争问题进行调查的清单。
Even if Trump changes his mind—as he has repeatedly—and resumes the full-bore conflict, renewed hostilities would not necessarily achieve a decisive blow. And at least one of the options Trump gave during a July press conference—striking water-treatment plants as part of a broadside on Iranian infrastructure—could amount to a war crime under international law. Democrats, with their new, large majorities in both chambers on Capitol Hill, could add any targeting of water-treatment plants to the list of Iran-war issues they want to investigate come January.
2011年12月,时任谷歌高管的埃里克·施密特就伊朗的网络能力发出了不祥的警告。伊朗刚刚捕获一架美国无人机,并被怀疑在欧洲发动了一次网络攻击。“由于某种我们尚不完全理解的原因,伊朗人在网络战方面异常有才华,”施密特在CNN的一次采访中说。十多年后,伊朗通过多次攻击反复展示了其网络能力。法国上周指责伊斯兰革命卫队的关联网络部队于10月渗透了约700个法国商业场所的制冷系统,操纵控制装置以破坏食品、引发火灾并扰乱商业活动。
In December 2011, Eric Schmidt, then a top executive at Google, issued an ominous warning about Iran’s cyber capabilities. Iran had just captured an American drone and was suspected of a cyberattack in Europe. “The Iranians are unusually talented in cyberwar for some reason we don’t fully understand,” Schmidt said in an interview on CNN. More than a decade later, Iran has repeatedly demonstrated its cyber capabilities through attacks. France last week accused the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ affiliated cyber unit of infiltrating refrigeration systems at roughly 700 French commercial sites in October, manipulating the controls in order to spoil food, trigger fires, and disrupt commerce.
7月,疑似与伊朗有关的黑客被怀疑针对明尼苏达州30多个市政供水系统发动攻击,扰乱了水泵和处理作业的调控。
In July, Iranian-linked hackers were suspected of targeting more than 30 municipal water systems in Minnesota, disrupting the regulation of pumps and treatment operations.
如果美国重启军事行动,这些可能只是德黑兰将释放能力的冰山一角。伊朗还保留着在霍尔木兹海峡用水雷和无人机扰乱航运、威胁美军和地区盟友、以及在全球范围内干扰美国行动的能力。上个月,在一个与伊朗有关的组织发出威胁后,十几架B-1轰炸机从美国在英国使用的一个基地被转移。
Those might just be a foretaste of what Tehran would unleash were the U.S. to restart military operations. Iran also retains the ability to disrupt shipping in the Strait of Hormuz with mines and drones, to threaten U.S. forces and regional allies, and to disrupt U.S. operations worldwide. Last month, a dozen B-1 bombers were relocated from a U.K. base used by the U.S. in England after threats from a group linked to Iran.
随着美国和伊朗摆姿态、施压、互相骚扰,油价居高不下;布伦特原油价格略低于每桶100美元。“要回到战争开始时的每桶70美元将非常困难,”专门研究伊朗的前以色列情报官员丹尼·西特里诺维奇告诉我们。
As the U.S. and Iran posture, pressure, and harass each other, oil prices remain elevated; Brent crude is just under $100 a barrel. “It will be very hard to get back to $70 a barrel, where it was at the start of the war,” Danny Citrinowicz, a former Israeli intelligence officer who specializes in Iran, told us.
目前,鉴于缺乏吸引力的替代方案,各方似乎都容忍这种尴尬的现状。但由于美国封锁的成本不断上升,“这种情景太不稳定、太危险、太昂贵,无法永远持续下去,”昆西负责任国家工艺研究所联合创始人特里塔·帕尔西告诉我们。局势必须有所改变。
For now, all parties seem tolerant of that awkward status quo, given the unappealing alternatives. But because of the U.S. blockade’s mounting costs, “this scenario is too unstable, too dangerous, and too costly to go in perpetuity,” Trita Parsi, a co-founder of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, a think tank, told us. Something has to give.
帕尔西表示,一种可能的结果是“瑞士奶酪”式情景:美国逐步且秘密地放松对封锁和制裁的执行,同时在形式上保留两者。这可能腾出舰船供他处部署,并逐渐允许更多油轮通过霍尔木兹海峡,增加全球能源供应。与此同时,海湾国家可能开始与德黑兰谈判各自的安排,以防范报复性袭击。伊朗可能会发现这种安排中有足够令其满意之处,实际上等待着漏洞吞噬奶酪。
One possible outcome, Parsi said, is a “Swiss cheese” scenario: The United States gradually and secretly relaxes its enforcement of the blockade and sanctions, while formally keeping both in place. That could free up ships for deployment elsewhere and gradually allow more tankers through the Strait of Hormuz, increasing global energy supplies. Meanwhile, Gulf nations could begin negotiating their own arrangements with Tehran to protect against retaliatory attacks. Iran might find enough to like in this arrangement that it waits, in effect, for the holes to overwhelm the cheese.
帕尔西说,由此出现的可能是“一种新的均势”,美国可以声称正在维持制裁或执行封锁,但执行力度足够弱,以至于“伊朗人没有升级的动机”。这种安排可能为特朗普争取时间,并防止立即重返敌对状态。但这也会让他陷入进退维谷的境地。特朗普无法可信地声称击败了伊朗,或实质性削弱了其能力。他也不必通过在谈判桌前接受伊朗的条件来承认失败。
What emerges, Parsi said, could be “a new equilibrium” in which the United States can claim to be maintaining sanctions or enforcing a blockade, but does so weakly enough that “Iranians don’t have an incentive to escalate.”Such an arrangement might buy Trump time and prevent an immediate return to hostilities. But it would also leave him in purgatory. Trump could not credibly claim to have defeated Iran or meaningfully weakened its capabilities. Nor would he have to admit defeat by accepting Iran’s terms at the negotiating table.
双方诉求之间的差距依然巨大。华盛顿想要一项能有效拆解伊朗核计划、并将霍尔木兹海峡恢复为自由开放水道的协议。德黑兰想要一项承认其对海峡实施有效控制、解除制裁、并保证美国不再发动袭击的协议。
The gap between the two sides’ demands remains enormous. Washington wants an agreement that effectively dismantles Iran’s nuclear program and restores the Strait of Hormuz to a free and open waterway. Tehran wants an agreement that recognizes its effective control of the strait, lifts the sanctions, and guarantees that the United States will not attack again.
目前,伊朗和特朗普政府都找到了避免做出可能导致明确结果的艰难决定的方法。相反,双方都在押注时间站在自己这边。但这可能是所有假设中最危险的一个。
For now, Iran and the Trump administration have found ways to avoid making difficult decisions that might lead to a clear outcome. Instead, both are betting that time is on their side. But that may be the most dangerous assumption of all.