近几天清楚地表明，将国家安全过度寄托在一位反复无常的私人公民埃隆·马斯克身上是何等愚蠢。据称，马斯克下令在乌克兰境内部分瘫痪其卫星互联网服务。这产生了两个恶劣后果。它阻碍了乌克兰本已有限的能力，使其难以保卫城市和民众免受速度快、杀伤力强的俄罗斯无人机袭击。它也让乌克兰更难反击俄罗斯的占领部队。
ECENT DAYS have made clear the folly of relying too much for your national security on a capricious private citizen named Elon Musk. Mr Musk is said to have ordered the partial hobbling of his satellite-internet service inside Ukraine. That had two malign effects. It hampered Ukraine’s already limited ability to defend its cities and civilians from fast and deadly Russian drones. It also made it harder for Ukraine to strike back at Russia’s occupying forces.
如果唐纳德·特朗普总统反对这种向克里姆林宫提供的极其恶劣的帮助，他对此保持了沉默。美国的盟友，无论在欧洲还是其他地方，都有理由质疑能在多大程度上信任这个超级大国。如果未来它们需要基于太空的通信系统来抵御攻击，能否绝对确定美国会无条件地提供？遗憾的是，问题在于不存在足够完善的本土替代方案。
If President Donald Trump objected to this egregious favour to the Kremlin, he kept quiet about it. America’s allies, in Europe and elsewhere, may reasonably ask how much they can trust the superpower. If, in the future, they need space-based communications systems to defend themselves against attack, can they be absolutely certain that America will supply them unconditionally? The problem, alas, is that no adequate home-grown alternative exists Europe talks a good game of trying to achieve “autonomy in space”.
欧洲口头上大谈实现“太空自主”，但这需要时间和金钱，还要求欧洲削减拖累其太空事业的浪费、内耗和重复建设。深度挖掘：欧洲对美国在太空领域的依赖难以摆脱如何实现目标？首先，欧洲必须具备将大量卫星送入轨道的发射能力。在这方面，其迄今为止的记录很差。它可以用“阿里安”火箭将重型有效载荷送入太空，但远不如马斯克的公司那样廉价高效。
But that will take time and money, and also require Europe to cut the waste, infighting and duplication that have weighed down its space efforts. Dig deeper Europe’s dependence on America in space is hard to escape How to get there? First, Europe must have the launch capacity to put large numbers of satellites into orbit. In this, its record so far is poor. It can lift heavy payloads into space on its Ariane rockets, but nowhere near as cheaply or efficiently as Mr Musk’s company does.
欧洲的火箭计划体现了其太空事业的缺陷。重型运载火箭“阿丽亚娜6号”研发延期，导致欧洲在2023年和2024年几乎整整一年无法进入太空。资助该计划的欧洲航天局难辞其咎。它未能将合同授予最具创新力或最高效的供应商，而是青睐捐资最多国家的企业。该计划还免受市场力量约束，每年获得约3亿欧元（约合3.37亿美元）的公共补贴。难怪它被SpaceX彻底击败：后者去年发射“猎鹰9号”火箭165次，向私人客户收费每发7000万美元，而“阿丽亚娜”尽管享有补贴，收费却超过9000万美元。
Europe’s rocket programme exemplifies flaws of its space ventures. Delays in developing its heavy-lift launcher, the Ariane 6, left Europe without access to space for almost a year in 2023 and 2024. The European Space Agency , which funds the programme, is partly to blame. It fails to award contracts to the most innovative or efficient suppliers, instead favouring firms from countries that donate the most funds. The programme is also shielded from market forces, getting roughly €300m ($337m) a year in public subsidies. Small wonder it has been trounced by SpaceX, which last year launched Falcon 9 rockets 165 times, charging private clients $70m a pop, while Ariane charges more than $90m despite those subsidies.
为扭转这一局面，欧洲航天局正试探性地效仿美国国家航空航天局（NASA）的做法：数十年前，NASA通过从研发火箭的“成本加成”合同转向采购固定价格发射服务，鼓励商业航天企业发展，这一政策让马斯克的SpaceX得以蓬勃发展。欧洲航天局已向三家火箭初创企业授予合同。合并重组可能随之而来，例如欧洲三大卫星制造企业拟议的联合。但欧洲能否在不削弱国内竞争的前提下，打造出一家足以在全球竞争的企业？
To fix this, the is tentatively copying America’s space agency, NASA which decades ago encouraged the growth of commercial space firms by switching from “cost-plus” contracts for developing rockets to buying fixed-price launch services, a policy that let Mr Musk’s SpaceX flourish. The agency has awarded contracts to three rocket startups. Mergers, such as the proposed tie-up of three of Europe’s biggest satellite-making businesses, could follow. But can Europe create a firm big enough to compete globally without reducing competition at home?
欧洲的第二大优先任务应是打造一个与马斯克的“星链”抗衡的系统，且不应采取推高价格、扼杀创新的政策。部分由英国和法国政府持股的OneWeb公司已提供类似“星链”的部分服务。欧盟正推进“IRIS 2”项目，投资160亿欧元部署348颗卫星，为政府和武装部队提供安全通信。然而，即便该项目也饱受碎片化和重复建设之苦。德国计划斥资约100亿欧元建设一个由100颗军用通信卫星组成的星座，而法国和英国也在投资各自的小型计划。各方若能整合对卫星服务的需求，将更为明智。
Europe’s second priority should be to create a rival to Mr Musk’s Starlink, and to do so without policies that drive up prices and stifle innovation. OneWeb, a firm part-owned by the British and French governments, already provides some services similar to Starlink’s. The European Union is going ahead with IRIS 2, a €16bn project to deploy 348 satellites to provide secure communications to governments and armed forces. Yet even this suffers from fragmentation and duplication. Germany plans to build a swarm of 100 military-communications satellites at a cost of about €10bn, while France and Britain are investing in their own smaller programmes. It would be wiser for all to pool their demand for satellite services.
一些政府将坚持要让此类系统处于国家控制之下。然而，通过按照通用标准建造卫星，使其具备互操作性，可以满足这些担忧。各国或集团可以拥有这些卫星，但通过将它们连接在一起，所有参与方都将受益：更大规模的卫星群意味着更强的韧性和更广的覆盖范围。这类例子已在轨道上运行，例如芬兰公司Iceye建造的小型雷达卫星。
Some governments will insist on having such systems under national control. Yet their concerns could be met by building satellites to common standards, so that they are interoperable. Countries or blocs could own these, but by linking them together, all would benefit: larger fleets would mean more resilience and greater coverage. Examples of this are already in orbit, such as small radar satellites built by Iceye, a Finnish firm.
该公司为客户提供“联邦模式”，客户可自行决定共享多少情报，并协调卫星的关注重点。这种做法应当鼓励欧洲以外志同道合的中等强国，如加拿大、日本和韩国，也开展合作。
It offers customers a “federated model”, in which they can choose how much to share intelligence and co-ordinate where their satellites focus. Such an approach should encourage like-minded middle powers beyond Europe, such as Canada, Japan and South Korea, to co-operate too.
欧洲无需止步于此。欧洲建设自身空间能力并与美国共享得越多，就越能令人信服地证明民主国家联盟的价值。如果是这样，尽管特朗普先生的本能反应如何，美国若要胁迫盟友，将面临巨大损失。
Europe need not stop there. The more it builds up its own space capabilities and shares them with America, the more convincingly it can show that an alliance of democracies is valuable. If so, despite Mr Trump’s instincts, America would have much to lose by holding its allies to ransom.