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特朗普不会拯救乌克兰,但玛丽娜·勒庞的背叛可能更糟Trump won’t save Ukraine. But Marine Le Pen’s betrayal could be worse

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2026年11月5日,玛丽娜·勒庞在巴黎附近的一场防务贸易展上。摄影:拉斐尔·拉法格/ABACA/ShutterstockMarine Le Pen at a defence trade show, near Paris on 5 November, 2026 Photograph: Raphaël Lafargue/ABACA/Shutterstock

2026年11月5日,法国国民联盟领导人玛丽娜·勒庞在巴黎附近的一个防务展览会上。欧洲领导人急需为一位极右翼法国总统上台做准备,这位总统将切断基辅的财政生命线。

Marine Le Pen at a defence trade show, near Paris on 5 November, 2026 European leaders need urgently to prepare for a far-right French president who would cut off Kyiv’s financial lifeline urope is consumed by two debates that matter less than it thinks, while neglecting one that matters enormously.

欧洲正陷入两场自以为重要实则次要的辩论,却忽视了一场至关重要的辩论。第一场是由谁代表欧盟同俄罗斯谈判。这在很大程度上无关紧要,因为在冬季结束前,几乎没有严肃的乌克兰和平谈判前景——尽管本周阿布扎比的讨论大肆宣传。俄罗斯有强大动机在未来几个月升级战争,试图击垮乌克兰的经济和民众士气。

The first is who should represent the EU in negotiations with Russia. This is largely irrelevant because there is little prospect of serious Ukraine peace talks before the end of winter - despite the fanfare that has surrounded discussions in Abu Dhabi this week. Russia has powerful incentives to escalate the war over the coming months in an attempt to break Ukraine’s economy and civilian morale.

第二场是唐纳德·特朗普对乌克兰的政策。这比过去重要性低——不仅因为他现在受到民主党控制的国会更多制约。自2025年1月重返白宫以来,特朗普未向基辅提供任何新的美国军事援助。美国武器销售对乌克兰战争努力仍然重要,但特朗普在中东的军事干预进一步紧张了乌克兰最需要的武器供应——特别是“爱国者”拦截弹。

The second is Donald Trump’s approach to Ukraine. This matters less than it once did – and not only because he is now more constrained by a Democratic Congress. Since returning to office in January 2025, Trump has provided no new US military aid to Kyiv. American weapons sales remain important to Ukraine’s war effort, but Trump’s military interventions in the Middle East have further strained supplies of the weapons Ukraine needs most – notably Patriot interceptors.

乌克兰仍严重依赖美国的预警情报,特别是用于探测来袭的俄罗斯弹道导弹,欧洲不太可能在2030年前完全复制这一能力。但更广泛的观点成立:美国对乌克兰而言,已不如两年前那样不可或缺。

Ukraine does remain heavily dependent on US early warning intelligence particularly to detect incoming Russian ballistic missiles, a capability Europe is unlikely to replicate fully before 2030. But the broader point stands: the US is a less indispensable partner to Ukraine than it was two years ago.

欧洲领导人忽视的辩论离家门口更近:如果玛丽娜·勒庞在六个月后的法国总统选举中获胜,会发生什么?

The debate European leaders are neglecting is much closer to home: what happens if Marine Le Pen wins France’s presidential election in six month’s time?

如果勒庞当选总统,将暂停法国对乌克兰的双边援助。更具深远影响的是,她反对增加法国对欧盟预算的缴款,这可能危及欧盟层面的资金支持。勒庞威胁要否决欧盟未来七年的预算,其中包括一项拟议的1000亿欧元乌克兰援助基金。这是欧盟希望在2028年后继续在财政上支持基辅的机制。

A president Le Pen would suspend France’s bilateral aid to Ukraine. More consequentially, her opposition to increasing France’s contribution to the EU budget could jeopardise EU-wide funding. Le Pen is threatening to veto the bloc’s next seven-year budget, including a proposed €100bn facility for Ukraine. This is the mechanism through which the EU hopes to sustain Kyiv financially beyond 2028.

勒庞当选总统还可能让离前线较远的政府获得政治掩护,从而削减其对乌克兰的支持。对意大利、西班牙、希腊、奥地利、匈牙利和斯洛伐克而言,乌克兰属于较低优先级,而在明年大选后,意大利的支持可能进一步削弱。

A Le Pen presidency could also give governments further from the frontline political cover to scale back their support. For Italy, Spain, Greece, Austria, Hungary and Slovakia, Ukraine is a lower priority and Italian support could weaken further after next year’s election.

由此导致的援助双边化,可能使一小部分北欧和西欧国家独自承担重担。它们将难以弥补勒庞导致南欧和中欧大部分国家缴款减少的损失。勒庞还将威胁乌克兰的欧盟成员国前景以及欧盟对俄罗斯的制裁体制。乌克兰加入欧盟将几乎变得不可能:关键决策需要一致同意,而勒庞已反对基辅入盟。她也不会孤军奋战。尽管公开表态支持,许多欧盟政府内心对接纳乌克兰存有严重保留。

The resulting bilateralisation of aid could leave a smaller group of northern and western European countries shouldering the burden. They would struggle to compensate for the loss of contributions from much of southern and central Europe Le Pen would also threaten Ukraine’s EU membership prospects and the bloc’s sanctions regime against Russia. Ukraine’s membership of the EU would become virtually impossible: key decisions require unanimity, and Le Pen has already opposed Kyiv’s accession Nor would she be alone in her reluctance. Despite their public commitments, many EU governments harbour serious reservations about admitting Ukraine.

制裁同样脆弱。勒庞自2017年以来一直主张解除欧盟对俄罗斯的制裁。欧盟的经济制裁将于2027年7月到期续期,法国的一票否决可能使其终止。她还可能阻挠个人制裁的续期,并否决任何新的制裁方案。

Sanctions would be equally vulnerable. Le Pen has advocated lifting EU sanctions on Russia since 2017. The bloc’s economic sanctions are due for renewal in July 2027, and a French veto could bring them to an end. She could also block the renewal of sanctions against individuals and veto any new packages.

简而言之,勒庞当选总统可能会同时动摇欧洲对乌克兰支持的三大支柱:资金援助、欧盟成员资格进程以及对俄罗斯的制裁。让我们设想一下最坏的情况——由于欧洲在勒庞获胜后无法继续支撑乌克兰,基辅被迫接受莫斯科规定的条件达成和解。俄罗斯获得对其吞并顿涅茨克和卢甘斯克(甚至可能包括扎波罗热和赫尔松)的宪法承认。莫斯科还向基辅强加政治和安全条件:禁止加入北约、限制武装力量规模,以及莫斯科包装为“去纳粹化”的政治要求。

In short, a Le Pen presidency could simultaneously undermine the three pillars of Europe’s support for Ukraine: on financing, EU membership and sanctions on Russia Let us imagine for a moment the worst-case scenario – as a result of Europe’s inability to sustain Ukraine after a Le Pen victory, Kyiv is pushed into a settlement on Moscow’s terms Russia gets constitutional recognition of its annexation of Donetsk and Luhansk (and possibly even Zaporizhzhia and Kherson). Moscow also imposes political and security conditions on Kyiv: a prohibition on Nato membership, a cap on the size of its armed forces, and the political demands Moscow dresses up as “denazification”.

一名消防员在基辅地区一物流中心遭俄罗斯无人机袭击引发大火后进行灭火作业,摄于2026年11月5日。

A firefighter works to extinguish a fire at a logistics centre following a Russian drone attack in the Kyiv region, 5 November 2026.

2026年11月5日,基辅地区一处物流中心遭俄罗斯无人机袭击后起火,一名消防员正在灭火。摄影:Ukrinform/ShutterstockA firefighter works to extinguish a fire at a logistics centre following a Russian drone attack in the Kyiv region, 5 November 2026. Photograph: Ukrinform/Shutterstock

在毫无挑衅的入侵和近五年无情的俄罗斯针对平民袭击之后,乌克兰人会将该协议视为屈辱的失败。如果基辅是在华盛顿施压、部分欧洲国家支持而另一些国家反对的情况下签署,这种屈辱将更甚。

After an unprovoked invasion and almost five years of ruthless Russian attacks on civilians, Ukrainians would see the deal as a humiliating defeat. The humiliation would be greater still if Kyiv signed under pressure from Washington, with support from some parts of Europe and opposition from others.

最重要的是,该协议将是一场人道主义悲剧。割让顿巴斯剩余地区将使数万平民置于俄罗斯占领之下。他们将面临占领在其他地方意味着的命运:大规模拘留、强迫失踪和酷刑。设法撤离的其他人将增加乌克兰的境内流离失所人口。

Above all, the deal would be a humanitarian tragedy. Ceding the rest of the Donbas would leave tens of thousands of civilians under Russian occupation. They would face what occupation has meant elsewhere: mass detentions, forced disappearances and torture. Others, who manage to get evacuated, would add to Ukraine’s internally displaced population.

因为任何领土转让都需要全民公投,乌克兰总统泽连斯基将不得不举行公投,并很可能将整个协议提交表决。乌克兰人极有可能否决它,从而引发前所未有的政治危机。如果乌克兰无法继续战斗,泽连斯基将面临两个糟糕的选择:无视投票结果强行推行一个极不得人心的协议;或者辞职,留下权力真空由下一届政府来填补。

Because any transfer of territory requires a referendum, Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, would have to hold one and would probably put the whole deal on the ballot. Ukrainians would very likely reject it, opening an unprecedented political crisis. If Ukraine could no longer keep fighting, Zelenskyy would face two bad options: overrule the vote and impose a deeply unpopular deal; or resign and leave a vacuum for the next government to fill.

无论如何,抗议者大概率会涌上街头,反对派会在法庭上挑战协议,而签署协议的人将失去职位。该协议还需经议会通过,但可能被否决,因为极少数议员愿意在上面签字。如果协议改为在宪法框架外强行推行,政治将分裂成派系,一些派系誓言废除协议,另一些则坚持继续推进。

Either way, protesters would probably fill the streets, opponents would challenge the agreement in court and whoever signed it would lose office. The deal would also need to clear parliament, where it could be voted down because few MPs would want their names on it. If it were instead imposed outside the constitution, politics would splinter into factions, some vowing to scrap the settlement and others insisting on moving on.

经济恐将随之恶化。原本计划为重建提供资金的捐助方和投资者会撤回,数十亿美元的潜在交易将搁置。俄罗斯再次入侵的威胁和政治动荡将使重建停滞。数百万乌克兰人将随后西行,与家人团聚,逃离一个无法提供切实安全保障的协议,留下经济满目疮痍。与此同时,许多士兵将拒绝放下武器,在被割让的顿巴斯地区继续游击战。这些部队将难以管控,可能给莫斯科提供借口,重启全面战争。

The economy is likely to follow. Donors and investors who had planned to fund reconstruction would pull back, leaving billions in potential deals on the table. The threat of Russia’s re-invasion and political instability would stall reconstruction. Millions more Ukrainians would then head west to rejoin their families, escaping a deal that fails to provide proper security guarantees and leaving economic devastation behind. At the same time, many soldiers would refuse to lay down their arms and keep up a guerrilla war in the ceded parts of Donbas. These units would be hard to rein in, possibly handing Moscow a pretext to resume full-scale fighting.

随着时间的推移,被背叛的感觉必将演变成对西方伙伴和基辅战时精英的共同怨恨。最危险的是,俄罗斯很可能利用喘息期重振经济和军力。弗拉基米尔·普京很快可能会感到受到诱惑,利用乌克兰的混乱再次入侵。按俄罗斯条款达成的协议所构建的脆弱安全框架将使这成为可能。欧洲将在其边境面对一个破碎、怨愤且重装备的国家,而在其身后则是一个气焰嚣张的俄罗斯。

Over time, the sense of betrayal is bound to harden into resentment of western partners and Kyiv’s wartime elites alike. Most dangerous of all, Russia would probably use the pause to rebuild its economy and army. Soon, Vladimir Putin may feel tempted to exploit Ukraine’s chaos and invade again. The weak security framework of a deal on Russia’s terms would make this possible. Europe would be left with a broken, embittered and heavily armed state on its border, and an emboldened Russia behind it.

这一切并非不可避免。乌克兰人对投降毫无意愿,数周的美国施压未能动摇民意。基辅也明白,莫斯科的条款很可能旨在制造这种动荡。只有在别无选择的情况下,乌克兰才会接受这样的协议。

None of this is inevitable. Ukrainians have shown little appetite for capitulation, and weeks of US pressure have not shifted public opinion. Kyiv also understands that Moscow’s terms are probably designed to produce exactly this kind of turmoil. Ukraine would accept such a deal only if it had no other choice.

要出现这种情况,需要多种因素同时出错:美国全面切断情报和军事支持,导致俄罗斯将前线推回;欧洲资金枯竭且无双边替代方案;以及俄罗斯在新一轮动员的支持下升级冲突。每一种因素单独出现都是可能的;但它们同时发生的可能性不大。尽管如此,这一情景应让欧盟各国首都深思。政策应建立在最坏情况的基础上,而非寄希望于勒庞上台后会像梅洛尼那样调整对乌克兰的立场。

Getting there would necessitate a combination of things going wrong at the same time: a full US cut-off of intelligence and military support that lets Russia push the front back; European funding drying up with no bilateral substitute; and a Russian escalation backed by new mobilisation. Each is possible; together, they are unlikely. Nonetheless, this scenario should give EU capitals serious pause for thought. Policy should be built on the worst-case scenario rather than wishful thinking that Le Pen, in power, will moderate her view of Ukraine, in the way that Meloni has Ukraine’s outlook is bleaker than at any point since Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022.

乌克兰的前景比2022年俄罗斯全面入侵以来的任何时候都更加黯淡。普京的战略一直是拖垮西方,在战场上无法实现的目标,通过政治手段达成。这一前景正变得更加现实——并非因为乌克兰失去了战斗意志,甚至也非由于华盛顿的退缩,而是因为明年欧洲可能发生的事情,使其成为自身击败俄罗斯战略中最薄弱的一环。

Putin’s strategy has always been to outlast the west and achieve politically what he cannot secure on the battlefield. That prospect is becoming more plausible – not because Ukraine is losing the will to fight, or even because of Washington’s retreat, but because of what may happen in Europe next year, making it the weakest link in its own strategy to defeat Russia.

穆吉塔巴·拉赫曼是欧亚集团欧洲部董事总经理,欧亚集团是一家政治风险研究和咨询公司。

Mujtaba Rahman is the managing director for Europe at Eurasia Group, a political risk research and consulting firm

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