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南方构造板块的转变A Southern Tectonic Shift

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2026年11月3日,在得克萨斯州奥斯汀,民主党得州州长候选人吉娜·伊诺霍萨的选举之夜活动上,支持者们欢呼。Supporters cheer at an election night event for Democratic Texas gubernatorial candidate Gina Hinojosa, November 3, 2026, in Austin, Texas.

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本月中期选举中民主党的全面胜利令人印象深刻,或许更重要的是,其震中位于南方。2030年人口普查将重新分配各州的国会选区数量和选举人票数,民主党的大本营将看到其代表权和选举影响力萎缩,以至于即使在后工业化中西部的蓝墙各州实现全面胜利,也无法保证获得选举总统所需的270张选举人票。

If you’d like to receive our next issue in your mailbox, here. As impressive, and perhaps more important, than the overall Democratic sweep in this month’s midterm election was the location of its epicenter: the South. After the 2030 census reapportions the number of congressional districts and electoral votes that each state will be given, Democratic strongholds will see their representation and electoral clout shrink to the point that even a Democratic sweep of the blue-wall states of the postindustrial Midwest won’t be able to guarantee the 270 electoral votes needed to elect a president.

然而,今年的中期选举为民主党提供了一个非常出人意料的备选方案。通过在四个最大的南方州中的三个州——佐治亚州、北卡罗来纳州和德克萨斯州——实现全面胜利,民主党意识到自己偶然发现了一条通往全国政治权力的另一条路径。《前景》直达您的邮箱:超越噪音的深度进步派报道。

This year’s midterms, however, provided the Democrats with a very surprising Plan B. By sweeping the table in three of the four largest Southern states—Georgia, North Carolina, and Texas—Democrats realized they’d stumbled upon another route to national political power. The Prospect in your inbox Analysis that goes beyond the noise with in-depth, progressive reporting.

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可以肯定,这些胜利是当年特殊条件的产物:一位极不受欢迎的总统,他发动的不合理战争和随意实施的关税使数百万美国人的财务濒临崩溃,他的驱逐行动和金融腐败冒犯了同胞的道德感,而他在经济濒临崩溃时却忙于折腾华盛顿特区的纪念碑,这使他的不支持率达到了与理查德·尼克松最低点相媲美的程度。国会共和党人始终未能约束特朗普的恶劣愚蠢行为,这使他们的支持率甚至低于特朗普。

To be sure, these victories were products of the conditions peculiar to the year: a wildly unpopular president whose unjustifiable war and arbitrarily applied tariffs stretched millions of Americans’ finances to the breaking point, whose deportation raids and financial corruption offended his compatriots’ moral sensibilities, and whose fiddling with D.C. monuments while the economy burned saddled him with disapproval ratings that rivaled Richard Nixon’s lowest points. That the Republican Congress consistently failed to rein in Donald Trump’s malignant idiocies saddled them with approval ratings even lower than his.

在网络电视台的选民出口民调中,被问及国会是否对特朗普及其政府提供了可接受的制衡,高达71%的选民表示国会做得不够,而认为做得过多的仅有9%。

Asked in the networks’ exit poll if Congress had provided an acceptable level of checks and balances to Trump and his administration, a whopping 71 percent said they’d not done enough, against a paltry 9 percent who judged they’d done too much.

宾夕法尼亚大道两端的共和党人放弃处理国家事务,使该党在通常占优势的议题上失去了对民主党的优势。出口民调不仅显示选民更倾向于由民主党处理经济问题,而且在处理税收问题上,选民对民主党的评价甚至更高(40%的人偏好民主党,而38%的人选择共和党),税收向来是共和党的强项。此外,共和党通常向公众提出以突出民主党缺点的那些议题,今年却未能奏效。

The abdication of Republicans at both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue from attending to the country’s business has cost the party its edge over the Democrats on topics that Republicans usually dominate. Not only did the exit polls show that voters preferred to have the Democrats handle the economy, but they even gave Democrats higher marks on handling taxes (40 percent preferred the Democrats, while 38 percent went with the Republicans), a perennial GOP strong point. Moreover, the kinds of issues that Republicans generally put before the public to highlight the Democrats’ shortcomings simply didn’t this year.

被问及他们认为最重要的议题是什么时,选民首先提到的是经济(39%)和美国民主的现状(33%),仅有3%的人提到犯罪(参见:民主党对犯罪软弱)。

Asked what they considered the most important issue, voters led with the economy (39 percent) and the state of American democracy (33 percent), with a bare 3 percent citing crime (see: Democrats soft on).

还有那些专门打击反对特朗普地区的特朗普政策。拉美裔人口高度集中的州,如德克萨斯州,出现了大规模的共和党阵营流失,这不仅源于生活成本,也源于摧毁其家庭和社区的驱逐行动的代价。堪萨斯州和爱荷华州等农业州依赖拖拉机和卡车来塑造和运输货物,发现柴油价格高得令人望而却步,而特朗普的贸易战又削减了他们的出口市场。

Then there were the Trump policies that specifically afflicted the regions that turned against him. States with heavy concentrations of Latinos, like Texas, saw massive flight from the Republican column, powered not just by the cost of living but also by the costs of the deportation sweeps that had devastated their families and communities. Agricultural states, like Kansas and Iowa, which rely on tractors and trucks to shape and move their goods, found the price of diesel prohibitive, even as Trump’s trade wars curtailed their markets for exports.

佐治亚州和密西西比州等黑人选民比例高的南部州,在最高法院削弱《投票权法案》以及释放旨在削弱黑人政治权力和利益的党派性共和党选区划分后,出现了高比例的黑人投票率。

Southern states with high percentages of Black voters, like Georgia and Mississippi, saw high Black turnout in response to the Supreme Court’s gutting of the Voting Rights Act and its unleashing of partisan Republican gerrymandering intended to diminish Black political power and interests.

最后,从肯·帕克斯顿到维韦克·拉马斯瓦米,再到达琳·格雷厄姆,共和党要求选民支持一大群名副其实的怪人,而民主党则推出了一批引人注目,或者至少是正常的候选人。

Finally, from Ken Paxton to Vivek Ramaswamy to Darline Graham, the Republicans asked voters to support a bevy of certifiable lulus, while the Democrats ran a crop of compelling, or at least normal, candidates.

所以,是的,特朗普任期第六年有一些非常特定的原因,为民主党的浪潮铺平了道路。是的,其中一些转变可能与关税战和高昂的汽油价格直接相关的短暂现象。但在这些特殊性之下,特朗普在三个关键南部州带到表面的,还有人口和政治经济方面的深层变迁。德克萨斯州、佐治亚州和北卡罗来纳州之所以在政治上变得“紫色”,有更深层的原因,理解这些原因可以帮助民主党创建可能成为新政治多数派的东西。

So yes, there were reasons very particular to year six of the Trump presidency that set the table for the Democrats’ wave. And yes, some of those shifts may be short-lived phenomena connected directly to tariff wars and the high price of gas. But beneath these particularities, there were also tectonic shifts in the demographics and political economy of the three key Southern states that Trump brought to the surface. There are deeper reasons why Texas, Georgia, and North Carolina have become politically purple, and understanding them can help the Democrats create what might become a new political majority.

首先,这三个州越来越受大都市地区主导,居住着种族多元的专业人士,以及种族更为多元的服务业劳动者,还有来自邻近州和遥远国度的年轻新移民,以及随之而来的日益国际化的文化。休斯顿、达拉斯和奥斯汀在德克萨斯州符合所有这些标准,亚特兰大在佐治亚州也是如此,而夏洛特和研究三角区在北卡罗来纳州则扮演着类似的角色。

TO BEGIN WITH, ALL THREE ARE STATES increasingly dominated by metropolitan areas, populated by racially diverse professionals, even more racially diverse service-sector workers, young newcomers from neighboring states and distant lands, and the steadily more cosmopolitan cultures coming along with them. Houston, Dallas, and Austin meet all those criteria in Texas, as Atlanta does in Georgia, while Charlotte and the Research Triangle play a version of that role in North Carolina.

年轻人出于职业原因迁居于此,并寻找比东北部和太平洋沿岸更负担得起的住房。虽然德克萨斯州的边境社区是美国最古老、最安定、最传统的地区之一,但大多数拉丁裔移民居住在该州种族构成更为多元的大城市里。

Young people move there for career reasons and to find housing more affordable than it is in the Northeast and the Pacific Coast. While the border communities in Texas are among the most venerable, settled, and traditional of any American regions, most Latino immigrants live in the state’s considerably more heterogeneous big cities.

城市本质上就具有多样性,而且比郊区或农村地区更容易组织,因此城市往往倾向于社会自由主义以及运动的形成(无论是计划内还是自发的,持续一天还是长期的)。今年的选民出口民调显示,城市居民以72比27的比例投票支持民主党而非共和党,而59%的郊区居民投票支持民主党,小城镇和农村居民中只有41%这样做。佐治亚州、北卡罗来纳州和德克萨斯州现在已经足够城市化,连带着所有相关影响,因此民主党需要将其努力集中在这些州。

Diverse by their very nature, and easier terrains to organize in than suburban or rural areas, cities invariably tend toward social liberalism and the formation of movements (planned or spontaneous, daylong or permanent). This year’s exit polls tell us that city dwellers voted for Democrats over Republicans 72-27, while 59 percent of suburbanites voted for Democrats, and only 41 percent of small-town and rural residents did. Georgia, North Carolina, and Texas are now sufficiently urban, with all that entails, to require the Democrats to target their efforts there.

德克萨斯州拥有40张选举人团票,长期以来一直是现代共和党及更广泛的美国保守主义的支柱州。但该州不仅日益城市化和种族多元,而且也日益年轻化。德克萨斯人的中位年龄为36岁,除犹他州外,是全美最低的。

Texas, with its 40 Electoral College votes, has long been the anchor state of the modern Republican Party and American conservatism more generally. But it is not only increasingly urban and racially diverse; it’s also increasingly young. The median age of Texans is 36, the lowest of any state except Utah.

得克萨斯州出现民主党全面胜利,而美国南部第二大州佛罗里达州仍大体保持共和党阵营,原因之一是该州自身拉丁裔的反卡斯特罗、反社会主义、反民主党政治倾向,这些拉丁裔主要源自古巴和南美。此外,佛罗里达州居民的中位年龄为42.6岁,在全美排名第五高,仅次于缅因州、新罕布什尔州、佛蒙特州和西弗吉尼亚州,这些州的年轻人为寻找工作而外流。佛罗里达州并没有相应的年轻人外流现象,但长期以来,该州一直以老年人内流为特征。

One reason why Texas had a Democratic sweep, while the second-largest Southern state of Florida remained largely Republican, is the anti-Castro, anti-socialist, anti-Democratic politics of its own Latinos, chiefly of Cuban and South American extraction. But in addition, the median age of Floridians (42.6) is the fifth-oldest in the country behind Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, and West Virginia, states that young people leave in search of work. Florida doesn’t have an equivalent out-migration of the young; it has long been defined, though, by an in-migration of the old.

本月选举中,得克萨斯州参议院选举中45岁以下选民的比例为36%。佛罗里达州为25%。(全国为31%。)这一11个百分点的差异在65岁及以上选民中同样存在:得克萨斯州,该年龄段选民占参议院选举选民的30%;佛罗里达州,为41%。这些数字足以决定一个州的政治格局,因为年轻人通常比老年人投票更倾向自由派,尤其是当大学、托儿和住房等早期职业生涯及家庭组建成本变得高昂时。

In this month’s election, the share of voters in the Senate race under the age of 45 in Texas was 36 percent. In Florida, it was 25 percent. (Nationally, it was 31 percent.) That 11-percentage-point difference was also true for voters 65 and older: In Texas, they constituted 30 percent of the Senate-race voters; in Florida, 41 percent. These are numbers that can define a state’s politics, because the young generally vote more liberally than the old, and even more so when the early-career and family formation costs of college, child care, and housing become prohibitive.

在某些时期,各代人可以形成独特的政治群体,而当前正是如此。在得克萨斯州,11月,30岁以下选民中有79%投给了民主党参议院候选人;30至45岁之间,比例下降至66%;65岁及以上老年人中,仅有44%。在佛罗里达州,两个45岁以下年龄段的民主党得票率分别比得克萨斯州低约5个百分点,分别为74%和61%,但仍远高于佛罗里达州老年人的投票倾向,后者仅有41%的选票投给了民主党候选人。

At certain times, generations can be distinct political cohorts, and this is one of those times. In Texas, 79 percent of voters under 30 voted for the Democratic Senate candidate this November; between 30 and 45, the percentage drops to 66 percent, and among seniors 65 and older, only 44 percent. In Florida, the Democratic percentages for the two under-45 age groups were about 5 points lower than in Texas—74 percent and 61 percent, respectively—but they still were well left of Florida’s seniors, who gave just 41 percent of their votes to the Democrat.

许多民主党稳固州——加利福尼亚州、纽约州、伊利诺伊州、明尼苏达州、罗德岛州、俄勒冈州——在2030年人口普查后可能会失去选举人票和国会议席,而德克萨斯州预计将增加四个新席位,摇摆州佐治亚州、北卡罗来纳州和亚利桑那州各预计增加一个席位。目前,德克萨斯州、佐治亚州和北卡罗来纳州的选举人票合计为72张,而三个最民主党的“蓝墙”州(宾夕法尼亚州、密歇根州和威斯康星州)的选举人票合计为44张(2030年后可能为42张)。

While many anchor Democratic states—California, New York, Illinois, Minnesota, Rhode Island, Oregon—are poised to lose electoral votes and members of Congress after the 2030 census, Texas is projected to gain four new seats, while the purple states of Georgia, North Carolina, and Arizona are projected to each gain one. Right now, the combined electoral votes of Texas, Georgia, and North Carolina come to 72, while those of the three most Democratic blue-wall states (Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin) come to 44 (likely 42 after 2030).

随着南部主要城市因其他州的年轻人和外国移民的涌入而增长,民主党最好专门回应这些年轻的、决定选举走向的选民的经济关切:更高的工资、为零工工人规定法定的工资和福利标准、负担得起的大学和职业学校、建筑业就业创造(如果这些工作建造住房,可以满足多种需求),以及将医疗保险覆盖范围扩大到儿童和年轻成年人。这些政策都不能被指责为“觉醒”,其吸引力也绝不局限于自称自由派的人。

As the South’s major cities grow with in-migration of young people from other states and immigrants from other lands, Democrats would do well to specifically address the economic concerns of these young, majority-making voters: higher wages, legally mandated wage and benefit standards for gig workers, affordable colleges and trade schools, job creation in construction (which could serve multiple needs if those jobs built housing), and the extension of Medicare coverage to children and young adults. None of these policies can be accused of “wokeness,” nor is their appeal at all limited to self-designated liberals.

虽然11月的选举标志着选民明显向左转,但美国选民的意识形态自我定义并未向左转。出口民调发现,26%的选民自称自由派,41%自称温和派,33%自称保守派。美国人对这些术语的含义从来都不十分明确;多年来,这些术语似乎更多反映人们在文化问题上的立场,而非经济问题。这些受访者中,61%还表示,他们希望联邦政府在帮助美国人获得医疗保健方面发挥更大作用,这无疑是一种自由派和社会民主的立场。

WHILE NOVEMBER’S ELECTION MARKED a clear swing leftward by the electorate, the ideological self-definitions of American voters did not swing left. The exit polls found that 26 percent of voters called themselves liberal, 41 percent called themselves moderate, and 33 percent called themselves conservative. What Americans mean by these terms has never been all that clear; for many years, they’ve seemed to reflect people’s stances on cultural issues more than on economic ones. Sixty-one percent of these same respondents also said that they wanted the federal government to take a bigger role in helping Americans get health care, which is a liberal and social democratic position if ever there was one.

民主党的关键在于,对进步民粹主义经济政策的支持远远超出自由派群体,更不用说社会主义者了。在期中选举选民中,被问及美国经济是偏向富人,还是对所有人普遍公平时,70%的人表示偏向富人。民调并未追究这一评估的含义,但其他民调已明确显示,公众普遍支持对富人和企业征收更高税收,也支持限制其在政治和政策上主导地位的立法。

The point for Democrats is that the level of support for progressive populist economics extends well beyond the ranks of liberals, much less socialists. Asked whether the American economy favored the wealthy, or was generally fair to all, 70 percent of midterm election voters said it favored the wealthy. The exit poll didn’t pursue the implications of that assessment, but other polls have made clear both the widespread support for higher taxes on the wealthy and corporations, and for legislation that would curtail the domination they exert over politics and policies.

我很高兴报告说,蒙大拿州选民以压倒性优势(65比35)通过了一项倡议,要求该州修订公司章程,禁止公司参与或向政治竞选活动、当选官员、候选人和投票议案捐款——这将适用于在该州开展业务的所有公司,以及它们在其他所有州的活动。(当然,这项公民联合案的“后门废除”最终将走向最高法院。)而这项倡议正是由同一批选民通过的,他们当时将52%的选票投给了共和党众议院候选人。

I’m pleased to report that Montana voters passed by a wide margin (65-to-35) an initiative that requires the state to amend its corporate charters so that corporations would be forbidden to participate in or contribute to political campaigns, elected officials, candidates, and ballot measures—which would apply to all corporations doing business in the state and to their activities in every other state as well. (The status of this backdoor repeal of Citizens United will eventually wend its way to the Supreme Court, of course.) And it was enacted by the same electorate that was casting 52 percent of its vote for Republican House candidates.

民粹主义横跨几乎所有意识形态;确保民粹主义聚焦于进步的经济目标和目标,是左翼的任务,也是中左翼在能够被唤起时的任务。在德克萨斯州参议员当选人詹姆斯·塔拉里科的选举夜胜选演说中,他明确表示,他真正击败的对手不是肯·帕克顿,而是投入超过2亿美元击败他的富豪埃隆·马斯克。塔拉里科补充说,问题不只是马斯克;还有那些巨额投资于人工智能、毫不关心其对未来人类就业和人类生活意味着什么的亿万富翁,以及那些投资于购买政治和政府的人。

Populism cuts across nearly all ideologies; ensuring that populism focuses on progressive economic targets and goals is the task of the left and, when it can be roused, the center-left. In his election night victory speech, Texas Sen.-elect James Talarico made clear that the real opponent whom he’d defeated wasn’t poor Ken Paxton but rich Elon Musk, who’d sunk more than $200 million into beating him. Talarico added that the problem wasn’t just Musk; it was the billionaires investing huge sums into AI with no regard for what it means to the future of human employment and human life, and into the purchase of politics and government.

塔拉里科不一定是左翼人士,但他是一位清醒的自由派,意识到我们当今的寡头统治既威胁民主,也威胁我们的生计,并且他已经与一群与他持相同信念的公众建立了联系。

Talarico is not necessarily a man of the left, but he is a sentient liberal aware that our reigning plutocracy is a threat to both democracy and our livelihoods, and he has connected with a public that shares his belief.

在对特朗普及其一切所作所为的反对之下,在对我们新时代寡头的日益增长的愤怒之下,美国政治的板块正在日益城市化的南方发生移动。共和党的支柱州现在变得模糊的紫色,与佐治亚州和北卡罗来纳州一起,可能证明是美国政治格局的根本性变化。民主党人,请注意。本文刊登于2026年12月号。

Beneath the backlash against Trump and all his works, beneath even the growing rage at our new-age oligarchs, the tectonic plates of American politics are shifting in the increasingly urban South. The Republicans’ anchor state is now a fuzzy purple, joining Georgia and North Carolina in what may prove to be a fundamental change in the American political landscape. Democrats, take heed. This article appears in Dec 2026 issue.

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