
作者:维娜·阿里-汗 阿卜杜勒·马利克·胡塞此前从未见过任何国际外交官。他身着也门传统服饰,在该国偏远的北部一座简朴的房子里耐心等候,头发看起来像是刚剪过。
Malik al-Houthi had never met an international diplomat before. Clothed in traditional Yemeni dress, he waited patiently at a modest house in the country’s isolated north, his hair apparently freshly cut.
那是2011年4月,也门正濒临全面内战,反政府抗议活动席卷全国,这是被称为“阿拉伯之春”的中东地区起义浪潮的一部分。当时,联合国驻也门特使贾迈勒·本奥马尔最终抵达,会见了这位鲜为人知的胡塞武装指挥官——许多人认为他不过是一个乌合之众的民兵头目。
It was April 2011, and Yemen was on the brink of all-out civil war with anti-government protests, part of the wave of regional uprisings known as the Arab Spring that was spreading across the Middle East. The United Nations envoy to the country at the time, Jamal Benomar, eventually arrived to meet the little-known commander of the Houthis, dismissed by many as a ragtag militia.
“你见到的人是一位绅士,说话轻声细语,极其礼貌,”本奥马尔回忆道。他表示,自己是唯一已知曾与胡塞本人会面的外交官。“即使他不喜欢你说的话,也绝不会打断你,更不会阻止你说出他不喜欢的内容。”十五年后,这位当时内敛的31岁青年,已成为中东最具影响力、也最神秘的人物之一。
“The guy you meet is a gentleman, speaks with a soft voice, extremely polite,” recalled Benomar, who said he was the only diplomat known to have met al-Houthi in person. “Even if he doesn’t like what you are saying, he will never interrupt and stop you from saying something he doesn’t like.”Fifteen years later, that reserved 31-year-old has become one of the Middle East’s most consequential and enigmatic figures.
胡塞领导着一个武装组织,该组织已占领也门大片领土,并常常以残酷手段镇压其控制下的民众。胡塞武装的影响范围远超也门境内:他们扰乱全球贸易、冲击能源市场,并向沙特阿拉伯发射导弹。沙特盟友的部队正在地面领导一支联军,并于上周末誓言要将胡塞武装彻底消灭。
Al-Houthi presides over a militant group that’s taken over swathes of Yemen, often brutally suppressing the people under its control. The Houthis’ reach extends far beyond the country as they disrupt global trade, rattle energy markets and fire missiles at Saudi Arabia, whose allied forces on the ground are leading a coalition that vowed at the weekend to eliminate them.
在唐纳德·特朗普政府将胡塞武装列为恐怖组织后,他们已积累起可覆盖数百英里范围的武器库,能够对红海地区的石油设施和商船发动袭击。他们还曾对以色列发动致命无人机袭击。今年9月,胡塞武装夺取了俯瞰曼德海峡的领土,而该海峡是全球最重要的海上咽喉之一。
Proscribed as a terrorist organization by Donald Trump’s administration, the Houthis amassed an arsenal capable of reaching hundreds of miles, striking oil facilities and commercial shipping in the Red Sea. They launched deadly drone attacks at Israel. In September, they seized control of territory overlooking Bab el-Mandeb, one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints.
他们还提升了自己在伊朗所谓“抵抗轴心”中的排名。随着2023年10月7日对以色列的恐怖袭击引发后续冲突中,加沙的哈马斯和黎巴嫩的真主党遭受重创,胡塞武装对自己在该联盟中的价值愈发自信。
They also raised their ranking within Iran’s so-called Axis of Resistance. As Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon were battered in the conflicts that followed the Oct. 7, 2023, terror attacks on Israel, the Houthis grew more confident about their own value to the alliance.
国际危机组织资深伊朗问题分析师、《抵抗轴心》一书的作者哈米德雷扎·阿齐兹表示,胡塞武装正在承担部分哈桑·纳斯鲁拉领导时期的真主党所扮演的角色。“他们不仅仅是网络中的另一个成员,而是连接并支持其他行动者的枢纽。”纳斯鲁拉两年前在一次以色列空袭中丧生。
They are taking on some of the role that Hezbollah played under Hassan Nasrallah, who was killed by an Israeli strike two years ago said Hamidreza Azizi, a senior Iran analyst at the International Crisis Group and author of a book on the Axis of Resistance. “Not simply as another member of the network, but as a hub connecting and supporting other actors,” he said.
2014年,胡塞武装推翻了也门政府,建立了压迫性的统治,招募童兵,并将也门拖入内战。这在该国本已全球最贫困之列的情况下,引发了最严重的人道主义危机之一。
The Houthis ousted Yemen’s government in 2014, imposing a repressive rule, recruiting child soldiers and embroiling Yemen in a civil war. It provoked one of the worst humanitarian crises in a nation that was already one of the poorest in the world.
上周末,也门获得国际承认的政府在胡塞武装与沙特阿拉伯之间持续数周的冲突不断升级、将也门重新拖入全面战争之后,发起了一场全面军事行动以夺回领土。
Yemen’s internationally recognized government last weekend launched a full-scale military campaign to retake territory after weeks of escalating clashes between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia dragged Yemen back into a fully-fledged conflict.
然而,在经历了二十多年的战争后,胡塞武装比以往任何时候都更加胆大妄为。他们的领导人年轻时便继承了该组织,当时它还在也门偏远的北部山区为生存而战。如今,他们控制着首都萨那以及也门北部和西海岸的大部分地区,那里居住着约70%的人口。
But after surviving more than two decades of war, the Houthis are more emboldened than ever before. Their leader inherited the group as a young man when it was fighting for survival in Yemen’s remote, mountainous north. They now rule the capital, Sanaa, and most of Yemen’s north and western coastline, home to roughly 70% of the population.
阿尔-胡塞的崛起尤其令人震惊,因为他几乎没见过外面的世界。没有任何证据表明他曾经去过伊朗,甚至对也门的大部分地区也知之甚少。阿尔-胡塞很少与外界人士会面。他在胡塞政权中没有任何正式职位,除了从某个未公开地点发表电视讲话外,几乎从不露面,这模仿了已故的真主党领导人纳斯鲁拉。很少有人知道他的住处。
Al-Houthi’s rise is all the more striking given how little of the world he had seen. There is no evidence he ever travelled to Iran or even saw much of Yemen. Al-Houthi rarely meets outsiders. He holds no formal position in the Houthi administration and is seldom seen beyond televised speeches delivered from an undisclosed location, emulating the late Hezbollah leader Nasrallah. Few know where he lives.
胡塞出生于1979年,家乡是与沙特阿拉伯接壤的贫困省份萨达。他成长于也门北部一个显赫的扎伊迪派宗教学者家族。
Born in 1979 in Saada, an impoverished province bordering Saudi Arabia, al-Houthi grew up in one of northern Yemen’s prominent families of Zaydi religious scholars.
他的父亲巴德尔·丁·胡塞是一位著名的宗教人士,毕生致力于传授和撰写有关扎伊迪派信仰的内容。扎伊迪派属于什叶派的一个分支,与伊朗主流的十二伊玛目派有所不同。
His father, Badr al-Din al-Houthi, was a prominentcleric who spent much of his life teaching and writing about the Zaydi faith, a branch of Shia Islam distinct from the Twelver Shiism dominant in Iran.
巴德尔·丁共有四位妻子,育有众多子女。据奥地利科学院高级研究员、相关著作作者玛丽克·布兰特介绍,他的长子侯赛因后来成为政治家兼极具魅力的传教士,其思想为胡塞运动奠定了意识形态基础。
Badr al-Din had four wives and a large family. His eldest son, Hussein, became a politician and charismatic preacher whose teachings laid the ideological foundations of the Houthis, according to Marieke Brandt, author of and a senior researcher at the Austrian Academy of Sciences.
“侯赛因影响力极大,对整个家族及同代人都产生了深远影响,”长期与胡塞共事的胡塞运动高级官员穆罕默德·布凯蒂在Telegram上说道,“他在塑造阿卜杜勒-马利克的思想及其对诸多问题与事件的看法方面发挥了重要作用。”据多年密切关注胡塞运动的萨那战略研究中心高级研究员梅萨·舒贾·迪恩介绍,胡塞除了在家族宗教环境中接受的教育外,并未接受过多少正规教育。他未能获得父亲或兄长那样的学术资历,而是凭借出色的军事才能在战场上声名鹊起。
“Hussein was such an influential figure that his impact was felt across the family and his generation,” Mohammed al-Bukhaiti, a senior Houthi official who has long worked with al-Houthi, said over Telegram. “He played a major role in shaping Abdul Malik’s thinking and his views on many issues and events.”Al-Houthi had little formal education beyond his family’s religious world, according to Maysaa Shuja al-Deen, a senior researcher at the Sanaa Center for Strategic Studies, who has followed the Houthi movement closely for many years He never acquired the scholarly credentials of his father or older brother, instead making his name on the battlefield because of his military capabilities, she said.
2004年9月,在萨达地区爆发的与萨利赫政府的六次战争中的第一场战争即将结束时,也门政府军击毙了侯赛因·胡塞。此后,这场运动逐渐以他的弟弟为核心凝聚起来,当时他作为游击部队指挥官已声名渐起。
Yemeni forces killed Hussein al-Houthi in September 2004, at the end of the first of six wars with Saleh’s government in Saada. The movement then gradually coalesced around his younger brother, who was earning a reputation as a commander of guerilla forces.
布凯蒂评价道:“他之所以出类拔萃,是因为他具备应对艰难处境的能力、能赢得身边人的信任,还能在实践中展现出卓越的领导力。”
What made him stand out was “his ability to deal with difficult circumstances, earn the trust of those around him, and demonstrate his leadership in practice,” said al-Bukhaiti.
在萨达战争期间,也门政府多次试图将胡塞势力从其北部据点彻底清除,但均以失败告终。胡塞运动得以存续,然而萨达地区却因连年战火而满目疮痍。
The government repeatedly tried and failed to crush the Houthis in their northern stronghold during the Saada wars. They survived, but the areas around them in Saada were devasted by years of war.
“炮火猛烈到,他已无法从声音中判断自己的步枪弹匣何时空了,”阿尔-布凯提说,“直到步枪不再撞击他的肩膀,他这才意识到。”萨达战争锻造了如今与胡塞组织关系最密切的核心圈子。如今围绕他的许多高级人物,都是当年与他并肩作战的人,而权力也依然集中在高层。
“The shelling was so intense that he could no longer tell from the sound when his rifle magazine was empty,” said al-Bukhaiti. “He only realized when the rifle stopped recoiling against his shoulder.”The Saada wars forged the circle that remains closest to al-Houthi. Many of the senior figures around him today are men who fought alongside him during those years and power remains concentrated at the top.
胡塞组织几乎不给那些偏离其政治、社会或宗教路线的人留下容身之地。接连不断的镇压行动已将批评者以及为外国援助组织工作的人员一网打尽。女性的行动、工作和公共生活都受到限制,而宗教少数群体则长期遭受歧视和迫害。
The Houthis leave little room for those who stray from their political, social or religious line. Successive crackdowns have swept up critics and people working for foreign aid organizations. Women face restrictions on their movement, work and public life, while religious minorities have been subjected to persistent discrimination and persecution.
新一轮战斗也造成了沉重代价。根据世界卫生组织的数据,自今年8月胡塞组织与获得国际承认的政府恢复敌对行动以来,也门已有至少838人死亡,超过3600人受伤。许多也门人已经逃过红海前往吉布提。
The renewed fighting has also taken a heavy toll. At least 838 people have been killed and more than 3,600 injured in Yemen since the Houthis resumed hostilities with the internationally recognized government in August, according to the World Health Organization. Many Yemenis have fled across the Red Sea to Djibouti.
胡塞过去经常与各类也门人会面,但随着其权力日益增长,他的孤立感也愈发强烈。舒贾·阿勒丁表示,胡塞“多疑”,不易信任他人。阿尔-布凯提则称,在多次暗杀未遂之后,他的隐居是出于安全需要,而胡塞本人仍牢牢掌控着最重要的决策权。
Al-Houthi once regularly met with a wide range of Yemenis, but as his power has grown, so too has his isolation. Shuja al-Deen said al-Houthi is “paranoid” and doesn’t trust people easily. Al-Bukhaiti said his seclusion is a security necessity after repeated attempts to kill him, while Al-Houthi keeps a tight grip on the decisions that matter most.
“他很少直接下达命令,更喜欢解释自己的要求,并引导其他人跟随他的思路,”阿尔-布凯提说。两人最初合作时,他的指示含蓄得令人难以察觉,以至于阿尔-布凯提有时甚至误以为那只是建议。
“He rarely gives direct orders, preferring to explain what he wants and bring others with him,” said al-Bukhaiti. When the two first worked together, his instructions were so understated that al-Bukhaiti said he sometimes mistook them for advice.
阿里·阿尔-布凯蒂曾是胡塞武装的官员,也是穆罕默德的兄弟。他回忆道,2011年时的阿尔-胡塞性格腼腆且细心,常常在会议中静静坐着认真倾听。“就我个人而言,直到今天我依然敬重他,”后来与胡塞武装决裂的阿里说道,“不过我并不认同他的理念。”同年,贝诺马尔呼吁国际社会认真对待胡塞武装。他表示,当时自己意在趁为时不晚之际促成也门各权力派别展开对话,希望所有在也门具有影响力的人士都能参与其中,包括这位年轻的胡塞武装领袖。
Ali al-Bukhaiti, a former Houthi official and Mohammed’s brother, remembers al-Houthi in 2011 as shy and attentive, often sitting silently through meetings and listening closely. “Personally, I still love him to this day,” said Ali, who later broke with the Houthis. “But I disagree with his ideas.”As he urged the international community to take the Houthis seriously that year, Benomar said he set out to bring Yemen’s powerbrokers together for dialogue before it was too late. He wanted everyone with influence in the country to be involved, including the young leader of the Houthis.
萨那市中心的解放广场上挤满了要求变革、希望结束阿里·阿卜杜拉·萨利赫总统三十年统治的年轻人。萨利赫政府正与反对派就国家的未来激烈交锋,几乎没人留意到来自北方的反叛运动。
Tahrir Square in central Sanaa was filled with young people demanding change and an end to President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s three-decade rule. Saleh’s government was jostling with opponents over the country’s future. Few were paying much attention to the rebel movement from the north.
贝诺马尔与当时年仅二十多岁的马赫迪·马沙特(如今是胡塞武装最高政治委员会主席)取得联系后,便前往北方的萨达省。他撇下了联合国安保人员,一路穿过多个胡塞武装的检查站才抵达该据点。贝诺马尔记得,沿途尽是战争留下的瓦砾与废墟,大片区域因连年征战而化为平地。
After coordinating with Mahdi al-Mashat, then in his mid 20s and now president of the Supreme Political Council of the Houthis, Benomar traveled north to Saada. He left his UN security detail behind and passed through a series of Houthi checkpoints to reach the stronghold. Benomar remembers driving through rubble and ruins, entire areas levelled by years of fighting.
然而,正是这种破坏促成了如今由阿尔-胡塞领导的武装组织的形成。
But the group al-Houthi runs today was galvanized by that destruction.
胡塞武装常被称作伊朗的代理人。但实际上,阿尔-胡塞与德黑兰的关系是逐步发展的——最初是通过该组织与黎巴嫩真主党的联系。2014年胡塞武装占领萨那后,德黑兰才开始更加重视这一组织。一年后,以沙特为首的联军开始对也门发动攻击,胡塞武装便进一步向伊朗靠拢。
The Houthis are routinely described as an Iranian proxy. But al-Houthi’s relationship with Tehran developed graduallyinitially through the group’s ties with Hezbollah. The Houthi takeover of Sanaa in 2014 forced Tehran to take the group more seriously. After the Saudi-led coalition started attacking Yemen a year later, the Houthis were driven closer to Iran.
真主党就是范例。这个黎巴嫩组织在与军事实力远胜于自己的以色列的多次战争中存活下来,同时不断增强自身的军事与政治力量。胡塞武装试图在也门复制这一模式。伊朗则视此为契机,以进一步扩大其“抵抗轴心”。此后,胡塞武装越来越多地获得伊朗提供的技术指导、武器与训练。
Hezbollah was the model. The Lebanese group had survived wars with a far more powerful military power, Israel, while building military and political power. The Houthis sought to replicate that in Yemen. Iran saw that as an opportunity to widen its Axis of Resistance. The Houthis then increasingly became beneficiaries of Iranian expertise, weapons and training.
“只要双方有着相同的议程与目标,他们就不必充当伊朗的代理人,”舒贾·阿尔-迪恩说道,“伊朗也无需向他们下达命令。”2023年,哈马斯突袭以色列南部,造成1200人死亡并劫持250名人质。作为回应,以色列对加沙发动战争。此后,胡塞武装与德黑兰的关系进入新阶段:他们开始向以色列发射导弹与无人机,并袭击红海上的商业船只,声称此举是为了声援巴勒斯坦人。
“They don’t need to be a proxy if they have the same agenda and the same goals,” Shuja al-Deen said. “Iran doesn’t need to give them orders.”Ties between the Houthis and Tehran entered a new phase after Israel launched its war on Gaza in 2023 in response to Hamas swarming into the south of the country, massacring 1,200 people and taking another 250 hostage. The Houthis began firing missiles and drones toward Israel and targeting commercial shipping in the Red Sea, saying they were acting in support of Palestinians.
这一系列行动显著提升了胡塞武装在地区乃至国际上的影响力,使其正式成为一支不可小觑的力量。美国至今仍维持着去年与胡塞武装达成的停火协议,以终止也门境内的轰炸行动;最近更在阿曼与该组织举行了直接会谈。
The campaign boosted al-Houthi’s regional and international profile and cemented the Houthis as a force to be reckoned with. The US has kept intact the truce it struck with the Houthis last year to end bombing in Yemen, recently holding direct talks with the group in Oman.
事实上,随着胡塞武装一次次挺过军事打击,其领导人阿尔-胡蒂的野心也日益膨胀。据舒贾·阿尔-迪恩透露,如今他已将胡塞武装视为一支能够影响伊斯兰世界与中东局势的区域性力量,而不仅仅是一支志在夺取也门更多领土的武装团体。
Indeed, as the Houthis survived each successive campaign, al-Houthi’s ambitions have grown bigger. He now sees them as a regional force, one that can shape Islam and the Middle East, according to Shuja al-Deen, not just one with an eye on capturing more of Yemen.
“他们并不自视为地方性组织,而是自认为一个具有跨国性质的革命团体,”她说道,“比起亚丁,他更把目光投向了麦加与麦地那。”
“They don’t define themselves as a local group, but as a revolutionary transnational group,” she said. “He is looking at Mecca and Medina more than he is looking at Aden.”