
早已被遗忘的拉丁美洲,如今已跃居华盛顿议程之首。美国总统唐纳德·特朗普和古裔美籍国务卿马可·鲁比奥的关注,涉及一个旧观念的新版本:19世纪的门罗主义。该主义宣称要保护拉丁美洲免受外国(主要是欧洲)列强干涉,却演变成美国可自由干涉以追求自身利益的想法。
Long forgotten, Latin America is now top of the agenda in Washington. The attention from President Donald Trump and Marco Rubio, the Cuban-American secretary of state, involves a new version of an old idea: the Monroe Doctrine of the 19th century. This purported to protect Latin America from interference by foreign (mostly European) powers but morphed into the idea that the United States could freely interfere to pursue its own interests.
最新版本被称为“特朗普门罗主义”,既保留了一点前者的意思(以中国为最大担忧),又掺入了大剂量的后者。2026年1月,这一做法达到了非同寻常的高度:美国特种部队抓捕了委内瑞拉强人尼古拉斯·马杜罗,并扶植其副手德尔西·罗德里格斯上台,后者作为一个顺从的独裁者,随即与特朗普达成了一笔大型的、可疑的石油交易。该政府对涉嫌贩毒船只的打击也在持续,并继续扼杀共产主义古巴的经济。
The latest version, dubbed the Donroe Doctrine, has a little of the former (with China the biggest worry) and a big dose of the latter. It reached extraordinary heights in January 2026 with the seizure of Venezuela’s strongman, Nicolás Maduro, by US special forces, and the installation of his deputy, Delcy Rodríguez, as a pliant authoritarian who then did a big, dodgy oil deal with Mr Trump. His administration’s strikes on alleged drug-trafficking boats have continued, too, along with the strangling of communist Cuba’s economy.
2027年,美国与拉美关系将由两种相互矛盾的力量塑造。左翼人士路易斯·伊纳西奥·卢拉·达席尔瓦在巴西赢得连任,但随着2026年秘鲁和哥伦比亚右翼获胜,加上从阿根廷到萨尔瓦多许多国家早已有右翼人士执政,特朗普政府将在该地区享有强有力的意识形态一致性。这有助于其打击贩毒集团并遏制中国。然而,在中期选举中失去参众两院控制权予民主党,意味着特朗普的行动将面临严格得多的审查。
In 2027 the United States’ relations with Latin America will be shaped by two contradictory forces. Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, a left winger, won re-election in Brazil, but the Trump administration will enjoy strong ideological alignment in the region after wins for right-wingers in Peru and Colombia in 2026 added to many others already in office, from Argentina to El Salvador. That should help it hit drug gangs and keep out China. Yet the loss of both houses of Congress to the Democrats in the midterm elections means Mr Trump’s actions will face much greater scrutiny.
这两种动态究竟如何演变将因情况而异。以委内瑞拉为例。美国主导的谈判正在进行,旨为总统选举奠定基础。但选举可能要等到 2028 年才举行。2027 年至少应当出现法院变革、废除针对反对派政客的最严苛压制性法律,以及公布选举时间表。其中可能包括在年内晚些时候举行地区甚至议会选举。
Exactly how these two dynamics play out will vary. Consider Venezuela. Negotiations sponsored by the United States are under way to lay the groundwork for presidential elections. But they may not come until 2028. In 2027 there should at least be changes to the courts, the repeal of the most repressive laws used against opposition politicians, and the announcement of an election timetable. That might include regional or even parliamentary elections later in the year.
最大的不确定性笼罩着古巴。民主党人和部分共和党人将呼吁更早举行选举。民主党人还将审查美国控制的委内瑞拉石油资金流向。石油产量应当逐步增加,从而提振经济。但这不太可能发生得足够快,以让特朗普和鲁比奥得意洋洋地提前大选;也不太可能慢到引发大规模抗议、迫使他们提前大选的地步。最大的变数是反对派领袖玛丽亚·科里娜·马查多。
The greatest uncertainty hangs over Cuba Democrats, and some Republicans, will call for elections to be held sooner. Democrats will also scrutinise the flow of Venezuelan oil money that the US controls. Oil production should gradually increase, boosting the economy. But it is unlikely to happen fast enough to convince Messrs Trump and Rubio triumphantly to bring forward elections, or so slowly as to generate big protests that might force them to. The biggest unknown is María Corina Machado, the opposition leader.
在多次试图返回委内瑞拉均受阻后,她于 2026 年 10 月回国。这可能激发街头力量,增加举行选举的压力。但很大程度上取决于她愿在多大程度上与特朗普决裂。
After many blocked attempts to return to Venezuela, she returned home in October 2026. That could galvanise the streets and add pressure for elections. But much depends on the extent to which she is willing to break with Mr Trump.
他打击贩毒集团的战争也将发生变化。针对快艇的(几乎可以肯定是非法的)打击行动可能会减少。取而代之的,预计将重点转向登船、带走大型补给和后勤船只的船员,然后将其击沉。
His war on drug gangs will change, too. There will probably be fewer of the (almost certainly illegal) strikes on speedboats. Instead, expect a focus on boarding and removing the crews from larger refuelling and logistics vessels, before sinking them.
与此同时,美国在拉丁美洲陆地上针对帮派的军事行动可能会增加。这种情况已经在厄瓜多尔发生——9月的一场突袭涉及50名美国士兵和大量高科技装备。战争部长皮特·赫格塞斯表示,哥伦比亚和洪都拉斯也已同意在其领土上开展联合军事行动。鲁比奥要求“美洲盾牌”联盟中的18个拉美国家——这是一个打击毒品帮派的联盟——将二十多个帮派和贩毒集团指定为恐怖组织。许多人认为,这是为美国加大对这些团体突袭的军事介入提供法律和政治掩护。
Meanwhile, US military operations against gangs on land in Latin America will probably increase. This is already happening in Ecuador—a raid in September involved 50 US soldiers and stacks of high-tech gear. Pete Hegseth, the secretary of war, says Colombia and Honduras have also agreed to joint military operations on their soil. Mr Rubio has asked the 18 Latin countries in the Shield of the Americas, a coalition against drug gangs, to designate two dozen gangs and cartels as terrorist organisations. Many see this as a way to provide legal and political cover for greater US military involvement in raids against such groups.
特朗普政府将进一步向墨西哥的左翼政府施压,要求其允许美国在打击帮派方面采取更多行动。丹尼尔·奥尔特加在尼加拉瓜的独裁政权在未来一年可能面临更严厉的美国制裁,尤其是在他表示将不再举行任何选举之后。(原定于2027年11月举行一次选举。)但最大的不确定性悬在古巴上空。美国严厉的经济施压和军事行动暗示,加上抛出可能就领导层变更举行谈判的诱饵,迄今尚未奏效。
The Trump administration will apply further pressure to the left-wing government in Mexico to allow more American action in the fight against gangs. And Daniel Ortega’s dictatorship in Nicaragua could face much tougher American sanctions in the coming year, especially after he said that there will be no more elections at all. (One was due in November 2027.) But the greatest uncertainty hangs over Cuba. America’s strategy of harsh economic pressure and hints of military action, while dangling possible talks about a change in leadership, has not worked so far.
特朗普可能会尝试达成一个不那么激进的协议。9月,鲁比奥本人的前途似乎也未卜,他表示政权中有些人手上没有“沾染鲜血”,美国可以与他们合作。有特朗普掌舵,任何事情都有可能发生。■
Mr Trump may try to cut a less radical deal. In September Mr Rubio, whose own future appears uncertain, said there are people in the regime whose hands are not “stained with blood”, that America could work with. With Mr Trump in charge, anything could happen. ■