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欧洲政治瘫痪之年Europe’s year of political paralysis

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欧洲习惯了来自外部的危机:俄罗斯的坦克纵队、美国的关税齐射、装满补贴中国商品的集装箱货轮。2027年,混乱将从内部袭来。欧盟各地将举行全国大选,其中包括其五个最大国家中的四个。法国、意大利和波兰大选(以及定于2026年11月举行的西班牙大选)的直接后果将是政治停滞,因为现任领导人会回避一些艰难的欧洲一体化决定。随着右翼民粹主义者获得更多影响力,更长远的问题可能会显得更加深远。

Europe is accustomed to crises arriving from outside: columns of Russian tanks, salvoes of American tariffs, container ships full of subsidised Chinese goods. In 2027 disruption will come from within. National elections will take place across the European Union, including in four of its five biggest countries. The immediate consequence of ballots in France, Italy and Poland—as well as the upshot of Spanish elections to be held in November 2026—will be political torpor, as incumbents avoid some difficult Europe-wide decisions. The longer-term question could prove more profound as right-wing populists gain yet more influence.

法国将率先于4月和5月举行大选。但麻烦在任何人投票之前就会开始。全国大选有一种习惯,能把渴望成为欧洲政治家的政客变成畏首畏尾的地方政客。在最好的时期,就深化欧盟单一市场达成一致,或是承诺提供数十亿美元援助乌克兰,都是棘手的事情。而在选举时期,正在布鲁塞尔权衡艰难妥协的首相们突然记起了需要百般呵护的农民、退休人员和其他国内群体。随着一个又一个大国在2027年进入竞选模式,欧盟面临着全年大部分时间都在等待某人、在某个地方结束投票的风险。

France will go first, in April and May. But the trouble will start before anyone casts a vote. National elections have a habit of turning wannabe European statesmen into timid local politicians. Agreement over deepening the EU single market or pledging billions to succour Ukraine is tricky at the best of times. At election time, prime ministers contemplating a difficult compromise in Brussels suddenly remember the farmers, pensioners and other domestic groups who need mollycoddling instead. With one big country after another entering campaign mode in 2027, the EU risks spending much of the year waiting for somebody, somewhere, to finish voting.

政治瘫痪或许只是欧洲最微不足道的担忧。欧盟出现更多的停滞从来都不是什么好时机。但在2027年,无论如何都必须做出两个具有深远影响的重大决定。其中一个关乎乌克兰。2025年达成的一项900亿欧元(1010亿美元)的资金一揽子计划本意是提供足以维持两年的资金。事实上,国防开支的飙升以及美国持续不愿出资,意味着将更早需要某种新的供资机制。一些国家政府正极力推动欧盟没收俄罗斯资产,并实际上将其交予乌克兰。这在2027年仍将像2025年首次被提出时一样困难。

Political paralysis may prove the least of Europe’s worries There is never a good time for yet more EU stasis. But two big decisions with long-term repercussions will have to be made one way or another in 2027. One concerns Ukraine. A €90bn ($101bn) funding package agreed on in 2025 was meant to provide enough money for two years. In fact a surge in defence spending—and America’s continued reluctance to contribute—means some kind of new funding mechanism will be required sooner. Some national governments are angling for the EU to confiscate Russian assets and, in effect, hand them over to Ukraine. This will still prove as difficult in 2027 as when it was last mooted in 2025.

另一个棘手的文件是欧盟的七年预算。必须为2028至2034年期间商定一个新的迭代版本。国家领导人曾希望在2026年达成协议,但这似乎不太可能。这份七年期预算价值2万亿欧元,理论上可以包含大量资金用于资助创新项目,从而有助于提高欧盟疲软的生产力。但在实践中,心系选举的政客们很可能会再次将巨额资金转移给预算的长期赢家:农民。

The other tricky dossier is the EU’s seven-year budget. A new iteration must be agreed on for the 2028-34 period. National leaders had hoped for a deal in 2026, but this seems unlikely. The budget, worth €2trn over seven years, could in theory include lots of money towards programmes funding innovation that would help raise the EU’s weak productivity. In practice, election-minded politicians are likely to divert a big sum once again to the budget’s perennial winners: farmers.

政治瘫痪或许只是欧洲最微不足道的担忧。根据选举结果,这些选举可能会改变欧盟本身的政治面貌。形形色色的民粹主义者要么在争夺公职,要么可能以使其更接近权力中心的方式成为关键少数。他们中没有人热爱欧盟;其中几人对俄罗斯抱有同情,对乌克兰态度矛盾。

Political paralysis may prove the least of Europe’s worries. Depending on their outcome, the elections could alter the political complexion of the EU itself. Populists of various guises will either be vying for office or could become kingmakers in ways that would bring them closer to power. None is enamoured of the EU; several have pro-Russian sympathies and are ambivalent about Ukraine.

最具影响力的结果将出现在法国。玛丽娜·勒庞的国民联盟不再希望离开欧盟。但在欧洲一体化长达八十年的历史中,这将是第一次由一个显然不买该项目账(且其政党曾由一家俄罗斯银行资助)的政客,去掌管作为欧洲俱乐部核心的法德“发动机”的一半。理论上,法国的反欧盟总统可能会被德国一位拥有大量政治资本可用于欧盟事务的富有活力的总理所抵消。弗里德里希·梅尔茨并非这样的人。州选举可能会在2027年进一步削弱他。

The most consequential result will be in France. Marine Le Pen’s National Rally no longer wants to leave the EU. But to have one half of the traditional Franco-German “engine” at the heart of the club run by a politician who plainly does not buy into the project (and whose party was once funded by a Russian bank) would be a first in eight decades of European integration. A Eurosceptic president in France could, in theory, be offset by a dynamic chancellor in Germany with lots of political capital to spend on EU matters. Friedrich Merz is not that man. State elections could weaken him further in 2027.

在意大利,民粹主义者可能会带来稳定。乔治亚·梅洛尼虽然属于民粹主义右翼,但她对欧盟的承诺一直坚定(或许是因为成为欧盟成员有助于意大利在背负巨额债务的同时逃脱财政赤字的惩罚)。但在2027年下半年举行大选后,她可能需要更多抨击布鲁塞尔的政党的选票才能重返执政岗位。

In Italy the populists may offer stability. Giorgia Meloni, though of the populist right, has been steadfast in her commitment to the EU (perhaps because being part of the club helps Italy get away with running budget deficits while having huge debts). But she may need the votes of more Brussels-bashing parties to return to office after elections due in the second half of 2027.

最后,波兰将在不晚于秋季的时候举行议会选举。唐纳德·图斯克的政府于2023年上台,承诺在民粹主义法律与公正党执政八年后修复波兰与欧盟的关系。但棘手的国内政治导致几乎没有什么改革能让图斯克的自由派基本盘感到兴奋。一项针对波兰民调的民调显示,选举结果鹿死谁手尚未可知。

Finally, Poland will vote in parliamentary elections no later than the autumn. Donald Tusk’s government came into office in 2023 promising to repair Poland’s relationship with the EU after eight years under the populist Law and Justice party. But tricky domestic politics have resulted in few reforms to enthuse Mr Tusk’s liberal base. A poll of Polish polls suggests the outcome could go either way.

布鲁塞尔方面很容易将2027年视为需要熬过的一年,这一年应当致力于维持现状,而不是勇往直前。但这可能低估了即将到来的一切。全国大选不仅仅是打断了欧洲政治。它们偶尔会改变欧洲政治。■

The temptation in Brussels will be to view 2027 as a year to be endured, one dedicated to keeping the show on the road rather than forging ahead. But that may underestimate what is coming. National elections do not merely interrupt European politics. Occasionally they transform it. ■

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