有理由相信，现在存在达成乌克兰和平协议的机会。单是俄罗斯同意本周出席阿布扎比新一轮三方会谈这一事实、一个对莫斯科不那么友好的美国新国会即将上任、弗拉基米尔·普京麾下部队伤亡率飙升，以及乌克兰城市和经济承受的难以忍受的代价，都指向这一点。遗憾的是，由此得出的理性结论——我们正处于结束战争协议的门槛上——具有误导性。
There are reasons to believe an opportunity now exists to reach a peace deal on Ukraine. There’s the mere fact that Russia agreed to attend a new round of trilateral talks in Abu Dhabi this week, the approach of a new, less Moscow-friendly US Congress, the soaring casualty rates among Vladimir Putin’s troops and the unbearable toll on Ukraine’s cities and economy. The rational takeaway from all this, that we are on the threshold of a pact to end the war, is unfortunately misleading.
确实有变化发生，不过欧洲需要迅速决定，在这场冲突的新阶段由谁为其发声。唐纳德·特朗普及其团队似乎终于意识到，欧洲必须参与其中，因为任何协议、以及普京愿意接受的任何安全保障，都必须应对他在发动战争时所追求的更宏大野心和关切。这从来不仅仅关乎乌克兰，还关乎俄罗斯在欧洲的控制与影响力野心。正如特朗普的特使之一贾里德·库什纳所认识到的，这将是一个漫长的过程——这很合克里姆林宫的意。
Something has indeed changed, though, and Europe needs to decide quickly who will speak for it in this new phase of the conflict. Donald Trump and his team seem at last to have realized that the continent must be involved because any deal, and any security guarantees that Putin will accept, must grapple with the larger ambitions and concerns for which he went to war. This was never just about Ukraine, but also Russia’s ambitions for control and influence in Europe. As Jared Kushner, one of Trump’s envoys to the talks has recognized, this will be a long process — and that suits the Kremlin well.
普京有一套获胜计划并坚持执行，因为它似乎比战争伊始以来他尝试的任何做法都更奏效。只有入侵战术发生了变化，这一转变可追溯至美国二月与伊朗开战、并开始消耗其稀缺的、单价数百万美元的“爱国者”防空拦截弹库存之时，基辅依赖这些拦截弹拦截弹道导弹。据估计，俄罗斯现在每月生产此类导弹多达200枚，创纪录新高，从而形成致命优势。
Putin has a plan for victory and he’s sticking with it, because it appears to be working better than anything he has tried since the first hours of the war. Only the tactics for his invasion have altered, a shift that can be traced back to the moment the US went to war with Iran in February and began burning through its stocks of the scarce, multimillion-dollar Patriot air-defense interceptors on which Kyiv relies to shoot down ballistic missiles. Russia is now estimated to produce those missiles at a record rate of up to 200 per month, creating a lethal advantage.
基辅无法防御这些强力武器，意味着俄罗斯的战略不再必须依赖其地面部队的成败。普京公开阐述的目标，是将乌克兰的基础设施和经济化为废墟。他不无理由地推算，随后将达成符合他条件的协议。
Kyiv’s inability to defend itself against these powerful weapons means that Russia’s strategy no longer has to rely on the success of its troops on the ground. Putin’s goal, as he has publicly spelled out, is to reduce Ukraine’s infrastructure and economy to rubble. Not unreasonably, he calculates, a deal on his terms will follow.
从莫斯科的角度来看，阿布扎比谈判——涉及囚犯交换、降级措施和安全结构的同时谈判——有助于让它在不招致更多国际压力和惩罚的情况下，推进其毁灭性战争。
From Moscow’s point of view, the Abu Dhabi negotiations — which involved simultaneous talks about prisoner swaps, de-escalation measures and security structures — are helpful in allowing it to pursue its war of destruction without incurring further international pressure and penalties.
乌克兰在这种情况下正在做它必须做的事，但乌克兰的命运现在掌握在欧洲手中。迄今为止，这个大陆展现出的韧性超过了普京或几乎任何人（包括我自己）在2022年2月所预期的。但由此实现的目标一致性还不够。现在，它需要以前所未有的方式行动并领导。
Ukraine is doing what it must in these circumstances, but its fate at this point is in Europe’s hands. So far, the continent has shown more spine than expected by Putin or pretty much anyone else (myself included) back in February 2022. But the unity of purpose this achieved is not enough. Now it needs to act, and lead, in ways it never has before.
首先是资金：根据欧盟委员会主席乌尔苏拉·冯德莱恩的说法，乌克兰明年的总预算缺口为700亿欧元（777亿美元），其中大部分资金将不得不来自欧洲。欧盟领导人正在考虑进一步提供450亿欧元贷款以填补大部分缺口，但围绕此事的国内政治只会变得更加困难——这是普京认为时间站在他一边的又一个原因。德国总理弗里德里希·梅茨威胁要阻止欧盟预算（以及随之而来的数十亿欧元资金，例如斯洛伐克亲俄总统罗伯特·菲科等人依赖的资金），这引起了不小的麻烦。但这是必须做的。
Money first: Ukraine has a total budget shortfall next year of €70 billion ($77.7 billion), according to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, and most of the funds to cover that will have to come from Europe. EU leaders are looking at a further €45 billion loan to cover a majority of the gap, but the domestic politics around this are only getting harder — another reason Putin believes time is on his side. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s threat to block the EUs budget (and with it the tens of billions in funding on which the likes of Slovakia’s pro-Russian President Robert Fico rely) cuts up rough. But that is what’s required.
其次，德国和其他国家需要联合起来，将被冻结的俄罗斯资产从比利时转移出去，比利时出于担心遭到莫斯科报复而阻止了这些资产的使用。这些资产必须被用来为乌克兰创造进一步的贷款。从道德和政治上讲，这是正确的举措，尤其是当替代方案是要求欧洲纳税人为普京的破坏买单时。
Second, Germany and others need to band together to move frozen Russian assets out of Belgium, which has blocked their use for fear of retribution from Moscow. These must be leveraged to create further loans for Ukraine. It is morally and politically the right move, especially when the alternative is to ask European taxpayers to foot the bill for Putin’s destruction.
接下来是防空问题。欧洲和基辅正试图发展自身能力，且已有承诺将在未来提供更多“爱国者”系统。在此之前，拯救乌克兰城市的唯一途径是摧毁俄罗斯境内的导弹发射装置和工厂。乌克兰正利用远程无人机群打击其能力所及的目标，但需要帮助——无论是秘密还是公开的——以攻克这些设施周围精心构建的防御体系。这并非针对俄罗斯轰炸平民及其生存手段的以牙还牙。这也不是欧洲与俄罗斯开战。这是协助乌克兰进行自卫。
Next, those air defenses. Europe and Kyiv are trying to develop their own capabilities, and there are promises of more Patriots down the line. Until then, the only way to save Ukraine’s cities is to destroy missile launchers and factories in Russia. Ukraine is reaching what it can with long-range drone swarms but it needs help — covert and overt — to overcome the elaborate defenses around these installations. This is not tit-for-tat over Russia’s bombing of civilians and their means to live. It is not Europe going to war with Russia. It is aiding Ukraine in its self-defense.
最后，欧洲需要一个一致且可信的声音。包括意大利总理梅洛尼在内的多位领导人指出，相互竞争、轮流登场的领导人自称代表旧世界在乌克兰问题上发声，这简直是不严肃的。人们会倾向于组建一个三巨头或类似的欧洲集体形象，这符合欧盟的惯常做法。但面对普京和特朗普这类人物，这几乎注定会失败，因为他们将其视为软弱。
Finally, Europe needs a consistent, credible voice. Several leaders, including Italy’s Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, have pointed out that the melee of competing, rotating leaders claiming to speak for the old world on Ukraine is simply unserious. The temptation will be to create a troika or some such collective European face, which is the EU’s wont. Yet this all but guarantees failure when dealing with the likes of Putin and Trump, who treat it as weakness.
同样，利用本应承担此职责却极少被允许或能够履行职责的欧盟机构这一想法也不妥。无意冒犯冯德莱恩和欧洲理事会主席科斯塔，但这不应由他们或其机构来承担。首先，美国和俄罗斯领导人都不尊重他们。其次，他们代表欧盟发声，而非代表包括英国在内的某些关键安全贡献国。
Likewise the idea of using the EU institutions that were designed for this job but have very rarely been allowed or able to execute it. With no insult intended to von der Leyen and European Council President Antonio Costa, this should not be done by them or their institutions. For one thing, neither the US nor the Russian leader respect them. For another, they speak for the EU but not for some vital security contributors, including the UK.
这是一个重要角色，应由一位现任欧洲领导人承担。这不能是“三大国”中的任何一个：法国极有可能很快由勒庞领导，其政党曾接受俄罗斯数百万欧元资助。梅尔茨也不行，他或许胜任此角色，但在国内立场太弱。英国的安迪·伯纳姆外交政策经验不足。
This is an important role that should be taken on by a current European leader. It cannot be any of the big three: France will likely soon be led by Marine Le Pen, whose party once took millions of euros in funding from Russia. It cannot be Merz, who might be good in the role but is too weak at home. The UK’s Andy Burnham has insufficient foreign policy experience.
幸运的是，有合适的候选人，包括梅洛尼，她在任期内已证明自己，并具备必要的果断。还有同样坚强务实的丹麦首相梅特·弗雷德里克森，她在为乌克兰寻找创造性解决方案方面处于领先地位，从战时重建港口城市米科拉伊夫，到设立丹麦乌克兰基金，从乌克兰制造商采购武器并直接运送到前线——这一机制已有其他捐助国加入。
Fortunately, there are good candidates, including Meloni, who has proved herself in office and has the necessary steel. Then there is the equally tough and pragmatic prime minister of Denmark, Mette Frederiksen, who has led in finding creative solutions for Ukraine, from wartime reconstruction in the port city of Mykolayiv to setting up the Danish Ukraine Fund to procure weapons from Ukrainian manufacturers and send them directly to the front — a mechanism that other donor nations have joined.
不过，芬兰的亚历山大·斯图布可能是头号人选，考虑到他国家与俄罗斯长期打交道的历史、共同边境以及保卫边境的军事实力。而且，他是特朗普的高尔夫伙伴，这也无妨。
Finland’s Alexander Stubb is probably the frontrunner, though, given his country’s long history of dealing with Russia, a shared border and the military heft to defend it. Nor does it hurt that he’s Trump’s golfing buddy.
这些合格候选人中谁获得这个职位并不那么重要，重要的是他们能尽快被选出。所有这些决定都需要在未来几周内做出，因为乌克兰的局势十分严峻，欧洲安全的前景也是如此。
It matters less which of these competent candidates gets the role than that they’re chosen quickly. All of these decisions need to be made in the coming weeks because Ukraine’s situation is dire, and with it the prospects for European security.