民主党不能指望每次选举都有大规模的蓝潮“虚假划区”是政治中最难捕捉的神话怪兽。虽然许多划区导致的席位少于预期，但真正的虚假划区——即削减本应受惠党派席位的地图——在野外极少出现。然而，就像挪威水手传说中的海怪最终被证实为巨型乌贼一样，美国2026年的蓝色海啸也冲上了一张规模惊人的虚假划区。北卡罗来纳州议会绘制的国会选区图本意是选出11名共和党人和3名民主党人，实际上正朝着11比3的比例前进，却恰恰有利于民主党。
Democrats cannot count on a big blue wave every election The dummymander is the most elusive mythical beast in politics. Although plenty of gerrymanders yield fewer seats than hoped, a true dummymander—a map that reduces the seat count of the party it was drawn to favour—is rarely spotted in the wild. Yet just as the kraken of Norwegian sailors’ lore eventually surfaced as the giant squid, America’s blue tsunami of 2026 has washed up a dummymander of astonishing proportions. A congressional map that North Carolina’s state legislature drew seeking to elect 11 Republicans and three Democrats is indeed on track to deliver an 11-3 split. It just favours Democrats.
人们曾认为共和党在2025年发起的重新划区战争中获胜。该党在七个州重新绘制选区，试图在一个看似合理的情景下最大化席位：即出现一次与2006年、2008年或2018年相似规模的民主党浪潮，并在全国范围内产生同等冲击。选举之夜，显而易见这两个假设都未成立。民主党以50年来最大的差距赢得了普选票，足以抵消任何划区优势。
Republicans were thought to have won the redistricting war that they started in 2025. The party re-drew maps in seven states, seeking to maximise seats under a scenario that seemed reasonable: a Democratic wave of similar magnitude to 2006, 2008 or 2018, landing with similar force across the country. By election night, it was clear neither assumption held up. Democrats won the popular vote by the largest margin in 50 years, enough to overcome any gerrymander.
其增幅集中在西班牙裔人口众多、从2020年到2024年对唐纳德·特朗普支持度转变最剧烈的地区——这些地区的共和党划区者本以为政治重组更为持久——以及南部以黑人为主的地区。
Their gains were concentrated in heavily Hispanic areas that swung hardest towards Donald Trump from 2020 to 2024—where Republican map-makers had counted on a more durable political realignment—and in largely black parts of the South.
各选区的实际席位统计数据陆续公布，许多原本被视为共和党大幅领先的竞选最终以极小差距收场。现在几乎所有结果都已明朗，我们可以通过计算如果2024年的选区图仍然有效，各党派本应获得的席位数，来制作划区得分卡。结果显示，共和党的划区收益微乎其微。
The actual seat-by-seat tallies have trickled in slowly, as many races where Republicans were heavy favourites wound up with razor-thin margins. Now that almost all are known, we can calculate a gerrymandering scorecard by working out how each party would have fared had maps from 2024 remained in effect. We find that Republican gerrymandering gains were miniscule.
2024年总统选举，北卡罗来纳州共和党与民主党的得票差距。要看北卡罗来纳州的杰利蝾螈如何反噬自身，看看该州第一选区便知。2024年，该选区以微弱优势将一名民主党人送进国会，尽管特朗普在这里以三个百分点的优势获胜。对于2026年中期选举，共和党人看到了机会。
2024 presidential election, vote margin North Carolina Republican Democrat To see how North Carolina’s gerrymander backfired, look at the state’s first district. In 2024 it narrowly elected a Democrat to Congress, even as Mr Trump won it by three percentage points. For the midterms in 2026, Republicans saw an opening.
议员们将一些竞争激烈的地区——包括2024年投票支持卡玛拉·哈里斯的威尔逊县——划入相邻的第三选区。作为交换，他们纳入了一些倾向特朗普的沿海地区。
Legislators shifted some competitive areas—including Wilson County, which voted for Kamala Harris in 2024—into the neighbouring third district. In exchange, they brought in some Trumpy coastal areas.
按照这些新边界，特朗普本会以12个百分点的优势赢得第一选区，而非三个百分点。
Under these new boundaries, Mr Trump would have won the first district by 12 points instead of three.
在全州范围内，特朗普2024年在北卡罗来纳州仅以三个百分点的优势获胜——与旧第一选区的差距相同。但他拿下了该州14个国会选区中的11个。
Statewide, Mr Trump won North Carolina by just three points in 2024—the same margin as the old first district. But he carried 11 of the state’s 14 congressional districts.
新的、更偏红的第一选区和更偏蓝的第三选区，在政治上与北卡罗来纳州其他共和党席位相似，这些席位自早前一次不那么激进的杰利蝾螈以来未曾改动。特朗普以10至20个百分点的优势拿下了所有这些席位。民主党人在另外三个选区则取得了巨大优势。
The new, redder 1st and bluer 3rd districts are politically similar to North Carolina’s other Republican seats, which were unchanged from an earlier, less ambitious gerrymander. Mr Trump carried all of them by 10-20 points. Democrats ran up huge margins in the other three.
2026年的蓝色浪潮冲垮了这些优势。在北卡罗来纳州，民主党人在众议院选举中以15个百分点的优势获胜，突破了共和党的防线。预计民主党人将赢得特朗普领先的11个选区中的8个，包括第一选区和第三选区。
The blue wave in 2026 washed away these advantages. In North Carolina, Democrats won the House vote by 15 points, pushing past the Republican barrier. Democrats are expected to win eight of the 11 districts where Mr Trump led, including both the first and the third.
得克萨斯州的共和党人也设下了类似的陷阱。他们划出六个拉美裔人口占多数的选区，这些选区在2024年倒向特朗普，共和党希望借此巩固战果。但最终取得大幅 swing 的却是民主党。以休斯敦地区为例，划图者把足够多的共和党票仓划入第9选区，按此推算特朗普本应以20个百分点的优势拿下这个新席位。然而，民主党人莱蒂西亚·古铁雷斯却以15个百分点的优势赢下了该席位。
Republicans in Texas set up a similar trap. They created six heavily Hispanic districts that swung for Mr Trump in 2024, hoping to consolidate their gains. But it was the Democrats who got the big swings. In the Houston area, for example, map-makers brought enough Republican-voting areas into the 9th district that Mr Trump would have carried the new seat by 20 points. Nonetheless, Democrat Leticia Gutierrez won it by 15.
在全州范围内，这张本意是让共和党多拿下五个国会席位的地图，反而让民主党比2024年多拿下一个席位（尽管这次杰利蝾螈划分可能帮助共和党比在旧地图下多保住了一个席位）。在亚拉巴马州和佛罗里达州，在新地图下成为目标的民主党现任议员同样成功连任，而他们所在的选区特朗普本可以以高达18个百分点的优势获胜。
Statewide, the map that was meant to send five more Republicans to Congress instead sent one more Democrat than in 2024 (although the gerrymander probably helped Republicans hold onto one more seat than they would have under the old map). In Alabama and Florida, Democratic incumbents targeted under new maps held on as well, in districts Mr Trump would have won by as many as 18 points.
重新划区在全国范围内净给共和党增加了大约三个席位，远低于预期。具有讽刺意味的是，唯一让共和党在账面上保持正收益的，是印第安纳州和南卡罗来纳州由共和党控制的州议会拒绝遵从特朗普重新划图的要求。如果这两个州实施了它们提出的杰利蝾螈方案，民主党本可能拿下16个席位中的14个，而不是他们实际赢得的5个。
Redistricting probably gained Republicans three seats on net across the country—far fewer than expected. Ironically, the only thing that kept the party on the positive side of the ledger was the refusal by Republican-controlled state legislatures in Indiana and South Carolina to comply with Mr Trump’s demand for a re-draw. Had those states implemented their proposed gerrymanders, Democrats might have won 14 of their 16 seats, instead of the five they actually claimed.
2024年总统选举和2026年众议院选举中，按得票优势划分的国会选区，百分点：得克萨斯州、佛罗里达州、阿拉巴马州。未来两年，这些被破坏的选区划分方案影响将仅有限。即使重划选区如预期那样为共和党带来八个净席位，民主党仍将拥有254比181的众议院压倒性多数。这些选区图要到全国普选票足够接近、以至于选区边界能够影响众议院控制权的选举时才会面临真正考验——这可能早在2028年。
Congressional districts by vote margin, % points 2024 Presidential vote 2026 House vote Texas Florida Alabama For the next two years, these broken gerrymanders will have only a modest impact. Even if redistricting had delivered eight net seats to Republicans, as had been expected, Democrats would still have a commanding 254-181 House majority. The maps will not face a real test until an election in which the national popular vote is close enough for district boundaries to affect control of the House—which could easily be in 2028.
如果共和党能够重新赢回西班牙裔选民，且黑人投票率回到2014年至2024年的水平，该党的选区绘制者很可能会笑到最后。相比之下，如果2026年的选民联盟代表新常态——或者选民像惯常一样带来某种新惊喜——他们的选区图可能永远不会见效。■
If Republicans can claw back Hispanic voters and black turnout returns to the levels seen in 2014-24, the party’s map-makers will probably have the last laugh. By contrast, if the coalitions of 2026 represent a new normal—or if the electorate delivers some new surprise, as is its wont—their maps may never bear fruit.■