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也门与曼德海峡:美伊对抗的第二海上战线Yemen and Bab al-Mandeb: Second maritime front in the US–Iranian confrontation

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曼德海峡不再是也门冲突的孤立战场;它已成为更广泛的美伊对抗的作战延伸,红海的压力加剧了霍尔木兹海峡航行受阻的影响。胡塞武装无需封锁海峡即可产生战略后果:提高感知风险足以迫使船只改道并推高保险费。2026年9月,过境量仍比危机前水平低约47%。尽管常规军事资源平衡明显有利于沙特阿拉伯及其盟友,但由于反胡塞力量内部分裂以及胡塞武装吸收打击的能力,这一优势未能转化为可持续的政治成果。

Bab el-Mandeb is no longer an isolated theater of the Yemeni conflict; it has become an operational extension of the broader US–Iranian confrontation, with pressure in the Red Sea compounding the effects of disrupted navigation through the Strait of Hormuz. The Houthis need not close the strait to generate strategic consequences: increasing perceived risk is sufficient to divert vessels and raise insurance premiums. In September 2026, transit volumes remained approximately 47% below pre-crisis levels. Although the conventional balance of military resources clearly favors Saudi Arabia and its allies, this advantage has not translated into a sustainable political outcome because of divisions among anti-Houthi forces and the Houthis' capacity to absorb strikes.

因此,长期消耗是最可能的近期走向,而持久稳定将需要一个制衡性的也门体制权力中心,以及一个涉及红海沿岸国家的地区安全框架。

Protracted attrition is therefore the most likely near-term trajectory, while durable stability will require both a countervailing Yemeni institutional center of gravity and a regional security framework involving the Red Sea littoral states.

自2023年底以来,也门冲突已从国际关注的边缘移至全球海上安全议程的中心。美国海事管理局记录了2023年11月至2025年10月间针对商船的100多起单独袭击,涉及与60多个国家有关联的船只。随着2026年华盛顿与德黑兰的对抗升级,该海峡成为连接霍尔木兹和苏伊士的相互关联的海上咽喉要道网络中的一个节点,而不再仅仅是受到威胁的商业通道。只要也门仍被视为一个独立的海上战场,曼德海峡就无法得到保障。僵局的核心在于各方均无法将军事能力转化为持久的政治收益。

Since late 2023, the Yemeni conflict has moved from the margins of international attention to the center of the global maritime security agenda. The US Maritime Administration documented more than 100 separate attacks on commercial vessels between November 2023 and October 2025, affecting ships linked to more than 60 countries. As the confrontation between Washington and Tehran widened in 2026, the strait became a node in an interconnected network of maritime chokepoints linking Hormuz and Suez, rather than merely a commercial passage under threat. Bab el-Mandeb cannot be secured as long as Yemen is treated as a discrete maritime theater. At the core of the impasse is the inability of all parties to convert military capabilities into lasting political gains.

德黑兰将也门视为一个更广泛竞技场网络的组成部分,通过该网络,伊朗可以在伊朗领土之外向对手施加压力,同时保持相当程度的合理否认性。华盛顿方面则将胡塞武装的升级视为伊朗分散美国海军和空军资产的工具。尽管如此,将胡塞武装的每一次行动都归结为伊朗的直接决策,忽视了该运动自身的国内考量,特别是涉及组织生存及其在也门内部议价地位的考量。

Tehran views Yemen as one component of a wider network of arenas through which it can impose pressure on its adversaries beyond Iranian territory while preserving a substantial degree of plausible deniability. Washington, for its part, regards Houthi escalation as an Iranian instrument for dispersing US naval and air assets. Nevertheless, reducing every Houthi action to a direct Iranian decision overlooks the movement’s own domestic calculations, particularly those concerning organizational survival and its bargaining position within Yemen.

2026年地区战争加深了这种相互关联。随着霍尔木兹海峡航行受阻,沙特阿拉伯对从延布出发的红海出口航线的依赖程度增加。2026年7月,胡塞武装宣布限制与沙特港口有关联的船只通行,从而针对同一条替代航线。2026年第二季度,通过曼德海峡的石油流量达到日均810万桶——这一数字反映的是货物为避开霍尔木兹海峡而改道,而非安全形势好转。

The 2026 regional war deepened this interconnection. As navigation through Hormuz was disrupted, Saudi Arabia became more dependent on Red Sea exports from Yanbu. In July 2026, the Houthis announced restrictions on vessels linked to Saudi ports, thereby targeting the same alternative route. Oil flows through Bab el-Mandeb reached 8.1 million barrels per day in the second quarter of 2026—a figure that reflects the rerouting of shipments away from Hormuz more than an improvement in security.

从地理上看,该海峡宽约29公里(18英里),但其有效航道要窄得多。马云岛(也称佩里姆岛)位于海峡中心附近,周围的岛屿和海岸线提供了可用于军事目的的战略制高点。这种地理条件使得资源受限的行为体能够产生与其常规军事能力不成比例的效果:仅仅增加感知风险就足以迫使船只绕行好望角。联合国贸易和发展会议(UNCTAD)估计,2024年红海航运中断导致全球海运距离增加了17%。

Geographically, the strait is approximately 29 kilometers (18 miles) wide, although its effective navigation channels are considerably narrower. Mayyun Island, also known as Perim Island, lies near its center, while the surrounding islands and coastlines provide strategic vantage points that may be used for military purposes. This geography enables a resource-constrained actor to generate effects disproportionate to its conventional military capabilities: merely increasing perceived risk may be sufficient to divert vessels around the Cape of Good Hope. The UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) estimated that disruptions in the Red Sea increased global maritime transport distances by 17% in 2024.

2026年9月,该海峡记录了1215次过境,比危机前水平下降约47%。因此,有必要区分控制海峡和具备威胁其航行的能力。胡塞武装并不控制两岸,但它们能让通行在商业上代价高昂、在操作层面缺乏吸引力。

In September 2026, the strait recorded 1,215 transits, approximately 47% below pre-crisis levels. It is therefore necessary to distinguish between controlling the strait and possessing the capacity to threaten navigation through it. The Houthis do not control both shores, but they can make passage commercially costly and operationally unattractive.

相关行为体并不通过同一视角看待该海峡。对胡塞武装而言,它是威慑和争取承认的工具;对伊朗而言,它是其影响力跨越两大咽喉要道的延伸;对沙特阿拉伯而言,它是保护西海岸和开发项目的防线;对美国及其盟友而言,它是全球公共领域的一部分。中国选择了务实安排,与胡塞武装建立直接联系以保障其油轮通行。埃及面临苏伊士运河收入下降,却不是冲突的直接当事方;而以色列则通过其贸易和南部港口安全的棱镜来审视该海峡。来源:作者基于UNCTAD数据和路透社报道的评估。

The relevant actors do not view the strait through the same lens. For the Houthis, it is an instrument of deterrence and recognition; for Iran, an extension of its influence across two chokepoints; for Saudi Arabia, a defensive line protecting the western coast and development projects; and for the United States and its allies, part of the global commons. China has opted for pragmatic arrangements, establishing direct contacts with the Houthis to secure the passage of its tankers. Egypt faces declining Suez Canal revenues without being a direct party to the fighting, while Israel views the strait through the prism of the security of its trade and southern ports. Source: Author's assessment based on UNCTAD data and Reuters reports.

因此,短期内的主要受益者是那些能够以可承受的代价将海上威胁转化为政治筹码的行为体,而地区和全球经济承担了更广泛的负担,其中较贫困人口承担了最大的负担。沙特阿拉伯2025年的军费开支约为832亿美元,而伊朗约为74亿美元,二者比例约为11比1。然而,这种差距并未决定政治或军事结果。反胡塞武装联盟拥有空中优势和国际合法性,但其主要实地组成部分——包括南方过渡委员会和联合部队——之间的分歧阻碍了统一指挥和持久的领土收益。

Accordingly, the primary short-term beneficiaries are those actors capable of converting a maritime threat into political leverage at a tolerable cost, while the regional and global economy bears the broader burden, with poorer populations shouldering the largest Saudi military expenditures reached approximately $83.2 billion in 2025, compared with $7.4 billion for Iran—a ratio of roughly 11 to 1. This disparity, however, has not determined the political or military outcome. The anti-Houthi coalition possesses air superiority and international legitimacy, but divisions among its principal field components, including the Southern Transitional Council and the Joint Forces, have impeded unified command and durable territorial gains. The Houthis, by contrast, benefit from centralized leadership, a demonstrated capacity to absorb strikes, and the ability to assemble drones and missiles locally with support from the Islamic Republic of Iran.

相比之下,胡塞武装受益于集中的领导层、吸收打击的已证实能力,以及在伊朗伊斯兰共和国支持下在当地组装无人机和导弹的能力。

Even the government offensive against coastal areas near the strait in October 2026 was accompanied by conflicting accounts regarding control of certain positions and islands.

即使是2026年10月政府军针对曼德海峡附近沿海地区的进攻,也伴随着关于某些阵地和岛屿控制权的相互矛盾的说法。核心教训是,控制领土并不自动保障海上安全,攻击暂时减少并不意味着恢复攻击的能力已被消除。

The central lesson is that control of territory does not automatically secure the sea, and that a temporary decline in attacks does not mean the capacity to resume them has been eliminated. The trajectory of the crisis depends on the interaction of four variables connected to developments in Bab el-Mandeb: the direction of the US–Iranian confrontation; the Houthis’ capacity to sustain the threat; the ability of the Yemeni government and its allies to consolidate coastal control; and the parties' willingness to negotiate over maritime security.

危机的走向取决于与曼德海峡事态发展相关的四个变量的相互作用:美伊对抗的走向;胡塞武装维持威胁的能力;也门政府及其盟友巩固沿海控制的能力;以及各方就海上安全进行谈判的意愿。这四个变量的相互作用产生了四种主要情景,它们在可能性以及安全和经济后果方面各不相同。

Their interaction produces four principal scenarios that vary in likelihood and in their security and economic consequences. A comparison of the four scenarios suggests that continued attrition is driven not only by the parties’ capacity to sustain military operations but also by their persistent inability to translate coercive power into a stable political settlement.

对四种情景的比较表明,持续的消耗不仅源于各方维持军事行动的能力,还源于其长期无法将强制力转化为稳定的政治解决方案。战术性停火可能为胡塞武装争取时间以重建军火库并巩固其成果。相比之下,体制化情景基于不同的前提:海上安全最终取决于在实地建立可行的政治和安全替代方案,而非主要依赖空中力量。

A tactical truce could provide the Houthis with time to rebuild their arsenal and consolidate their gains. The institutional scenario, by contrast, proceeds from a different premise: maritime security ultimately depends on establishing a viable political and security alternative on the ground, rather than relying primarily on air power. Disruption to navigation through Bab el-Mandeb reflects a deeper political and institutional imbalance within Yemen and across its regional environment.

曼德海峡航行的中断反映了也门内部及其地区环境中更深层次的政治和体制失衡。军事打击可能暂时减少袭击频率,但既无法消除胡塞武装的权力来源,也无法阻止该运动在德黑兰与华盛顿新一轮升级周期中利用该海峡。因此,可持续的海上安全需要采取同时应对航行即时威胁和助长该威胁的政治条件的措施。基于此分析,提出以下四项政策优先事项:下一阶段的决定性问题将不再是谁拥有威胁曼德海峡的能力,而是谁能在地理杠杆转化为稳定安全安排的同时,避免将地区拖入更广泛的战争。

Military strikes may temporarily reduce the frequency of attacks, but they neither eliminate the Houthis' sources of power nor prevent the movement from exploiting the strait during renewed cycles of escalation between Tehran and Washington. Sustainable maritime security therefore requires measures that address both the immediate threat to navigation and the political conditions that enable it. Four policy priorities follow from this analysis: The decisive question in the next phase will not be who possesses the capacity to threaten Bab el-Mandeb, but who can translate geographic leverage into a stable security arrangement without drawing the region into a wider war.

本文首发于安纳多卢通讯社月刊《AA Briefing》2026年11月版。

This piece first appeared in the November 2026 edition of Anadolu Agency's monthly publication, AA Briefing.

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