
苏丹武装部队(SAF)本周在西科尔多凡州控制了几个战略要地的村庄和地区,使其在与对手准军事组织快速支援部队(RSF)的战争中占据上风。
The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) gained control over several strategically important villages and localities in west Kordofan this week, shifting the war against the rival paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in its favour.
据当地媒体报道,周五,苏丹军队控制了阿尔库韦。这是西科尔多凡州的主要城镇之一,也是军队在资源丰富的该州针对RSF的持续战役中的一个战略要地,该战役始于几周前。
On Friday, the Sudanese army took control of al-Khuwai, according to local media. This is one of the main towns in West Kordofan and a strategically important site in the army’s ongoing campaign against the RSF in the resource-rich state, which began several weeks ago.
迄今为止,SAF及其盟友达尔富尔部队的进攻已成功打破了RSF对北科尔多凡州首府阿尔奥拜德及周边地区的围困。
So far, the offensive by the SAF and allied Darfur forces has succeeded in breaking the RSF siege on al-Obeid, the capital of North Kordofan, and surrounding areas.
这也为苏丹中部和西南部的军队开辟了新路线,为SAF在南科尔多凡州的重大推进铺平了道路,一直延伸到巴布努萨以及通往北达尔富尔的通道,包括连接拥有金矿的阿尔努胡德和阿尔库韦的一条重要道路。
It has also opened up new routes for the army in central and southwest Sudan, paving the way for significant SAF advances in South Kordofan, all the way to Babnusa and the approaches to North Darfur, including an important road linking al-Nuhud, the site of gold mines, and al-Khuwai.
RSF及其据称的盟友——由阿卜杜勒阿齐兹·阿尔希卢领导的苏丹人民解放运动-北方——仍控制着阿尔努胡德和南科尔多凡州的部分地区。但其在苏丹南部和西部的近期失败可能会削弱该准军事组织在该地区争取部落团体支持的能力。
The RSF, alongside its alleged allies in the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North, led by Abdelaziz Al-Hilu, still holds al-Nuhud and parts of South Kordofan. But its recent defeats in southern and western Sudan could weaken the paramilitary’s ability to coopt tribal groups in the region.
“RSF从进攻转向防御将改变其军事构成,该构成建立在要求迅速获得部落支持的基础上,”独立苏丹分析人士穆罕默德·阿里向半岛电视台表示。
“The RSF’s shift from attack to defence will alter its military composition, which was built on demanding rapid tribal support,” Mohamed Ali, an independent Sudanese analyst, told Al Jazeera.
“科尔多凡地区不是RSF的社会据点,因此预计RSF将从该地区撤出,并将其部队重新部署到达尔富尔。这将使苏丹武装部队在科尔多凡地区获得战略优势,并可能使达尔富尔比预期更早成为冲突的新中心。”一名苏丹武装部队士兵在苏丹军队领导人访问乌姆杜尔曼期间拍摄,2025年10月 [N Mahmoud/半岛电视台] 部落结构 RSF的主要社会和部落支持基础位于达尔富尔南部和东部的阿拉伯社区,包括尼亚拉和埃尔-代因周边地区,以及与邻国接壤的边境地区。
“The Kordofan region is not a social stronghold for the RSF; therefore, it is expected to withdraw from the region and reposition its forces in Darfur. This would give the army a strategic advantage in Kordofan and could make Darfur the new epicentre of the conflict sooner than expected.”A Sudanese soldier in the Sudanese Armed Forces during a visit by the army leader in Omdurman, October 2025 [N Mahmoud/Al Jazeera] Tribal structures The RSF’s main social and tribal support base is among the Arab communities of south and east Darfur, including areas around Nyala and el-Daein, along with border areas with neighbouring countries.
苏丹军事问题专家穆希丁·穆罕默德表示,RSF严重依赖动员其控制地区的部落和平民。当准军事组织面临多线攻击且急需增援来守住防线时,情况尤其如此。
The RSF has relied heavily on mobilising tribes and civilians in areas under its control, said Mohiedeen Mohamed, an expert on Sudanese military affairs. This is particularly true when the paramilitary comes under attack from several fronts and reinforcements are desperately needed to hold the line.

但这种非正式联盟也容易受到战争局势变化的影响,随着苏丹武装部队取得进展,最近几周已有多个部落及其他群体脱离RSF。
But this informal coalition is also vulnerable to the changing circumstances in the war, with a number of tribal and other groups defecting from the RSF in recent weeks, as the SAF gains ground.
“当RSF扩张到科尔多凡地区的部分地区时,它与某些部落群体和当地社区建立了联盟,”穆罕默德对半岛电视台表示。
“When the RSF expanded into parts of the Kordofan region, it established alliances with certain tribal groups and local communities,” Mohamed told Al Jazeera.
“然而,这些联盟至少部分可以理解为由军事和政治必要性驱动的安排,而不一定反映长期的社会和历史融合。”人道主义危机 2019年前苏丹总统奥马尔·巴希尔垮台后,苏丹武装部队总司令阿卜杜勒·法塔赫·布尔汉将军与其前RSF盟友穆罕默德·哈姆丹·“赫梅蒂”·达加洛之间的权力斗争浮出水面,并于2023年4月发展成为双方之间的全国性冲突。
“However, these alliances can be understood, at least in part, as arrangements driven by military and political necessity, rather than necessarily reflecting the longstanding social and historical integration.”Humanitarian crisis After the downfall of former Sudan President Omar al-Bashir in 2019, a power struggle between General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan the head of the SAF, and his former ally in the RSF, Mohamed Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagalo emerged, developing into a nationwide conflict between the two sides in April 2023.
苏丹武装部队(SAF)与快速支援部队(RSF)之间的战斗导致了世界上最严重的人道主义危机之一,约15万人丧生,苏丹5300万人口中有超过1400万人在持续的战争中流离失所。
Fighting between the SAF and RSF has resulted in one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises, with about 150,000 people killed and more than 14 million of Sudan’s 53 million population displaced in the ongoing war.
随着苏丹武装部队在喀土穆及其他地区取得军事胜利,战斗重心已转移至偏远、贫困但石油资源丰富且战略地位重要的苏丹达尔富尔和科尔多凡省份。
Following SAF’s military successes in Khartoum and other areas, fighting has focused on the remote, impoverished but oil-rich and strategically important Sudanese provinces of Darfur and Kordofan.
2022年8月,尼罗河州,一名苏丹公民在苏丹武装部队周年纪念活动上 [N Mahmoud/Al Jazeera] 科尔多凡近期的战斗是围绕地理、经济资源以及连接苏丹中部地区与达尔富尔及更远地区补给线的更广泛斗争的一部分。
A Sudanese citizen at the Sudanese Armed Forces annual anniversary, River Nile state, August 2022 [N Mahmoud/Al Jazeera] The recent battles in Kordofan form part of a broader struggle over geography, economic resources, and supply routes connecting Sudan’s central regions with Darfur and beyond.
快速支援部队仍巩固着对达尔富尔所有五个州的控制,包括北达尔富尔首府法希尔,该市于2025年10月在经历残酷围困和血腥报复后落入快速支援部队之手,数千名平民被杀、遭酷刑、被拘留或遭强奸。联合国已将科尔多凡认定为苏丹冲突的震中,并表示该地区的战斗正在使本已严峻的人道主义局势更加复杂。
The RSF still consolidates control across all five states in Darfur, including el-Fasher, the capital of North Darfur, which fell to the RSF in October 2025 after a brutal siege and bloody reprisals that saw thousands of civilians killed, tortured, detained or raped The United Nations has identified Kordofan as the epicentre of Sudan’s conflict and said fighting in the area is complicating an already dire humanitarian situation.

持续的战斗已导致约450万平民逃往乍得、埃及、南苏丹及其他邻国。
Continued fighting has seen about 4.5 million civilians flee to Chad, Egypt, South Sudan, and other neighbouring countries.
平民在战争中付出了最高代价,无人机袭击平民及民用基础设施,包括住宅、学校、医疗设施、电厂和水厂。10月数天内,苏丹西部地区的无人机袭击造成约160人死亡。
Civilians are paying the highest price in the war, with drones targeting them and civilian infrastructure, including homes, schools, health facilities, power and water plants. About 160 people were killed in drone attacks over several days in October in western regions of Sudan.
消耗战 虽然双方均被指使用无人机,但分析人士认为,快速支援部队使用无人机是更广泛恐吓和经济破坏战略的一部分,旨在在政府控制区散布恐惧、瘫痪日常生活。
War of attrition While both sides have been accused of using drones, analysts see the RSF’s use of drones as part of a wider strategy of intimidation and economic disruption, aimed at spreading fear and paralysing daily life in government areas.
“然而,科尔多凡的军事平衡正在发生变化。苏丹武装部队日益增强的空中优势、大量使用无人机以及地面战术的改变,使其能够沿意想不到的路线推进,这一点从攻占库韦便可得到证明,”穆罕默德说。“这些发展显著降低了快速支援部队收复失地的机会。”由于安全局势恶化,该地区大多数人道主义援助行动已停止。
“However, the military balance in Kordofan is shifting. The SAF’s growing air superiority, extensive use of drones, and changing ground tactics have enabled advances along unexpected routes, as demonstrated by the capture of Al-Khuwei,” said Mohamed. “These developments significantly reduce the RSF’s chances of regaining lost territory.”Most humanitarian assistance operations in the region have halted due to the deteriorated security situation.
55岁的奥马尔·优素福是名为“塔萨米”的组织的援助物资运送司机,他说穿越家乡科尔多凡变得越来越危险。但他相信,如果苏丹武装部队在该地区的军事行动取得成功,人道主义和安全局势可能会改善。
Omer Yousif, 55, a driver who works in aid delivery for an organisation called Tasami, said travelling through his native Kordofan has become an increasingly dangerous task. But he believes the humanitarian and security situation might improve if the SAF campaign in the region is successful.
“尽管危险,我们仍前往科尔多凡地区的各个地方,因为我们想帮助我们的同胞。去年8月我被民兵俘虏并遭到殴打。我的一些同事遭受酷刑并被杀害,”他告诉半岛电视台。
“We were travelling to all of Kordofan region despite the danger because we wanted to help our people. I was captured last August by the militia and I was beaten. Some of my colleagues were tortured and killed,” he told Al Jazeera.
“将科尔多凡地区[夺回给苏丹武装部队]意味着可以向科尔多凡和达尔富尔两个地区运送更多援助。” 位于恩图曼的马尔希亚特军营的一名军官,10月20日摄 [N Mahmoud/Al Jazeera] 军事专家拉希德·穆罕默德告诉半岛电视台,苏丹武装部队在科尔多凡的攻势似乎在巩固其在苏丹中部的战果、并打通一条通往达尔富尔的新路线方面取得了一些成功。
“Restoring the Kordofan region [to the SAF] means more aid can be delivered to both Kordofan and Darfur region.”A military officer at al-Markhiyat military camp, Omdurman, October 20 [N Mahmoud/Al Jazeera] Al-Rasheed Mohamed, a military expert, told Al Jazeera the SAF offensive in Kordofan appears to have had some success in consolidating their gains in central Sudan, and opening a new route towards Darfur.

“当然,沿西部战略轴线的当前行动是更广泛军事战略的一部分,关乎收复全国控制权、恢复苏丹对其领土每一寸土地主权的总体计划,”他告诉半岛电视台。
“Of course, the current operations along the western strategic axis are part of a broader military strategy linked to the overall plan to reclaim control of the entire country and restore Sudan’s sovereignty over every inch of its territory,” he told Al Jazeera.
“虽然各战线的进展不尽相同,但总体战略目标保持不变——军队现在在这些战线上取得主动并向前推进,而RSF已被迫转入防御姿态。”边境地区对科尔多凡的控制还带来可观的经济和战略利益,该地区农产品丰富,包括芝麻、花生、洛神花和阿拉伯胶。
“Although the advances have varied across different fronts, the overarching strategic objective remains the same – the army is now advancing and taking the initiative across these fronts, while the RSF has been pushed into a defensive position.”Border areas Control of Kordofan also brings considerable economic and strategic benefits, with the region being rich in agricultural products, including sesame seeds, groundnuts, hibiscus and gum arabic.
该地区也是战略要地赫格利油田的所在地,赫格利油田是苏丹和南苏丹原油的重要加工与输送枢纽,同时还有黄金资源。
It is also home to the strategically important Heglig oilfield, a major oil processing and transit hub for Sudanese and South Sudanese crude, as well as gold.
“最终,恢复科尔多凡的国家控制和稳定不仅是领土或安全目标;它是关键的经济和国家主权优先事项,”苏丹大学经济学教授穆罕默德·阿尔-纳耶尔对《半岛电视台》表示。
“Ultimately, restoring state control and stability across Kordofan is not merely a territorial or security objective; it is a critical economic and national sovereignty priority,” Mohamed al-Nayer, a professor of economics at the University of Sudan, told Al Jazeera.
“这将使苏丹政府重新掌握自然资源,恢复出口,恢复石油生产,增加外汇收入,并为短期和长期的可持续经济复苏奠定基础。”科尔多凡靠近南苏丹,使其掌握关键的边境口岸、贸易路线、牧民走廊以及重要的石油基础设施。
“It would enable [the] Sudan [government] to regain control of its natural resources, revive exports, restore oil production, increase foreign currency revenues, and lay the foundations for sustainable economic recovery in the short and long term.”Kordofan’s proximity to South Sudan also gives it control over key border crossings, trade routes, pastoral corridors and critical oil infrastructure.
因此,谁掌控科尔多凡,谁就能获得对邻近南苏丹的显著经济杠杆和战略影响力。
Whoever controls Kordofan would thus gain significant economic leverage and strategic influence with neighbouring South Sudan.
“科尔多凡的稳定对南苏丹同样重要,南苏丹的石油出口依赖通过苏丹领土运往巴沙耶尔港,”阿尔-纳耶尔说。
“Kordofan’s stability is equally important to South Sudan, whose oil exports depend on transportation through Sudanese territory to Bashayer Port,” said al-Nayer.
“因此,两国在保障石油基础设施、保护边境地区以及恢复跨境贸易方面拥有共同的战略利益。”该地区的战略油田尤为重要,尤其是西科尔多凡的赫格利和巴利拉油田,这两大油田产出占苏丹石油的90%。对这些资源的控制也为与苏丹武装部队(SAF)关联的政府增添了国内外的意义和合法性。
“Both countries therefore share a strategic interest in securing oil infrastructure, protecting border areas, and restoring cross-border trade.”Of particular importance are the area’s strategic oil fields, particularly Heglig and Balila in West Kordofan, which produce 90% of Sudan’s oil. Control over these resources also grants the government linked to the SAF added national and international significance and legitimacy.
“确保这些油田并恢复石油产量将有助于减少苏丹对进口石油产品的依赖,增强公共收入,并支持经济复苏,” alNayer 补充道。
“Securing these fields and restoring oil production would help reduce Sudan’s dependence on imported petroleum products, strengthen public revenues, and support economic recovery,” alNayer added.