上周，美国选民给特朗普总统的“让美国再次伟大”议程以沉重打击。此后，特朗普的反应摇摆不定：一方面表示“民主党干得不错”，并称将与其合作；另一方面又扬言要动用其“巨大权力”否决民主党的政策。
Last week, America delivered a resounding defeat to President Trump’s MAGA agenda. Trump has since vacillated in response to the results, saying that “the Democrats did a good job” and that he will work with them, while also threatening to use his “tremendous powers” to veto Democratic policies.
当其政党控制国会时，特朗普已展现出他愿意做什么、如何曲解规则。但这还远未见底。
Trump has shown us what he’s willing to do and how he bends the rules when his party controls Congress. But we ain’t seen nothing yet.
历史先例和传统政治智慧认为，失去对国会的控制将使特朗普沦为跛脚鸭总统，主持一个分裂的政府，蒙受极大耻辱。但这不大可能成为特朗普的命运。
Historical precedent and conventional political wisdom say that Trump losing control of Congress will relegate him to the ultimate ignominy of being a lame-duck president presiding over a divided government. That’s unlikely to be Trump’s fate.
反直觉的是，在中期选举中失利反而可能让特朗普保持大众关注度，使他免于总统通常会经历的逐渐淡出大众视野的命运。虽然他将从国会山获得越来越少的配合，但他将相对摆脱执政的负担，得以自由追求他极度渴望的关注。对特朗普而言，获取关注最稳妥的方式就是挑起冲突。中期选举失利不会让特朗普变弱——只会让他更具攻击性。
Counterintuitively, losing the midterms may keep Trump popularly relevant and save him from the usual presidential fade into oblivion. While he’ll get less and less cooperation from Capitol Hill, he’ll be relatively released from the burdens of governing and free to pursue the attention that he so desperately craves. For Trump, the surest way to get that attention is to pick a fight. Losing the midterms won’t make Trump weaker — it will only make him more aggressive.
部分原因在于性格：执政很难，特朗普一直更习惯站在集会讲台上，而非坐在“决心桌”后。这一偏好在本届任期内得到更多纵容：忠诚者取代了第一届政府中的“屋里的成年人”，而且特朗普面前没有另一次大选——至少没有宪法规定的大选——来约束他。
Part of the reason is temperament: Governing is hard, and Trump has always been more at home at the rally podium than behind the Resolute Desk. That preference has been indulged more often this term: loyalists have replaced the first administration’s “adults in the room,” and Trump doesn’t have another election ahead of him — at least, not a constitutional one — to moderate him.
政府机构及其内部的团体（如“及时行乐核心小组”，由摆脱连任考量的参议员组成）迄今在一定程度上制约了特朗普。例如，今年早些时候，参议员汤姆·蒂利斯（共和党-北卡罗来纳州）阻挠新任美联储主席的确认，直到特朗普放弃对杰罗姆·鲍威尔的惩罚性调查。
Government institutions and groups within those institutions like the YOLO Caucus, made up of senators freed from reelection considerations, have somewhat constrained Trump thus far. Earlier this year, for instance, Sen. Thom Tillis (R-N.C.) blocked the confirmation of a new Fed chair until Trump dropped his punitive investigation of Jerome Powell.
特朗普始终有可能妥协退让，顺应民主党传统政策。但既然在其剩余任期内无望对民主党控制的国会施加实质性控制，更有可能的是，特朗普很快将变得基本不受约束——如果你愿意这么叫，就是一位“只活一次”式的总统。
There is always the possibility that Trump will roll over and go along with traditionally Democratic policies. But with no hope of exerting substantive control over a Democratic Congress for the remainder of his time in office, it is more likely that Trump will soon become essentially unfettered — a YOLO president, if you will.
迄今为止，友好的立法部门仅在边缘上对其形成制约。即便本党掌控国会，特朗普依然偏爱“闯入瓷器店的公牛”式做法。当这种做法受阻时，他便直接无视国会，只有在法律模糊地带无法再推进时，才给予象征性的、有限的尊重。
Thus far, a friendly legislative branch has constrained him only at the margins. Even with his party in control, Trump prefers the bull-in-a-china-shop approach. And when that approach is stymied, he has waded into defying Congress outright, offering only token, narrow deference when the legal ambiguity can’t be pushed any further.
2月，特朗普在未获国会授权的情况下发动了对伊朗的战争。当《战争权力决议》规定的60天期限到来时，其政府辩称4月的停火已终止计时。7月停火破裂后，他发出通知称重启打击属于独立行动，从而重新开始计时。
In February, Trump launched the Iran war without congressional authorization. When the 60-day War Powers Resolution deadline arrived, his administration argued that an April ceasefire had ended the clock. When the ceasefire collapsed in July, he sent a notice calling the renewed strikes a separate operation, restarting the clock.
连续两年，白宫通过让资金在国会议员得以就请求进行表决前过期，取消了国会拨付的款项。政府问责局已两次认定这种“口袋撤销”属于违法。
For two straight years, the White House has canceled money that Congress appropriated by letting the funds expire before lawmakers could vote on the request. The Government Accountability Office has twice found this type of “pocket rescission” illegal.
我们也见识过立法部门不那么友好时会发生什么。特朗普曾一度失去众议院控制权，随后两年带来了当时史上最长的政府停摆、为花费国会拒绝授权的边境墙资金而宣布国家紧急状态，以及两次弹劾。
We also have seen what happens when the legislature isn’t so friendly. Trump lost the House once before, and the two years that followed gave us the then-longest-ever government shutdown, a national emergency declaration to spend border wall money Congress refused to authorize, and two impeachments.
这届民主党控制的国会将彻底扼杀他的立法优先事项通过的任何可能。掌握每一项拨款法案的财政大权，它也将成为特朗普的有力对照，并很可能会极大地刺激他动用行政命令——或者直接无视国会。对特朗普最有利的是，这将给他一个看似合理、且有总统先例可循的理由：立法机构陷入僵局，所以他必须单独行动，使用贝拉克·奥巴马在议员们阻挠他时提出的同样“笔和电话”论点。
This Democratic Congress will end any chance of his legislative priorities passing. Holding the purse strings on every spending bill, it will also provide a useful foil to Trump and will likely supercharge his use of executive orders — or straight-up defiance of Congress. Most usefully for Trump, it will give him a seemingly reasonable justification with presidential precedent: The legislature is gridlocked, so he has to act alone, using the same “pen and phone” argument Barack Obama made when lawmakers stalled him.
未来两年民主党的传票和拨款监督很可能会让人尴尬且痛苦，但正如边境墙“紧急状态”所显示的，它们的实际效果将有限。弹劾很可能在某个时候被提上日程。但如果没有定罪并将特朗普免职所需的67票，第三次弹劾的损害将不大于前两次——而且这将给他在每次集会上高呼的重大不满提供素材。
The next two years of Democrats’ subpoenas and appropriations oversight will likely be embarrassing and painful, but as the border wall “emergency” showed, they’ll have limited actual effect. Impeachment will likely be on the docket at some point. But without the requisite 67 votes to convict and remove Trump from office, a third impeachment will be no more damaging than the first two — and it will give him a major grievance to trumpet at every rally.
随着政策成就无望，不满将成为特朗普保持大众关注度、控制其忠实支持者、并作为事业殉道者沉浸在基本盘崇拜中的唯一选择。没有愿意配合的立法伙伴默许他重塑美国和总统角色的努力，特朗普将被逼入绝境，在他看来唯一的出路就是比以往更顽强地战斗。
With policy accomplishments off the table, grievance will be the only option for Trump to stay popularly relevant, exert control over his faithful, and bask in the adoration of his base as a martyr for the cause. Without a willing legislative partner acquiescing to his efforts to redefine America and the president’s role in it, Trump will be backed into a corner where the only option he sees is to fight harder than ever.
如果那一天到来，特朗普将处于他最有效、似乎也最自在的位置。他可以抛弃假装关心治理的必要，直接开启另一场巡演，对民主党所做的一切发泄愤怒，并打破我们国家制度和体面所剩无几的残余。
If and when that happens, Trump will be where he’s most effective and, seemingly, most comfortable. He can leave behind the need to pretend to care about governing and simply go on another tour, raging against everything Democrats do and breaking whatever vestiges are left of our national institutions and decency.
我们已经见识过特朗普在一个配合他的国会面前会做什么。现在我们即将看到，他在一个不配合他的国会面前会做什么。
We’ve already seen what Trump does with a Congress that goes along with him. Now we’re about to find out what he does with a Congress that won’t.
迈卡·艾布尔斯在《年轻保守派的良知》撰写关于外交政策和美国政治的文章。
Micah Ables writes about foreign policy and U.S. politics at Conscience of a Young Conservative.