
分析人士称,尽管美国和以色列对伊朗发动的两场战争暴露了伊朗情报和安全机构的严重弱点,伊朗正在利用这一威胁来镇压异见。
While two wars on Iran by the United States and Israel have exposed serious vulnerabilities in Iran’s intelligence and security institutions, Iran is using the threat to crack down on dissent, analysts have said.
田纳西大学查塔努加分校政治学副教授赛义德·戈尔卡表示,伊朗面临真实间谍威胁的例证是高层人物被暗杀,其中包括前最高领袖阿亚图拉阿里·哈梅内伊在以色列和美国于2月28日发动的最新袭击的第一天丧生。
Saeid Golkar, an associate professor in political science at the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga, said the genuine espionage threats faced by Iran were illustrated by the killing of high-level figures, including former Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, on the first day of the latest assault by Israel and the US on February 28.
“与此同时,该政权历来利用真实的、或多数情况下被认为是安全威胁来为政治镇压辩护,并扩大其镇压机器,”戈尔卡对半岛电视台说。
“At the same time, the regime has historically used real or, most of the time, perceived security threats to justify political repression and expand its coercive apparatus,” Golkar told Al Jazeera.
“目前的镇压似乎既反映了合理的反间谍关切,也反映了该政权更广泛地压制异见和恐吓社会的努力。”
“The current crackdown appears to reflect both legitimate counterintelligence concerns and the regime’s broader efforts to suppress dissent and intimidate society.”
以色列前情报机构负责人戴维·巴尼亚最近表示,在以色列于2025年6月对伊朗发动为期12天的战争之前的几周,他批准了数十名负有明确情报或破坏任务的特工进入伊朗。
Former Israeli spy chief David Barnea recently said that in the weeks before Israel launched its 12-day war on Iran in June 2025, he had approved the entry into the country of dozens of agents with clear intelligence or sabotage assignments.
“我不能说他们和我们在一起。但他们就在德黑兰,过着他们的生活。”他在10月22日于以色列举行的一场会议上说。
“I can’t say that they are here with us. But they are there in Tehran, living their lives,” he told a conference in Israel on October 22.
据巴尼亚说,他担任摩萨德负责人五年,直至2026年6月。以色列情报机构试图让当地当局逮捕尽可能多的伊朗公民,以掩护其在伊朗境内的真正特工。
According to Barnea, who was the director of Mossad for five years until June 2026, Israeli intelligence tried to maximise the number of Iranian citizens arrested by local authorities in order to shield its genuine agents inside Iran.
就在发动战争并打死高级指挥官和核科学家几个小时后,他们故意发布了带有摩萨德标志的特工在伊朗境内的录像,导致数千名与以色列情报机构无关的人被逮捕。
Just hours after launching the war and killing senior commanders and nuclear scientists, they deliberately released footage of agents inside Iran with a Mossad logo, leading to the arrests of thousands of people with no links to the Israeli intelligence service.
巴尼亚声称这一战略奏效,他们几乎所有的情报人员都未被识别。在以色列和美国对伊朗发动的第二场战争进行到第八个月之际——这场战争公开宣称的目标是推翻伊斯兰共和国——伊朗的多疑依然如故。
Barnea claimed the strategy worked, and almost all of their assets remained unidentified. Eight months into a second war launched by Israel and the US against Iran, with the stated aim of overthrowing the Islamic republic, Iran’s paranoia remains.
自2025年战争以来,伊朗当局大幅加快了涉及国家安全案件的司法惩处,包括大规模逮捕、快速起诉、长期监禁、没收资产和处决。
Iranian authorities have significantly accelerated judicial punishments for cases linked to national security since the 2025 war. That has entailed mass arrests, expedited prosecutions, lengthy imprisonment, asset confiscations and executions.
被针对的人员包括涉嫌间谍者,也有抗议者、记者、律师和少数群体。国际特赦组织和人权观察记录在案的案件涉及逼供、剥夺有效辩护,以及对异见人士适用国家安全罪名。
The people targeted include alleged spies but also protesters, journalists, lawyers and minorities. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have documented cases involving coerced confessions, the denial of effective defence and national security charges applied to dissenters.
国际政策中心高级研究员内加尔·莫尔塔扎维说:“伊朗面临的间谍威胁非常真实。两场美以战争暴露了伊朗情报与安全机构的严重漏洞……德黑兰对外国渗透、破坏和境内情报活动抱有合理关切,尤其是在再次军事升级的威胁依然高企之际。”
“The espionage threat facing Iran is very real. The two US-Israeli wars exposed serious vulnerabilities in Iran’s intelligence and security apparatus… Tehran has legitimate concerns about foreign infiltration, sabotage, and intelligence operations inside the country, especially as the threat of another military escalation remains high,” Negar Mortazavi, a senior fellow with the Center for International Policy, said.
“但在间谍活动与异见之间存在着根本区别,”她补充说。“间谍活动涉及秘密收集敏感情报或协助外国情报行动。批评政府、报道其失误、接触外国媒体或质疑官方叙事,本身并不构成间谍活动。伊朗当局日益模糊这一界限,将政治反对派和独立报道视为外国情报活动的延伸。”
“But there is a fundamental distinction between espionage and dissent,” she added. “Espionage involves covertly gathering sensitive intelligence or assisting foreign intelligence operations. Criticising the government, reporting on its failures, engaging with foreign media, or challenging official narratives does not, in itself, constitute espionage. The Iranian authorities have increasingly blurred this distinction, treating political opposition and independent reporting as extensions of foreign intelligence activity.”
伊朗当局辩称,外国情报行动的目的不仅是推翻政府,还包括分裂国家。
Iranian authorities argue that foreign intelligence operations are aimed not only at overthrowing the government but also fragmenting the country.
伊朗情报部今年5月表示,“敌人”正在将间谍活动、破坏行动、敌对媒体宣传、利用经济危机以及煽动民族和教派紧张关系结合起来,作为“混合战争”的一部分。
Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence said in May that “enemies” were combining espionage, sabotage, hostile media, exploitation of economic crises and fuelling ethnic and sectarian tensions as part of a “hybrid war”.
司法总监戈拉姆-侯赛因·穆赫塞尼-埃杰伊多次援引战时状态和国内法律,主张采取紧急安全措施,并加快对被控合作者的惩罚,以此作为保护国家的手段。
Judiciary chief Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei has repeatedly invoked wartime conditions and domestic laws to argue for urgent security measures, and accelerated the punishment of alleged collaborators as a means of protecting the country.
司法部发言人阿里·卡泽米今年10月早些时候表示,目前有涉及至少1895人的在办案件,其中包括94名媒体工作者,他们被控与以色列或其他敌对国家合作。警方宣布,2025年6月战争后已逮捕至少2.1万人,而2026年1月全国性抗议活动相关被拘留者至少达5万人。据总部位于美国的权利组织HRANA称,在伊朗各地对抗议活动的镇压中,数千名平民被杀害。
Judiciary spokesman Ali Kazemi said earlier in October that there were active cases involving at least 1,895 people, including 94 media workers, accused of cooperation with Israel or other hostile states. Police had announced at least 21,000 arrests following the June 2025 war, while at least 50,000 people were detained in connection with the nationwide protests in January 2026. Thousands of civilians were killed in the crackdown against antigovernment protests across Iran, according to US-based rights organisation HRANA.
当局将全国性抗议活动称为完全由以色列和美国情报机构策划的“政变”。伊朗政府还声称,摩萨德和其他情报人员杀害了抗议者。但联合国独立事实调查团表示,当局在自革命以来最暴力的镇压中犯下了反人类罪。
The authorities have referred to the nationwide protests as a “coup” orchestrated entirely by Israeli and US intelligence agencies. The Iranian government also claims that Mossad and other intelligence agents killed protesters. But an independent United Nations fact-finding mission said the authorities committed crimes against humanity during their most violent crackdown since the revolution.
与安全指控相关的处决在战争和抗议活动后也有所增加。据联合国称,2025年6月至12月期间,至少有19人在间谍相关案件中被处以绞刑。
Executions linked with security charges have also increased following the wars and protests. At least 19 people were hanged in espionage-related cases between June and December 2025, according to the UN.
总部位于奥斯陆的非营利组织“伊朗人权”表示,该组织记录了2026年1月至9月间16名间谍案被告被处决,另有33名抗议者和13名与被禁组织有关联的囚犯被处决。该组织截至10月初已追踪到至少604起处决。
Iran Human Rights, an Oslo-based nonprofit group, said it recorded 16 espionage defendants executed between January and September 2026, alongside 33 protesters and 13 prisoners affiliated with banned groups. The group had tracked at least 604 executions by early October.
国际特赦组织称,截至10月13日,今年至少有34起处决与1月的全国性抗议有关,其中5起发生在9月30日至10月5日之间。
Amnesty International reported at least 34 executions this year linked to the January nationwide protests by October 13, including five between September 30 and October 5.
伊朗当局警告公众,摩萨德和其他情报机构正在开展网络行动以扩大其在伊朗的影响力,并指责这些机构通过社交媒体和网络邀约招募人员。
Iranian authorities have warned the public about Mossad and other intelligence agencies running cyber-operations to expand their influence in Iran, accusing them of recruiting people through social media and online offers.
向被视为对伊朗政府怀有敌意的网络(包括BBC波斯语频道)发送图像或信息,可能被判处10至15年监禁并处以高额罚款。若与其他罪行合并,还可能被控“人间腐败”罪,该罪名可判处死刑。
Sending images or information to networks deemed to be hostile to the Iranian government – including BBC Persian – could result in sentences of 10 to 15 years in prison and heavy fines. Combined with other offences, it could lead to potential charges of “corruption on Earth”, which carry the death penalty.
当局还将“星链”卫星互联网服务视为一种“战争工具”,被伊朗境内的“敌方”特工用于间谍活动、情报收集,甚至操控无人机。尽管分发和使用该服务会受到严厉惩罚,仍有数万个星链终端被走私进入该国。伊朗当局曾试图没收或干扰这些终端。
The authorities also regard the Starlink satellite internet service as a “tool of war” used for espionage, information gathering and even operating drones by “enemy” agents inside Iran. Tens of thousands of Starlink terminals have been smuggled into the country despite severe punishments for distributing and using the service. Iranian authorities have tried to confiscate or jam them.
在12天战争期间的数日、1月抗议期间的20天以及当前战争初期的88天里,伊朗对9000万伊朗人实施了近乎全面的互联网断网。官方给出的理由从保护国家资产免受网络攻击到干扰敌方无人机不等。伊朗的全球互联网仍受到严格过滤,当局警告称,一旦军事局势升级,网络可能再次被切断。
For several days during the 12-day war, 20 days during the January protests and 88 days at the start of the current war, Iran imposed a near-total internet shutdown on 90 million Iranians. The official reasons ranged from protecting national assets against cyberattacks to disrupting hostile drones. The global internet remains severely filtered in Iran, and authorities have warned it could be disrupted again in case of military escalation.
田纳西大学查塔努加分校的戈尔卡表示,由于当局模糊了间谍活动与政治反对之间的界限,他们日益将抗议者、记者和普通公民视为对国家安全的潜在威胁。
University of Tennessee at Chattanooga’s Golkar said that by blurring the line between espionage and political opposition, authorities increasingly treat protesters, journalists and ordinary citizens as potential threats to national security.
他说:“归根结底,这个伊斯兰共和国越来越将政权安全与国家安全视为可以互换的概念。反间谍本是一项正当的国家职能,但它也已成为保护执政集团、扩大安全机构影响力的工具。”
“Ultimately, the Islamic republic increasingly treats regime security and national security as interchangeable concepts. While counterespionage is a legitimate state function, it has also become a tool to protect the ruling establishment and expand the influence of security institutions,” he said.
“简而言之,随着时间推移,这个伊斯兰共和国已转变为一个以安全为主导的政权,日益将政治和社会生活的几乎方方面面安全化,包括和平的公民活动,甚至将非暴力的异见表达也视为对政权存续的潜在威胁。”
“In brief, and over time, the Islamic republic has transformed into a security-dominated regime that increasingly securitises nearly every aspect of political and social life, including peaceful civic activism, treating even nonviolent expressions of dissent as potential threats to regime survival”.