2026年,霍尔木兹海峡的关闭引发了石油史上最大的供应冲击。这一年的大部分时间里,全球经济吸收冲击的能力出奇地好:中国大幅削减石油进口,美国增加燃料出口,欧洲推迟天然气采购,使价格基准远低于伊朗战争爆发时分析师所担心的峰值。然而到了最后一个季度,缓冲手段逐渐失效。2027年,无论霍尔木兹海峡是否永久重新开放,供应紧张都将蔓延至一系列大宗商品市场。
IN 2026 THE closure of the Strait of Hormuz triggered the biggest supply shock in petroleum history. For much of the year the global economy absorbed it remarkably well: China slashed its oil imports, America exported more fuel and Europe delayed gas purchases, keeping price benchmarks well below the peaks that analysts had feared when the Iran war began. By the final quarter, though, the buffers were wearing thin. In 2027 tightness will spread across a range of commodity markets—whether or not Hormuz reopens for good.
石油将最先显现压力——不过,正如2026年那样,原油价格并不是衡量这种压力的正确指标。油轮将继续悄悄驶过海峡,因此世界不会面临原油的严重短缺。如果中东炼油厂基本仍处于停摆状态,而乌克兰持续打击俄罗斯炼油厂,那么稀缺的大宗商品可能仍是炼油产能。战争拖得越久,柴油价格停留在极高水平的时间就越长,航空燃油价格也是如此。海湾实现和平会压低价格。但炼油和运输的延迟将使市场在数月内保持紧张。
Oil will show the strain first—though, as in 2026, the crude price is the wrong gauge of it. Tankers will keep slipping through the strait, so the world will not face a crippling deficit of raw petroleum. The scarce commodity could remain refining capacity, if Middle Eastern plants stay largely offline and Ukraine keeps pummelling Russian refineries. The longer the war drags on, the longer diesel prices will stay in the stratosphere, and those for jet fuel, too. Peace in the Gulf would push prices down. But delays in refining and shipping would keep markets tight for months.
化肥生产商受到硫磺短缺的严重打击。硫磺对从采矿到芯片制造的各行各业都至关重要,出于类似原因,它可能仍是奢侈品。2026年末,硫磺价格为每吨750至800美元,而正常时期为100至200美元。伊朗战争之前市场就已紧张:俄罗斯希望将有限的产量留给国内使用(硫磺主要是石油和天然气炼制的副产品),已禁止出口。
Fertiliser producers have been hit hard by a sulphur shortage Sulphur, vital to industries from mining to chipmaking, could stay a luxury item for similar reasons. In late 2026 it traded at $750-800 a tonne, against $100-200 in normal times. The market was already tight before the Iran war: Russia, keen to preserve its limited output for domestic use (sulphur is largely a by-product of oil and gas refining), had banned exports.
随后这场危机切断了全球近一半的出口供应;中国、印度、哈萨克斯坦和土耳其的限制措施又使非海湾地区的出口减少了40%。除非海湾紧张局势缓解,否则这一贸易将保持低迷。利润率极薄的印尼镍生产商将受到冲击;铜生产商在需求强劲的情况下拥有更强的定价权,更容易消化成本。
The crisis then cut nearly half of the world’s exported supply; restrictions in China, India, Kazakhstan and Turkey shrank non-Gulf exports by another 40%. Unless Gulf tensions ease, the trade will stay subdued. Indonesian nickel producers, which operate on razor-thin margins, will suffer; copper producers, with greater pricing power amid strong demand, can absorb the cost more easily.
化肥生产商受到严重冲击,其中许多还依赖硫磺。摩洛哥、印度、美国和巴西的工厂最初削减了产量,随后转向养分含量较低的省硫品种。天然气这一另一关键投入品价格高企,进一步挤压了该行业。
Fertiliser producers, many of which also rely on sulphur, have been hit hard. Factories in Morocco, India, America and Brazil initially cut output before shifting towards sulphur-sparing variants that deliver fewer nutrients. High prices for natural gas—another key input—are squeezing the industry further.
化肥稀缺且昂贵,再加上柴油价格高昂和运费高企,可能拖累来年的农产品出口。伊朗战争爆发时,许多农民仍有化肥和燃料库存,而且种植正在进行或已经完成;这一次他们没有这些缓冲。联合国粮食及农业组织10月编制的食品价格指数处于2022年11月以来的最高水平。化肥用量低导致产量低,可能使价格在2027年保持高位。
Scarce, expensive fertiliser, combined with dear diesel and high freight costs, could hamper agricultural exports this coming year. When the Iran war began, many farmers still had stocks of fertiliser and fuel, and planting was under way or finished; they lack those buffers this time. A food-price index compiled by the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organisation in October was at its highest since November 2022. Low yields, due to low fertiliser use, could keep prices high in 2027.
在这三种情况下,只有伊朗战争迅速结束,才能阻止保护供应免受又一次冲击的缓冲不断萎缩。■
In all three cases, only a swift end to the Iran war can halt the steady shrinkage of the buffers protecting supply from another shock.■