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伊朗新任最高领袖能否在幕后促成和平?Can Iran’s new supreme leader make peace from behind the scenes?

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2026年11月4日,伊朗德黑兰,一名伊朗女子在前美国大使馆大楼前参加纪念美国大使馆被占领47周年的反美集会,手中举着伊朗最高领袖阿亚图拉穆杰塔巴·哈梅内伊的画像。[阿贝丁·塔赫尔肯纳雷/欧洲新闻图片社]An Iranian woman as holds a picture of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei while taking part in an anti-US rally marking the 47th anniversary of the US Embassy takeover, in front of the former US embassy building in Tehran, Iran, on November 4, 2026. [Abedin Taherkenareh/EPA]

伊朗新任最高领袖穆杰塔巴·哈梅内伊在不公开露面、也不让人听到其声音的情况下行使权力。自3月接替其父以来,他一直通过书面声明和法令治国,而有关他会见高级官员的报道则让人得以一窥他如何行使权力。

Iran’s new supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, is exercising power without appearing in public or allowing his voice to be heard. Since succeeding his father in March, he has governed through written statements and decrees, while reports of his meetings with senior officials offer a glimpse into how he exercises power.

5月和8月宣布的会面似乎主要是为了向伊朗人保证,他们的新领袖仍然在世并在行使权威。但10月11天内宣布的四次会面——涉及伊朗议会、司法和国家安全机构负责人以及高级军事指挥官——则暗示了更多东西:一套新的决策体系正在成形。

The meetings announced in May and August appeared intended primarily to reassure Iranians that their new leader was alive and exercising authority. But a series of four meetings announced within 11 days in October, involving the heads of Iran’s parliament, judiciary and national security establishment, as well as senior military commanders, suggests something more: a new system of decision-making taking shape.

这些会面举行之际,德黑兰正在权衡是在谈判与同美国和以色列重新对抗之间作何选择。它们也让人联想到2015年核协议达成前的磋商。问题在于,伊朗的新领导层是否正在为一项同样重大的决定做准备,以及这套体系是否有能力作出这样的决定。

The meetings come as Tehran weighs its options between negotiations and renewed confrontation with the United States and Israel. They also invite comparisons with the consultations that preceded the 2015 nuclear agreement. The question is whether Iran’s new leadership is preparing for a similarly consequential decision, and whether this system is capable of making one.

新哈梅内伊主义近37年来,阿里·哈梅内伊的统治建立在他个人直接在场的基础上:发表划定红线的讲话,与指挥官、政治精英和普通伊朗人公开会面。他的儿子则在不同的情况下上台。据路透社援引与其关系密切的消息人士称,他在2月28日导致其父身亡的袭击中受伤,并被告知不要露面或发布音频录音,以免被追踪。

The new Khameneism For nearly 37 years, Ali Khamenei’s rule rested on his direct personal presence: speeches setting red lines, public meetings with commanders, political elites and ordinary Iranians. His son came to power in different circumstances. Injured in the February 28 strike that killed his father, he was advised, according to sources close to him quoted by Reuters, not to appear or release audio recordings for fear of being tracked.

他的统治通过重建机构的法令、经由一个由可信官员组成的狭窄圈子传达的决定,以及以他人的证词代替个人露面而逐渐成形。

His rule has taken shape through decrees rebuilding institutions, decisions channelled through a narrow circle of trusted officials, and the testimony of others in place of personal appearances.

10月的会晤是在任命接替在战争中丧生的军事和安全指挥官之后进行的。今年8月,哈梅内伊任命其军事顾问穆赫辛·雷扎伊为他在最高国家安全委员会的代表;雷扎伊后来成为该委员会秘书。随后有六项军事任命,包括阿里·阿卜杜拉希出任武装力量总参谋长、艾哈迈德·瓦希迪出任伊斯兰革命卫队司令、阿里·阿兹马伊出任伊斯兰革命卫队海军司令。阿卜杜拉希还受命完成总参谋部与哈塔姆·安比亚中央司令部的合并。

The October meetings followed appointments to replace military and security commanders killed in the war. In August, Khamenei appointed his military adviser, Mohsen Rezaei, as his representative on the Supreme National Security Council; Rezaei later became its secretary. Six military appointments followed, including Ali Abdollahi as chief of the Armed Forces General Staff, Ahmad Vahidi as commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Ali Azmaei as IRGC Navy commander. Abdollahi was also instructed to complete the merger of the General Staff with Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters.

哈梅内伊据报一系列会晤的顺序颇具揭示性。5月宣布的与总统马苏德·佩泽希齐扬以及时任哈塔姆·安比亚司令阿卜杜拉希的会晤,以及8月宣布的另一次与佩泽希齐扬的会晤,主要作用是让伊朗人放心,新领导人仍然在世并在履行职责。10月的会晤似乎构成了一轮系统性磋商,从宪制机构一直延伸到武装部队。

The sequence of Khamenei’s reported meetings is revealing. Those announced in May with President Masoud Pezeshkian and Abdollahi, then head of Khatam al-Anbiya, and another with Pezeshkian announced in August, served chiefly to reassure Iranians that the new leader was alive and exercising his duties. October’s meetings appear to have constituted a systematic round of consultations reaching from constitutional institutions to the armed forces.

在10月31日宣布的、他与自己重组后的军方领导层的首次据报会晤中,阿卜杜拉希、陆军司令阿米尔·哈塔米和瓦希迪据报向哈梅内伊汇报了在海湾、霍尔木兹海峡和阿曼海的军事战备情况。

At his first reported meeting with the military leadership he had reconstituted, announced on October 31, Abdollahi, army commander Amir Hatami and Vahidi reportedly briefed Khamenei on military readiness in the Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz and the Sea of Oman.

因此,伊朗似乎正从重建转向运作:激活一套决策体系,而不仅仅是确立领导人的存在。

Iran thus appears to be moving from reconstruction to operation: activating a decision-making system rather than merely establishing the leader’s presence.

这些磋商与密集的调解同时展开,内部磋商的每一阶段都紧随一次外部外交进展。

These consultations unfolded alongside intensive mediation, with each stage of internal consultation following an external diplomatic development.

10月20日,巴基斯坦陆军参谋长、元帅阿西姆·穆尼尔携带一份卡塔尔-巴基斯坦折中提案抵达德黑兰。据阿拉伯媒体报道,该提案设想以未经通报的核设施核查为交换,伊朗获得其在卡塔尔被冻结资金的利息收入。次日,哈梅内伊会见伊朗首席谈判代表穆罕默德·巴盖尔·卡利巴夫的消息被对外宣布。

On October 20, Pakistan’s army chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, carried a Qatari-Pakistani compromise proposal to Tehran. According to Arab media reports, it envisaged unannounced inspections of nuclear facilities in exchange for Iran receiving the interest on its frozen funds in Qatar. Khamenei’s meeting with Mohammed Bagher Ghalibaf, Iran’s chief negotiator, was announced the following day.

10月26日,穆尼尔偕同沙特国防部长哈立德·本·萨勒曼·阿勒沙特王子及土耳其情报局局长易卜拉欣·卡林再次抵达。会谈达成共识,认为地区安全乃地区国家自身之责任。雷扎伊亦宣布,德黑兰已向华盛顿提交一份关于霍尔木兹海峡的提案,并设定七天期限。次日,哈梅内伊会见雷扎伊的消息被宣布,后者此前收到美国副总统万斯的信函。

On October 26, Munir returned with Saudi Defence Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman Al Saud and Turkish intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalin. Their discussions produced an understanding that regional security was the responsibility of the region’s own states. Rezaei also announced that Tehran had sent Washington a proposal concerning the Strait of Hormuz with a seven-day deadline. Khamenei’s meeting with Rezaei, who had received a letter from US Vice President JD Vance, was announced the next day.

10月30日,在白宫协调下,卡塔尔调解人在德黑兰进行了12小时会谈,此前美国特使汤姆·巴拉克曾表示初步谅解即将达成。次日,哈梅内伊会见军方指挥官的消息被宣布。这一时间节点表明,内部磋商已成为外部调解的另一面。

On October 30, Qatari mediators held 12 hours of talks in Tehran, coordinated with the White House, after US envoy Tom Barrack suggested an initial understanding was close. Khamenei’s meeting with military commanders was announced the following day. This timing suggests that internal consultation has become the other side of external mediation.

这些会议释放的信号传递出两条并行而非相互矛盾的信息。在与雷扎伊的会见中,哈梅内伊坚持伊朗结束战争的条件,摆脱“非战非和”这一消耗性状态,并掌控霍尔木兹海峡。在对指挥官的指示中,他要求对任何威胁立即实施不设地理界限的报复,扩大美以打击目标清单,并强调由伊朗决定任何重新爆发的对抗何时结束。

The statements from these meetings carry two parallel, not contradictory, messages. In the meeting with Rezaei, Khamenei insisted on Iran’s conditions for ending the war, escaping the debilitating state of “neither war nor peace” and managing the Strait of Hormuz. In his instructions to the commanders, he demanded immediate retaliation against any threat without geographical limits, an expanded list of US and Israeli targets, and emphasised that Iran would decide when any renewed confrontation ended.

对团结的反复呼吁,显示出对政治精英内部在战争与谈判问题上存在相互竞争观点的清醒认识。

Repeated appeals for unity suggest an awareness of competing views within the political elite over war and negotiations.

然而,这些会议似乎只是界定了伊朗选择的上下限,而非敲定某一具体路径:一端是拒绝“无战无和”这种无法忍受的延续;另一端则是若袭击重启,准备扩大战争。在这两个极限之间,存在着通过卡利巴夫、礼萨伊及调解人推动的、按伊朗条件达成的协议,或者是在强化国内阵线的同时继续相互施压。

Yet the meetings appear to have defined the upper and lower limits of Iran’s choices, rather than settled on a particular course: at one end, rejecting an intolerable continuation of “neither war nor peace”; at the other, preparing to widen the war if attacks resume. Between these limits lie a settlement on Iranian terms, pursued through Ghalibaf, Rezaei and the mediators, or continued mutual pressure while strengthening the domestic front.

分歧依然巨大。华盛顿希望在谈判恢复前获得核让步;德黑兰则首先要求解除海上封锁、释放冻结资产并恢复石油出口。

The gap remains wide. Washington wants nuclear concessions before negotiations resume; Tehran first wants the naval blockade lifted, frozen assets released and oil exports restored.

值得注意的是,哈梅内伊提到的是由“国家官员设定的条件”,而非他本人设定。这种措辞将责任分散给各个机构,并为他日后接受或否认最终结果留出了空间。

Significantly, Khamenei spoke of conditions “set by the country’s officials”, not by himself. The wording distributes responsibility among institutions and preserves room for him to embrace or disown an eventual outcome.

与2015年的对比 这里隐约可见2015年7月14日达成核协议前漫长磋商的回响。

The comparison with 2015 There are echoes here of the lengthy consultations before the nuclear agreement of July 14, 2015.

在阿里·哈梅内伊批准下,马斯喀特开启了一个秘密渠道。2013年9月17日,他对伊斯兰革命卫队指挥官谈及“英雄般的灵活性”,在谈判前安抚军方。2015年6月,他划定了红线,10月发布了一份有条件批准的信函。核问题档案的责任从最高国家安全委员会移交给穆罕默德·贾瓦德·扎里夫领导的外交部,标志着政治决策已成定局。

A secret channel in Muscat opened with Ali Khamenei’s approval. On September 17, 2013, he spoke to IRGC commanders of “heroic flexibility”, reassuring the military before negotiations. In June 2015, he set out his red lines, and in October he issued a letter of conditional approval. Responsibility for the nuclear file passed from the Supreme National Security Council to the Foreign Ministry under Mohammad Javad Zarif, a sign that the political decision had been made.

相似之处清晰可见:最高领袖划定红线,将谈判授权给信任的人物,并在重大转向前让军方参与进程。

The resemblance is clear: a supreme leader establishes red lines, delegates negotiations to trusted figures and brings the military into the process before a major shift.

差异则更为深刻。早前的进程在制裁而非战争状态下持续了约两年。如今的磋商在武装对抗、海上封锁以及临近11月3日美国中期选举的背景下,被压缩在了11天内。

The differences are deeper. The earlier process lasted around two years under sanctions, not war. Today’s consultations were compressed into 11 days amid armed confrontation, a naval blockade and the approaching November 3 US midterm elections.

阿里·哈梅内伊以自己的声音发声;其子则通过书面声明发声。早期谈判由外交官主导;如今,两位具有伊斯兰革命卫队背景的人物——卡利巴夫和礼萨伊——扮演核心角色。早期的幕后渠道经由阿曼,而今调解涉及卡塔尔以及《麦加协议》签署国,该协议于8月7日签署。

Ali Khamenei spoke in his own voice; his son speaks through written statements. Diplomats led the earlier negotiations; now two figures with IRGC backgrounds, Ghalibaf and Rezaei, play central roles. Where the earlier backchannel ran through Oman, today mediation involves Qatar and the countries of the Mecca Agreement, signed on August 7.

最重要的是,“英雄式的灵活”曾被呈现给指挥官们,作为达成协议的准备。如今,和解条件与一份扩充的军事目标清单并列。

Above all, “heroic flexibility” was presented to commanders as preparation for an agreement. Today, conditions for a settlement sit alongside an expanded list of military targets.

信任赤字也进一步加深。如果说1979年的遗产塑造了华盛顿对德黑兰的看法,2018年美国退出核协议塑造了德黑兰对华盛顿的看法,那么2025年6月和2026年2月的战争又增添了一层任何技术性协议都难以轻易克服的不信任。

The deficit of trust has also deepened. If the legacy of 1979 shaped Washington’s view of Tehran, and the US withdrawal from the nuclear agreement in 2018 shaped Tehran’s view of Washington, the wars of June 2025 and February 2026 have added a layer of mistrust that no technical agreement can easily overcome.

因此,这些磋商在形式上类似于2013年,功能上却截然不同。当时,它们为谈判铺路;现在,它们为在谈判与升级之间做选择做准备。

The consultations thus resemble those of 2013 in form but not function. Then, they prepared the ground for negotiations; now, they prepare for a choice between negotiation and escalation.

据报七次会晤表明,新哈梅内伊主义可能不仅仅是填补领导真空的尝试。其决策机制似乎已就位并运转,尽管最高领袖的存在只能通过他人来确证。

The seven reported meetings suggest that the new Khameneism may be more than an attempt to fill a leadership vacuum. Its decision-making machinery appears to be in place and functioning, even though the supreme leader’s presence can be established only through others.

然而,每一个旨在消除疑虑的公告都产生了更多疑虑,且没有照片,也没有关于会晤确切时间地点的细节。决策的合法性在一定程度上仍取决于领袖现身的合法性。

Yet every announcement intended to dispel doubts produces more of them, without photographs or details of exactly when and where the meetings took place. The legitimacy of decisions remains partly dependent on the legitimacy of the leader’s presence.

这一体系拥有新指挥官,并发出妥协与威慑的平行信息,能否做出如2015年那般影响深远的决策?战争已将灵活的政治成本推高,超出了一个尚未公开露面的领袖所能承受的范围。

Can this system, with its new commanders and parallel messages of compromise and deterrence, make a decision as consequential as the one taken in 2015, when war has raised the political cost of flexibility beyond what a leader who has yet to appear publicly may be able to bear?

父亲曾亲眼目睹并被众人看见;儿子则通过背书和隔着保护屏障的影响力来彰显存在感。

The father saw and was seen; the son makes his presence felt through endorsements and influence from behind protective barriers.

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