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反对“宗教左派”的理由The Case Against a ‘Religious Left’

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詹姆斯·塔拉里科和亚当·汉密尔顿照片的明亮拼贴,配有几何图形和蓝天Bright collage of photos of James Talarico and Adam Hamilton with geometric shapes and a blue sky

上周,长老会神学院学生詹姆斯·塔拉里科和联合卫理公会牧师亚当·汉密尔顿分别在得克萨斯州和堪萨斯州参议院选举中获胜,这再次引发了人们对美国那个难以捉摸的宗教左派的关注。多年来,在那些怀有严肃基督教信仰的人看来,共和党一直是理所当然的选择。这些胜利提出了一种可能:公开谈论信仰或许能帮助民主党接触到新的选民,并成为其未来通往权力的一条可行路径。

The victories last week of the Presbyterian seminarian James Talarico and the United Methodist pastor Adam Hamilton in the Texas and Kansas Senate races prompted renewed attention to America’s elusive religious left. For years, Republicans have been the presumptive party for those with serious Christian convictions. These wins raise the possibility that talking openly about faith might be a way for Democrats to reach new voters, and a viable path to power going forward.

我是一名基督徒,常常希望美国政治能更好地体现信仰中的革命性元素,比如怜悯、宽恕和非暴力。但欢呼宗教左派的崛起还为时过早。更重要的是,如果政治倾向偏左的基督徒仅仅沦为民主党一个普通的投票集团,他们的影响力反而会被削弱。

I am a Christian and often wish that American politics better reflected the revolutionary elements of the faith, such as mercy, forgiveness, and nonviolence. But hailing the rise of a religious left is premature. More than that, Christians with left-leaning political tendencies would be diminished by becoming little more than a standard Democratic voting bloc.

塔拉里科和汉密尔顿并非首批赢得国会席位的民主党信仰领袖。在不久前的过去,拉斐尔·沃诺克在佐治亚州当选美国参议员,伊曼纽尔·克利弗和科里·布什在密苏里州当选美国众议员;这三人都是出自黑人基督教传统的牧师,而这一传统与左派政治有着长期的联系。如果说塔拉里科和汉密尔顿(以及艾奥瓦州的牧师莎拉·特罗恩·加里奥特和林赛·詹姆斯,两人都赢得了众议院席位)是宗教左派中引人注目的人物,部分原因在于他们是白人。

Talarico and Hamilton are not the first Democratic faith leaders to win seats in Congress. In the recent past, Raphael Warnock was elected U.S. senator in Georgia, and Emanuel Cleaver and Cori Bush were elected to the U.S. House in Missouri; all three are pastors from the Black Christian tradition, which has a long-standing relationship with politics on the left. If Talarico and Hamilton (along with the ministers Sarah Trone Garriott and Lindsay James in Iowa, who both won House seats) are remarkable figures on the religious left, it is in part because they are white.

他们还都翻转了共和党控制的选区。他们的成功引出的问题是:一种公开带有宗教色彩的民主党路线,是否可能拉走那些认真对待宗教、但过去一直不愿投票给民主党的选民?

They also all flipped red jurisdictions. The question raised by their success is whether an overtly religious Democratic approach might peel off voters who take religion seriously but have been wary of voting for Democrats in the past.

民主党在上周选举中全面大胜,这意味着目前仍不清楚汉密尔顿和塔拉里科在多大程度上是因为他们的宗教信息而获胜,还是因为选民对共和党的更广泛反弹。我们目前所知的情况表明,这种影响有限:根据美联社公布的一项民调,这两位候选人在各自州的白人福音派选民中分别获得约20%的选票;其余选民绝大多数支持共和党,这与福音派的基本投票模式相比没有显著偏离。

The fact that Democrats won so handily across the board in last week’s elections means that it’s still unclear to what extent Hamilton and Talarico prevailed because of their religious messaging versus a broader backlash to the GOP. What we know so far suggests that the effect was limited: According to a poll published by the Associated Press, the two candidates each earned about 20 percent of the white evangelical vote in their respective states; the rest overwhelmingly supported Republicans, representing no significant departure from baseline evangelical voting patterns.

对于任何希望出现一个新的宗教左翼的人来说,问题在于它没有一个天然的选民基础。专门研究宗教的政治学家和统计学家瑞安·伯奇指出,主流新教徒是左翼基督教情绪的天然蓄水池,而这一群体的人数正在迅速减少,目前仅占美国人的11%。伯奇还告诉我,长期数据显示,随着人们在政治上变得更加自由,他们往往会完全脱离宗教,这意味着民主党的投票基础可能会随着时间推移变得不那么宗教化。

The problem for anyone hoping for a new religious left is that there isn’t a natural constituency for it. Ryan Burge, a political scientist and statistician who specializes in religion, points out that the number of mainline Protestants, the natural reservoir of left Christian sentiment, is rapidly dwindling, representing just 11 percent of Americans today. Burge also told me that long-term data have shown that as people become more politically liberal, they tend to leave religion altogether, meaning that the Democratic voting base could continue to become less religious with time.

与此同时,年轻人比老一辈更不宗教化;2004年至2008年出生的人中只有36%、2000年至2003年出生的人中只有27%称宗教在他们生活中非常重要。

Young people, meanwhile, are less religious than older generations; only 36 percent of people born from 2004 to 2008 and 27 percent born from 2000 to 2003 describe religion as very important in their lives.

对于持左翼政治立场的基督徒来说,这种动态可能令人沮丧,因为它导致政治上的无权。但在某些方面,这也可能是一份礼物。只需看看宗教右翼,就能得到一个警示故事,了解当信徒与一个政党合作得过于紧密时会发生什么。福音派这一基督教传统已成为共和党获胜的关键,它与共和党的交织如此彻底,以至于有时很难确定是谁在为谁设定议程。这种宗教的世俗化和政治的神圣化,对宗教左翼来说将是一场诅咒。

For Christians with leftist politics, these dynamics can be frustrating because they result in political disempowerment. But that might also, in certain respects, be a gift. One need only look to the religious right for a cautionary tale about what happens when believers collaborate too closely with a political party. Evangelicalism, the Christian tradition that has become key to Republican victories, has grown so thoroughly entwined with the GOP that it can sometimes be difficult to determine who is setting the agenda for whom. That kind of secularization of religion and sacralizing of politics would be a curse for the religious left.

基督教左翼试图制衡基督教右翼的风险众多。民主党基督徒政客可能会发现自己为了顺应党的期望而淡化自己的基督教信仰。一旦政客们注意到赢得基督教左翼可以成为一种可行的选举策略,那么这些信徒就会被转化为单纯的民主党投票群体,用有针对性的信息和微小的回报来争取。民主党可能开始迎合基督徒,却毫不尊重使他们与众不同的东西——比如激进地优先考虑穷人、移民以及其他受压迫者的福祉——把他们视为达到目的的手段。反过来,基督徒选民可能会受到诱惑,为了服务于政党而放弃其宗教特性的独特方面。

The risks of a Christian left attempting to counterbalance the Christian right are numerous. Democratic Christian politicians might find themselves softening their Christian beliefs to comply with the party’s expectations. Once politicians noticed that winning the Christian left could become a viable electoral strategy, then those believers would be converted into a mere Democratic voting constituency to be wooed with targeted messaging and small rewards. The party might start pandering to Christians without any respect for the things that make them distinct—such as radically prioritizing the welfare of poor people, migrants, and those who are otherwise oppressed—viewing them as a means to an end. Christian voters, in turn, might be tempted to give up unique aspects of their religious character in service to the party.

那么,其他一些不体面的结果也会随之出现。候选人可能只是假装信教,就像唐纳德·特朗普有时自称的那样(例如,在华盛顿特区乔治·弗洛伊德抗议期间,他在一座教堂前举起一本圣经)。愤世嫉俗的政党精英可能会用轻浮的献礼来敷衍信徒——例如,白宫祈祷活动,很像特朗普最近与一些天主教神职人员的会面,其中一些人意识到自己被当作政治道具后,很快便抽身退开。

A number of other unseemly outcomes would then also be on the table. Candidates might merely pretend to be religious, as Donald Trump has sometimes claimed to be (for example, holding up a Bible in front of a church during the George Floyd protests in Washington, D.C.). Cynical party elites might patronize believers with frivolous offerings—for example, White House prayer events much like Trump’s recent meeting with a number of Catholic clergy, some of whom, realizing they had been used as political props, quickly backed away.

民主党人与基督徒之间新建立的联盟可能对基督徒帮助甚微,同时也无法为民主党人带来多少好处。基督教与公共生活中心主席、前奥巴马政府宗教外联官员迈克尔·韦尔告诉我,民主党人不应把塔拉里科和汉密尔顿当作招募未来候选人的模板,因为那很容易适得其反。“你能做的最糟糕的事情,就是试图过度地把这件事变成一种策略,”他说。“这些候选人的关键在于他们的真诚——在于他们不是由”党内官员“炮制出来的”这一事实。

A newfound alliance between Democrats and Christians might do little for Christians while also failing to do much for the Democrats. Michael Wear, the president of the Center for Christianity and Public Life and a former Obama-administration faith-outreach official, told me that Democrats should refrain from using Talarico and Hamilton as templates for recruiting future candidates, because that could easily backfire. “The worst thing that you could do is try to overly turn this into a strategy,” he said. “The thing about these candidates is the earnestness of them—the fact that they weren’t cooked up” by party officials.

左翼的基督徒从政者可以也应当坦率表明自己的信念,只是不要被民主党的优先议程所俘获。否则,他们就有可能把右翼那套脆弱的基督教政治换成左翼那套脆弱的基督教政治。选举后不久,圣公会作家蒂什·哈里森·沃伦写道,尽管她乐见塔拉里科获胜,但他倾向于把自己的基督教信仰过于整齐地塞进民主党政治之中,这让她反感,而共和党人在更大程度上也是如此。

Christian politicians on the left can and should be forthright about their convictions, just without being captured by Democratic Party priorities. Otherwise, they run the risk of trading the flimsy Christian politics of the right for flimsy Christian politics on the left. Shortly after the election, the Anglican author Tish Harrison Warren wrote that although she was glad that Talarico won, she had been put off by his tendency to fit his Christianity too neatly into his Democratic politics, as Republicans have to a greater degree. (Talarico declined, for instance, to support universal health care despite the obvious Christian reasons for extending healing to everyone, and instead advocated for what he termed “Medicare for Y’all,” a public option program more in keeping with policies pushed by mainstream Democrats.)

(例如,塔拉里科拒绝支持全民医保,尽管从基督教的角度看,把医治带给所有人有着显而易见的理由,他转而主张他所称的“全民联邦医疗保险”,这是一种更符合主流民主党人所推政策的公共选项方案。)沃伦说,耶稣不应成为一个穿着西装的美国政客,顺理成章地配合共和党的每一条指令。“如果宗教左翼把那个老一套的、穿西装的政客耶稣拿过来,只是把他的领带换成蓝色,那算不上什么伟大的胜利,”她写道。

Jesus, Warren said, should not be an American politician in a business suit, conveniently cooperating with every dictate of the Republican Party. “It is no great victory if the religious left takes the same old political Jesus in the suit and simply turns his tie blue,” she wrote.

“不同的政党。同样的偶像崇拜。”在我看来,基督徒应当对某些左翼政治立场持开放态度;这两种倾向的共同点远比人们通常以为的要多。同样,左翼也应当愿意把基督徒算作自己阵营中的一员,即便他们的优先事项与无宗教信仰的选民和政客不同。但信教者最好还是以怀疑的态度看待政治,并警惕当政治与宗教靠得太近时,政治对宗教施加的那种扭曲性的引力。归根结底,信徒的国度不属于这个世界。

“Different party. Same idolatry.”Christians should be open, in my view, to certain leftist political positions; the two tendencies share much more than is commonly assumed. Likewise, leftists should be open to counting Christians among their ranks, even when their priorities are different from those of nonreligious voters and politicians. But it also seems best for the faithful to entertain politics skeptically, and to beware of the warping gravitational pull that politics exerts upon religion when the two draw close. The believer’s kingdom is, in the end, not of this world.

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