“唐罗主义”——即美国总统唐纳德·特朗普重塑美国领导下的西半球的努力——一直是他治国方略中最具一致性、也最成功的方面。这场地缘政治博弈既受益于拉丁美洲的政治右转，又反过来催化了这一转向。
The “Donroe Doctrine” — President Donald Trump’s effort to reforge the Western Hemisphere under US leadership — has been the most consistent, and most successful, aspect of his statecraft. That geopolitical gambit has both benefited from and helped catalyze Latin America’s swing to the political right.
如今，路易斯·伊纳西奥·卢拉·达席尔瓦总统周日在巴西实现后来居上的连任，正在暴露出这一成功局限性。特朗普一直在美洲的自家后院强势重申美国的权力，但针对这一计划的挑战正逐渐显现。
Now the come-from-behind reelection of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in Brazil on Sunday is exposing the limits of that success. Trump has aggressively reasserted US power in America’s home region, but challenges to that project are coming into view.
特朗普及其助手辩称，美国必须主导其战略周边地区，以此作为影响世界的平台——或者也许是作为避开世界沧桑巨变的避难所。自2025年初以来，该政府融合了经济、军事、情报和外交手段——从对涉嫌贩毒船只的打击到对友好政府的财政支持，无所不包——以将这一愿景变为现实。
Trump and his aides argue that the US must dominate its strategic surroundings as a platform for influencing the world — or, perhaps, as a refuge from its vicissitudes. Since early 2025, the administration has fused economic, military, intelligence and diplomatic tools — everything from strikes on alleged drug-smuggling boats to financial support for friendly governments — to make that vision real.
这些成果绝非微不足道。特朗普驱逐了委内瑞拉的一位专制、反美的领导人，并对古巴施加了压倒性的压力。通过多国“美洲之盾”倡议，该政府建立了专注于打击残暴贩毒集团的伙伴关系。
The accomplishments are hardly trivial. Trump removed one tyrannical, anti-US leader in Venezuela and has put Cuba under crushing pressure. Through the multinational Shield of the Americas initiative, the administration has built partnerships focused on beating back brutal drug gangs.
美国一直在将中国的影响力挤出巴拿马的港口和电信基础设施。在其寻求资源安全的过程中，特朗普的国务院已吸引智利、阿根廷和其他国家加入美国主导的关键矿产伙伴关系“硅和平”。
The US has been squeezing Chinese influence out of Panamanian ports and telecommunications infrastructure. In his search for resource security, Trump’s State Department has enticed Chile, Argentina and other countries to join Pax Silica, a US-led critical minerals partnership.
更广泛地说，最近与丹麦和格陵兰岛达成的安全协议将有助于保护西半球的北极通路——尽管这只有在特朗普通过威胁吞并这个庞大岛屿而无谓地损害了北大西洋公约组织之后才得以实现。地缘政治顺应政治：特朗普一直在收割该地区向右转带来的红利。
More broadly, a recent security deal with Denmark and Greenland will help protect the hemisphere’s Arctic approaches — though this occurred only after Trump needlessly damaged the North Atlantic Treaty Organization by threatening to annex the massive island. And geopolitics follows politics: Trump has been reaping the rewards of the region’s rightward shift.
从2025年4月到2026年6月，从智利到洪都拉斯等国，中右翼候选人在七场总统选举中接连获胜。在其他一些情况下，例如阿根廷2025年10月的中期选举，中右翼政党巩固了对权力的掌控。不出特朗普的作风，他经常介入以扶持意识形态盟友，同时也在拉拢萨尔瓦多的纳伊布·布克尔等“让美国再次伟大”（MAGA）的同路人。
From April 2025 to June 2026, right-of-center candidates won seven straight presidential contests in countries from Chile to Honduras. In other cases, such as Argentina’s midterm elections in October 2025, right-of-center parties strengthened their grip on power. Trump, characteristically, has often intervened to boost ideological allies, while also courting MAGA fellow travelers such as Nayib Bukele in El Salvador.
因此，西半球的政治气候一直有利于打击犯罪的强硬政策，以及针对加拉加斯和哈瓦那的施压战略。墨西哥的克劳迪娅·谢因鲍姆和巴西的卢拉等中左翼领导人发现自己陷入孤立。
The hemisphere’s political climate has thus been favorable to tough-on-crime policies and pressure strategies against Caracas and Havana. Left-of-center leaders, such as Mexico’s Claudia Sheinbaum and Brazil’s Lula, found themselves isolated.
因丑闻失势的前总统雅伊尔·博索纳罗之子弗拉维奥·博索纳罗如果胜选，将使南美洲巨人巴西归入保守派阵营。但他失败了，此后已逃往迈阿密。卢拉的胜利使拉丁美洲的右倾浪潮和特朗普的“唐罗主义”变得复杂，尽管这很难将其阻止。
A win for Flávio Bolsonaro, son of disgraced former president Jair Bolsonaro, would have put Brazil, the giant of South America, in the conservative column. But he failed and has since fled to Miami. Lula’s victory complicates, although it hardly halts, Latin America’s rightward wave and Trump’s Donroe Doctrine.
正如博索纳罗曾承诺的那样，由卢拉领导的巴西不会加入“美洲之盾”，也不会允许美军在其领土上打击贩毒集团。它将继续在华盛顿和北京之间玩经济平衡把戏。虽然卢拉可能不会寻求与美国对抗——巴西仍然需要进入美国市场的途径——但他拒绝美国主导该地区的想法。他在上个月的联合国大会上宣称，巴西“不会容于任何人的后院”。
A Lula-led Brazil won’t join the Shield of the Americas, as Bolsonaro had pledged to do, or allow US forces to fight drug cartels on its soil. It will continue its economic balancing act between Washington and Beijing. And while Lula probably won’t seek confrontation with the US — Brazil still needs access to American markets — he rejects the idea of an American-dominated region. Brazil “wouldn’t fit in anyone’s backyard,” he declared at the United Nations last month.
特朗普的西半球计划还面临其他几项新兴考验。首先，哈瓦那还有未竟的事业。在推翻委内瑞拉的尼古拉斯·马杜罗之后，特朗普将胁迫施压的重点转向了古巴。虽然美国的封锁扼杀了古巴经济，但并未迫使古巴的共产党领导人下台。
There are several other emerging trials for Trump’s hemispheric project. First, there’s unfinished business in Havana. Since toppling Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro, Trump has focused his coercive pressure on Cuba. While the US blockade has throttled the economy, it hasn’t forced Cuba’s communist leaders to step aside.
或许持续施压会带来类似于政权更迭的结果。但如果古巴统治者不肯屈服，特朗普可能面临一种抉择：要么在军事上升级行动，要么承认自己——就像自德怀特·艾森豪威尔以来的每一位总统一样——无法赶走美国近海的一个流氓政权。
Perhaps a continuing squeeze will produce something like regime change. But if Cuba’s rulers don’t yield, Trump may face a choice between escalating militarily or admitting that he — like every president since Dwight Eisenhower — can’t dislodge a rogue regime near US shores.
其次，反美反弹的风险正在上升。推翻马杜罗的美国突袭行动在委内瑞拉及更广泛的地区获得了大量支持。特朗普从临时总统德尔西·罗德里格斯那里榨取的那笔带有准帝国色彩的石油交易——据报道是以威胁起诉她为手段——可能会在政治上具有毒性。
Second, the risks of an anti-US backlash are rising. The US raid that removed Maduro drew substantial support in Venezuela and the wider region. The quasi-imperial oil deal Trump extracted from interim President Delcy Rodríguez — reportedly by threatening to indict her — could prove politically toxic.
特朗普的议程解决了困扰美洲各地民众的现实问题，无论是根深蒂固的暴政还是失控的毒品暴力。但如果这些解决方案涉及强权帝国主义或赤裸裸的资源掠夺，地区的善意很快就会枯竭。
Trump’s agenda tackles real problems, whether entrenched tyrannies or out-of-control drug violence, that afflict populations across the hemisphere. But if the solutions involve heavy-handed imperialism or naked resource grabs, regional goodwill will dry up soon.
第三，特朗普这一计划的政治基础正在动摇，在国内外皆是如此。如果民主党在下周的中期选举中赢得国会参众两院中的一个或全部两个，预计他们将大举调查那些在法律上有疑问的运毒船打击行动，或是与委内瑞拉暗箱操作的势力进行的令人不快的资源交易。
Third, the political foundations of Trump’s project are getting shaky, at home as well as abroad. If Democrats win one or both chambers of Congress in next week’s midterms, expect them to aggressively investigate legally questionable drug-boat strikes or unsavory resource deals with shady Venezuelan actors.
正如卢拉的胜利所提醒我们的那样，不要高估该地区右转趋势的持久性。正如历史所表明的那样，如果这种摇摆纯粹是周期性的——如果它反映了一个机构脆弱且政治危险的地区的持久动荡——“让美洲再次伟大”的情绪可能只是昙花一现。
And as Lula’s victory reminds us, don’t overestimate the durability of the region’s rightward move. If, as history suggests, that swing is merely cyclical — if it reflects the enduring volatility of a region where institutions are weak and politics are perilous — the “Make the Americas Great Again” mood may be just a moment.
最后，特朗普削弱了北美堡垒。西半球既延伸到美国以北，也延伸到美国以南。理想情况下，与加拿大和墨西哥的紧密联系应构成美国在该地区乃至全球影响力的核心。
Finally, Trump has weakened the North American citadel. The Western Hemisphere reaches north as well as south of America. Ideally, strong ties with Canada and Mexico would form the core of US influence in the region and the world.
然而，北美贸易的未来充满不确定性，美墨加协定处于悬而未决的状态。特朗普关于“第51个州”的嘲弄促使加拿大寻求实现更大程度的对美战略与经济独立，并日益将目光投向欧洲。特朗普在关键领域为美国政策注入活力，理应获得肯定。但如果北美走向分裂，一项旨在实现西半球整合的计划将无法成功。《权力的版图：地理与国家的兴衰》
Yet the future of North American trade is uncertain, with the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement in limbo. Trump’s “51st state” taunts have prompted Canada to seek greater strategic and economic independence from the US and increasingly to look to Europe. Trump deserves credit for invigorating US policy in a vital area. But a project of hemispheric consolidation won’t succeed if North America fragments. The Landscape of Power: Geography and the Rise and Fall of Nations,