在过去800年的大部分时间里，德国士兵的出现都让立陶宛人心生恐惧。如今，作为一个与俄罗斯接壤的小波罗的海国家，立陶宛乐于接待一支永久部署的德国装甲旅。
FOR MOST of the past 800 years, the sight of German soldiers inspired dread in Lithuanian hearts. Today, as a small Baltic state with Russia as a direct neighbour, Lithuania is happy to host a permanently deployed German armoured brigade.
俄罗斯总统普京的侵略行径，以及其美国对应人物唐纳德·特朗普那种强权即公理的冷酷态度，不仅打乱了欧洲对力量的判断，也改变了这个大陆的恐惧平衡。2029年，作为欧洲最大的国家，德国计划将国内生产总值（GDP）的3.5%，即1620亿欧元用于国防开支。这超过了英国和法国去年国防开支的总和。许多邻国非但没有因德国重整军备而感到惊恐，反而正指望着它。
The aggression of Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, and the might-makes-right callousness of his American counterpart, Donald Trump, have not only scrambled Europe’s calculations about power, but also the continent’s balance of fear. In 2029 Germany, Europe’s largest country, plans to spend 3.5% of GDP, or €162bn, on defence. That is more than the combined defence spending of Britain and France last year. Far from being alarmed by German rearmament, many neighbours are counting on it.
直白地说，在国防投入不足持续了几十年后，主流欧洲领导人极其恐惧：在该地区尚未具备足以自行遏制俄罗斯的实力之前，就被美国抛弃。这种恐惧在普京2022年全面入侵乌克兰后加剧。2024年特朗普连任后，他明确表现出对乌克兰及其在北约和欧盟盟友的蔑视，并倾向于以有利于俄罗斯的条件结束乌克兰战争，这让欧洲领导人的恐惧升级为近乎恐慌。
Put bluntly, after decades of underinvestment in defence, mainstream European leaders have a horror of being abandoned by America before the region is strong enough to deter Russia on its own. Their fears mounted after Mr Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. They turned to near-panic after Mr Trump was re-elected in 2024, and he made clear his scorn for Ukraine and its allies in NATO and the European Union, and his preference for ending the Ukrainian war on terms favourable to Russia.
欧洲领导人大体一致认为，有必要支持乌克兰，并为美国充当北约“最后手段的离岸保护者”这一角色（充其量只能扮演这一角色）做好准备。这一共同任务帮助英国修复了与那些认真对待国防的盟友的关系，包括拥有核武器的法国、大手笔投入国防的德国，以及乌克兰在北欧和东欧最忠诚的支持者。共同的敌人让脱欧纠纷显得微不足道。
European leaders broadly agree on the need to support Ukraine and prepare for America to become, at best, NATO’s offshore protector of last resort. That shared task helped Britain repair ties with allies that take defence seriously, including nuclear-armed France, big-spending Germany, and Ukraine’s most loyal supporters in northern and eastern Europe. A common foe puts Brexit squabbles in perspective.
恐惧的平衡在德国也发生了变化，那里的公众不得不克服对军事力量的不安。尽管冷战时期的西德维持着北约最大的军队之一，但政客们允许国民沉溺于一种舒适的幻想，将1989年后的德国描绘成一个以通商为念、爱好和平、对所有人友好的国家。一些左翼人士把德国视为某种正在戒除军国主义瘾的瘾君子，一旦让它沾染一点火药味，它可能就会大发作一场，醒来时头痛欲裂，却发现自己再次占领了卢森堡。
The balance of fear has changed, too, in Germany, where the public had to overcome its unease about military might. Though cold-war West Germany maintained one of NATO’s largest armies, politicians allowed citizens to indulge in a comfortable fantasy, portraying post-1989 Germany as a commerce-minded, pacifist friend to all. Some on the left treated Germany as something like a recovering addict to militarism, which if allowed even a sniff of gunpowder might go on a terrible bender before waking with a headache to discover it had occupied Luxembourg, once again.
这种焦虑是由普京先生，尤其是特朗普先生治愈的。2022年乌克兰遭入侵后，德国国防开支开始认真增长，激发了时任总理朔尔茨所谓的“Zeitenwende”，即“历史转折点”。2024年后，随着“美国优先”总统回归，开支激增。
Such angst was cured by Mr Putin and above all by Mr Trump. German defence spending grew in earnest after Ukraine’s invasion in 2022, inspiring what Germany’s then-chancellor, Olaf Scholz, called a Zeitenwende, or “turning point”. Spending surged after 2024 and the return of an America-First president.
然而，欧洲团结比表面看起来更脆弱。未来12个月，西班牙、法国、波兰和意大利将举行选举。在几种情况下，民族主义右翼政党有望掌权。一些右翼民粹主义者有同情俄罗斯的历史，包括法国总统大选领跑者玛丽娜·勒庞，以及意大利前将军、仰慕俄罗斯的罗伯托·万纳奇，他正从右翼向意大利保守派总理梅洛尼发起挑战。
European unity is, however, more fragile than it appears. Over the next 12 months, elections will be held in Spain, France, Poland and Italy. In several cases, parties on the nationalist right are poised for power. Some right-wing populists have histories of sympathising with Russia, including Marine Le Pen, front-runner in the French presidential contest, and Roberto Vannacci, a former general and Russia-admirer challenging Italy’s conservative prime minister, Giorgia Meloni, from her right.
如果波兰政客们在一件事上达成一致，那就是痛恨俄罗斯。尽管如此，一些波兰保守派将乌克兰描绘成贪得无厌、忘恩负义，且迟迟不承认二战期间乌克兰人对波兰人所犯罪行的国家。他们咆哮着说，对乌援助应附带条件。最重要的是，民族主义右翼团结在反对更深层次的欧洲一体化上，即便在亲欧盟的西班牙，沃克斯党也可能进入政府。
If Poland’s feuding politicians agree on one thing it is on loathing Russia. Still, some Polish conservatives cast Ukraine as needy, ungrateful and too slow to acknowledge crimes committed by Ukrainians against Poles during the second world war. Aid for Ukraine should come with conditions, they growl. Above all, the nationalist right is united in opposing deeper European integration, even in pro-EU Spain, where the Vox party may enter government.
得意洋洋的勒庞女士预测，一年的选举将把欧盟从一个想成为超级国家的实体，变成一个“民族的欧洲”。
An exultant Ms Le Pen has predicted that a year of elections will transform the EU from a would-be superstate into a “Europe of nations”.
遗憾的是，一股民族主义浪潮也可能使欧洲的重整军备计划脱轨。为了避免令邻国感到恐惧，德国只有将其财政和军事实力置于北约和欧洲的服务之下，才能发展其武装部队和国防工业，这是新书《德国重整军备：战争的回归与幻想的终结》作者莉亚娜·菲克斯的观点。实际上，成为一股“欧洲”力量，意味着在法德同盟框架内行动，自1945年以来德国便将其力量束缚于此。
Alas, a nationalist wave could also derail Europe’s rearmament. To avoid frightening its neighbours, Germany can only grow its armed forces and defence industries if it puts its fiscal and military might at the service of NATO and Europe, argues Liana Fix, the author of a new book, “Germany Rearmed: The Return of War and the End of Illusions”. To be a “European” power means, in effect, to act within the Franco-German alliance in which Germany has bound its strength since 1945.
但这制造了一个两难困境。菲克斯担心欧洲会分裂为一个东北部集团——包括波罗的海三国、英国、北欧国家和波兰，它们仍寻求遏制俄罗斯——以及一个地中海集团，由南方政府组成，它们准备安抚普京、购买其石油和天然气，并将安全开支集中在加强边境以抵御来自贫困国家的移民。菲克斯写道，德国有国家利益保障波兰和波罗的海三国作为抵御俄罗斯的缓冲地带。但如果法国不愿加入北方集团，德国的国家利益和欧洲利益就会发生冲突。
But that creates a dilemma. Ms Fix fears a division of Europe into a north-eastern bloc, including the Baltic states, Britain, Nordic countries and Poland, which still seeks to deter Russia, and a Mediterranean bloc of southern governments ready to appease Mr Putin, to buy his oil and gas and to focus security spending on hardening borders against poor-world migrants. Germany would have a national interest in securing Poland and the Baltics as a buffer against Russia, Ms Fix writes. But if France does not want to join a northern bloc, Germany’s national and European interests would be at odds.
即将到来的普京安抚者合唱团 确实，随着勒庞嗅到胜利的气息，她已收敛了此前亲普京的言论。她将自己塑造成戴高乐的继承人，承诺维持强大的武装力量。但至少，她那咄咄逼人、法国优先的工业支出做法可能使多国国防项目脱轨。在最坏的情况下，欧洲将得出结论：危机时刻无法依赖法国。
The coming chorus of Putin appeasers True, as Ms Le Pen scents victory, she has moderated her formerly Putin-friendly rhetoric. Casting herself as an heir to Charles de Gaulle, she pledges to maintain strong armed forces. But at a minimum her sharp-elbowed, France-first approach to industrial spending could derail multinational defence projects. At worst, Europe will conclude it cannot rely on France in a crisis.
特朗普政府的角色既无益又前后矛盾。特朗普继续施压欧洲人增加国防开支。与此同时，他寻求与普京缓和关系，并大声支持欧洲民族主义右翼的亲俄政党，其中包括德国最大的在野党、亲普京且拒不支持乌克兰的“德国另类选择党”。但如果欧洲无需威慑俄罗斯，就不清楚特朗普为何认为欧洲需要重整军备：欧洲几乎不可能去应对中国。
The Trump administration’s role is both unhelpful and incoherent. Mr Trump continues to push Europeans to spend more on defence. At the same time, he seeks detente with Mr Putin and offers noisy support to pro-Russian parties on Europe’s nationalist right, including Germany’s largest opposition party, the Putin-friendly, Ukraine-spurning Alternative for Germany. But if Europe has no need to deter Russia, it is unclear why Mr Trump thinks it needs to rearm: the continent is hardly about to take on China.
欧洲需要从特朗普时代吸取正确的教训。“让美国再次伟大”带来的冲击让欧洲人，在德国的带领下，终于认真对待自身安全。要完成这一任务，欧洲现在必须摒弃特朗普式的民粹民族主义，因为那可能毁掉这一工程。除此之外的任何做法都将是一个可怕的错误。
Europe needs to learn the right lessons from the Trump era. The MAGA shock made Europeans, led by Germany, serious about their own security, at long last. To complete the task, Europe must now shun Trump-style populist nationalism, which risks wrecking that project. Anything else would be a fearful blunder.