字号·· | 护眼
华尔街日报

欧洲谋划后特朗普时代Europe Games Out a Post-Trump World

点「原文对照」整页切到原文,或双击某段只看那段的原文。

2025年5月16日,欧洲各国领导人在阿尔巴尼亚地拉那。斯特芬·库格勒 / 德国联邦政府 / 路透社European leaders in Tirana, Albania, May 16, 2025. steffen kugler / bundesregierung / Reuters

伦敦 欧洲人在观看美国中期选举结果陆续出炉时,或许曾想松一口气。虽然特朗普总统将继续留任,未来两年对跨大西洋联盟而言恐将充满挑战,但选民否决了他的政治路线。这可能预示着某种版本的美国终将结束——这种美国把欧洲联盟视作时而负担、时而烦恼,对待盟友时而散漫、时而个人化,无视欧洲大陆在应对俄罗斯问题和对待北大西洋公约组织方面的关切。

London Europeans watching the U.S. midterm election results roll in might have been tempted to breathe a sigh of relief. While President Trump will remain in office for what will likely be a difficult two years for the trans-Atlantic alliance, voters rebuked his politics. That could signal an eventual end to a version of the U.S. that has treated the European alliance as alternately a burden and a frustration, that is scattershot and personalist with allies, and that has disregarded the Continent’s concerns about its dealings with Russia and its approach to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

虽然美国政治潜在的转变为欧洲人构建更具建设性的对美联盟提供了机遇,但这不应成为自满的理由。美国政治不会在特朗普任期结束后自动回弹至冷战后的“常态”。当特朗普主义的浪潮退去,欧洲人将发现美国外交政策版图已发生重要变化。

While a potential shift in U.S. politics offers opportunities for Europeans to build a more constructive alliance with America, it shouldn’t be cause for complacency. American politics won’t snap back to a post-Cold War “normal” after Mr. Trump’s term ends. When the tide of Trumpism goes out, Europeans will find the U.S. foreign policy landscape changed in important ways.

在查塔姆研究所,我们今夏采访了一系列美国外交政策思想者,询问特朗普之后会怎样以及这对欧洲意味着什么。我们的调查结果表明,从20世纪90年代到21世纪头十年,那种为美国外交政策定向的两党共识已经终结。虽然其中某些要素可能保留,但未来的美国领导人不会回到那个贸易自由化、美国担保同盟、并大规模动用武力以遏制威胁并维持美国全球首位地位的时代。

At Chatham House, we spent the summer interviewing a range of U.S. foreign policy thinkers to ask what comes after Mr. Trump and what it means for Europe. Our findings suggest the bipartisan consensus that oriented U.S. foreign policy from the 1990s through the 2000s has ended. While elements may remain, future U.S. leaders won’t return to this era of trade liberalization, U.S.-guaranteed alliances, and expansive use of military force to counter threats and maintain U.S. primacy in the world.

欧洲决策者一直专注于应对特朗普的具体做法。特朗普政府在关税、格陵兰岛、乌克兰及其他问题上的做法,在许多方面都属于异常。与此同时,关于美国在世界上角色的更广泛假设,正在美国政治光谱的各个层面发生改变。这种重新思考涉及贸易、安全和技术。

European policymakers have been absorbed with managing the specifics of Mr. Trump. The Trump administration, in its approach to tariffs, Greenland, Ukraine and other issues, has been aberrant in many ways. At the same time, broader assumptions about America’s role in the world are changing across the country’s political spectrum. This rethink applies to trade, security and technology.

对自由贸易的支持与对自由主义国际主义的支持不再同步,越来越多的民主党人开始接受关税在未来发挥作用,并公开对数十年不受限制的自由贸易政策的后果表示遗憾。全球化仍保留着一些拥护者,针对关税的具体反弹也可能出现。但除此之外,寻求为美国战略产业提供保护、将主要对手定位为中国、将关键竞争领域定位为技术的倾向,在左派和右派思想家中都很普遍。

Support for free trade and liberal internationalism no longer go hand in hand, with a growing number of Democrats embracing a future role for tariffs and publicly regretting the effect of decades of unfettered free-trade policy. Globalization retains some champions, and there may be a backlash on tariffs specifically. But otherwise, the tendency to seek protections for American strategic industries, with the primary adversary framed as China and the key race as technology, is common among thinkers on the left and right.

这源于一个更广泛的担忧:全球化并未像人们希望的那样惠及美国经济或美国工人。因此,即使接替特朗普的是截然不同类型的政治家,产业补贴和关税的使用、收紧出口和投资管制、以及政府持有产业股份的做法,仍可能以新形式延续。

This centers on a wider concern that globalization didn’t benefit the American economy or the American worker in the way that had been hoped. The use of industrial subsidies and tariffs, tightened export and investment controls, and the practice of government taking equity stakes in industry may thus continue in new forms, even if a very different type of politician succeeds Mr. Trump.

2028年后的美国将继续把中国视为其关键挑战,并可能寻求盟友在贸易和投资措施中发挥更广泛的作用,以抗衡北京的经济主导地位。对欧洲而言,现在就为此做规划,并在欧盟-美国特恩贝里关税协议于2029年12月到期时寻求更好的解决方案,对未来的贸易关系至关重要。

A post-2028 America will continue to see China as its crucial challenge, and may look to allies to play a broader role in trade and investment measures to counter Beijing’s economic dominance. For Europe, planning for this now, and seeking a better settlement when the European Union-U.S. Turnberry deal on tariffs expires in December 2029, is vital for future trade relationships.

在安全方面,我们的采访发现,在“9·11”后时代成长起来的年轻美国政客,对外国纠葛和开放式安全同盟持深深的怀疑态度。美国政坛鲜有旗手主张美国应重返其在北约中过大的角色,或将欧洲作为其首要安全和防务优先事项。虽然后特朗普时代的美国可能更愿意就北约内部的责任分担逐步转移进行谈判,但仍有可能推动这种转移,欧洲应相应做好规划。

On security, our interviews found that younger American politicians who grew up in the post-9/11 era are deeply skeptical of foreign entanglements and open-ended security alliances. There are few standard-bearers in U.S. politics for the idea that America should return to its outsize role in NATO or make Europe its primary security and defense priority. While a post-Trump U.S. may be more open to negotiating a gradual shift in burdens within NATO, it is still likely to pursue such a shift, and Europe should plan accordingly.

美国外交政策思想界认为,在先进技术尤其是人工智能领域保持领先地位,对国家实力至关重要。然而,左右两派在如何管控风险方面看法不同,而公众对大型科技公司的反感情绪,可能迫使政府转向更多的监管与管控。从大西洋彼岸观察,本次中期选举一个引人入胜的支线剧情是,多位新当选领导人在胜选演讲中融入了反对大型科技公司和数据中心的言辞。

U.S. foreign-policy thinkers see maintaining a lead in advanced technology, especially artificial intelligence, as essential to national power. The left and right have different takes on how to manage the risks, however, and public sentiment against big tech may force a turn to more government regulation and control. A fascinating subplot of the midterms, seen from across the Atlantic, was the number of newly elected leaders weaving rhetoric against big tech and data centers into their victory speeches.

这也为欧洲人寻找盟友、共同监管一种令欧洲大陆许多人长期警惕的技术,提供了潜在机遇。但美国政客很可能会对外国试图遏制本国科技实力的做法感到不满,他们更倾向于让美国科技受到美国主导的监管约束。

Here too are potential opportunities for Europeans seeking allies in the quest to regulate a technology about which many in the Continent have long been wary. But American politicians are likely to chafe at foreign attempts to constrain national tech power, and they would prefer to have U.S. tech constrained by U.S.-led regulation.

旧有的跨大西洋确定性已让位于一种新的美国路径,这种路径将更具交易性、更多变数,也更取决于欧洲自行负责自身的防务与安全。即使未来选举中钟摆摆回跨大西洋主义者,我们的研究表明,贸易、安全和技术领域的这些转变将会持续。但在经历了第二个特朗普任期的磨合与美国在格陵兰岛问题上的威胁冲击后,这种缺乏情感色彩的态度或许也适合欧洲人。

The old trans-Atlantic certainties have given way to a new American approach that will be more transactional, more contingent and more dependent on Europe taking care of its own defense and security. Even if the pendulum swings back to a trans-Atlanticist in future elections, our research suggests these shifts on trade, security and technology will remain. But after the bruising experience of the second Trump term and the shock of U.S. threats over Greenland, that lack of sentimentality may suit Europeans too.

拉普女士任查塔姆大厦美国与北美项目主任,奥沙利文女士任英国在世界项目主任。

Ms. Rapp is director of the U.S. and North America Program and Ms. O’Sullivan of the U.K. in the World Program at Chatham House.

阅读媒体原文 ↗