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明晟降级威胁暴露印尼裙带关系问题MSCI downgrade threat exposes Indonesia's patronage problem

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10月21日,一名男子走过雅加达印度尼西亚证券交易所外一块显示市场指数的电子屏幕。© 路透社A man walks past an electronic board displaying market indexes at the Indonesia Stock Exchange in Jakarta on Oct. 21. © Reuters

迪亚·普里塔德拉贾蒂(Dyah Pritadrajati)是悉尼洛伊研究所印太发展中心(Indo-Pacific Development Centre)的经济学家兼研究员。

Dyah Pritadrajati is an economist and research fellow at the Lowy Institute's Indo-Pacific Development Centre in Sydney.

1997至1998年的亚洲金融危机凸显了政治庇护在多大程度上腐蚀了印尼的资本配置。改革范围广泛,但该国许多最大的企业集团仍然保留着它们的政治联系。如今,在总统普拉博沃·苏比托(Prabowo Subianto)的领导下,国家将在投资过程中扮演越来越大的角色,而这反过来又可能会巩固这些政治联系。

The 1997-98 Asian financial crisis highlighted the extent to which political patronage had corrupted capital allocation in Indonesia. Reforms were extensive but many of the country's biggest conglomerates still had their political links. Now, under President Prabowo Subianto, the state is going to be playing an ever larger role in the investment process and that, in turn, will likely entrench those political links.

10月15日,全球指数提供商明晟(MSCI)提议将印尼从新兴市场降级为独立市场地位,理由是股权结构不透明、涉嫌协同交易以及对市场操纵的监管不力。该国将被归入与阿根廷、黎巴嫩和津巴布韦相同的类别,并将被排除在明晟的主要新兴市场和前沿市场指数之外。印尼股市在两个交易日内暴跌近15%,股票市值缩水约820亿美元。

On Oct. 15, global index provider MSCI proposed downgrading Indonesia from emerging market to standalone status on the grounds of opaque shareholding structures, suspected coordinated trading and poor enforcement against market manipulation.. The country would be placed in the same bracket as Argentina, Lebanon and Zimbabwe, and would be excluded from MSCI's main emerging and frontier market indices. Indonesian equities plunged almost 15% over two trading days, with the market value of the shares falling by some $82 billion.

印尼已经宣布了一系列监管措施,但明晟的担忧指向了历届改革努力根本未能解决的问题。

Indonesia has announced a raft of regulatory measures, but MSCI's concerns point to issues that successive reform efforts have simply failed to fix.

在亚洲金融危机之前,印尼有政治背景的企业集团严重负债于它们通常拥有控制权的银行。随着危机爆发,不良贷款堆积如山,国家最终在拯救银行系统的过程中买单了巨额费用。银行监管得到了改善,但这些企业集团在经济和政治上依然强大。它们的影响力如今已全面延伸至所有由政府合同、执照和特许权决定企业命运的行业。

Prior to the Asian financial crisis, Indonesia's politically connected conglomerates were heavily in debt to banks which they often controlled. As the crisis hit, the bad loans piled up and the state ended up picking up a huge portion of the bill in the rescue of the banking system. Banking supervision improved but the conglomerates remained powerful economically and politically. Their influence now extends across the board in all the sectors where government contracts, licenses and concessions determine the fortunes of businesses.

克里斯蒂安·洛伊茨(Christian Leuz,当时在沃顿商学院,现就职于芝加哥大学)和费利克斯·奥伯霍尔泽-吉(Felix Oberholzer-Gee,哈佛商学院)在2006年的一项研究发现,有政治背景的印度尼西亚企业不太可能通过海外证券市场筹集资金。失去政治联系的企业则更有可能走出国门筹集资金。政治联系为国际资本提供了一种替代方案,因为它们使企业能够避免本需承受的国际审查。

A 2006 study by Christian Leuz (then at the Wharton School, now the University of Chicago) and Felix Oberholzer-Gee (Harvard Business School) found that politically connected Indonesian firms were less likely to raise capital via overseas securities markets. Firms that had lost their political connections were more likely to go abroad to raise capital. Political connections provided an alternative to international capital in that they allowed the firm to avoid the international scrutiny that would otherwise be involved.

二十年过去了,这些研究结果依然非常契合现状。印度尼西亚希望深化资本市场并吸引更多外国投资,但更高的透明度也将暴露各控股股东的所有权结构和商业关系——其中许多股东几乎没有动力去改变现状。

Two decades on, the findings are still very much pertinent. Indonesia wants deeper capital markets and more foreign investment, but greater transparency would also reveal the ownership structures and business relationships of the various controlling shareholders -- many of which have little incentive to alter.

在普拉博沃上台之前,国家的经济足迹就已经十分庞大。国有企业在2022年持有9.789万亿印尼盾(合5400亿美元)的资产,约占当时国内生产总值的的一半,按资产计算,该国最大的五家银行中有四家是国有的。普拉博沃在这方面走得更远。Danantara主权财富基金于2025年成立,旨在将所有国有资产置于一个投资管理机构之下。2026年6月,政府出台了规定,要求战略大宗商品的出口须通过一家国有企业进行,同时允许在部长级别批准该规定的豁免。

The state's economic footprint was already massive prior to Prabowo's time in office. State-owned enterprises held assets of 9,789 trillion rupiah ($540 billion) in 2022, about half of gross domestic product at the time, and four of the country's five largest banks by assets are state owned. Prabowo has gone further in this regard. The Danantara sovereign wealth fund was created in 2025 to bring all state assets under one investment authority. In June 2026, the government introduced rules to route the export of strategic commodities through a state enterprise, with exemptions from that rule being permitted at the ministerial level.

6月11日,几名女性在雅加达走过印度尼西亚Danantara主权财富基金总部。

Women pass the headquarters of Indonesia's Danantara sovereign wealth fund in Jakarta on June 11.

更大的国家控制权也让部长们以及运营Danantara和其他国企的高管们,在谁能赢得合同、执照和出口豁免权方面拥有更多自由裁量权。然而,这些决定面临的监督却少之又少。经济合作与发展组织(OECD)2026年的廉洁评估发现,印度尼西亚在实践中仅满足了其游说透明度标准的11%(经合组织平均水平为38%)。目前没有公开记录表明谁在游说谁以及他们代表什么利益。对投资者而言,问题在于商业决策是否基于实力做出,以及识别优待措施有多容易。

Greater state control also gives ministers and the executives running Danantara and other state enterprises more discretion over who wins contracts, licenses and export exemptions. Yet those decisions face very little scrutiny. The OECD's 2026 integrity review found Indonesia met just 11% of its lobbying transparency criteria in practice (the OECD average is 38%). There is no public of who lobbies whom and what interests they represent. For the investor the issue is whether commercial decisions are being made on merit and how easy it is to spot preferential treatment.

10月16日,印度尼西亚金融服务管理局(OJK)宣布对与三家上市公司有关联的多方处以总计2.1万亿印尼盾的罚款:Dian Swastatika Sentosa(从事煤炭开采和能源业务,属于维查亚家族的金光集团);巴里托可再生能源公司(Barito Renewables Energy,地热发电);以及Petrindo Jaya Kreasi(煤炭开采)。后两家公司与亿万富翁巴拉约戈·庞格斯图(Prajogo Pangestu)有关,他曾作为前总统苏哈托的亲密盟友建立了自己的木业帝国。

On Oct. 16, the Indonesian Financial Services Authority (OJK) announced fines totaling 2.1 trillion rupiah on parties linked to three listed companies: Dian Swastatika Sentosa (coal mining and energy, part of the Widjaja family's Sinar Mas group); Barito Renewables Energy (geothermal power); and Petrindo Jaya Kreasi (coal mining). The latter two are associated with billionaire Prajogo Pangestu, who built his timber empire as a close associate of former President Suharto.

印尼金融服务管理局发现了涉及Dian Swastatika的股价操纵行为,以及巴里托可再生能源和Petrindo公开募股中隐瞒的关联。据称向公众发售的股票实际上已被分配给与控股股东有关联的各方。在10月19日提交给证券交易所的文件中,这三家公司均表示尊重印尼金融服务管理局的决定。这些调查结果并未指向任何政治干预,但确实引发了人们对印尼一些最具权势的商业集团监管水平的质疑。

OJK uncovered share price manipulation involving Dian Swastatika and concealed links in the public offerings of Barito Renewables and Petrindo. The shares purportedly offered to the public had in fact been allocated to parties linked to the controlling shareholders. In stock exchange filings on Oct. 19, all three companies said they respected OJK's decision. The findings do not point to any political interference but do raise questions about the level of oversight of some of Indonesia's most powerful business groups.

此类安排可能会虚增报告的流通股比例、掩盖实际所有权并扭曲价格发现。集中控制的好处大体上仍归私有,而市场治理受损的代价则由整个交易所承担,因为明晟(MSCI)的降级将引发由指数驱动的抛售——甚至会波及与违规行为毫无关系的那些公司。

Such arrangements can inflate the reported free float, hide actual ownership, and distort price discovery. The benefits of concentrated control remain largely private, while the costs of compromised market governance are borne across the exchange, as an MSCI downgrade would trigger index-driven selling -- even of companies which have nothing to do with the wrongdoing.

监管机构已经将最低公众持股量从百分之七点五提高了一倍至百分之十五,目前还在提议更严格的所有权披露要求。提高门槛的问题在于,如果关联方仍然拥有实际控制权,这样做就收效甚微。

Regulators have already doubled the minimum free float from 7.5% to 15% and are also proposing tighter ownership disclosure requirements. The problem with raising the threshold is that it achieves very little if the affiliates still have effective control.

预计摩根士丹利资本国际(MSCI)将在二零二七年六月前对印尼的市场分类做出决定。避免降级需要可信的执法,而不仅仅是出台新规。监管机构必须能够识别最终受益所有人并执行披露要求,包括针对最大型企业集团的披露要求。国家自身的投资决策、合同和特许权也需要受到更严格的审查。印尼在一九九八年后有效地改革了银行,但各大商业集团的政治影响力的持续时间要长得多。

MSCI is expected to make a decision on Indonesia's classification by June 2027. Avoiding a downgrade will require credible enforcement, not just new rules. Regulators must be able to identify ultimate beneficial owners and enforce disclosure requirements, including against the largest conglomerates. The state's own investment decisions, contracts, and concessions also need much greater scrutiny. Indonesia reformed its banks effectively after 1998, but the political influence of the major business groups has been much more enduring.

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