10月29日,朝鲜国家赞助的黑客组织TraderTraitor从加密货币交易所Binance窃取了63亿美元。这次盗窃是有记录以来最大的一次,超过了该组织2025年对另一家加密货币交易所Bybit发起的15亿美元袭击。上周,FBI宣布,另一个朝鲜计划在18个月内通过虚假视频通话劫持他人身份,窃取了4亿美元的加密货币。
ON OCTOBER 29TH TraderTraitor, a state-sponsored North Korean hacking group, stole $6.3bn from Binance, a cryptocurrency exchange. The heist was the largest on record, surpassing the group’s $1.5bn raid on Bybit, another crypto exchange, in 2025. Last week the FBI announced that another North Korean scheme nabbed $400m of cryptocurrency over 18 months, using fake video calls to hijack people’s identities.
过去二十年来,敌对国家逐渐将其间谍和破坏行动从政府转向西方企业,认识到高科技公司的创新是战略优势的来源,而这些公司的防御远远不及其所持有资产的价值。
Over the past two decades, hostile states have steadily turned their espionage and sabotage efforts away from governments and towards Western businesses, recognising that the innovations of high-tech companies were a source of strategic advantage, and that those companies’ defences fell well short of the value of what they held.
朝鲜现在将普通商业活动视为收入来源。由于制裁使其与国际金融体系隔绝,它通过三种方式赚钱:窃取加密货币、以虚假身份让工人进入西方公司,以及在国外运营贸易公司和空壳公司来转移资金。这些方式常常相互交织,同一网络往往同时进行这三项活动。
North Korea now treats ordinary commercial activity as a revenue stream. Cut off from the international financial system by sanctions, it makes money in three ways: stealing cryptocurrency, getting workers into Western companies under false identities, and running trading and front companies abroad to move the funds. These often blur into each other, with the same networks doing all three.
对大多数首席执行官来说,安全仍然意味着防火墙。这只是工作的一半。另一半是了解谁在接近你的工程师,你的新员工到底是谁,以及你每月支付费用的招聘机构或供应商背后是谁。这些问题触及每个董事会,远远超出加密货币交易所和科技公司,而任何制裁名单都无法回答这些问题。
For most chief executives, security still means the firewall. That is only half the job. The other half is knowing who is approaching your engineers, who your new hires really are and who is behind the staffing agency or supplier you pay each month. Those questions reach every boardroom, well beyond crypto exchanges and tech firms, and no sanctions list will answer them.
招聘已成为这场战争的前线。在Binance,入侵途径是向其一名员工发出的工作邀约:一位友好的招聘人员,几次令人信服的视频面试,以及一份携带恶意软件的编程测试。没有任何异常之处;每年有数百万人以这种方式找工作。
Recruitment has become a front line in this war. At Binance the way in was a job offer to one of its employees: a friendly recruiter, a couple of convincing video interviews and a coding test that carried malicious software into the organisation. Nothing about it looked unusual; this is how millions of people find jobs every year.
这同样适用于反向情况:公司需要意识到自己真正雇佣的是谁。许多朝鲜工人被国家派遣到IT、餐饮、医疗诊所和建筑工地等行业。他们受到严密监视,并被要求将工资汇回国内,因此雇佣一名朝鲜工人的公司不仅会让数据面临风险,还会帮助资助朝鲜政权。令人震惊的是,美国和欧洲董事会依赖的招聘背景调查和制裁筛查,会让绝大多数朝鲜代理人直接通过。
It works in reverse, too: companies need to be aware of whom they are really hiring. Many North Korean workers are deployed by the state across industries such as IT, restaurants, medical clinics and building sites. They operate under close surveillance and are made to send their wages home, so a company that hires one is not only putting its data at risk, but helping to fund North Korea’s regime. Shockingly, the hiring checks and sanctions screening that American and European boardrooms rely on would wave the bulk of North Korea’s agents straight through.
员工并非唯一的风险。许多公司也常常没有意识到,使用错误的供应商或进行错误的付款,可能会无意中向平壤输送资金。
Employees are not the only risk. Many companies are also often unaware that by using the wrong supplier or making the wrong payment they could unwittingly be sending money to Pyongyang.
像我这样的公司现在使用代理人AI来追踪数千个组织之间的所有权和交易关系,筛选的公共记录比任何合规团队人工核查的都要多。利用这些技术,Strider已标记出875家位于朝鲜境外的企业,这些企业与朝鲜政权的交易可能违反国际制裁。其中不到3%出现在任何政府制裁名单或出口黑名单上。实际上,一家企业可能与与朝鲜有关联的公司签订合同、通过中介机构雇佣人员或向供应商付款,而其制裁检查不会发出任何警报。
Firms like mine now use agentic AI to trace who owns and deals with whom across thousands of organisations, combing through more public records than any compliance team could check by hand. Using these techniques, Strider has flagged 875 businesses outside North Korea that are linked to dealings with the regime that may break international sanctions. Less than 3% of them are on any government sanctions list or export blacklist. In practice, a business could sign a contract, hire through an agency or pay a supplier linked to North Korea, and its sanctions checks would raise no alarm.
这408家组织位于中国和俄罗斯,这并不令人意外,因为这两个国家是朝鲜最亲密的伙伴。令人意外的是,其余组织分布在70多个国家。其中88家位于香港、新加坡、马来西亚或阿联酋,这些金融中心每天都有西方贸易和资金流经。朝鲜可能被排除在世界经济之外,但它找到了一条后门。
It is unsurprising that 408 of these organisations are based in China and Russia, North Korea’s closest partners. What is surprising is that the rest are spread across more than 70 countries. Eighty-eight are in Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia or the United Arab Emirates, financial centres that Western trade and money pass through every day. North Korea might be shut out of the world economy, but it has found a back door.
关键的是,这些并非仅仅是纸面上存在的公司。超过300家被标记为在海外雇佣朝鲜劳工,这一做法于2017年被联合国禁止。79家被标记为买卖过朝鲜军事物资。这些炮弹和导弹正在被发射向乌克兰城市。
Crucially, these are not just companies that exist on paper. More than 300 are flagged as employing North Korean workers abroad, a practice banned by the UN in 2017. Seventy-nine are flagged as having bought or sold North Korean military goods. These shells and missiles are now being fired at Ukrainian cities.
与金正恩政权相关的资金可以通过体面的机构流转,往往机构本身毫不知情。供应商或招聘机构可能看起来完全合规,拥有所有正确文件,并通过每一项标准检查,却与为朝鲜工作的网络仅相隔一两步。制裁名单只记录政府正式指定的那些网络,因此显示的是每个名字被加入当天的威胁状况。这些名字背后的网络变化速度远快于大多数政府更新名单的速度。
Money linked to Kim Jong Un’s regime can pass through respectable institutions, often without them knowing. A supplier or recruitment agency can look entirely above board, carry all the right paperwork and pass every standard check while being one or two steps removed from a network working on North Korea’s behalf. A sanctions list records only those networks that governments have formally designated, so it shows the threat as it stood on the day each name was added. The networks behind those names are shifting far faster than most governments can update a list.
拒绝国际人才或对每家海外公司都持怀疑态度是不现实的。目标应当是让开放更安全。具体而言,意味着三件事。第一,严格的尽职调查,主动聚焦国家风险:在签约前而非签约后,审视合同名称背后合作伙伴的所有权、资金来源及与国家机构的联系。第二,将这些情报置于决策点前,无论是在招聘、采购还是投资委员会。第三,赋予某人真正的权力:一位负责促成正确交易、并在风险明显或过于模糊时叫停交易的高管。
Shutting out international talent or treating every overseas firm with suspicion would be unrealistic. The aim should be to make openness more secure. In practice, that means three things. First, rigorous due diligence, actively focused on state risks: look past the name on the contract to a partner’s ownership, funding and links to state bodies, beforeg rather than after. Second, put that intelligence in front of decision-makers at the point of decision, whether in hiring, procurement or an investment committee. Third, give someone real authority: a C-suite executive with responsibility for enabling the right deals and halting those where the risks are evident, or too opaque.
加密货币历史上最大的盗窃案始于一份工作邀约。数十年来,经济安全一直由政府负责;朝鲜已将其变成董事会的问题。每一次雇佣、每一家供应商和每一笔付款,现在都可能成为敌对国家的入口,而金正恩的技术走狗已经证明,只需要一次机会。■ Greg Levesque是Strider Technologies的首席执行官兼联合创始人。
The biggest theft in crypto history began with a job offer. For decades, economic security was left to governments; North Korea has made it a boardroom problem. Every hire, every supplier and every payment is now a potential way in for a hostile state, and Kim Jong Un’s techno-stooges have shown it needs only one.■ Greg Levesque is the chief executive and co-founder of Strider Technologies.