
国会弹劾唐纳德·特朗普不应出于政治策略的考量,而应因为法律和原则要求这样做。
Congress should impeach Donald Trump not for reason of political strategy, but because law and principle demand it.
民主党在中期选举中的压倒性胜利,使是否弹劾总统唐纳德·特朗普的问题突然再次具有现实意义。一种传统智慧似乎正在形成,即民主党人不应该弹劾特朗普,而应转而弹劾他的各个下属。中期选举前不久,前副总统卡玛拉·哈里斯在接受采访时暗示,国会民主党人不应该推进弹劾。相反,他们的“有限资源”应花在其他事情上,比如问责与调查(在我看来,把这两者并列在一起实在有些奇怪)。
The Democratic Party’s resounding victory in the midterm elections has made the question of whether or not to impeach President Donald Trump suddenly relevant again. And it seems as though a conventional wisdom is developing that Democrats should not impeach Trump, but should instead impeach his various subordinates. Shortly before the midterms, former Vice President Kamala Harris suggested in an interview that congressional Democrats should not move toward impeachment. Instead, their “limited resources” should be spent on other things, like accountability and investigations (a rather strange juxtaposition, if you ask me).
与此同时,弹劾国防部长皮特·赫格塞斯的严肃讨论正在展开。最近,肯塔基州共和党人托马斯·马西于11月9日提交了对赫格塞斯的弹劾条款,指控的罪状从在伊朗的战争、绑架委内瑞拉领导人尼古拉斯·马杜罗,到随意袭击加勒比海域的渔船。马西的弹劾决议次日被搁置,但每一位民主党人都投票赞成推进弹劾,而且民主党人1月掌控众议院后,实际上弹劾赫格塞斯的可能性似乎极大。
Meanwhile, there is serious talk of impeaching Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth. Most recently, Kentucky Republican Thomas Massie filed articles of impeachment against Hegseth on November 9, for offenses ranging from the war in Iran to the kidnapping of Venezuelan leader Nicolas Maduro to the strikes on random fishing boats in the Caribbean. Massie’s impeachment resolution was tabled the following day, but every Democrat voted to proceed with the impeachment, and it seems more than likely that the Democrats will in fact impeach Hegseth when they take control of the House in January.
预计将出任众议院议长的哈基姆·杰弗里斯对弹劾特朗普的想法并不热衷,但他形容自己对追究赫格塞斯是“坚决支持”。
Presumptive future Speaker of the House Hakeem Jeffries, who has been less than enthusiastic about the idea of impeaching Trump, described himself as a “hard yes” on going after Hegseth.
所有这些似乎都反映了国会民主党人的一种看法:特朗普第一任期内的两次弹劾适得其反,再次弹劾他很可能也会如此。普遍的说法是,因特朗普勒索乌克兰总统泽连斯基而对他进行弹劾,只会激发特朗普的基本盘并巩固对他的支持。尽管民主党在中期选举中大获全胜,但他们在1月份将仅拥有56个参议院席位,远低于弹劾定罪所需的67票。假设共和党像迄今为止那样继续支持特朗普,再次弹劾他将毫无实际作用。
All of this seems to reflect a view among congressional Democrats that the two impeachments of Trump’s first term backfired, and that impeaching him again would likely do the same. The common narrative is that impeaching Trump for his extortion of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy only served to rally Trump’s base and consolidate support. Notwithstanding the Democrats’ sweeping midterm victory, they will have only 56 Senate seats in January, far short of the 67 required to convict on an impeachment charge. Assuming Republicans stand by Trump, as they have done so far, impeaching him yet again would serve no practical function.
另一方面,人们认为赫格塞斯在国会共和党人中相当不受欢迎。有人认为他实际上可能会被定罪。无论如何,他是一个更安全的目标:他不是特朗普,也没有特朗普那群铁杆粉丝,他们可能会因再次弹劾特朗普的威胁而被激活。
Hegseth, on the other hand, is thought to be quite unpopular among congressional Republicans. There is some thought he might actually be convicted. And in any event he is a safer target: he is not Trump, and does not have Trump’s legions of diehard fans who might be activated by the threat of another Trump impeachment.
我对再次弹劾特朗普属于糟糕政治策略的论点持怀疑态度。2019年首次弹劾在政治上助推了特朗普这一观点缺乏有力支持;在他的支持率图表上,你根本看不出弹劾审判的痕迹。但我在这里的观点并非要就策略问题本身进行探讨。恰恰相反:在我看来,即将上任的国会民主党之所以应该因重罪和轻罪弹劾唐纳德·特朗普,仅仅是因为他犯有重罪和轻罪。他们应该弹劾特朗普,因为这是法律和原则对他们的要求,是他们对宪法宣誓的要求。
Now I am skeptical of the arguments for why impeaching Trump again would be poor political strategy. The idea that the first impeachment in 2019 boosted Trump politically is not well supported; you cannot really spot the impeachment trial in the graph of his approval ratings. But my point here is not to engage with the question of strategy on its own terms. Quite the contrary: the reason why the incoming Democratic Congress should impeach Donald Trump for high crimes and misdemeanors, in my view, is just because he is guilty of high crimes and misdemeanors. They should impeach Trump because it is what law and principle demand of them, what their oaths to the Constitution demand of them.
我们早已习惯于争论弹劾策略的细微差别,以至于这种观点听起来可能显得天真得毫无希望。当然,弹劾首先是政治利益的问题;除此之外它还能是什么呢?无论如何,对于那些遵循杰拉尔德·福特格言——“可弹劾的罪行就是众议院多数派在某一历史时刻认为它是什么”的人的来说,“法律”和“原则”可能要求弹劾这一整个概念听起来都很荒谬。然而,我从未认同福特的观点,理由我在别处已作阐述。
We are so well accustomed to debating the nuances of impeachment strategy that this idea can sound hopelessly naïve. Of course impeachment is a matter of political advantage first and foremost; what else would it be? In any event the whole notion that “law” and “principle” might demand impeachment sounds silly to those who follow Gerald Ford’s maxim that an “impeachable offense is whatever a majority of the House of Representatives considers it to be at a given moment in history.”I have never subscribed to Ford’s view, however, for reasons I have articulated elsewhere.
不,宪法并未详细规定什么算作“重罪或轻罪”。但这几乎适用于宪法中的每一个实质性措辞。我们确定其含义的方式是通过所有常规的法律论证技巧,而在弹劾语境下,这些技巧并不比在其他地方少用。无论如何,这个开放式措辞只是弹劾理由之一:特朗普在其第二任期内肯定犯下了具体的受贿罪,依我之见,他在2021年1月6日犯下了叛国罪。作为法律问题,他犯有可弹劾的罪行、最高等级的罪行,实在毫无疑问。
No, the Constitution does not prescribe in detail what counts as a “high crime or misdemeanor.”But this is true of almost every substantive phrase in the Constitution. The way we determine their meaning is through all the usual techniques of legal argumentation, and these are no less useful in the impeachment context than anywhere else. In any event, this open-ended phrase is only one of the grounds for impeachment: Trump has certainly committed the specific offense of bribery throughout his second term, and in my view he committed treason on January 6, 2021. There is really no doubt that, as a matter of law, he is guilty of impeachable offenses, crimes of the highest order.
此外,尽管这种思维方式可能已不合时宜,但宪法并未留下多少疑问:弹劾本意是一项原则问题。宪法第一条第三款规定,当参议员审理弹劾案时,必须宣誓;按惯例,这是一项“根据宪法和法律作出公正裁决”的誓言。诚然,众议院并无此类特别誓言,但根据宪法第六条第三款(以及美国法典第5编第3331条),其全体成员均宣誓“拥护和捍卫宪法”。
Furthermore, although this way of thinking may be unfashionable, the Constitution does not really leave much doubt that impeachment is meant to be a matter of principle. Article I, Section 3 specifies that, when Senators sit to try impeachments, they must take a special oath; by convention, this is an oath to “do impartial justice according to the Constitution and laws.”Granted, the House swears no such special oath, but its members all do swear the basic oath to “support and defend the Constitution,” per Article VI, Clause 3 (and 5 U.S.C. § 3331).
在其极具影响力的弹劾手册中,查尔斯·布莱克写道,弹劾“类似于司法刑事程序,因为宪法将其交由负责任的法庭——众议院和参议院——处理,且这些机构有责任根据其对法律和事实的看法行事,尽可能不受党派政治动机和压力的影响。”
In his influential Handbook on impeachment, Charles Black wrote that impeachment “resembles the judicial criminal process in that it is confided by the Constitution to responsible tribunals—the House of Representatives and the Senate—and in that these bodies are duty-bound to act on their views of the law and the facts, as free as may be of partisan political motives and pressures.”
因此,他建议公民在该过程中的角色主要应是“警惕地等待”,认为“成堆的电报不应起任何作用”。与实际参与的国会议员一样,我们应争取“原则性的政治中立立场”,并应不断“自问:如果同一问题涉及一位我们对其感情与面临罢免的总统截然相反的总统,我们是否会给出同样的回答”。
For this reason, he suggested that the role of the citizen in the process should primarily be one of “vigilant waiting,” that “a snow of telegrams ought to play no part.”Like the members of Congress actually participating, we should strive for a “stance of principled political neutrality,” and that we should constantly “ask ourselves whether we would have answered the same question the same way if it came up with respect to a president toward whom we felt oppositely from the way we feel toward the president threatened with removal.”
布莱克写下这些文字时是1974年,理查德·尼克松的水门丑闻让美国百年来首次面临总统弹劾的考量。那是一个相对单纯的年代:如今,认为弹劾能完全脱离大众政治而独立运作,已是一种幻想。布莱克并非没意识到,指望作为民选政治机构的参议院能以“完全的公正,至少类似忠实法官或陪审员的公正”行事,其中的困难。
Now, Black was writing in 1974, when Richard Nixon’s Watergate scandal made the nation consider presidential impeachment for the first time in a century. It was a more innocent age: today the idea that impeachment could be totally insulated from popular politics is a fantasy.
但他提出的解决之道,在1974年比今天更具说服力:补救之道只能寄托于每位参议员的良知,他们应当认识到其中的危险,并尽可能摒弃一切偏见。我看不出这为何不能产生令人满意的结果。
Black was hardly oblivious to the difficulties of expecting the Senate, an elected, political body, to act with “total impartiality, at least resembling that of a faithful judge or juror.”But his solution to the problem was rather more plausible in 1974 than it is today:
同样,布莱克建议,虽然参议院审判肯定必须公开,但不应允许“广播、电视和摄像机”进入。特别是电视报道是不可取的,因为它“最大限度地增加了产生某种既定结果的公众压力的可能性”。相反,“公众的判断应当在事后,在对永远可查阅的记录进行冷静和长久的考虑之后作出”。现在读这段话不禁让人苦笑,不是因为他错了,而是因为这场战斗早已输掉了。
The remedy has to be in the conscience of each senator, who ought to realize the danger and try as far as possible to divest himself of all prejudice.
(同样,他主张“对有罪或无罪进行……民意调查,应被视为不可言说的无礼行为。”)但他的根本观点没有变。在最大程度上,弹劾不应是党派之争。尽管在现代,随着电视报道和民调变得不可避免,这变得更加困难,但这绝不改变宪法规定的基本义务。当他们作为弹劾程序的一部分行事时,国会议员完全不应以其政党成员的身份行事。他们的唯一责任是对国家、对宪法、对真理负责。
I see no reason why this cannot produce a satisfactory result.
我们谴责在特朗普第一任期弹劾审判中投票宣判无罪的共和党参议员,正是因为他们失职。他们出于党派忠诚背弃了誓言。但如果这种行为在共和党人身上应受谴责,在民主党人身上也绝不能容忍。明确说,这并不意味着那些基本按党派路线投票弹劾特朗普的民主党人做错了什么:特朗普确实犯有重罪,今天如此,2019年和2021年也是如此。相反,扭曲的是,危险在于民主党人会像共和党人一样,因为认为这符合其党派政治利益而对特朗普袖手旁观。我们这样做并不比他们更有道理。
Similarly, Black suggested that, although the Senate trial must surely be open to the public, there was no place for “radio, television, and cameras.”Television coverage in particular was undesirable, for it “maximizes the chances of development of public pressure for some given result.”Instead, the “judgment of the public ought to come after the fact, on sober and long consideration of a record which will remain accessible forever.”It is no longer possible to read this passage without bitter laughter, not because he was wrong but because that fight has long since been lost. (Similarly his claim that the “taking…of public opinion polls on guilt or innocence, should be looked on as an unspeakable indecency.”) His fundamental point has not changed, though. To the greatest extent possible, impeachment is not meant to be a partisan matter. That this has become more difficult in our modern age, as television coverage and polling have become unavoidable, in no way changes the basic obligation under the Constitution. When they act as part of the impeachment process, members of Congress ought not to act as members of their political parties at all. Their sole responsibility is to the nation, to the Constitution, to the truth.
到了2019年,在特朗普执政前两年后,民主党夺得众议院控制权,当时有理由认为,他们必须考虑政治策略问题,因为共和国的存亡正处于关键时刻。特朗普当时正如今天一样,正在寻求让自己成为美国的暴君。如果他在2020年赢得连任,他极有可能会成功。
We condemn the Republican Senators who voted to acquit Trump in his first-term impeachment trials precisely because they were derelict in this duty. They forsook their oaths out of partisan loyalty. But if this behavior is to be deplored in Republicans, it must not be tolerated in Democrats either. To be clear, this does not imply that the Democrats who have voted to impeach Trump, on an essentially party-line basis, are doing anything wrong: Trump really is guilty of high crimes, today as in 2019 and in 2021. Instead, perversely, the danger is that Democrats, like Republicans, will stay their hand against Trump because they perceive that to be in their partisan political interest. It is no more defensible for us to do that than it is for them.
因此,捍卫宪法意味着采取一切最有可能让特朗普真正交出权力的行动。这与1974年的情况不同,当时参议院共和党人最终确信尼克松犯有罪行并抛弃了他,导致他辞职;而这一次,通过弹劾将特朗普赶下台并无实际可能。因此,对弹劾采取现实政治的观点是恰当的,即只有在弹劾似乎有助于在下届大选中击败特朗普时才去推进。
Now in 2019, when the Democrats took control of the House of Representatives after Trump’s first two years in office, there was an argument to be made that they had to consider questions of political strategy because the survival of the Republic was on the line.
这一论点让人联想到亚伯拉罕·林肯在内战初期主张暂停人身保护令时的论据:“难道除了这一条,所有法律都不执行,政府本身瓦解,就为了不违反这一条吗?”但问题是,民主党刚刚赢得了四十年来最大的压倒性胜利。这并非某种奇怪的偶然:过去两年里,所有特别选举的结果都显示出类似的趋势。特朗普极其不受欢迎,结果导致民主党拥有数十年来最大的国会多数优势(参议院自2010年以来,众议院自1992年以来),以及全国绝大多数州长职位。
Trump was seeking then, as he is still seeking today, to make himself the tyrant of America.
看来,民主党赢得2028年总统大选不仅极有可能,而且很可能会以相当大的优势获胜。此外,特朗普本人根据第二十二修正案受任期限制。尽管他曾开玩笑说要寻求非法的第三任期,但从如此弱势的政治地位来看,很难想象他能实现这一点。换句话说,没有非常充分的理由为了拯救宪法而背叛宪法。我们处于更有利的地位;我们有能力坚持原则,因此我们有义务这样做。
If he had won re-election in 2020, there is every chance he would have succeeded.
同样值得考虑的是,不在这些问题上采取原则立场的代价。政治领袖的行为为公民树立了榜样。我们之所以觉得布莱克早在1974年所描述的“国会应在弹劾事务上秉持原则行事”这一建议显得格格不入,必然与国会在1998年、2019年和2021年彻底未能做到这一点这一事实有关。考虑到前述原因,众议院民主党人在2019年采取策略性行动或许有其正当性。但这仍然有助于教导公众:荣誉和原则是愚人的专利。毕竟,两党都公开允许政治算计主导其弹劾策略。
Therefore, defending the Constitution meant doing whatever made it most likely that Trump would actually leave power. Unlike in 1974, when Senate Republicans were finally convinced of Nixon’s criminality and abandoned him, leading to his resignation, there was no actual prospect of ousting Trump through impeachment. Thus, it was appropriate to take a realpolitik view of impeachment, to pursue it only if that seemed likely to help beat Trump at the next election. The argument is reminiscent of Abraham Lincoln’s argument for suspending habeas corpus during the early days of the Civil War: “Are all the laws but one to go unexecuted, and the Government itself go to pieces lest that one be violated?”But here’s the thing. Democrats just won the biggest landslide in forty years. This wasn’t some strange fluke: special election results all through the last two years have shown similar results. Trump is hideously unpopular, as a result of which the Democrats have the biggest congressional majorities in decades (since 2010 in the Senate, and 1992 in the House), as well as a comfortable majority of the nation’s governorships. It seems, if not certain, then at least very likely that Democrats will win the 2028 presidential election, and quite likely by a sizable margin. Moreover, Trump himself is term-limited by the Twenty-Second Amendment. Although he has made jokes about seeking an illegal third term, it is hard to see him pulling that off from such a weak political position. There is no very strong justification, in other words, for betraying the Constitution in order to save it. We are in a stronger position than that; we can afford to stand on principle, and therefore we are obliged to.
2019年的同样策略性谨慎,或许也助长了特朗普猖獗犯罪行为的常态化。尽管众议院因乌克兰事件和“1月6日”事件两度弹劾特朗普,却将数十宗乃至上百宗可予弹劾的罪行置之不理——最显眼的便是特别检察官罗伯特·穆勒那份著名报告所涉事项,该报告在不使用“弹劾”一词的前提下,已接近明确建议弹劾。公众极易推断:既然连民主党反对派都不认为穆勒报告值得以此弹劾特朗普,那么他的行为恐怕并没有那么糟糕。
It is also worth considering the cost of not taking a principled stance on these matters. The behavior of political leaders serves as a model for the citizenry. That we find the very suggestion that Congress ought to act with principle in matters of impeachment, as Black described back in 1974, is surely related to the fact that it utterly failed to do so in 1998 and in 2019 and in 2021. It may have been justifiable for House Democrats to behave strategically in 2019, for the reasons just mentioned. But it still helped to teach the public that honor and principle are for fools. Both parties, after all, were openly allowing political calculus to govern their approach to impeachment.
那么,这一次若再袖手旁观,会教导出什么教训?特别是,弹劾赫格塞斯等下属却不弹劾特朗普本人,会传递什么教训?弹劾历史在此颇具启示。美国的弹劾程序仿照的是英国一项历史悠久的做法。而在英国语境下,议会几乎专门针对可类比为赫格塞斯这类人物的大臣动用弹劾:即行政官员,而非行政首长。
The same strategic caution in 2019 may have helped to normalize Trump’s rampant criminality, for although the House did impeach Trump over Ukraine and over January 6, it left scores if not hundreds of impeachable offenses unprosecuted—most conspicuously, the matter covered in the famous report of special counsel Robert Mueller, which was about as close to an express recommendation of impeachment as it could be without using the word itself. It is all too easy for a member of the public to draw the inference that, if even the Democratic opposition did not think the Mueller Report worth impeaching Trump for, then his behavior cannot really have been all that bad.
然而,之所以如此,有一个非常具体的原因:行政首长是国王。议会不能直接针对国王。事实上,甚至批评国王的行为都可能被视为叛国。因此,对政府政策的反对必须找到一个更安全的出口,而弹劾国王的大臣正好提供了这样一个出口。这使得议会能够在保持对王室忠诚的同时实现政策变革。事实上,通过将过错归咎于某个可被解职的大臣,弹劾有助于为王室开脱罪责。
What, then, would be the lesson taught by staying our hand this time around? In particular, what would be the lesson of impeaching Hegseth and other underlings but not Trump himself? The history of impeachment is instructive here. The American impeachment process is modeled on a much older British practice. And in the British context, Parliament used impeachment almost exclusively against ministers who can be considered analogous to someone like Hegseth: executive officers, but not the chief executive.
然而,我们的弹劾条款明确规定行政首长可被弹劾。结合英国历史来看,规定“总统、副总统和合众国所有文职官员”均可被弹劾,可以理解为一项明确的宣示:总统不是国王。事实上,在我们国家没有利用弹劾针对下级行政官员的传统。众议院在其整个历史上仅两次通过针对下级行政官员的弹劾条款,一次是1876年,当时战争部长威廉·沃思·贝尔纳普被发现收受贿赂;另一次是2024年,共和党控制的众议院弹劾了国土安全部长亚历杭德罗·马约尔卡斯。
There was, however, one very specific reason for this: the chief executive was the King. And Parliament could not go at the King directly. Indeed, it could be considered treasonous even to criticize the King’s actions.
(他们真正的不满针对的是总统乔·拜登,他们显然认为拜登的移民政策违法且可被弹劾;我一直认为,他们弹劾马约尔卡斯而非拜登本人,是缺乏原则的懦弱表现。)正如哈里·杜鲁门名言所言,“责任止于此”:总统对政府所作所为承担最终责任。通常情况下,当内阁部长行为失检时,总统会要求其辞职。如果总统不这样做,如果他们维护下属,那么国会弹劾总统、追究其对下属所为的责任,理应是正当的。
Opposition to government policy therefore had to find a safer outlet, and impeachment of the King’s ministers provided just such an outlet. This allowed Parliament to effect a change in policy while remaining loyal to the Crown. Indeed, by locating the fault in some minister who could be sacked, impeachment helped to absolve the Crown of wrongdoing.
弹劾赫格塞斯却不弹劾特朗普,传递出的信息是:特朗普是我们的国王。他的统治权不容置疑;正如十七世纪的英国,我们的反对派必须寻找更安全的出口,必须对王冠保持忠诚。这不符合一个自由共和国的体面,也是对数百万在“无国王”口号下走上街头抗议特朗普民众的严重背叛。
Our Impeachment Clause, however, expressly makes our chief executive subject to impeachment. Viewed in light of the British history, stating that the “President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States” are subject to impeachment can be understood as a pointed declaration that the President is not a king. Indeed, in our country there is no tradition of using impeachment against lesser executive officers. The House has only approved articles of impeachment against any lesser executive officer twice in its entire history, once in 1876 when Secretary of War William Worth Belknap was found to have taken bribes and once in 2024 when the Republican House impeached Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro Mayorkas. (Their true grievance was with President Joe Biden, whose immigration policies they evidently thought unlawful and impeachable; I have always thought it was an act of unprincipled cowardice on their part to impeach Mayorkas instead of Biden himself.) As Harry Truman famously said, the buck stops here: the President bears final responsibility for everything the government does. Ordinarily, then, when a Cabinet officer has behaved scandalously, the President will demand their resignation. If they did not, if they stood by their subordinate, then Congress might properly impeach the President for what that subordinate had done.
这并非说我们不应弹劾赫格塞斯,或特朗普麾下的其他恶棍。正如马西的弹劾条款所清楚表明的,赫格塞斯确实犯有重罪和轻罪。
Impeaching Hegseth but not Trump, then, sends the message that Trump is our king. That his right to rule cannot be questioned; that, as in seventeenth-century Britain, our opposition must find a safer outlet, must remain loyal to the Crown. This is unbecoming of a free republic, and would be a gross betrayal of the millions who turned out to protest against Trump under the slogan “No Kings.”Now this is not to say that we should not impeach Hegseth, or any of the other rogues in Trump’s gallery. Hegseth is certainly guilty of high crimes and misdemeanors, as Massie’s articles of impeachment make clear.
他仅仅是在执行特朗普的政策,这不能免除他的责任:如果总统命令你犯下重罪,你的义务是拒绝执行和/或辞职。虽然在通常情况下,无需弹劾内阁部长,只需施压其辞职即可,但弹劾提供了一项单纯免职所不具备的功能:被定罪者还可被禁止担任未来的公职。特朗普的部属理应得到这种下场,特朗普本人当然也是如此。仅凭这一理由,对他们每个人单独走完正式的弹劾程序就是恰当的。但这不能替代弹劾特朗普本人。
That he was merely implementing Trump’s policies does not absolve him of culpability: if the president orders you to commit a high crime, your duty is to refuse and/or resign. And although in the ordinary case there is no need to impeach a Cabinet officer instead of pressuring them to resign, impeachment does offer one function above and beyond mere removal from office: the convicted party can also be barred from holding future office. Trump’s underlings arguably deserve that fate, as he himself surely does. For that reason alone, it is proper to go through the formal mechanics of impeaching each of them individually. But this cannot be a substitute for impeaching Trump himself.
特约图片为奥利弗·F·阿特金斯拍摄的尼克松向内阁成员和白宫工作人员告别的照片。
Featured Image is Nixon's farewell to his cabinet and members of the White House staff, by Oliver F. Atkins